Lowercase sigmabot III (talk | contribs) m Archiving 1 discussion(s) to Wikipedia talk:Arbitration Committee/Noticeboard/Archive 29) (bot |
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"and asks for community input on how they would like to see the Subcommittee function in the future". I presume you're asking for said feedback here, and not at some other venue? If I'm wrong, that venue should be publicised in the announcement. --[[User:Dweller|Dweller]] ([[User talk:Dweller|talk]]) 12:04, 7 September 2015 (UTC) |
"and asks for community input on how they would like to see the Subcommittee function in the future". I presume you're asking for said feedback here, and not at some other venue? If I'm wrong, that venue should be publicised in the announcement. --[[User:Dweller|Dweller]] ([[User talk:Dweller|talk]]) 12:04, 7 September 2015 (UTC) |
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:Yes, please --[[User:Guerillero|<font color="#0b0080">Guerillero</font>]] | [[User_talk:Guerillero|<font color="green">Parlez Moi</font>]] 17:13, 7 September 2015 (UTC) |
:Yes, please --[[User:Guerillero|<font color="#0b0080">Guerillero</font>]] | [[User_talk:Guerillero|<font color="green">Parlez Moi</font>]] 17:13, 7 September 2015 (UTC) |
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I'm dropping back from inactivity to make this comment, but I'm still inactive so might not be able to respond. Sorry for the length! When I nominated to join AUSC as a community member I thought it would be a body which was able to set its own agenda and standard as separate from ArbCom, however the past year has shown me that almost the opposite is true. AUSC as a body is dependent on ArbCom who (IMHO) have shown little interest in providing muscle to AUSC's investigations (referring here to inactivity primarily) and to enforcing a high standard of functionary activity (except SPI block case). Given that I don't see a continuing purpose for the AUSC unless there are major reforms, primarily that it does not have arbitrators sitting on it (even if members are still appointed by ArbCom) and that it's decisions do not require ArbCom to decide what action to take but rather are [[Rubber stamp (politics)|rubber stamped]] by ArbCom (only if ArbCom still needs to remain involved, per global/WMF policy). Here are some points to support that: |
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*Risker mentions above "the last pro-active AUSC" was years ago, I disagree to some extent. Since 2014 I've been looking fairly regularly at functionary actions but as I've previously mentioned (after SPI block case I think) it's impossible to check a large enough number of them to have an effect, therefore the sub-committee has to rely on reports from functionaries and the community. |
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*My feeling, from the last year or so on AUSC, is that there is very little appetite among the community members and both sets of Committee members to act in a proactive manner by more rigorously setting and enforcing a standard. Rather AUSC tends to see things as within policy in good faith (or because the CU/OS thought it was) unless they are blatantly not, such as the WMF staffer inappropriately using OS (which isn't IMHO the primary purpose of AUSC). |
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*As was seen in the SPI block case AUSC tends to stick to a middle ground (although when the PD was posted it did seem pretty clear that we didn't have all the facts). That case also showed that ArbCom was running their own investigation anyway so the AUSC investigation was largely a waste of time. |
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*There have been a few times in the past year where I've thought a functionary's action was too far, outside best practice or outside of policy, or that the action taken by AUSC should have been stronger but I was in a minority of the sub-committee (see next dot point) so no action could be taken. |
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*It's also unclear how much evidence (and what type) is required to remove the tools or to warn or remind or whatever. That's because there isn't much precedent and it's not up to AUSC to determine how much evidence is necessary. Added to this, its unclear how much weight AUSC recommendations are given by ArbCom. If the authority to remove CU/OS rested with AUSC that would be easier to determine. Currently we have a situation where the body which does the investigation has to guess at what the Committee of that year sees as acceptable and what they don't. |
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*If AUSC believes there is tool abuse by an arbitrator it is almost impossible for the sub-committee to do anything concrete about it since we'd (AUSC) would need to report it to the Committee the arb is on and there really isn't a defined way for the Committee to remove the CU/OS from a sitting arb. So AUSC just concretes itself into the middle ground where they avoid making a decision (which is a fairly regular occurrence). |
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*I guess there is also an inbuilt preference not to do things AUSC can't do by itself. For example, AUSC can't remove the tools so they don't recommend it, instead they recommend a warning as they can do that themselves without needing an ArbCom vote (although that is debatable). |
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*Throughout the past year as a community member I've suggested that AUSC release statements of best practice (a suite of them following the SPI block case investigation) be released. That hasn't happened primarily because it was put off by some AUSC members and it was unclear who had the authority to release them - that majority of AUSC members, all six AUSC members, ArbCom, consensus of the functionaries or the community (as it would be creating policy). |
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*One example of AUSC not being able to do anything is something which should be simple. ArbCom procedure is crystal clear on required functionary activity levels however of the four (I think, maybe more) reports of functionaries not meeting activity requirements only once was (as far as I know) action taken (and that was the form of an initial email to the inactive functionaries). I gave up working out who was inactive and reporting it to ArbCom since nothing happened, and when I asked if AUSC could make the two attempts at contact it was met with silence. |
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I know I've made the same point more than once but hopefully I've found some different examples of what I'm talking about. From my point of view I can't see a purpose for AUSC in its current form and membership (including me, as we are all used to this version of the AUSC) as it is toothless and tends not to act (possibly because it can't do anything itself). To link to a previous comment, I primarily agree with Courcelles' [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia_talk%3AArbitration_Committee%2FNoticeboard&type=revision&diff=679527704&oldid=679526219 position above].<b>[[User:Callanecc|Callanecc]]</b> ([[User talk:Callanecc|talk]] • [[Special:Contributions/Callanecc|contribs]] • [[Special:Log/Callanecc|logs]]) 08:13, 8 September 2015 (UTC) |
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== Arbitration motion regarding [[Wikipedia:Arbitration/Requests/Case/Christianity and Sexuality|''Christianity and Sexuality'']] == |
== Arbitration motion regarding [[Wikipedia:Arbitration/Requests/Case/Christianity and Sexuality|''Christianity and Sexuality'']] == |
Revision as of 08:13, 8 September 2015
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Coat of Many Colours
Just curious, is there something publicly available about this decision, or was it handled in camera? BMK (talk) 21:47, 30 August 2015 (UTC)
- There is nothing public --Guerillero | Parlez Moi 00:09, 31 August 2015 (UTC)
Motion: Longevity
Motion: Activity
- Original announcement
- David Fuchs's and Ks0stm's OTRS access for oversight has been removed accordingly. Thanks for your service. Keegan (talk) 22:22, 31 August 2015 (UTC)
Arbitration motion regarding Argentine History
- L235, I think a link back to the user in question (or their talk page) would greatly improve the announcement. :) ☺ · Salvidrim! · ✉ 02:05, 1 September 2015 (UTC)
- @Salvidrim!: Done. (Usually we just copy the wikitext verbatim.) Thanks, L235 (t / c / ping in reply) 02:17, 1 September 2015 (UTC)
Motion: AUSC Extension
- Suggest that you correct the end date of the extension. There is no September 31. Risker (talk) 02:22, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- Thanks risker, Done --Guerillero | Parlez Moi 02:25, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- Also out of curiosity. Knowing how previous AUSC committee members reacted when their terms were extended (i.e., they weren't happy), what was the reaction of this year's AUSC members when they were asked? Can we assume that they all agreed, given the motion? Risker (talk) 02:27, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- As far as I'm aware (and I double checked), they were not asked. Courcelles (talk) 02:29, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- That's my understanding also. I was not aware when I voted that this was going to be posted without first asking them if they were willing to remain on the AUSC. GorillaWarfare (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 02:35, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- Now knowing this, will they be asked as a courtesy? Otherwise I would perhaps suggest that reforms be introduced after a new AUSC is put in place. Mkdwtalk 02:40, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- They need to be asked before we extend their terms. I would rather scrap the subcommittee entirely, but want to do so only after we're clear on who will handle issues that the AUSC currently addresses. I'd prefer have the discussion about potentially replacing the AUSC happen without appointing a new group entirely, though of course if consensus is in favor of continuing the AUSC, I will defer to that. GorillaWarfare (talk) 02:46, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- I have sent an apologetic email --Guerillero | Parlez Moi 02:49, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- Thankfully all three members were fine with the extension, although hopefully we can figure out a longer term solution as soon as possible. NativeForeigner Talk 14:17, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- Before the community can make an informed recommendation, we need to know how many requests were made to the AUSC this year, and how many of them were considered to be "in scope". Of those that were in scope, how many resulted in actions, recommendations, suggestions for improvement (either individually or to the applicable functionary group). The only one we know of publicly is that relating to a specific Arbcom case, and the AUSC's recommendation (to give a warning, essentially) was ignored by the Arbitration Committee. Risker (talk) 02:53, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- Yes, I have emailed AUSC asking for updated statistics to be published. However, it would help if a decision were made on the principle of the question first. No pattern applies to the frequency of complaints, nor do temporary fluctuations in the subcommittee's activity change the fundamental and theoretical question: if there should be independent scrutiny by the community of advanced permissions. AGK [•] 14:34, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- That isn't the fundamental question. The fundamental question is "is there value in having project-specific scrutiny of advanced permissions by a handful of community members". At this point, nobody has answered that question. There is already independent scrutiny through the Ombudsman Commission. Risker (talk) 05:51, 7 September 2015 (UTC)
The AUSC is pretty much an entirely useless body. The only power they actually have is to screen complaints about Cu/OS use and refer the ones having merit to Arbcom proper. And there just aren't many: the only matter of any significance this year was referred to them for an opinion by Arbcom itself, then they reported back to Arbcom (See the Sockpuppet Investigations Block case for how that worked).
Calling them "community seats" these days is utter nonsense, given that Arbcom appoints them. Arbitrators hold half the seats, so there's no independence whatsoever. Arbcom itself could handle the entirety of the complaints -- and actually reduce ArbCom's workload. The entire process to select the AUSC members takes up far more man-hours than the AUSC generates, especially since Arbcom gets the complaints that have merit anyhow (Most of the meritless complaints (which are most of them) are so lacking in merit they take a minimal amount of time to consider.)
The one thing I've noticed in my four years on it, is that the Oversight-l list is a far, far more effective body for reviewing the use of the OS tool than AUSC. Matters are resolved quickly, with vigorous discussion when they arise that often settles matters in a day or two. I wrote a proposal to formally transfer the review functions of the AUSC to the oversight-l list, where any arbitrator could escalate it if it was bad enough to, in their opinion, to warrant any form of disciplinary action or decision of best practices. There's no reason a checkuser-enwp couldn't do the same thing. There is always the Ombudsman Commission as a failsafe. Absent OC action, serious complaints will always end up at Arbcom unless a completely independent body is set up with the actual authority to remove the flags. What we're doing now is endless hours of bureaucracy that accomplishes nothing. And if such a body with actual power is desired, it would have to come from the community rather than by Arbcom fiat. Courcelles (talk) 03:04, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- It is entirely useless because when the committee created it, we curtailed its power out of a misplaced power hunger or fear of delegation. The body is ineffective because it has been improperly established. The real question is, do we want CU and OS to be scrutinised by the community? If so, AUSC needs the independence and authority it currently lacks. If not, it should be abolished. Which side do you fall on, Courcelles?
The alternative you suggest is an invitation to disaster. The functionaries should not oversee themselves, and there is no evidence whatsoever that the community would support an advanced permissions oligarchy.
I suggest we divest arbitrator membership from AUSC, elect its members directly, and amend ArbCom procedure so that we always delegate final decision-making to the auditors. AGK [•] 14:31, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- You acknowledge that what we have is useless, though. It at least paid some lip service to community oversight when the re were direct elections, but the 2010 ArbCom removed those for functionary selection. We need an oversight authority, but right now the only ones with the experience to do so are either the existing functionaries or Arbcom itself, and Arbcom is the body with the community mandate to make decisions about access to advanced permissions. The recent SPI Block case showed the strength of the functionaries and ArbCom to deal with abuse of the tools, and the utter uselessness of the AUSC. I can recall them making two recommendations to Arbcom, and both were acted contrary to the recommendation. Could we elect a body as you describe? Probably, though I think that would require a community consensus since global policy designates Arbcom as the appointing body of CU/OS without a community preference for another method. But, no, I don't think we necessarily need some separate body with the power to discipline holders of CU/OS flags, there isn't anywhere near enough work to make it anything other than a sinecure, and where are you expecting these candidates to come from? We have a hard time getting people to stand and do the work that already exists, be it at RFA, SPI, OTRS, etc. New committees proliferate the amount of seats needing to be filled, but it doesn't increase the number of people who care and are willing to go through the election process for a very low-duty work. Such people would spend many more hours on running for the seat than doing anything once in the seat. (So, yes, I want to abolish AUSC with absolutely no formal replacement, but see this as an increase in the quality of tool oversight.) Courcelles (talk) 19:53, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- I acknowledge it could be better and I propose we act to make it better – not that we act to disband the body altogether. The incremental, disjointed scope and authority of the body explains its unwillingness to get involved where you would expect it (e.g. OS handbook). Would you try to get involved if you'd be told to stop overstepping the limited job ArbCom gave you? Case in point: auditors raising complaints themselves is, in itself, a workaround to its stated purpose. The only real authority we have given to AUSC is to hear complaints brought by others.
We seem to have no trouble getting people to volunteer for the OC or ArbCom (albeit the former draws from other projects too), and in my judgement the shortage of AUSC volunteers is actually because those in the role cannot effect change – i.e. the role is unrewarding. Incidentally, I disagree with you that the current AUSC members are unfit for purpose. They are all experienced, reliable volunteers, and in any case the principle (there should be independent auditing) is just as important as the practice (whether any particular AUSC has passed findings with which you or I disagree).
Yes, the most recent high-profile audit was led by ArbCom and the functionaries. That doesn't mean it was right to sideline the community's auditors, and it simply speaks to my point that AUSC is useless because we have sidelined it, in practice and in the very procedures defining its role. AGK [•] 13:21, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
- I acknowledge it could be better and I propose we act to make it better – not that we act to disband the body altogether. The incremental, disjointed scope and authority of the body explains its unwillingness to get involved where you would expect it (e.g. OS handbook). Would you try to get involved if you'd be told to stop overstepping the limited job ArbCom gave you? Case in point: auditors raising complaints themselves is, in itself, a workaround to its stated purpose. The only real authority we have given to AUSC is to hear complaints brought by others.
- (ec) As the longest-serving community member, I thought I might have some insights worth sharing. AUSC was created at a difficult time for ArbCom when a significant portion of the community had lost faith in the Committee's ability to police functionaries and respond quickly to urgent matters. I was not privy to ArbCom's deliberations at the time, but I suspect those factors figured into the creation of a 6 person AUSC with 3 non-arbitrators. AUSC's mission was not well defined, and I think it's fair to say that AUSC has not attempted to expand or aggressively define the scope of its mandate. To that end, AUSC has not employed all of the means it might have to detect abuse and has mainly relied upon functionary self-reporting and user complaints to set its agenda. To Courcelle's point that AUSC is useless, I would agree that AUSC is useless if the goal is to quickly resolve complaints with a minimum of bureaucracy. I'm not sure that is the goal though. The community members, as originally envisioned, and even now with some members who do use the tools on a day-to-day basis, serve an independent function. They are designated persons whose job it is to make sure that ArbCom does not sweep complaints under the rug, either of the misconduct of its own members or of favored functionaries. That AUSC has not had to challenge a functionary or ArbCom cover-up is not evidence of its uselessness, but rather is evidence that functionaries almost always perform their work in a forthright manner and that cultural (Oversight-L) and administrative (ArbCom) norms serve as a check on misconduct or incompetence that may occur. This role could conceivably be replaced by the OC, and I realize my perception of AUSC as an en-wiki-centered body that is responsive to en-wiki norms is colored by my participation in it, but I'll leave it to others to contemplate alternative models. MBisanz talk 14:59, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
(e/c) Part of the issue is having a body, independent of the checkusers, with expertise in the custom and practice of checkusing (that is likely to create some balance in the checkuser's action up-front - eg, it's good the ctte doesn't have to discipline, but its presence is still likely to promote self-discipline n checkusers) - such independent expertise formation, is not likely to come from anywhere else. Alanscottwalker (talk) 15:07, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- What AUSC was envisioned to be back in 2009 (which was an investigatory body that would do a lot of the legwork to collect sufficient evidence to remove problematic CU and OS in a manner which would be accepted by the community, and to act as a watchdog) fell apart pretty quickly. It has become clear over the years that many in the community see AUSC as one of the most certain entryways into holding checkuser and oversight permissions, whether as CU or OS independently, or as members of arbcom. That's not necessarily bad - it gives those individuals a taste of what is involved and only those who find it really interesting will follow this path, and they do have additional experience and knowledge when they put themselves forward as CU/OS/Arbcom candidates. On the other hand, the last pro-active AUSC, one that actually looked at CU/OS activity and raised questions independently, was...in 2009-10. Its membership has not in any way advocated for any changes or improvements that relate to CU or OS (e.g., it has not participated despite requests in updating the Oversighter "handbook", it does not participate in any way in setting standards, it does not review the activity logs, and it is not even AUSC members who update the activity stats). In most years, there is one or maybe two active community members, and the rest are largely inactive; I can't remember the last pro-active AUSC member who was not an arbitrator. I may have at one point supported the AUSC being an elected community only body, if it had proven its worth as an oversight body. But after the Sockpuppet case, where they could not even steel themselves to recommend tool removal from a checkuser, and Arbcom had to do the right thing and take those tools away, I do not have faith in the AUSC to actually do what the community needs it to do. That case was brought because *checkusers* didn't think the behaviour was appropriate, and because *checkusers* knew that there was a pile of nonsense in that SPI.
A question to AGK: would he be satisfied with a community group separate of Arbcom removing tools from arbitrators? If so, on what basis can it be justified to continue automatically handing out OS and CU to arbitrators? Because that's all part of the same issue. Risker (talk) 15:39, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- That wouldn't be necessary. Arbitrators are already held to account in elections (or through their elected colleagues being able to recall them). The issues are not as intrinsically connected as you say, because it is only functionaries who operate without direct community supervision (or who would do if AUSC was disbanded). The nature of arbitrator CU/OS use differs very much from non-arbitrator use. AGK [•] 13:21, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
- Erm, no. It is the same thing. Abuse of the tools is abuse of the tools. If a newly elected arbitrator abuses the tools, the community has no opportunity to do anything about it for two years. In fact, the policy remains that arbitrators may retain the tools after their term ends, at which time they need to meet the same activity standards as other CU/OS. There are always a few arbitrators who do a significant number of non-arbcom checks, in particular. (Nobody's all that worried about suppressions, and the oversight team has long reviewed the actions of arbitrators in this area.) So are arbitrators going to be held to the same standards as non-arbitrators? Would this hypothetical New and Improved AUSC be able to remove tools from arbitrators? Risker (talk) 14:59, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
- So… it would be great if you read what I actually wrote. I'll simplify. Non-arbitrators would be held to account by elected auditors. Arbitrators by elected arbitrators. Or would it also be suboptimal that the elected auditors are only re-elected every year? What if there were 18 months between elections? 19?
Incidentally, contrary to your point there is no special extra supervision of arbitrators by the OS team. I have identical access rights and subscriptions to you, so unless there are there a hidden set of auditors this is incorrect. AGK [•] 21:38, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
- I did read it. So your proposal is that arbitrators are responsible for overseeing their peers for CU and OS, and the AUSC would oversee the rest of the CU/OS. Given that arbitrators make up 30% or more of the advanced permission holders (and some of them are amongst the more active CU/OS, at that), the AUSC would be hamstrung. No, either they're responsible for monitoring everybody or nobody. I don't see any value at all in treating arbitrators as special snowflakes when it comes to the use of these permissions, and I'm quite certain the community would agree with that. My opinion is that AUSC should be abolished, but if it is retained it should be responsible for making recommendations on *all* rights holders. That (despite efforts on several occasions) the AUSC through several iterations has steadfastly ignored the requests and the existing mandate to take responsibility for collating and posting tool usage reports, to audit tool usage logs, to recommend best practices...well, I know that Arbcoms in the past have encouraged it, and I assume that the same is true over the last few years since I left the committee. It does have a warrant for action, but it has never actually used it; not since 2009-10. Risker (talk) 05:51, 7 September 2015 (UTC)
- So… it would be great if you read what I actually wrote. I'll simplify. Non-arbitrators would be held to account by elected auditors. Arbitrators by elected arbitrators. Or would it also be suboptimal that the elected auditors are only re-elected every year? What if there were 18 months between elections? 19?
- Erm, no. It is the same thing. Abuse of the tools is abuse of the tools. If a newly elected arbitrator abuses the tools, the community has no opportunity to do anything about it for two years. In fact, the policy remains that arbitrators may retain the tools after their term ends, at which time they need to meet the same activity standards as other CU/OS. There are always a few arbitrators who do a significant number of non-arbcom checks, in particular. (Nobody's all that worried about suppressions, and the oversight team has long reviewed the actions of arbitrators in this area.) So are arbitrators going to be held to the same standards as non-arbitrators? Would this hypothetical New and Improved AUSC be able to remove tools from arbitrators? Risker (talk) 14:59, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
- You're actually making one of the points against the AUSC == the new appointees ae more often than not complete newbies to the operation and practices of CU/OS. This isn't say, (I'm not liking the AUSC/functionaries to police) a police internal affairs department, where all the officers appointed have years of experience doing the actual job, most of the auditors in recent memory had to learn the job while learning to provide a token level of oversight to the processes. Courcelles (talk) 19:07, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
- Well, no the analogy would be to a citizens review board not internal affairs. 'Who watches the watchers' goes back, at least, to Ancient Rome. Getting into the minutia of it is something they have at least agreed to do (and presumably have some interest in doing), and they have the position to do so -- if need be, they can raise the alarm and building in redundancies over the sensitive/technical is regularly done. Alanscottwalker (talk) 02:20, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
- One of the things an audit subcommittee can do is perform a regular audit on the use of checkuser and oversight.
- Of what would such an audit comprise?
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- A detailed report on the assignation and use of the tools.
- An investigation into complaints, looking for other examples of the same behaviour.
- Checking the documentation of sample oversight and checkuser uses to confirm that there was no CoI, that policy and procedure were followed, and that correct logging of reasons was employed.
- This would increase confidence in functionaries. It would also mean that people would be happier raising abuses, knowing that they would be taken seriously. For example I saw a minor (and probably unintentional) checkuser abuse recently, I didn't bother mentioning it, because previous response has been a combination of circling the wagons, and WP:IDIDN'THEARTHAT. If I could trust AUSC to respond if the functionary didn't then I would think these minor abuses worth dealing with. In my experience minor abuse leads to major abuse after a while.
- In addition there is scope for improving the checkuser tool to improve transparency and accountability, as I outlined previously. Recommendations from the AUSC would carry some weight with WMF.
- All the best: Rich Farmbrough, 19:23, 6 September 2015 (UTC).
Part of the problem is that per the m:CU and m:OS global policies, stewards will only accept removal requests from ArbCom or a vote from the community. I do not believe they would accept an AUSC request as AUSC does not fall into either of those categories. --Rschen7754 22:27, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
- That would seem like the stewards making up rules. m:CU states that "ArbCom can decide on the removal of access". Can being presumably distinguished from must. And AUSC derives its authority, on enwiki, from ArbCom; under the arbitration policy ArbCom may delegate its authority to another body, which from then acts on behalf of the committee itself. The stewards would presumably not wish to override local policy decisions, especially without a clear basis in global policy.
Should the WMF/Meta expressly assert otherwise, ArbCom can always rubber stamp the removal of permissions. AGK [•] 22:39, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
- On the contrary, this would be making up rules as well; since AUSC or other groups not representative of the rest of the community are not explicitly given the ability to remove CU or OS, the stewards would decline such a request. Stewards also do not recognize the arbitration policy, and tend to err on the side of being conservative especially with policies involving privacy (i.e. not allowing for the regranting of resigned CU/OS permissions unless explicitly authorized by local ArbCom or local policy). --Rschen7754 22:48, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
- Bottom line, there is no provision at all in global policy (which cannot be overridden by local policy) for Arbcom to delegate removal of permissions (or, for that matter, granting of permissions) to any other group excepting the community as a whole. AUSC, no matter what configuration is chosen, is not the community, even if it is made up solely of community members. That is, incidentally, why it is set up the way it is. Global CU and OS policy has not had any significant changes since the AUSC was created. Not even the Ombudsman Commission can require that someone have CU or OS permissions removed; they make a recommendation to the Board of Trustees. Arbcom has always had the option of simply rubber-stamping the AUSC's recommendations, and to my knowledge that's pretty much what it has done, most of the time - except in the most recent case, where it overruled the AUSC and opted for significantly more serious sanctions. (I agreed with Arbcom's decision, which is no surprise since I brought the case.) So you are pretty much left with either disbanding the AUSC or leaving it as status quo (i.e., without direct power but only recommending action to the Arbitration Committee). Of the two, I'd rather see it disbanded. Instead of running for AUSC, those candidates can be considered for CU or OS directly. Risker (talk) 05:51, 7 September 2015 (UTC)
- The AUSC was created because a significant portion of the community had lost faith in the Committee's ability to police functionaries; that is why it included appointees. A series of bad decisions taken on political grounds undermined faith in both ArbCom and the way it is constituted. At the same time ArbCom claimed that it was far too busy with CU work to perform the role that it was actually elected to do. Now arbs are claiming that there is actually very little work in it and they could do it. In the minds of many, rolling back this first tentative step at reform by disbanding AUSC will only confirm what they think they already know: that ArbCom is at best incompetent and at worst corrupt. Hawkeye7 (talk) 10:37, 7 September 2015 (UTC)
"and asks for community input on how they would like to see the Subcommittee function in the future". I presume you're asking for said feedback here, and not at some other venue? If I'm wrong, that venue should be publicised in the announcement. --Dweller (talk) 12:04, 7 September 2015 (UTC)
- Yes, please --Guerillero | Parlez Moi 17:13, 7 September 2015 (UTC)
I'm dropping back from inactivity to make this comment, but I'm still inactive so might not be able to respond. Sorry for the length! When I nominated to join AUSC as a community member I thought it would be a body which was able to set its own agenda and standard as separate from ArbCom, however the past year has shown me that almost the opposite is true. AUSC as a body is dependent on ArbCom who (IMHO) have shown little interest in providing muscle to AUSC's investigations (referring here to inactivity primarily) and to enforcing a high standard of functionary activity (except SPI block case). Given that I don't see a continuing purpose for the AUSC unless there are major reforms, primarily that it does not have arbitrators sitting on it (even if members are still appointed by ArbCom) and that it's decisions do not require ArbCom to decide what action to take but rather are rubber stamped by ArbCom (only if ArbCom still needs to remain involved, per global/WMF policy). Here are some points to support that:
- Risker mentions above "the last pro-active AUSC" was years ago, I disagree to some extent. Since 2014 I've been looking fairly regularly at functionary actions but as I've previously mentioned (after SPI block case I think) it's impossible to check a large enough number of them to have an effect, therefore the sub-committee has to rely on reports from functionaries and the community.
- My feeling, from the last year or so on AUSC, is that there is very little appetite among the community members and both sets of Committee members to act in a proactive manner by more rigorously setting and enforcing a standard. Rather AUSC tends to see things as within policy in good faith (or because the CU/OS thought it was) unless they are blatantly not, such as the WMF staffer inappropriately using OS (which isn't IMHO the primary purpose of AUSC).
- As was seen in the SPI block case AUSC tends to stick to a middle ground (although when the PD was posted it did seem pretty clear that we didn't have all the facts). That case also showed that ArbCom was running their own investigation anyway so the AUSC investigation was largely a waste of time.
- There have been a few times in the past year where I've thought a functionary's action was too far, outside best practice or outside of policy, or that the action taken by AUSC should have been stronger but I was in a minority of the sub-committee (see next dot point) so no action could be taken.
- It's also unclear how much evidence (and what type) is required to remove the tools or to warn or remind or whatever. That's because there isn't much precedent and it's not up to AUSC to determine how much evidence is necessary. Added to this, its unclear how much weight AUSC recommendations are given by ArbCom. If the authority to remove CU/OS rested with AUSC that would be easier to determine. Currently we have a situation where the body which does the investigation has to guess at what the Committee of that year sees as acceptable and what they don't.
- If AUSC believes there is tool abuse by an arbitrator it is almost impossible for the sub-committee to do anything concrete about it since we'd (AUSC) would need to report it to the Committee the arb is on and there really isn't a defined way for the Committee to remove the CU/OS from a sitting arb. So AUSC just concretes itself into the middle ground where they avoid making a decision (which is a fairly regular occurrence).
- I guess there is also an inbuilt preference not to do things AUSC can't do by itself. For example, AUSC can't remove the tools so they don't recommend it, instead they recommend a warning as they can do that themselves without needing an ArbCom vote (although that is debatable).
- Throughout the past year as a community member I've suggested that AUSC release statements of best practice (a suite of them following the SPI block case investigation) be released. That hasn't happened primarily because it was put off by some AUSC members and it was unclear who had the authority to release them - that majority of AUSC members, all six AUSC members, ArbCom, consensus of the functionaries or the community (as it would be creating policy).
- One example of AUSC not being able to do anything is something which should be simple. ArbCom procedure is crystal clear on required functionary activity levels however of the four (I think, maybe more) reports of functionaries not meeting activity requirements only once was (as far as I know) action taken (and that was the form of an initial email to the inactive functionaries). I gave up working out who was inactive and reporting it to ArbCom since nothing happened, and when I asked if AUSC could make the two attempts at contact it was met with silence.
I know I've made the same point more than once but hopefully I've found some different examples of what I'm talking about. From my point of view I can't see a purpose for AUSC in its current form and membership (including me, as we are all used to this version of the AUSC) as it is toothless and tends not to act (possibly because it can't do anything itself). To link to a previous comment, I primarily agree with Courcelles' position above.Callanecc (talk • contribs • logs) 08:13, 8 September 2015 (UTC)