m Signing comment by 108.205.228.188 - "→new: " |
108.205.228.188 (talk) →Pinto:: new section |
||
Line 178: | Line 178: | ||
*Development time isn't 22 months. June 67 to first production Aug 70. 38 months, only 5 less than normal. |
*Development time isn't 22 months. June 67 to first production Aug 70. 38 months, only 5 less than normal. |
||
*Initial fuel standard (1967) was for front impact only. In Jan 1969, 18 months after development had started NHTSA proposed added rear impacts to Standard 301 (cedEng, sec 2.3). Since Pintos were not available Ford used mock ups and changed the Pinto design based on the testing. In Aug 70 the proposal was changed to be more stringent with an 18 month lead time. 30 MPH was the long term goal. Ford voluntarily adopted the 20 mph moving standard for 73 and later cars, the only automaker to do so. (Lee, Edmann) <small class="autosigned">— Preceding [[Wikipedia:Signatures|unsigned]] comment added by [[Special:Contributions/108.205.228.188|108.205.228.188]] ([[User talk:108.205.228.188|talk]]) 04:31, 21 February 2016 (UTC)</small><!-- Template:Unsigned IP --> <!--Autosigned by SineBot--> |
*Initial fuel standard (1967) was for front impact only. In Jan 1969, 18 months after development had started NHTSA proposed added rear impacts to Standard 301 (cedEng, sec 2.3). Since Pintos were not available Ford used mock ups and changed the Pinto design based on the testing. In Aug 70 the proposal was changed to be more stringent with an 18 month lead time. 30 MPH was the long term goal. Ford voluntarily adopted the 20 mph moving standard for 73 and later cars, the only automaker to do so. (Lee, Edmann) <small class="autosigned">— Preceding [[Wikipedia:Signatures|unsigned]] comment added by [[Special:Contributions/108.205.228.188|108.205.228.188]] ([[User talk:108.205.228.188|talk]]) 04:31, 21 February 2016 (UTC)</small><!-- Template:Unsigned IP --> <!--Autosigned by SineBot--> |
||
== Pinto: == |
|||
== Fuel System Safety Controversy == |
|||
=== Media Attention === |
|||
''[[Mother Jones (magazine)|Mother Jones]]'' magazine obtained Ford's cost-benefit analysis document. In September, 1977 ''Mother Jones'' magazine said that Ford was aware of the tank's design flaw, was unwilling to pay for a redesign, and decided it would be cheaper to pay off possible lawsuits. The document became known as ''Ford's Pinto Memo''.<ref name="mother">{{cite web |title=Pinto Madness |work=[[Mother Jones (magazine)|Mother Jones]] |first=Mark |last=Dowie |date=September 1977 |url=http://motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness |accessdate= January 17, 2014}}</ref> On August 10, 1977, consumer advocate [[Ralph Nader]] and the author of the ''Mother Jones'' article held a news conference on the dangers of the Pinto design flaws.<ref>{{harvnb|Dardis|Zent|1982}}: On August 10, 1977, Ralph Nader and Mark Dowie held a press conference to notify the public that unnecessary deaths and injuries were being suffered as a result of the faulty design of the pre-1977 model year Pinto.</ref> |
|||
=== NHTSA investigations and Recall === |
|||
In April, 1974, the [[Center for Auto Safety]] petitioned the [[National Highway Traffic Safety Administration]] (NHTSA) to recall Ford Pintos to address fuel system design defects after reports from attorneys of three deaths and four serious injuries in rear-end collisions at moderate speeds.<ref>{{cite book |title=Business Ethics: A Stakeholder and Issues Management Approach |first=Joseph W. |last=Weiss |publisher=[[Berrett-Koehler Publishers]] |year=2014 |isbn=9781626561410}}</ref> |
|||
The next day, August 11, 1977, the NHTSA initiated an investigation.<ref>{{harvnb|Dardis|Zent|1982}}: On August 11, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began an investigation of the claims.</ref> |
|||
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ultimately directed Ford to recall the Pinto. Initially, the NHTSA did not feel there was sufficient evidence to demand a recall due to incidents of fire. 27 deaths were attributed to Pinto fires (the same number of deaths attributed to a Pinto transmission problem{{clarify|date=March 2016}}) and in 1974 the NHTSA ruled that the Pinto had no "recallable" problem.<ref name=L&E>{{cite journal |title=Pinto "Madness," a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis |first1=M.T. |last1=Lee |first2=M.D. |last2=Ermann |journal=Social Problems |volume=46 |number=1 |date=Feb 1999}}</ref> |
|||
On May 8, 1978 the NHTSA informed Ford of their determination that the Pinto fuel system was defective.<ref>{{harvnb|Stuart|1980}}: In the Pinto case, the highway safety agency made an ''initial determination'' in May 1978 that a defect existed in the fuel tank system.</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1978}}: But NHTSA, a Department of Transportation agency, informed Ford on May 8 about results of the new investigation, which concluded that Pintos had a safety defect.</ref> The NHTSA concluded |
|||
<blockquote>1971-1976 Ford Pintos have experienced moderate speed, rear-end collisions that have resulted in fuel tank damage, fuel leakage, and fire occurrences that have resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries...The fuel tank design and structural characteristics of the 1975-1976 Mercury Bobcat which render it identical to contemporary Pinto vehicles, also render it subject to like consequences in rear impact collisions.<ref>{{harvnb|Dardis|Zent|1982}}: In May 1978, NHTSA determined that pre-1977 model year Ford Pintos were subject to "fuel tank damage, Fuel leakage and fire occurrences which had resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries" when impacted at "moderate speeds," and that the "fire threshold" in those vehicles was reached at closing speeds of 30-35 MPH.</ref><ref>{{cite report |title=Investigative Report: Alleged Fuel Tank and Filler Neck Damage in Rear-end Collisions of Subcompact Cars Passenger Cars, 1971-1976 Ford Pinto, 1975-1976 Mercury Bobcat |publisher=Office of Defects Investigation, [[National Highway Traffic Safety Administration]] |date=May 1978 |url=http://www.autosafety.org/sites/default/files/ODIPinto.pdf |accessdate=March 5, 2016 |quote=Based upon the information either developed or acquired during this investigation, the following conlcusions have been reached: 1971-1976 Ford Pintos have experienced moderate speed, rear-end collisions that have resulted in fuel tank damage, fuel leakage, and fire occurrences that have resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries.}}</ref></blockquote> |
|||
NHTSA scheduled a public hearing for June, 1978, and NHTSA negotiated with Ford on the recall.<ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1978}}: A spokesman for NHTSA said that his agency and Ford began a "process of negotiation" after May 8 that led to Ford's announcement in Detroit yesterday.</ref> |
|||
On June 9, 1978, days before the NHTSA was to issue Ford a formal recall order, Ford recalled 1.5 million Ford Pintos and Mercury Bobcats, one of the largest recalls in automotive history at the time.<ref>{{harvnb|Stuart|1980}}: Days before a formal recall order was to be issued by the Government, Ford voluntarily recalled more than a million Pintos for modifications of the fuel tank system.</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1978}}: Ford Motor Co. yesterday recalled 1.5 million Pinto and Mercury Bobcat cars, to make alterations that will reduce the risk of fuel tank fires in rear-end accidents...Yesterday's recall, one of the largest in automotive history, was not the first involving the Pinto...</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=1971-1976 Pinto and 1975-1976 Bobcat Fuel Systems (Except Station Wagons) Campaign no. 293 |url=http://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/uploads/import/Pinto%20Recall.pdf |publisher=[[Ford Motor Company]], Office of Automotive Safety |first=J. C. |last=Eckhold |date=June 15, 1978 |accessdate=March 5, 2016}}</ref> Ford's recall provided a plastic protective shield to be dealer-installed between the fuel tank and the differential bolts, another to deflect contact with the right-rear shock absorber, and a new fuel-tank filler neck that extended deeper into the tank and was more resistant to breaking off in a rear-end collision.<ref name="birth"/><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/results.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE&year=1975&make=FORD&model=PINTO&component_id=0&TYPENUM=1&summary=true |title=NHTSA Recalls for the 1975 Ford Pinto}}</ref> Ford disagreed with the NHTSA finding of defect, and said the recall was to "end public concern that has resulted from criticism of the fuel systems in these vehicles."<ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1978}}: In a prepared statement, Ford vice President Herbet L. Misch said: "Ford informed NHTSA that it does not agree with the agency's initial determination of May 8 that an unreasonable risk of safety is involved in the design of these cars..." Misch said Ford decided to offer the modifications "so as to end public concern that has resulted from criticism of the fuel systems in these vehicles".</ref> |
|||
*** bad info, kill it *** |
|||
After the recall, but before parts were made available, six more people died in Pinto fires.<ref>{{harvnb|Center for Auto Safety|2009}}: Recall notices were mailed in September, 1978 and parts were to be at all dealers by September 15, 1978. However, between June 9, 1978, and the date when parts were available to repair the estimated 2.2 million vehicles, six people died in Pinto fires after a rear impact.</ref><ref name=nbc20130618>{{cite news |agency=[[NBC News]] |url=http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/18/19024405-take-that-back-famous-recalls-from-tylenol-to-toyota |date=June 18, 2013 |accessdate=March 5, 2016 |first=Gillian |last=Spear |title=Take that back: Famous recalls, from Tylenol to Toyota |quote=Three people died before the recall and six died in Pinto fires during the time following the recall but before the parts to repair the vehicle were made available.}}</ref> |
|||
*****Trival, kill it****** |
|||
The recall was included in ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine's 2009 top ten product recalls, ''[[Popular Mechanics]]'' magazine's 2010 five most notorious recalls of all time, and [[NBC News]]' 2013 twelve famous recalls.<ref name=nbc20130618/><ref name=time20090702>{{cite news |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |title=Top 10 Product Recalls |url=http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1908719_1908717_1908696,00.html |date=July 2, 2009 |accessdate=March 5, 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |magazine=[[Popular Mechanics]] |title=5 Most Notorious Recalls of All Time |url=http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/g261/4345725/?slide=2 |first=John Pearley |last=Huffman |date=February 12, 2010 |accessdate=March 5, 2016}}</ref> ''Time'' said "The Ford Pinto was a famously bad automobile, but worse still might be Ford's handling of the safety concerns."<ref name=time20090702/> |
Revision as of 03:36, 8 March 2016
--User:--HughD reported by --User:--Springee (Result: )
Page: ExxonMobil (edit | talk | history | links | watch | logs)
User being reported: Template:--userlinks
Previous version reverted to: [1]
Diffs of the user's reverts:
Diff of edit warring / 3RR warning: [link]
Diff of attempt to resolve dispute on article talk page: [6]
Initial discussion of edits in wrong section. [7]
HughD noting incorrect placement of discussion and thus was aware of the attempt to discuss disputed content (no comment on disputed content) [8]
Moved discussion to dedicated section [9]
HughD correcting title of dedicated section (no comment on disputed content) [10]
First comment by HughD related to disputed content after 4th revert [11]
Comments:
********************************
Template:--subst:Sanction enforcement request header
- Sanction or remedy to be enforced
- [[12]] :
- Diffs of edits that violate this sanction or remedy, and an explanation how these edits violate it
- Dec 21st HughD was told on December 11th by {--U:--Ricky81682} that the Watchdog.org topic was part of his topic ban. For violating that ban his Tea Party, broadly construed topic ban was expanded to all US conservative politics 2009 and later. The WP:TBAN guidelines state that a topic ban covers "a topic ban covers all pages (not only articles) broadly related to the topic, as well as the parts of other pages that are related to the topic." Asking for an RfC that HughD created on the page that resulted in his expanded topic block looks like discussing the banned topic.
- Dec 23 Citizens United vs FEC is a topic that falls within conservative politics. The article makes mention of conservative groups on a number of occasions including the group "Citizens United". The case was brought before the USSC in 2009 and decided in 2010. Thus the date of the case is within the topic ban. The subject is conservative politics.
- Diffs of previous relevant sanctions, if any
- Aug 28 HughD topic-banned from "any articles involving the Tea Party movement broadly, including but not limited to anything at all related to Americans for Prosperity, Koch Industries, the Koch brothers, for one year."
- Oct 11 After AE request, HughD warned that "further violations of the TBAN will likely result in a block (even if just minor)."
- Oct 29 HughD blocked for one week "following editing on Franklin Center for Government and Public Integrity." An appeal of this block was declined at AE [13].
- Dec 11 HughD informed that the TBAN was expanded to all US conservative politics 2009 and later, broadly construed.
- [14] WP:BLUDGEON admin Ricky81682 regarding limits and justification of TBAN.
- If discretionary sanctions are requested, supply evidence that the user is aware of them (see WP:AC/DS#Awareness and alerts)
- Editor's sanctions were expanded less than 2 weeks back.
- Additional comments by editor filing complaint
- Notification of the user against whom enforcement is requested
Discussion concerning HughD
Statements must be made in separate sections. They may not exceed 500 words and 20 diffs, except by permission of a reviewing administrator.
Administrators may remove or shorten noncompliant statements. Disruptive contributions may result in blocks.
Statement by HughD
Statement by (username)
Result concerning HughD
- This section is to be edited only by uninvolved administrators. Comments by others will be moved to the sections above.
Evolution (1970s and 1980s)
As civil rights grew more accepted throughout the nation, basing a general election strategy on appeals to "states' rights," which some would have believed opposed civil rights laws, would have resulted in a national backlash. The concept of "states' rights" was considered by some to be subsumed within a broader meaning than simply a reference to civil rights laws.[1][2] States rights became seen as encompassing a type of New Federalism that would return local control of race relations.[3]
Republican strategist Lee Atwater discussed the Southern strategy in a 1981 interview later published in Southern Politics in the 1990s by Alexander P. Lamis.[4]
Atwater: As to the whole Southern strategy that Harry Dent and others put together in 1968, opposition to the Voting Rights Act would have been a central part of keeping the South. Now [the new Southern strategy of Ronald Reagan] doesn't have to do that. All you have to do to keep the South is for Reagan to run in place on the issues he's campaigned on since 1964 . . . and that's fiscal conservatism, balancing the budget, cut taxes, you know, the whole cluster...
Questioner: But the fact is, isn't it, that Reagan does get to the Wallace voter and to the racist side of the Wallace voter by doing away with legal services, by cutting down on food stamps?
Atwater: You start out in 1954 by saying, "Nigger, nigger, nigger." By 1968 you can't say "nigger" — that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states' rights and all that stuff. You're getting so abstract now [that] you're talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you're talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is [that] blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously maybe that is part of it. I'm not saying that. But I'm saying that if it is getting that abstract, and that coded, that we are doing away with the racial problem one way or the other. You follow me — because obviously sitting around saying, "We want to cut this," is much more abstract than even the busing thing, and a hell of a lot more abstract than "Nigger, nigger."
Several events which occurred during Ronald Reagan's 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns have been cited as evidence of the evolution of the Southern Strategy. In 1980, Reagan made a much-noted appearance at the Neshoba County Fair.[5] His speech which included the phrase "I believe in states' rights"[note 1] was cited as evidence that the Republican Party was building upon the Southern strategy.[6] During the 1976 and 1980 campaigns, Reagan was seen as using racially-coded rhetoric, making attacks on the "welfare state" and leveraging resentment towards affirmative action.Cite error: A <ref>
tag is missing the closing </ref>
(see the help page). The stereotype of a "welfare queen" with a large house and a Cadillac using multiple names to collect over $150,000 in tax-free income was often used when calling for welfare reforms.[7][8] Aistrup described Reagan's campaign statements as "seemingly race neutral" but explained how whites interpret this in a racial manner, citing a DNC funded study conducted by CRG Communications.[7] Though Reagan didn't overtly mention the race of the welfare recipient, the unstated impression in whites' minds were black people and Reagan's rhetoric resonated with Southern white perceptions of black people.[7] The phrase "strapping young buck" and later "young fellow" were used to refer to an unscrupulous, able-bodied man using food stamps.[9]
These claims that Reagan intentionally used coded racism have been disputed in press and scholarship. Both Mayer and Cannon argue these issues were not appeals to racism but the result of Reagan's insensitivity to issues of race and note this caused a great deal of trouble for his campaigns. Reagan's Neshoba appearance was during phase of the campaign when Reagan was also trying to reach out to black voters and illustrated his blindness to racial sensitivities.[10] Reagan, fearing breaking a commitment once made, refused to cancel the Neshoba speech despite fears of a public backlash by his own campaign staff.[11] When describing the welfare abuse Reagan was referring to a real case in Chicago though Reagan never mentioned the woman's race.[12][10] Mississippi was expected to be a swing state and the fair was a recognized appearance stop for a candidate in the state.[13] When informed that the term "young buck" had regionally offensive connotations, Reagan defended his actions as a nonracial term that was common in his Illinois hometown but also never used the phrase again.[10] Cannon, when describing these incidences emphasized Reagan's abhorrence of racism and cites the comments of William Franklin Burghardt, an African American who played football with Reagan in college, "I just don't think he [Reagan] was conscious of race at all. If you listened to the Carter debate during the campaign, Reagan said that when he was growing up they didn't know they had a race problem. It was the dumbest thing a grown person could say, but he'd never seen it. I believe that [the hotel incident] was his first experience of that sort." [11] Mayer concluded that Reagan was, "also a man blind to the pain that ignorance and racial insensitivity could cause minorities and to the damage it could do to his party" .The 1980 campaign was focused on economy and foreign policy while downplaying social issues and was overall free from mention of race even in code.[10]
During the 1988 U.S. presidential election, the Willie Horton attack ads run against Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis built upon the Southern strategy in a campaign that reinforced the notion that Republicans best represent conservative whites with traditional values.[14] Lee Atwater and Roger Ailes worked on the campaign as George H. W. Bush's political strategists,[15] and upon seeing a favorable New Jersey focus group response to the Horton strategy, Atwater recognized that an implicit racial appeal could work outside of the Southern states.[16] The subsequent ads featured Horton's mugshot and played on fears of black criminals. Atwater said of the strategy, "By the time we're finished, they're going to wonder whether Willie Horton is Dukakis' running mate."[17] Al Gore was the first to use the Willie Horton prison furlough against Dukakis and, like the Bush campaign, would not mention race. The Bush campaign claimed they were initially made aware of the Horton issue via the Gore campaigns use of the subject. Bush hesitated to use the Horton campaign strategy the campaign saw it as a wedge issue to harm Dukakis who was struggling against Democratic rival Jessie Jackson.[18]
In addition to presidential campaigns, subsequent Republican campaigns for the House of Representatives and Senate in the South employed the Southern strategy. During his 1990 re-election campaign, Jesse Helms attacked his opponent's alleged support of "racial quotas," most notably through an ad in which a white person's hands are seen crumpling a letter indicating that he was denied a job because of the color of his skin.[19][20]
New York Times opinion columnist Bob Herbert wrote in 2005 that "The truth is that there was very little that was subconscious about the G.O.P.'s relentless appeal to racist whites. Tired of losing elections, it saw an opportunity to renew itself by opening its arms wide to white voters who could never forgive the Democratic Party for its support of civil rights and voting rights for blacks."[21] Aistrup described the transition of the Southern strategy saying that it has "evolved from a states’ rights, racially conservative message to one promoting in the Nixon years, vis-à-vis the courts, a racially conservative interpretation of civil rights laws—including opposition to busing. With the ascendancy of Reagan, the Southern Strategy became a national strategy that melded race, taxes, anticommunism, and religion."[22]. This view conflicts with that of Mayer who saw Reagan as racially insensitive but also one who campaigned in a relatively colorblind fashion in the 1980 and 1984 elections.[10]
Some analysts viewed the 1990s as the apogee of Southernization or the Southern strategy, given that the Democratic president Bill Clinton and vice-president Al Gore were from the South, as were Congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle.[23] During the end of Nixon's presidency, the Senators representing the former Confederate states in the 93rd Congress were primarily Democrats. During the beginning of Bill Clinton's, 20 years later in the 103rd Congress, this was still the case.[24]
Notes about recent section edit.
- Claims of NPOV and Coatrack were put forward on the NPOVN. There has been no support for the view that the included information violates either policy.
- The Herbert and Jack White references in the Neshoba county paragraph are both opinion articles used in support of facts and are thus inappropriate citation. The Herbert reference was removed from this section earlier and then restored. However, because they are being used to support a statement that “people claimed…” and because the claim is supported by two other sources (hence the text wouldn’t change) they were left in place. The Lopez references were not changed from the Salon article to the book though this would be a reasonable change.
- The Mayer and Cannon books should be considered very reliable sources. The WP:RS scholarship section says the following
- Material such as an article, book, monograph, or research paper that has been vetted by the scholarly community is regarded as reliable, where the material has been published in reputable peer-reviewed sources or by well-regarded academic presses.
- One can confirm that discussion of the source has entered mainstream academic discourse by checking the scholarly citations it has received in citation indexes.
- Both the Mayer and Cannon sources have been reviewed in peer reviewed journals. Mayer is also a professor in the field. Both books are listed in Google Scholar’s citation index (Cannon’s Role of a Lifetime: 583, Mayer: 53, Lopez for reference is at 35).
new section
Scoobydunk argues that Mayer is not a credible source vis-a-vis Lopez and thus shouldn't even be mentioned in the wiki article solely because Lopez was published by a university press while Mayer was not. Note that both are university faculty members in fields related to this topic. I am not arguing that we should take one POV over the other, only that we should not censor one vs the other. Mayer's work clearly has earned scholarly acceptance. It has been reviewed by a scholarly journal (ie peer reviewed journal). It also has, according to Google Scholar a higher citation count than Lopez. Scoobydunk has previously tried to dismiss citation counts as unimportant by noting that others might be citing to criticize vs endorse. Perhaps but let us review the scholarly works that have draw from Mayer. Note that by drawn from I mean they support an aspect of their work by referring to Mayer. This is different than simply citing Mayer as someone who made a claim the author disagrees with. Note this is not a complete list.
- The Return of Old-Fashioned Racism to White Americans’ Partisan Preferences in the Early Obama Era Michael Tesler, Journal of Politics 2013 - Mayer is cited in the first column of this journal article.
- Obama's Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America Michael Tesler, David O. Sears, U of Chicago Press - Sears is one of the scholars cited in the Wiki article. Noted scholar citing Mayer for a scholarly view.
- Kinder Institute for Urban Research, The "Southwestern Strategy:" Immigration and Race in GOP Discourse Jessica Brown - Rice University Kinder Institute. - This is an example of a university research institute using Mayer's book as a reference for a working paper.
- A Companion to Richard M. Nixon - Chapter 12 - Civil Rights Policy Melvin Small, Dean Kotlowski - Wiley Online Library (note, While is a scholarly press and thus a peer reviewed publication). Cite Mayer's book as further reading on the subject.
- Goldwaterism Triumphant? Race and the Republican Party, 1965–1968 Timothy N Thruber, The Journal of the Historical Society - Thurber cites Mayer as a factual reference.
- Immigration in the 2008 Virginia presidential election: A cultural issue remains puissant despite an economic crisis Ward Kay, Jeremy Mayer - The Social Science Journal - Self citiation in a peer reviewed journal. The reviewers didn't seem to mind Mayer citing his 2002 book.
- Whose Black Politics?: Cases in Post-Racial Black Leadership Andra Gillespie - Routlege (academic publisher) - uses Mayer as a reference.
- Racialized campaign ads: the emotional content in implicit racial appeals primes white racial attitudes. Banks, Antoine J. ; Bell, Melissa A., Public Opinion Quarterly - They cite Mayer as fact in the opening section.
- The Centrality of Race in American Politics V Hutchings, N Valentino - Annual review of political science - Yet again Mayer is used to support fact, not as an example of an opinion.
- Anger and Racial Politics: The Emotional Foundation of Racial Attitudes in America Antoine Banks - Cambridge U Press - Mayer cited as a factual reference at least twice in the book.
I would also note that Mayer already exists in the article, I was not the first editor to cite his 2002 book. Cannon's book that I cited has almost 600 Google citations and has been reviewed in several peer reviewed journals (Gold - The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science; Pious - Political Science Quarterly, Fall; Tyler - Challenge; Finan - Current History; ) Listing a dozen scholarly works that draw on Cannon would be easy.
Really, Scoobydunk's attempt to claim the Mayer is not worth of scholarly weight is simply inconsistent with both WP:RS as well as WP:IAR. Doing the same with Cannon is also highly questionable given the extensive scholarship which references his books. Trying to suppress the views of clearly reliable sources because they were not published by a university press and in the face of extensive evidence to their quality is simply wrong according to Wikipedia. If I were trying to claim we should abandon the old material in favor of new material then Scoobydunk's bureaucratic objections may have merit. Instead I'm attempting to broaden the information in the article using related reliable sources. I would suggest reading WP:FATRAT and WP:RAP.
Notes
- ^ Quoted from Reagan's speech: I still believe the answer to any problem lies with the people. I believe in states' rights and I believe in people doing as much as they can for themselves at the community level and at the private level. I believe we have distorted the balance of our government today by giving powers that were never intended to be given in the Constitution to that federal establishment. "Sound file" (MP3). Onlinemadison.com. Retrieved 2015-09-27.
Section
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Tp9WODvGNScC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1943&ots=9LSEJcyVGF&sig=LELtFvt7jXTvAT4Uv6v0xh2ugOs#v=onepage&q=race&f=false https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7UvzZAZcDl4C&oi=fnd&pg=PT11&ots=r5TH0NvDto&sig=_vXvhLB03y67buaqku2eG5wwE60#v=snippet&q=mississippi&f=false https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jFEFZyaT37gC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=Kiron+K.+Skinner+reagan+"states+rights"&ots=ndU1ssUMnw&sig=DaSCnERidUj5vBggiwRVhg2SO7U#v=snippet&q=racist&f=false https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=naQJQVEwUCsC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=Kiron+K.+Skinner+reagan+"states+rights&ots=tTfGs5mQ-e&sig=yem-HyyMxLYjurJbroIC5Tc4eBQ#v=snippet&q=code&f=false http://www.nationalreview.com/article/222886/reagan-no-racist-deroy-murdock https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-the-butler-gets-wrong-about-ronald-reagan-and-race/2013/08/29/5f6aa21e-0e87-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
More stuff
Crespo replies to Brooks. That adds weight to the view that this is not an established narrative. If it was why acknowledge the other side? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.59.122.10 (talk) 17:26, 3 December 2015 (UTC)
"Reagan made his case against civil rights legislation not in the pugnacious, arm-waving, and belligerent style of Wallace but in a polished and low-key manner."
- This exact quote doesn't support any claims of coded language. The section immediately after this quote references and thus depends on Dan Cater.
"Reagan showed that he could use coded language with the best of them, lambasting welfare queens, busing, and affirmative action as the need arose."[6] This is Dan Cater. Chappell is critical of this work.
"While Nixon has been more pronouncedly identified with the southern strategy, many presidents before Nixon and since have used it. Ronald Reagan did in his infamous 1980 speech in Philadelphia, Mississippi, in which he called for states' rights."[7] States that Reagan used Southern Strategy and gives Neshoba as an example. Does not cite others in this regard.
"The strategy for such a politics gathered a powerful momentum during the Reagan era with the practice of "coding" racial meanings so as to mobilize white fears. Hence, the use of terms such as quotas, busing, welfare, and multiculturalism as signifiers to arouse the insecurities and anger of whites.[8] No mention of southern strategy but does mention Reagan and racial coding.
"Reagan knew that southern Republicans were making racial appeals to win over conservative southern Democrats, and he was a willing participant." [9] This is an opinion article by an expert in the field (Crespo). This article tells us that Crespo feels there is disagreement among people with regards to the content of his op ed article. That should be enough to show that we lack scholarly consensus in and of itself. This is compounded by the other biographers and scholars who disagree on this point.
Tasha Philpot (22 December 2009). Race, Republicans, and the Return of the Party of Lincoln. Discusses Southern Strategy and Reagan with coded.
Disagreeing:
Ref
new
http://www.aei.org/publication/rollover-economics/ http://www.aei.org/publication/is-pinto-a-criminal/ https://users.wfu.edu/palmitar/Law&Valuation/chapter%202/Attachments/Viscusi-StanfordArticle.html https://www.cedengineering.com/userfiles/Ethics%20-%20An%20Alternative%20Account%20of%20the%20Ford%20Pinto%20Case.pdf http://www.autonews.com/article/20140412/OEM11/304149999/automotive-safety-at-any-cost-sounds-good-but-its-not-true — Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.205.228.188 (talk) 17:57, 20 February 2016 (UTC)
- Development time isn't 22 months. June 67 to first production Aug 70. 38 months, only 5 less than normal.
- Initial fuel standard (1967) was for front impact only. In Jan 1969, 18 months after development had started NHTSA proposed added rear impacts to Standard 301 (cedEng, sec 2.3). Since Pintos were not available Ford used mock ups and changed the Pinto design based on the testing. In Aug 70 the proposal was changed to be more stringent with an 18 month lead time. 30 MPH was the long term goal. Ford voluntarily adopted the 20 mph moving standard for 73 and later cars, the only automaker to do so. (Lee, Edmann) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.205.228.188 (talk) 04:31, 21 February 2016 (UTC)
Pinto:
Fuel System Safety Controversy
Media Attention
Mother Jones magazine obtained Ford's cost-benefit analysis document. In September, 1977 Mother Jones magazine said that Ford was aware of the tank's design flaw, was unwilling to pay for a redesign, and decided it would be cheaper to pay off possible lawsuits. The document became known as Ford's Pinto Memo.[25] On August 10, 1977, consumer advocate Ralph Nader and the author of the Mother Jones article held a news conference on the dangers of the Pinto design flaws.[26]
NHTSA investigations and Recall
In April, 1974, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to recall Ford Pintos to address fuel system design defects after reports from attorneys of three deaths and four serious injuries in rear-end collisions at moderate speeds.[27]
The next day, August 11, 1977, the NHTSA initiated an investigation.[28]
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ultimately directed Ford to recall the Pinto. Initially, the NHTSA did not feel there was sufficient evidence to demand a recall due to incidents of fire. 27 deaths were attributed to Pinto fires (the same number of deaths attributed to a Pinto transmission problem[clarification needed]) and in 1974 the NHTSA ruled that the Pinto had no "recallable" problem.[29]
On May 8, 1978 the NHTSA informed Ford of their determination that the Pinto fuel system was defective.[30][31] The NHTSA concluded
1971-1976 Ford Pintos have experienced moderate speed, rear-end collisions that have resulted in fuel tank damage, fuel leakage, and fire occurrences that have resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries...The fuel tank design and structural characteristics of the 1975-1976 Mercury Bobcat which render it identical to contemporary Pinto vehicles, also render it subject to like consequences in rear impact collisions.[32][33]
NHTSA scheduled a public hearing for June, 1978, and NHTSA negotiated with Ford on the recall.[34]
On June 9, 1978, days before the NHTSA was to issue Ford a formal recall order, Ford recalled 1.5 million Ford Pintos and Mercury Bobcats, one of the largest recalls in automotive history at the time.[35][36][37] Ford's recall provided a plastic protective shield to be dealer-installed between the fuel tank and the differential bolts, another to deflect contact with the right-rear shock absorber, and a new fuel-tank filler neck that extended deeper into the tank and was more resistant to breaking off in a rear-end collision.[38][39] Ford disagreed with the NHTSA finding of defect, and said the recall was to "end public concern that has resulted from criticism of the fuel systems in these vehicles."[40]
- bad info, kill it ***
After the recall, but before parts were made available, six more people died in Pinto fires.[41][42]
- Trival, kill it******
The recall was included in Time magazine's 2009 top ten product recalls, Popular Mechanics magazine's 2010 five most notorious recalls of all time, and NBC News' 2013 twelve famous recalls.[42][43][44] Time said "The Ford Pinto was a famously bad automobile, but worse still might be Ford's handling of the safety concerns."[43]
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
Counter
was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Cite error: The named reference
Branch
was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Aistrup, Joseph A. (2015). The Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican Top-Down Advancement in the −South. University Press of Kentucky. p. 48. ISBN 0-8131-4792-1.
- ^ Lamis, Alexander P. (1999). Southern Politics in the 1990s. Louisiana State University Press. pp. 7–8. ISBN 978-0-8071-2374-4.
- ^ "Ronald Reagan's Neshoba County Speech". C-SPAN. C-SPAN. April 10, 2010. Retrieved June 11, 2015.
- ^ Herbert, Bob (November 13, 2007). "Righting Reagan's Wrongs?". The New York Times. Archived from the original on January 22, 2012.
{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|deadurl=
ignored (|url-status=
suggested) (help)
White, Jack (December 14, 2002). "Lott, Reagan and Republican Racism". Time. Archived from the original on January 22, 2012.{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|deadurl=
ignored (|url-status=
suggested) (help)
Cannon, Lou (2003). Governor Reagan: His Rise to Power, New York: Public Affairs, 477-78.
Michael Goldfield (1997) The Color of Politics: Race and the Mainspring of American Politics, New York: The New Press, 314.
Walton, Hanes (1997). African American Power and Politics. p. 20. ISBN 978-0-231-10419-7. - ^ a b c Cite error: The named reference
Reagan's Southern Strategy
was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/12/20/255819681/the-truth-behind-the-lies-of-the-original-welfare-queen
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
Lopez-salon
was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ a b c d e Mayer, Jermey D (2002). Running on Race: Racial Politics in Presidential Campaigns, 1960-2000. Random House Inc. pp. 152–155, 166, 168–169.
- ^ a b Cannon, Lou (1991). President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. Simon & Schuster. pp. 518–520, 577.
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
Roll of a Lifetime
was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Murdock, Deroy (Nov 20, 2007). "Reagan, No Racist". National Review. Retrieved 10/20/2015.
{{cite news}}
: Check date values in:|accessdate=
(help) - ^ Aistrup, Joseph A. (2015). The Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican Top-Down Advancement in the South. University Press of Kentucky. pp. 51–52. ISBN 0-8131-4792-1.
- ^ Swint, Kerwin (2008). Dark Genius: The Influential Career of Legendary Political Operative and Fox News Founder Roger Ailes. New York: Union Square Press. pp. 37–38. ISBN 1-4027-5445-0.
- ^ Mendelberg, Tali (2001). The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. pp. 143–144. ISBN 0-691-07071-7.
- ^ Whitaker, Morgan (October 21, 2013). "The legacy of the Willie Horton ad lives on, 25 years later". MSNBC.
- ^ Mayer, Jermey D (2002). Running on Race: Racial Politics in Presidential Campaigns, 1960-2000. Random House Inc. pp. 212–214.
- ^ Helms' "Hands" campaign ad on YouTube
- ^ Caliendo, Stephen Maynard; McIlwain, Charlton D. (2005). "Racial Messages in Political Campaigns". Polling America: An Encyclopedia of Public Opinion. Vol. 2. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. p. 643. ISBN 0-313-32713-0.
- ^ Herbert, Bob (October 6, 2005). "Impossible, Ridiculous, Repugnant". The New York Times. Archived from the original on January 22, 2012.
{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|deadurl=
ignored (|url-status=
suggested) (help) - ^ Aistrup, Joseph A. The Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican Top-down Advancement in the South University Press of Kentucky, 1996
- ^ Nossiter, Adam (November 10, 2008). "For South, a Waning Hold on National Politics". The New York Times. Archived from the original on January 22, 2012.
{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|deadurl=
ignored (|url-status=
suggested) (help) - ^ Alexander P. Lamis, ed., Southern Politics in the 1990s (1999) pp 1-9
- ^ Dowie, Mark (September 1977). "Pinto Madness". Mother Jones. Retrieved January 17, 2014.
- ^ Dardis & Zent 1982 : On August 10, 1977, Ralph Nader and Mark Dowie held a press conference to notify the public that unnecessary deaths and injuries were being suffered as a result of the faulty design of the pre-1977 model year Pinto.
- ^ Weiss, Joseph W. (2014). Business Ethics: A Stakeholder and Issues Management Approach. Berrett-Koehler Publishers. ISBN 9781626561410.
- ^ Dardis & Zent 1982 : On August 11, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began an investigation of the claims.
- ^ Lee, M.T.; Ermann, M.D. (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness," a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1).
- ^ Stuart 1980 : In the Pinto case, the highway safety agency made an initial determination in May 1978 that a defect existed in the fuel tank system.
- ^ Jones 1978 : But NHTSA, a Department of Transportation agency, informed Ford on May 8 about results of the new investigation, which concluded that Pintos had a safety defect.
- ^ Dardis & Zent 1982 : In May 1978, NHTSA determined that pre-1977 model year Ford Pintos were subject to "fuel tank damage, Fuel leakage and fire occurrences which had resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries" when impacted at "moderate speeds," and that the "fire threshold" in those vehicles was reached at closing speeds of 30-35 MPH.
- ^ Investigative Report: Alleged Fuel Tank and Filler Neck Damage in Rear-end Collisions of Subcompact Cars Passenger Cars, 1971-1976 Ford Pinto, 1975-1976 Mercury Bobcat (PDF) (Report). Office of Defects Investigation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. May 1978. Retrieved March 5, 2016.
Based upon the information either developed or acquired during this investigation, the following conlcusions have been reached: 1971-1976 Ford Pintos have experienced moderate speed, rear-end collisions that have resulted in fuel tank damage, fuel leakage, and fire occurrences that have resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries.
- ^ Jones 1978 : A spokesman for NHTSA said that his agency and Ford began a "process of negotiation" after May 8 that led to Ford's announcement in Detroit yesterday.
- ^ Stuart 1980 : Days before a formal recall order was to be issued by the Government, Ford voluntarily recalled more than a million Pintos for modifications of the fuel tank system.
- ^ Jones 1978 : Ford Motor Co. yesterday recalled 1.5 million Pinto and Mercury Bobcat cars, to make alterations that will reduce the risk of fuel tank fires in rear-end accidents...Yesterday's recall, one of the largest in automotive history, was not the first involving the Pinto...
- ^ Eckhold, J. C. (June 15, 1978). "1971-1976 Pinto and 1975-1976 Bobcat Fuel Systems (Except Station Wagons) Campaign no. 293" (PDF). Ford Motor Company, Office of Automotive Safety. Retrieved March 5, 2016.
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
birth
was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ "NHTSA Recalls for the 1975 Ford Pinto".
- ^ Jones 1978 : In a prepared statement, Ford vice President Herbet L. Misch said: "Ford informed NHTSA that it does not agree with the agency's initial determination of May 8 that an unreasonable risk of safety is involved in the design of these cars..." Misch said Ford decided to offer the modifications "so as to end public concern that has resulted from criticism of the fuel systems in these vehicles".
- ^ Center for Auto Safety 2009 : Recall notices were mailed in September, 1978 and parts were to be at all dealers by September 15, 1978. However, between June 9, 1978, and the date when parts were available to repair the estimated 2.2 million vehicles, six people died in Pinto fires after a rear impact.
- ^ a b Spear, Gillian (June 18, 2013). "Take that back: Famous recalls, from Tylenol to Toyota". NBC News. Retrieved March 5, 2016.
Three people died before the recall and six died in Pinto fires during the time following the recall but before the parts to repair the vehicle were made available.
- ^ a b "Top 10 Product Recalls". Time. July 2, 2009. Retrieved March 5, 2016.
- ^ Huffman, John Pearley (February 12, 2010). "5 Most Notorious Recalls of All Time". Popular Mechanics. Retrieved March 5, 2016.