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As the Chilean economy collapsed, the first of what were to be a 24-day wave of confrontational strikes by truck-owners joined by small businessmen and several (mostly professional) unions and student groups began in October, 1972. The head of the army, general [[Carlos Prats]], was brought into the civilian government as Interior Minister.<ref>http://icarito.latercera.cl/icarito/2003/912/pag1b.htm]</ref> |
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On [[June 29]], [[1973]], a tank regiment under the command of Colonel [[Roberto Souper]] surrounded the presidential palace (la Moneda) in |
On [[June 29]], [[1973]], a tank regiment under the command of Colonel [[Roberto Souper]] surrounded the presidential palace (la Moneda) in an unsuccessful coup attempt.<ref>http://literature.rebelyouth.ca/educhile_1970s/tanquetazo.html</ref> The failed coup was followed by a further strike at the end of July, joined by the copper miners of El Teniente. On [[August 9]], General Prats was made Minister of Defense, but this decision proved so unpopular with the military that on August 22 he was forced to resign not only this position but his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Army; he was replaced in the latter role by Pinochet.<ref>http://icarito.latercera.cl/icarito/2003/912/pag1c.htm</ref> |
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By August 1973, a constitutional crisis loomed, as the [[Supreme Court of Chile|Supreme Court]] publicly complained about the government's unwillingness to enforce thousands of its decision; and on [[August 22]], the [[Chamber of Deputies of Chile]] (with the Christian Democrats uniting with the National Party) [[wikisource:Declaration of the Breakdown of Chile’s Democracy|accused Allende's government of unconstitutional acts]], and called on the military ministers to ''"put an immediate end" to what they described as "breach[es of] the Constitution...with the goal of redirecting government activity toward the path of Law and ensuring the constitutional order of our Nation and the essential underpinnings of democratic coexistence among Chileans."'' They accused Allende's government of a ''"breakdown of the Rule of Law by means of the creation and development of government-protected armed groups which...are headed towards a confrontation with the Armed Forces."''<ref>[[Jose Pinera]]'s [http://www.josepinera.com/pag/pag_tex_quiebredemoc_en.htm archive of the CoD's Resolution]</ref> Allende's efforts to re-organize the military and police (which he clearly had reason to fear in their then-current forms) were characterized as ''"notorious attempts to use the Armed and Police Forces for partisan ends, destroy their institutional hierarchy, and politically infiltrate their ranks."''<ref>http://icarito.latercera.cl/icarito/2003/912/pag1c.htm</ref> (''See [[1973 coup in Chile#The Chamber of Deputies calls on the military|1973 coup in Chile]].'') |
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Two days later ([[August 24]], [[1973]]), Allende responded (''See [[1973 coup in Chile#Allende Responds|1973 coup in Chile]]; full text of the response is at [http://www.josepinera.com/pag/pag_tex_respallende.htm] in Spanish, [http://sources.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvador_Allende%27s_Last_Speech_%28English_translation%29] in English''), responding point-by point to their accusations and, in turn, accusing Congress of "facilit[ing] the seditious intention of certain sectors" and promoting a coup or a civil war by "invoking the intervention of the Armed Forces and of Order against a democratically elected government". He pointed out that the declaration had failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority constitutionally required to bring an accusation against the president and argued that the legislature was trying to usurp the executive role. |
Two days later ([[August 24]], [[1973]]), Allende responded (''See [[1973 coup in Chile#Allende Responds|1973 coup in Chile]]; full text of the response is at [http://www.josepinera.com/pag/pag_tex_respallende.htm] in Spanish, [http://sources.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvador_Allende%27s_Last_Speech_%28English_translation%29] in English''), responding point-by point to their accusations and, in turn, accusing Congress of "facilit[ing] the seditious intention of certain sectors" and promoting a coup or a civil war by "invoking the intervention of the Armed Forces and of Order against a democratically elected government". He pointed out that the declaration had failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority constitutionally required to bring an accusation against the president and argued that the legislature was trying to usurp the executive role. |
Revision as of 14:01, 15 August 2006
As the Chilean economy collapsed, the first of what were to be a 24-day wave of confrontational strikes by truck-owners joined by small businessmen and several (mostly professional) unions and student groups began in October, 1972. The head of the army, general Carlos Prats, was brought into the civilian government as Interior Minister.[1]
On June 29, 1973, a tank regiment under the command of Colonel Roberto Souper surrounded the presidential palace (la Moneda) in an unsuccessful coup attempt.[2] The failed coup was followed by a further strike at the end of July, joined by the copper miners of El Teniente. On August 9, General Prats was made Minister of Defense, but this decision proved so unpopular with the military that on August 22 he was forced to resign not only this position but his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Army; he was replaced in the latter role by Pinochet.[3]
By August 1973, a constitutional crisis loomed, as the Supreme Court publicly complained about the government's unwillingness to enforce thousands of its decision; and on August 22, the Chamber of Deputies of Chile (with the Christian Democrats uniting with the National Party) accused Allende's government of unconstitutional acts, and called on the military ministers to "put an immediate end" to what they described as "breach[es of] the Constitution...with the goal of redirecting government activity toward the path of Law and ensuring the constitutional order of our Nation and the essential underpinnings of democratic coexistence among Chileans." They accused Allende's government of a "breakdown of the Rule of Law by means of the creation and development of government-protected armed groups which...are headed towards a confrontation with the Armed Forces."[4] Allende's efforts to re-organize the military and police (which he clearly had reason to fear in their then-current forms) were characterized as "notorious attempts to use the Armed and Police Forces for partisan ends, destroy their institutional hierarchy, and politically infiltrate their ranks."[5] (See 1973 coup in Chile.)
Two days later (August 24, 1973), Allende responded (See 1973 coup in Chile; full text of the response is at [1] in Spanish, [2] in English), responding point-by point to their accusations and, in turn, accusing Congress of "facilit[ing] the seditious intention of certain sectors" and promoting a coup or a civil war by "invoking the intervention of the Armed Forces and of Order against a democratically elected government". He pointed out that the declaration had failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority constitutionally required to bring an accusation against the president and argued that the legislature was trying to usurp the executive role.
"Chilean democracy," he wrote, "is a conquest by all of the people. It is neither the work nor the gift of the exploiting classes, and it will be defended by those who, with sacrifices accumulated over generations, have imposed it… With a tranquil conscience… I sustain that never before has Chile had a more democratic government than that over which I have the honor to preside." He concluded by calling upon "the workers, all democrats and patriots" to join him in defense of the constitution and of the "revolutionary process."
In early September 1973, Allende floated the idea of resolving the crisis with a plebiscite.