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::::*I don't think we need to note what every single delegate had read into the protocol (WP:N, WP:UNDUE). |
::::*I don't think we need to note what every single delegate had read into the protocol (WP:N, WP:UNDUE). |
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::::*The issues you raise above are reflected in the article POV-wise. If it's so important to you to note that Brown ''also'' thought the French was equally authentic, you could add a few words noting the fact after the full paragraph of Perry explaining why he thought so, for example. But you want to add a whole new couple of paragraphs just say the same thing again. I'm sure you understand why this is problematic. Same goes for the inadmissibility principle, or any of the other issues you keep trying to add walls of text about, in a transparent attempt to lead the reader to conclusions you want them to reach. [[User:No More Mr Nice Guy|No More Mr Nice Guy]] ([[User talk:No More Mr Nice Guy|talk]]) 18:11, 25 August 2010 (UTC) |
::::*The issues you raise above are reflected in the article POV-wise. If it's so important to you to note that Brown ''also'' thought the French was equally authentic, you could add a few words noting the fact after the full paragraph of Perry explaining why he thought so, for example. But you want to add a whole new couple of paragraphs just say the same thing again. I'm sure you understand why this is problematic. Same goes for the inadmissibility principle, or any of the other issues you keep trying to add walls of text about, in a transparent attempt to lead the reader to conclusions you want them to reach. [[User:No More Mr Nice Guy|No More Mr Nice Guy]] ([[User talk:No More Mr Nice Guy|talk]]) 18:11, 25 August 2010 (UTC) |
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== Israeli conditional acceptance of 242 == |
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The article currently contains a discussion of Syria's evolving attitude towards 242 and eventual acceptance. A hidden comment in the text suggests this should be done also for Israel, which I agree with. But the earliest reference that follows of Israel's attitude towards it isn't until a year later! Abba Eban was at the UN during deliberations and participated in those proceedings, although he had no vote. He made his government's position perfectly clear from the beginning. The delegate from India stated: |
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''Members of the Council will recall that during the fifth emergency special session an overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations, whether they voted for the Latin American draft resolution 2/ or the non-aligned, Afro-Asian draft resolution, had reaffirmed the principle of non-acquisition of territory by military conquest and had supported the call for the withdrawal of Israel armed forces to the positions they held prior to the outbreak of the recent conflict on 5 June 1967. On this point there was universal agreement among the membership of the United Nations.... The principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force is absolutely fundamental to our approach and we cannot accept or acquiesce in any decision that leaves out territories occupied by military conquest from the provision of withdrawal.... It is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by the Council, will commit it to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories--I repeat, all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict which began on 5 June 1967. In other words, the draft commits the Council to the withdrawal of Israel forces from the whole of Sinai, Gaza, the Old City of Jerusalem, Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River and the Syrian territory. This being so, Israel cannot use the words "secure and recognized boundaries", contained in sub-paragraph (ii) of operative paragraph 1 of the United Kingdom draft resolution, to retain any territory occupied in the recent conflict. Of course, mutual territorial adjustments are not ruled out, as indeed they are not in the three-Power draft resolution co-sponsored by India. This is our clear understanding of the United Kingdom draft resolution.'' |
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Abba Eban responded with his own interpretation: |
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''I reiterate that in negotiations with our neighbors we shall present a concrete vision of peace. Before saying what that vision is, I should like to make one comment on the course of this debate with special reference to the remarks of the Indian representative. The establishment of a peace settlement, including secure and recognized boundaries, is quite different from what he had been proposing, namely, withdrawal, without final peace, to demarcation lines. The representative of India has now sought to interpret the resolution in the image of his own wishes. For us, the resolution says what it says. It does not say that which it has specifically and consciously avoided saying.'' |
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In other words, while members of the Security Council explicitly stated that the draft resolution called on Israel to fully withdraw from the occupied territory, Eban stated that his government would interpret it to mean that withdraw would only occur subsequent to a final border settlement. Numerous other voting delegates observed that this unilateral Israeli interpretation was just that, and that the intent of the Security Council was that Israel should withdraw unconditionally, in accordance with the inadmissibility principle. |
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I therefore propose the following to be added to the paragraph on the Israeli acceptance of 242: |
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''The Israeli representative to the U.N. Abba Eban expressed approval of the resolution prior to the vote, but conditioned his acceptance upon the unilateral Israeli interpretation that it meant final borders must be established and recognized before withdrawal would take place, an interpretation explicitly rejected by members of the Security Council.[http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/9f5f09a80bb6878b0525672300565063?OpenDocument]'' [[User:JRHammond|JRHammond]] ([[User talk:JRHammond|talk]]) 10:33, 1 September 2010 (UTC) |
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Caradon quote
I just re-inserted a quote from Lord Caradon, which anon IP(s) have been deleting on the grounds that it doesn't say where and when the quote was made. However, the quote is footnoted to a book he published in 1981. Just posting here because by edit summary came out truncated. --FormerIP (talk) 16:30, 9 December 2009 (UTC)
It is quite misleading to state "Lord Caradon said" without specifying where and when or providing a link to the text in context. Accredited (talk) 18:44, 9 December 2009 (UTC)
- I'm not necessarily saying you are wrong, but obviously WP is choc full of quotes without giving the time and place. What's different about this example? --FormerIP (talk) 00:00, 10 December 2009 (UTC)
This article has numerous citations to Caradon's remarks from the GWU Symposium on 242. It is a 60 page pamphlet, with chapters written by Caradon, Eban, and Goldberg. It is not a book. You can find it in many libraries, or via inter-library loan.
From page 13:
(b) Palestinian rights
The second criticism of the Resolution 242 is that the Resolution, while calling for a solution of the problem of the refugees, did not speak of Palestinian self-determination. But it is very necessary to remember that when we drew up Resolution 242 we all took it for granted that the occupied territory would be restored to Jordan.
From page 14:
(c) Jerusalem
There is a third main criticism of the 1967 Resolution. It is that no reference is made, in so many words, to the future of Jerusalem, and many would strongly and rightly maintain that without peace in Jerusalem there can be no peace in the Middle East. Why therefore did we not refer to the future of Jerusalem in the original Resolution?
We all assumed that withdrawal from occupied territories as provided in the Resolution was applicable to East Jerusalem. This was not questioned at the time and has only much more recently been raised in fierce discussion.
But, as I say, we who worked on the original Resolution, those who voted for it and indeed I think all concerned, assumed that withdrawal from occupied territories must include the area of Jerusalem which had been occupied by Israeli forces in the 1967 conflict.harlan (talk) 06:30, 10 December 2009 (UTC)
You had repeatedly posted Caradon's assertions at the Symposium. Furthermore, he did not say "insubstantial and mutually beneficial alterations." Accredited (talk) 10:51, 10 December 2009 (UTC)
- The article had several quotes from the Symposium before I ever laid eyes on it. What is your point? Caradon and the UK government extended de jure recognition to the union of Arab Palestine and Transjordan. The clause in the resolution about "respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area" applied ipso jure to the West Bank of the Kingdom of Jordan.
- Since you like having links you can read, here is one from "Conceived in Law: The Legal Foundations of Resolution 242, by Prof. Michael Lynk, Page 10" --Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411698:
"This was not Caradon’s view. As he would later state, he was prepared to see some insubstantial and mutually beneficial alterations to the 1949 armistices lines, such as a re-alignment of the boundary at Latrun and Tulkarm to resolve some border awkwardness(footnote 30) ... ..*30 Caradon, supra [Lord Caradon, “Security Council Resolution 242”, in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981] note 27, at p. 13. Also see “An Interview with Lord Caradon” (1976), 5 Journal of Palestine Studies 142, at pp. 145-6."
It already sounds like a broken record. Repetition unwarranted. Furthermore, It is particularly ludicrous to state that "the parties assumed" while his own Foreign Secretary George Brown said precisely the opposite. Accredited (talk) 14:01, 10 December 2009 (UTC)
You have provided a link to the Lynk article but not the Caradon interview. 79.178.42.55 (talk) 10:03, 11 December 2009 (UTC)
- You may have noticed that CAMERA doesn't provide a link to the interview either. It is copyrighted, and not available online. harlan (talk) 11:08, 11 December 2009 (UTC)
CAMERA provided a quote of Caradon's own words: "We could have said: well, you go back to the 1967 line. But I know the 1967 line, and it’s a rotten line. You couldn’t have a worse line for a permanent international boundary. It’s where the troops happened to be on a certain night in 1948. It’s got no relation to the needs of the situation." There is no reason to believe that Caradon said at the same interview "insubstantial and mutually beneficial alterations." Accredited (talk) 10:49, 15 December 2009 (UTC)
- Why is there no reason? It appears to be sourced. It looks, in any case, like partial quote as it provided by CAMERA is about a prospective settlement, not directly about 242 (because he refers to a "permanent international boundary" - it is clearly not his view that this was intended to be the outcome of 242). --FormerIP (talk) 11:26, 15 December 2009 (UTC)
Caradon did not say such a thing at the interview just as he did not say it at the symposium. It would be inconsistent with his numerous statements on the topic. Upon presenting Resolution 242 to the Security Council, Lord Caradon declared: "All of us recognize that peace is the prize. None of us wishes a temporary truce or a superficial accommodation. We could never advocate a return to uneasy hostility. As I have said, my Government would never wish to be associated with any so-called settlement which was only a continuation of a false truce..." Accredited (talk) 11:53, 15 December 2009 (UTC)
I have restored this comprehensive quote to the context section so that you may be certain that he was indeed specifically addressing the meaning of 242. Accredited (talk) 12:13, 15 December 2009 (UTC)
- Accredited you deleted the portions of the quote about returning the West Bank and Jerusalem that I cited verbatim above. Caradon damn sure did say that. There already was a cite to the Journal of Palestinian studies Interview with Caradon where he explained that the way to change the border without acquisition of territory by war was for both sides to negotiate the exchange of small parcels of land for the benefit of all. I've added a cite to Lynk, so that is not my personal interpretation. Caradon quoted British Foreign Minister Brown's policy statements for the record in the minutes of S/PV.1381 and the other representatives read them again during the 1382nd session. I notice you aren't quoting that official statement. harlan (talk) 14:33, 15 December 2009 (UTC)
(Outdent) Caradon had been in the Colonial Service and held several posts as District Commissioner in Palestine. He made it clear that the armistice lines were impractical because farmers had been cut off from their fields, but that "secure and recognized borders" had nothing to do with territory or geography.
Lynk cites "Interview with Caradon" from Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3/4 (Spring - Summer, 1976), pp. 142-152:
Q. The basis for any settlement will be United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, of which you were the architect. Would you say there is a contradiction between the part of the resolution that stresses the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and that which calls for Israeli withdrawal from "occupied territories," but not from "the occupied territories"?
A. I defend the resolution as it stands. What it states, as you know, is first the general principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. That means that you can't justify holding onto territory merely because you conquered it. We could have said: well, you go back to the 1967 line. But I know the 1967 line, and it's a rotten line. You couldn't have a worse line for a permanent international boundary. It's where the troops happened to be on a certain night in 1948. It's got no relation to the needs of the situation. Had we said that you must go back to the 1967 line, which would have resulted if we had specified a retreat from all the occupied territories, we would have been wrong. In New York, what did we know about Tayyibe and Qalqilya? If we had attempted in New York to draw a new line, we would have been rather vague. So what we stated was the principle that you couldn't hold territory because you conquered it, therefore there must be a withdrawal to let's read the words carefully "secure and recognized boundaries." They can only be secure if they are recognized. The boundaries have to be agreed; it's only when you get agreement that you get security. I think that now people begin to realize what we had in mind that security doesn't come from arms, it doesn't come from territory, it doesn't come from geography, it doesn't come from one side dominating the other, it can only come from agreement and mutual respect and understanding.
Q. But how would one change the previous border without the acquisition of territory by war? Are you suggesting mutual concessions, that is, that both Israel and the Arabs would rationalize the border by yielding up small parcels of territory?
A. Yes, I'm suggesting that. And when the representatives of the four principal powers met together at that time in the United Nations after the 1967 resolution, we all agreed that what we had to do was to readjust the line to make it a reasonable line, instead of an unreasonable line, and that
this could be done one way or the other.
Q. And that this should be mutually done, with mutual territorial concessions?
A. Yes, yes. To the benefit of all.
harlan (talk) 16:00, 15 December 2009 (UTC)
Lord Caradon speaks for himself. You are not his spokesman. As he said on Nov. 22, 1967: "All of us, no doubt, have our own views and interpretations and understandings. I explained my own when I spoke on Monday last. On these matters each delegation rightly speaks only for itself." Accredited (talk) 12:21, 16 December 2009 (UTC)
- Caradon was speaking about his remarks during the 1381st session of the Security Council. It was held in New York on Monday, 20 November 1967, at 3:30PM. S/PV.1381(OR) and is available in the Journal of the United Nations:
- At paragraph 19. Caradon said "First on the policy of my government in the questions at issue, I have no hesitation in reaffirming what has been said by my Foreign Secretary and by myself on behalf of my government. Those statements are on the record. Our policy has been consistent and clear throughout.
- At paragraph 20 Caradon said If I had to sum up the policy, which has been repeatedly stated by my government, I would go back to the words used by the Foreign Secretary, in the General Assembly less than a month ago. These were his words: "I should like to repeat what I said when I was here before: Britain does not accept war as a means of settling disputes, nor that a State should be allowed to extend its frontiers as a result of a war. This means that Israel must withdraw. But equally, Israel's neighbors must recognize its right to exist, and it must enjoy security within its frontiers. What we must work for in this area is a durable peace, the renunciation of all aggressive designs, and an end to policies which are inconsistent with peace."
- It is fairly obvious that you ask for citations, and when they were provided, you simply choose to ignore them. Caradon published explanations of his own remarks, and they are more than adequately cited by other published sources like Lynk. You haven't supplied any published source which says "Caradon never said such a thing", or excludes Lynk's interpretation. I'm going to revert your deletions. harlan (talk) 16:14, 16 December 2009 (UTC)
You chose to ignore Caradon's subsequent remarks just prior to the adoption of Resolution 242:
"Secondly, the draft resolution which we have prepared is not a British text. It is the result of close and prolonged consultation with both sides and with all members of this Council. As I have respectfully said, every member of this Council has made a contribution in the search for common ground on which we can go forward."
Furthermore, British Foreign Secretary George Brown had said:
I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied', and not from 'the' territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories.[1]
What does it make sense to add to the symposium repetitions "the parties assumed" the opposite? How can one ignore Caradon's assertion that "each delegation rightly speaks only for itself"? How can one mix part of the 1981 remarks with Lynk's interpretation of the 1976 interview and present it as a single Caradon statement? Caradon had described the 1967 lines as "rotten lines" and called for agreement on secure boundaries at the same interview. Accredited (talk) 19:02, 16 December 2009 (UTC)
- Caradon explained that secure borders has nothing to do with territory or geography, so I'll add that to the article. President Johnson also said he was talking about a return to the 4 June 1967 situation. The United States told both the Soviets and Yugoslavia during the drafting process that there was no problem with the 4 June 1967 borders.
- Brown and Caradon both stated that Brown's remarks to the General Assembly were a matter of record, and were the official policy of the British government. Brown's comments to the Jerusalem Post after he left office were not. Great Britain recognized the union of Arab Palestine and Transjordan on a de jure basis, but only recognized de facto control of Jerusalem. It bases its policy on a 1950 statement:
HMG’s formal position is based on the 1950 statement: it recognises that Israel exercises de facto authority in West Jerusalem and , from 1950 to 1967, recognised that Jordan exercised de facto authority in East Jerusalem. Since the war of 1967, HMG has regarded Israel as being in military occupation of East Jerusalem, and in this connection subject to the rules of law applicable to such an occupation, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. HMG also holds that the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 on the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war applies to East Jerusalem.
- Brown and Caradon both stated that Brown's remarks to the General Assembly were a matter of record, and were the official policy of the British government. Brown's comments to the Jerusalem Post after he left office were not. Great Britain recognized the union of Arab Palestine and Transjordan on a de jure basis, but only recognized de facto control of Jerusalem. It bases its policy on a 1950 statement:
- The clause regarding territorial integrity applied to the West Bank of Jordan, and Caradon said so during the symposium. Brown said: "'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State ...'. Here the words 'territorial integrity' have a direct bearing on the question of withdrawal, on which much has been said in previous speeches. I see no two ways about this; and I can state our position very clearly. In my view, it follows from the words in the Charter that war should not lead to territorial aggrandizement." He also said Israel could not expand its borders. harlan (talk) 19:51, 16 December 2009 (UTC)
Harlan, I think there is something wrong with what you are adding. Although it is not really very misleading as it is, I think it would be better to directly quote from the sources and cite them as they are relevant. For example:
- According to Lord Caradon: "We (those involved in drafting the Resolution) all assumed that withdrawal from occupied territories as provided in the Resolution was applicable to East Jerusalem". <ref name="ReferenceA"/> He also said that the Principle Powers supported mutual territorial concessions "to the benefit of all".<ref> “An Interview with Lord Caradon” (1976), 5 Journal of Palestine Studies 142, at pp. 145-6</ref>
An explanation of what Principle Powers is should be given (or, ideally by wikilink). I don't acutally know what it is. It is either the main WWII Allies (UK, Russia, France, US) or the main WWI Allies (UK, France, Italy, Japan). Although it seems less likely, it could be the latter, because of the San Remo conference.
I'd also note that he doesn't appear to mention the West Bank or use the word "insubstantial", so what you have been adding is a little loose in that regard.
Accredited, I don't think there is any valid general objection to what Harlan is trying to insert. It is a genuine representation of what was said (the above notwithstanding) and it is sourced. Your main objection seems to be that it doesn't chime with your understanding of Caradon's position. However, it is sourced. Perhaps your understanding is incomplete. You've posted a number of other quotes in which Caradon says various things, but none of them appears to be inconsistent with what Harlan wishes to include in the text. You need to either provide sources which directly undermine Harlan's contribution, or else just allow it. --FormerIP (talk) 22:08, 16 December 2009 (UTC)
- FormerIP, I only supplied a few examples from "3 Shortcomings" here on the talk page. Caradon repeated those statements with slight variations a number of times to emphasize the points he was making. The article already cited Caradon's remarks about withdrawal from the West Bank. They appeared in section "2. Substance":
"It was from occupied territories that the Resolution called for withdrawal. The test was which territories were occupied. That was a test not possibly subject to any doubt. As a matter of plain fact East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan and Sinai were occupied in the 1967 conflict. It was on withdrawal from occupied territories that the Resolution insisted."
- Abba Eban had a kitten over that remark. I think what is missing from the discussion is that CAMERA, Accredited, et.al are trying to suggest that Caradon supported the Israeli position or interpretation of 242 in the Security Council and in the GWU symposium. That was not the case, as Lynk and others have indicated. In his chapter of the GWU symposium, Abba Eban attacked Caradon's interpretation and recollections. Eban said that Caradon's memory had become faulty. Lord Caradon was granted permission by the GWU sponsors to write an annex with additional material under a "Right of Reply" heading that responded to Eban's attack. As I recall, that is where he cited corroborating policy statements made by other officials. Many said the resolution required a total withdrawal, some like the U.S. had said any territorial changes would be insubstantial. No one said Israel had "the right" to retain the occupied territory. McHugo noted that many people would be horrified to learn their words were being used out of context in order to support a position which would appear to give Israel a right to acquire parts of the occupied territories. In any case, it is inappropriate for Wikipedia to use the neutral voice of the article to suggest that Eban and Caradon held compatible views, and supported each others' interpretation of the resolution.
- I had the pamphlet on loan a while back and transcribed some of its contents when Steve was discussing it under a previous thread. That extract is here. [1] There are also extracts online in Palestine and the law: guidelines for the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict, By Musa E. Mazzawi [2]
- I did not reproduce all of the material from (3) Shortcomings. There were additional comments about withdrawal in both the Palestinian rights and Jerusalem subsections. The Powers are the Permanent members of the Security Council who could veto any resolution. Here is the concluding comment from the Jerusalem subsection: But, as I have said, when we passed the unanimous Resolution in 1967 we all assumed that East Jerusalem would revert to Jordan. East Jerusalem, as a matter of fact, had been occupied in the 1967 conflict and it therefore plainly under the terms of the Resolution came under the requirement for Israeli withdrawal.
- Caradon and Charles de Gaulle both said that the requirement for a restoration of Arab territory was necessary to the settlement of the refugee problem: It has been said that in the Resolution we treated Palestinians only as refugees, but this is unjustified. We provided that Israel should withdraw from occupied territories and it was together with that requirement for a restoration of Arab territory that we also called for a settlement of the refugee problem.
- In his letter to David Ben-Gurion dated 9 January 1968, French President Charles de Gaulle said that he was convinced that Israel had ignored his warnings and overstepped the bounds of moderation by taking possession of Jerusalem, and so much Jordanian, Egyptian, and Syrian territory by force of arms. He felt Israel had exercised repression and expulsions during the occupation and that it amounted to annexation. He said that provided Israel withdrew her forces, it appeared that it might be possible to reach a solution through the UN framework which could include assurances of a dignified and fair future for refugees and minorities in the Middle East, recognition from Israel's neighbors, and freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.[2]
harlan (talk) 10:25, 17 December 2009 (UTC)
- Harlan, whatever you put in needs to be sourced. If there are better sources, then use them instead. But you can't quote him as saying things that are not in the source you cite. You also can't put your interpretation of his position and present it as reported speech (that would be WP:SYN). You are right that Caradon does not support the Israeli position. All you need to do is pick the quote that best represents that. --FormerIP (talk) 10:47, 17 December 2009 (UTC)
You did not answer my questions while you continue to ignore Caradon's statement before the vote that the draft resolution is not a British text and that each delegation rightly speaks only for itself.
You wish to add to the article another 1981 symposium repetition that "Lord Caradon said that the parties assumed that withdrawal from occupied territories as provided in the resolution was applicable to East Jerusalem."
However, you make no mention of his conclusion: "but I am quite sure that if we had attempted to raise or settle the question of Jerusalem as a separate issue at that time our task in attempting to find a unanimous decision would have been far greater if not impossible."
You also insist on inserting "the West Bank" and mixing Lynk's interpretation: "insubstantial and mutually beneficial alterations" but not Caradon's words on the "rotten" 1967 line and his stress on "agreement" at the same 1976 interview. Accredited (talk) 18:28, 19 December 2009 (UTC)
This is completely unwarranted and quite inappropriate. Make up your mind. Amend or delete it. Accredited (talk) 18:30, 20 December 2009 (UTC)
- You are trying to delete verbatim quotes from the Journal of Palestine Studies "Interview with Lord Caradon" and the restatement of British policy against expansion of borders by war and territorial aggradizment that was delivered twice during the Security Council discussions. There is nothing left to discuss on that material. It is properly sourced and is going to be included. harlan (talk) 05:17, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
- Lord Caradon and his quotes appear no less than eight times in this article. Am I the only one who finds this a bit much? With all due respect to the guy (who's name is wikilinked 4 times, as if a reader wouldn't get it the first time), he is one representative of one country. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 10:41, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
The British negotiated the adoption of the resolution
- The Foreign Relations of the United States documents the fact that Ambassador Goldberg could not draft a resolution that was acceptable to all of the members of the Security Council. In Document 467. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy said "Goldberg is no longer the ideal negotiator." Ambassador Goldberg subsequently reported on numerous private meetings with Caradon in which he asked the UK representative to draft the proposals and negotiate agreement with the other members of the Security Council.
- Glenn Perry, Musa Mazzawi, George Brown, John Norton Moore, and Arthur Lall all said that Caradon not only negotiated the adoption of the resolution, he even stage-managed statements made by the other delegates to prevent a Soviet or USA veto. The USSR, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, France, India, Mali, Brazil, Argentina, and Nigeria all made statements on the record that they thought Israel was required to withdraw from all of the occupied territory. McHugo notes that of the other states on the Security Council, Canada, China, Denmark, Japan and the USA made no statements on the record, which touch directly on the meaning of the withdrawal phrase.
- Glenn Perry says "The absence of any rejection of the "full withdrawal" interpretation was the result of a behind-the-scenes agreement. Until November 22, there was uncertainty whether the United Kingdom would expressly reject any clarification of the meaning of the draft, in which case the Soviet Union was prepared to veto it. According to Lall:
A crucial meeting took place at 3 p.m. [on November 22] between the Arabs and Caradon. He was able to reassure them that their position on the question of withdrawal remained unprejudiced. Further negotiations followed between Parthasarathi [the Indian representative] and Caradon which involved also the French and Nigerian delegates. As a result of these late exchanges Caradon agreed to delete from his proposed response to the Indian delegate's projected statement the words "But the Indian interpretation is not binding on the Council." On this basis Parthasarathi decided to vote for the resolution and so informed the Soviet Union. See Security Council Resolution 242: The Withdrawal Clause, Glenn Perry, Middle East Journal, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Autumn,1977), pp. 413-433, page 429
- Glenn Perry says "The absence of any rejection of the "full withdrawal" interpretation was the result of a behind-the-scenes agreement. Until November 22, there was uncertainty whether the United Kingdom would expressly reject any clarification of the meaning of the draft, in which case the Soviet Union was prepared to veto it. According to Lall:
- The Indian delegate said the resolution required Israel to withdraw from all the territories. He quoted George Brown's statements on British policy, which set out British rejection of the practice of territorial aggrandizement and which said that Israel could not expand its borders as a result of the war. Caradon said we stand by our declarations. Mazzawi quotes the statements made by Brown in the monthly magazine "Middle East" in May 1978. Brown said they had arranged beforehand for the Indian delegate to make that statement, and also that they would not respond so that interpretation of the policy would remain on the record.
- In the same interview Brown said "It would have been impossible to get the Resolution through if the words "all" or "the" were included. But the English text is clear. Withdrawal from territories means just that, nothing more, nothing less. The French text is equally legitimate. In the French translation the word "des" is used before territories, meaning "from the", implying all the territories seized in the '67 war. The Israelis knew this. They understood that it called for withdrawal with only minor border changes from the old frontiers - just to straighten the lines. I told the Israelis they had better accept it, because if they didn't they could be left with something worse, and with our version there would be something to argue about later." See Palestine and the law: guidelines for the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict, by Musa E. Mazzawi, Ithaca Press, 1997, ISBN: 0863722229, page 209. harlan (talk) 14:40, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
- I really don't know what you think that wall of text proves. To be quite honest and blunt, I'm getting tired of reading your endless quotes which are usually only tangential to the issues being discussed.
- Caradon was instrumental in the drafting process. Acknowledged. Why is he quoted 8 times in the article? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 14:56, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
Your personal opinion about Caradon leaves me underwhelmed. In addition to his remarks, I'm citing verifiable published accounts and analysis written by others. I'd be happy to remove the long quotes about straightening or rationalizing the borders, those remarks were subject to much shorter British policy statements that were actually recited during the Security Council sessions, and they have been summarized by Brown and Caradon in much fewer words.
McHugo complains that statements by many statesmen are being misused to make it appear that Israel has the right to retain occupied territory. Perry says those sort of statements are not conclusive. He cites more than a hundred pages of statements by Goldberg, Rostow, Brown, Caradon and others that were cataloged by John Norton Moore: "Subsequent statements by particular statesmen who were involved in the drafting and passage of the resolution (e.g. George Brown and Lord Caradon) are not conclusive, particularly when they contradict what they said during the UN debates in 1967. For several statements in this category, see John Norton Moore (ed.), The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Volume II: Readings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. pp. 1024-1144. For example, Goldberg told the other members of the Security Council that their positions on withdrawal would not be jeopardized by the text of the resolution. But after the resolution was adopted, he adopted a very different position. harlan (talk) 16:10, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
- Harlan, I agree with NMMNG about the quotes. The issues here seem to me to be quite specific, so it isn't helpful to anyone to throw down so much text on tangental points each time you post.
- I think it is fairly obvious that there are two keys things that Caradon thought, with respect to his interpretation of 242. (1) that Israel had no entitlement to retain territory it had captured in the Six-Day War; (2) that the Resolution did nothing to enforce or reify the pre-1967 boundary, which should be modified by negotiation (this had been the British position ever since 1948). These two things are not contradictory, so that quotes supporting (1) do not undermine (2) and vice-versa. More to the point, the article should not be made to read as if either point is undermined by the other. The problem at the moment is down to attempts to shore up one or the other viewpoint as if they are in conflict. We just need a short quote to support (1) and a short quote to support (2). We do not need any additional quotes brought in with an unspoken "...however, this appears to be contradicted by...".
- (This is all slighltly complicated by the fact that much of the article is in a terrible state, but one step at a time is best).--FormerIP (talk) 16:26, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
- I agree. Caradon's position was that Israel was not entitled to the territories it captured and that the borders could and probably should be modified through negotiations, expecting relatively minor modifications. Now if we can put that in a way that is acceptable to everyone, we could use refs or footnotes for the actual quotes and start cutting down the clutter in the article. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 17:42, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
That's odd, I suggested that approach in the section regarding misuse of quotes above, but Accredited and NMMNG restored deleted material sourced to remarks made by Sisco and Caradon. I pointed out that the voice of the encyclopedia is making editorial remarks, including comments Brown reportedly made to the Jerusalem Post, but it was decided to leave those in the article.
Accredited deleted a short statement made by Foreign Minister Brown from the Context section. Those remarks actually were recited for the record during the 1381st and 1382nd SC sessions by Caradon and Parthasarathi as part of a negotiated deal to secure acceptance of the resolution by the USSR. They represented the official position of the British government on land for peace and recognized borders. The quote by Brown that I've got there now is very relevant and adequately sourced. harlan (talk) 19:36, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
- You are completely missing the point. This article is quickly becoming a quote farm. Lets work out wording we can all agree too and move the excessive quotes (not only the ones you don't like) to the ref or footnote section. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 23:51, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
PA Position and French vs. English Text
I've moved this here for discussion. It keeps getting inserted in the French vs. English text subsection and it has NOTHING to do with that discussion:
Moreover, Minister Nabil Shaath admitted that the resolution does not require a return to the lines that existed on June 4, 1967, when he declared that the PA will not accept "borders based on UN Resolution 242, which we believe is no longer suitable." [3]
What he actually said was:
I confirmed the matter of borders. Whether a state is announced now or after liberation, its borders must be those of 4 June 1967. We will not accept a state without borders or with borders based on UN Resolution 242, which we believe is no longer suitable. On the contrary, Resolution 242 has come to be used by Israel as a way to procrastinate.
That begs the question the subsection seeks to address, since the majority of the members of the Security Council (USSR, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, France, India, Mali, Brazil, Argentina, and Nigeria) made statements on the record that they thought Israel was required to withdraw from all of the occupied territory under the terms of the resolution. The other states on the Security Council, Canada, China, Denmark, Japan and the USA made no statements on the record, which dealt with the meaning of the withdrawal phrase. harlan (talk) 19:54, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
Removed FRUS and drafting quotes pending discussion
P.S. All the material is still there in history. If anyone needs to restore some or all of it, feel free. I think we can do without most of it.
Many published sources including the FRUS contradict Ambassador Goldberg's and Under Secretary Eugene Rostow's quoted remarks about the negotiation and drafting of the resolution. Donald Neff says that clearly such remarks do not reflect misunderstanding. Lucius D. Battle reaffirmed US policy regarding "insubstantial" territorial changes in a 1993 interview. He said that over the years, on the issue of 242, Goldberg had proven to be a "slippery character".
The quotes in the article sourced to Goldberg and Rostow do not clarify or alter US policy decisions that appear elsewhere by more senior members of the government, i.e. the President, and Secretaries of State. The same thing applies to many of the vague comments made by Brown, Caradon, and Stewart that are contradicted by official statements that were made for the Security Council record.
Eugene Rostow, claimed that he "helped produce" UN 242, and has repeatedly argued that it authorizes continued Israeli control over the territories.
David Korn, former State Department office director for Israel and Arab-Israeli affairs, responded that "Professor Rostow may think he `helped produce' Resolution 242, but in fact he had little if anything to do with it." He was an "onlooker," like "many others who have claimed a hand in it." "It was U.S. policy at the time and for several years afterward," Korn continues, "that [any border] changes would be no more than minor." Korn confirms that "Both Mr. Goldberg and Secretary of State Dean Rusk told King Hussein that the United States would use its influence to obtain territorial compensation from Israel for any West Bank lands ceded by Jordan to Israel," and that Jordan's acquiescence was based on these promises. Rostow's evasive response contests none of these statements. See Deterring Democracy Copyright © 1991, 1992 by Noam Chomsky. Published by South End Press. Afterword [4] Korn's account was confirmed by the declassified documents contained in the 2004 edition of the FRUS on the Six Day War.
Sidney A. Freifeld was a counselor of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations during the years 1967-68, when Canada was a member of the Security Council. He wrote a long letter to the Editor of Commentary Magazine which challenged Rostow's version of events and the honesty of his arguments. [5]
The FRUS contains document 476 from Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff which says that Goldberg opposed any public effort to define our position because it would just get the US in further trouble with everyone. Goldberg made no statement for the record during the Security Council sessions regarding the meaning of the withdrawal clause.
Goldberg talked about attempts to add the words "all" or "the" to the resolution, but failed to mention Document 478. It explained that on October 18th Goldberg removed the paragraph on withdrawal and belligerency and had drafts circulated to other members of the Security Council while telling Caradon the US would disown it if it came to be known as the US version. There were no drafts subsequently tabled by the other members without a withdrawal clause. Document 521 says that on 12 November, Goldberg told the members of the Security Council that the text of the resolution does not prejudice the positions of those directly concerned. According to Lall, on 22 November Caradon also told the Arabs that their position on withdrawal was not prejudiced by the wording of the resolution. But both men insisted in later accounts that the wording was crucial. harlan (talk) 21:30, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
- So you think we can with without anything that contradicts your POV. What a surprise. Seriously, if you think this article is going to end up without the view that the resolution doesn't require full withdraw (a view apparently also held by Nabil Shaath as we can see in the previous section) you are gravely mistaken. This is a significant published view and you'd do well to self revert and discuss before removing huge chunks of relevant sourced content. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 23:48, 23 December 2009 (UTC)
- No, you've been complaining about quotes and FRUS material from day one. I'm no mind reader. I'm giving you the opportunity to restore whatever it is that you want.
- The main problem is that the article doesn't quote Israeli officials on their own policy and viewpoints regarding 242. I cited Ruth Lapidoth in the lead as a representative example of the three main viewpoints. I have no objection to inclusion of her material. I only asked Steve to summarize and quote her, and to stop trying to write a Lapidoth, McHugo, Goldberg, Caradon, synthesis.
- The article still discusses the "Israeli" and "Palestinian" POV, land for peace, the French vs. English text, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and etc. There is still a Goldberg quote on the missing definite article, and an Abba Eban quote along the same lines. If you want to quote what Nabil Shaath actually said above, go ahead. That isn't relevant to the French vs. English subsection where it was located. It is doubtful that it accurately represented the PA position. The desiderata of a contiguous Palestinian state would not be obtained by a withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 borders.
- A single IRMA report isn't likely to represent the "Palestinian view" of 242 in any case. For example, it is doubtful that this represents the "Israeli view": "Prime Minister Ehud Barak today (27.2.2000) accepted the Arab assertion that U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 requires Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders. Mr. Barak noted that Madrid was based on 242 and asked his cabinet rhetorically "what other recognized border is there besides the 1967 border?" [6] Ha'aretz said that outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert also remarked that Israel would have to withdraw from East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights if it was serious about making peace with the Palestinians and Syria.[7] There are a range of viewpoints that the article doesn't address. harlan (talk) 05:27, 24 December 2009 (UTC)
- I don't want to quote Nabil Shaath. I think we need much less quotes in this article. But you can't just go excising one point of view. If we can condense the stuff you deleted into a couple of sentences, that would be awesome. Until we find a way to do that, deleting a huge amount of sourced content relating only to one point of view just won't cut it. I'm restoring the whole thing. Lets find a way to summarize it before we remove it. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 11:12, 24 December 2009 (UTC)
- A single IRMA report isn't likely to represent the "Palestinian view" of 242 in any case. For example, it is doubtful that this represents the "Israeli view": "Prime Minister Ehud Barak today (27.2.2000) accepted the Arab assertion that U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 requires Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders. Mr. Barak noted that Madrid was based on 242 and asked his cabinet rhetorically "what other recognized border is there besides the 1967 border?" [6] Ha'aretz said that outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert also remarked that Israel would have to withdraw from East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights if it was serious about making peace with the Palestinians and Syria.[7] There are a range of viewpoints that the article doesn't address. harlan (talk) 05:27, 24 December 2009 (UTC)
Accredited's unsourced material and deletions
Accredited is trying to write unsourced editorials which say that there are sharp disagreements between the US and Israel over the interpretation of the resolution. There are already several sources, including Rusk, which say that.
He is also trying to add more quoted material about straightening or rationalizing the borders. 90 percent of the article consists of quotes from the MFA, CAMERA, and the FRUS. They more than adequately address that topic.
This resolution is famous for its ambiguity. Accredited has already deleted policy statements, made by Brown, that Caradon, Parthasarathi (India), and Berad (France) arranged beforehand to have read into the record on the day the resolution was adopted. Several published sources said was done in order to secure the Soviet vote. He also has deleted Browns subsequent explanation regarding (a) the meaning of the withdrawal clause; (b) the authenticity of the French version; (c) the possibility of straightening the borders; (d) his discussions and advice to the Israelis during the drafting and negotiation of the resolution. Accredited substituted yet another ambiguous comment about straightening the borders in its place. harlan (talk) 15:08, 25 December 2009 (UTC)
- I suggest, once again, that we summarize the various published views on the matter and keep the quotes to a minimum. All this over quoting is an obvious attempt to influence the reader's conclusions, and that's not our job here.
- To get the ball rolling, here's what I think the most frequently published views are:
- Definite article issue:
- Israel must withdraw from all the territories.
- Israel must withdraw from most territories with minor negotiated border corrections expected.
- Israel must withdraw from some territories.
- Borders issue:
- 1967 borders (with or without modifications) are now Israel's borders.
- UNGA 181 borders are Israel's borders.
- Did I forget anything? If this seems ok to everyone, I suggest the next thing is writing it up nicely (with no quotes, only refs) here on the talk page, and hopefully we can reach something we can put in the article and remove all the crap. We could mention in a few words the difference between the English and French versions and get rid of that whole section. We could cut down the negotiation process section substantially. We could probably remove a lot more stuff and start getting this article into some kind of shape.
- Thoughts? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 17:00, 25 December 2009 (UTC)
- You restored the "quote farm", despite the fact that it contained unsourced editorial statements made in the voice of the encyclopedia. It is not Wikipedia's job to say the statements of British and American officials provide "key evidence" to support the "some territories" reading, and then deliberately obscure actual policy statements that were made by the relevant American and British officials. That requires an explanation from a published source, not a synthesis cobbled together on the article talk page. The policy is to use the main template and split up the article if it gets too large.
- Kissinger said that "a flood of words" was used to justify the various demands and that it obscured rather than illuminated the fundamental positions. McHugo and others have cited the MFA's misuse of quotes on its website to suggest the resolution authorized Israel to retain some territories. There have also been books and articles written by insiders, like David Aaron Miller: [8]; David Korn: [9]; Sidney Freifeld: [10]; and others like Perry and Neff which say that many American and Britih officials involved in Arab-Israeli peacemaking have acted as Israel's attorney, catering and coordinating with the Israelis at the expense of successful peace negotiations. That criticism is notable and its inclusion in the article is warranted. It has been leveled at former officials, including Aurthur Goldberg, Eugene Rostow, Michael Stewart, and Elliot Abrams. harlan (talk) 20:59, 25 December 2009 (UTC)
- You deleted a huge chunk of text, some of which has been in the article for a while, without discussion. I reverted your whole deletion. I didn't check the sources one by one.
- From your response above I gather you're not interested in finding some sort of compromise that will include all published views and that everyone can live with, you're only interested in getting your POV in and spamming the article with quotes in the hope you'll influence the opinion of the reader.
- This is getting tiresome. I'd like to remind you that this article is under WP:General Sanctions. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 21:12, 25 December 2009 (UTC)
(outdent)Correction, 90 percent of the original article's content was quoted directly from MFA, CAMERA, and JCPA websites and it contained very long chery-picked quotes of Caradon's remarks from the GWU Symposium. I added some additional quotes from the same Symposium that said Israel was violating 242 and that everyone assumed the bulk of the occupied territories would be returned to Jordan. There was a very long discussion about that. Goldberg's and Eban's viewpoints were still represented in the article's content after I deleted the FRUS material and the quotes about "drafting" the resolution. In any event, I added Ruth Lapidoth's viewpoint and cited her JCPA article. You've deleted material from Dugard, and a host of others on non-recognition based upon resolution 242. That material is no longer reflected in the article's content, and it isn't included in your proposed list. harlan (talk) 21:57, 25 December 2009 (UTC)
- If I missed something do feel free to point it out. Also, it's not a "proposed list". It's a list of the main published views as far as I could remember. It's not supposed to look like that in the article. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 22:22, 25 December 2009 (UTC)
I call on you to substantiate or retract your allegation on unsourced material and deletions.
I have only replaced Mazzawi's unreliable text with the correct statement as qtd. in the American Journal of International Law. Accredited (talk) 10:12, 27 December 2009 (UTC)
- Your additions to the context section do not add anything new, or clarify the positions, since both Rusk and Brown said the borders could be rationalized or straightened out and demilitarized zones established in much fewer words. The resolution provided for DMZs and Reagan's comments about Israel not returning to a situation where it was in artillery range makes no mention of a right to retain any territory. During the first Gulf War, it was demonstrated that all of Israel and the occupied territories are within range of SCUD missiles and that borders don't stop missiles. Reagan's remarks about Jerusalem being unified do not represent any change in US policy regarding internationalization.
- The FRUS says the Rostow telegram was approved by Rostow, not Rusk. The paragraph you are quoting begins with the words "Rostow said" and it does not actually end with the word "Rusk". It presents Rostow's views about the resolution, and those have been publicly dismissed by Korn, Freifeld, and other officials as incorrect.
- The American Journal of International Law (AJIL) has been published quarterly since 1907, that isn't a readily verifiable citation. But CAMERA is quoting a specific Rostow article that merely quotes Brown on the missing definite article. On the other hand, the quote from Mazzawi is accurate and sourced to a specific edition, May 1978, "The Middle East" magazine and speaks about the the missing definite article, the authenticity of the French version, the meaning of the withdrawal clause, and Brown's discussions with the Israeli's. Mazzai, Lall, and Moore all recount the 22 November meeting where Caradon arranged beforehand to have the Indian representative read the official policy statements made by Brown regarding territorial aggrandizement into the record. He said that Israel could not expand its borders, and that Israel must withdraw. I'm going to add that episode to the article. harlan (talk) 14:03, 27 December 2009 (UTC)
You did not answer my call to substantiate your allegation on unsourced material and deletions.
In the first telegram Rusk said that "the difference between pre-June 5 positions and secure national boundaries was an important difference."[3]
The second telegram that starts "Rostow said" is also signed Rusk. Both are brief. [4]
Mazzawi's text is irrational and clearly unreliable.
On the one hand he says that "It would have been impossible to get the Resolution through if the words "all" or "the" were included." On the other hand he says "But the English text is clear. Withdrawal from territories means just that, nothing more, nothing less." Does that make sense? Furthermore, he contradicts himself by saying that "The French text is equally legitimate. In the French translation the word "des" is used before territories, meaning "from the", implying all the territories seized in the '67 war." Again he switches, "The Israelis knew this. They understood that it called for withdrawal with only minor border changes from the old frontiers - just to straighten the lines." This is quite misleading and an insult to the intelligence of the readers.
However, CAMERA's quote of Brown from the Rostow article is clearly reliable and consistent.
[Resolution 242] does not call for Israeli withdrawal from “the” territories recently occupied, nor does it use the word “all”. It would have been impossible to get the resolution through if either of these words had been included, but it does set out the lines on which negotiations for a settlement must take place. Each side must be prepared to give up something: the resolution doesn’t attempt to say precisely what, because that is what negotiations for a peace-treaty must be about. [5]
Reagan's statement is self-explanatory.
The British policy is irrelevant to the meaning of Resolution 242 as I already stated:
You chose to ignore Caradon's subsequent remarks just prior to the adoption of Resolution 242:
"Secondly, the draft resolution which we have prepared is not a British text. It is the result of close and prolonged consultation with both sides and with all members of this Council. As I have respectfully said, every member of this Council has made a contribution in the search for common ground on which we can go forward."
Furthermore, British Foreign Secretary George Brown had said:
I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied', and not from 'the' territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories.[6]
Lord Caradon speaks for himself. You are not his spokesman. As he said on Nov. 22, 1967: "All of us, no doubt, have our own views and interpretations and understandings. I explained my own when I spoke on Monday last. On these matters each delegation rightly speaks only for itself."Accredited (talk) 18:24, 27 December 2009 (UTC)
CAMERA has clipped the Brown quote. I'm going to use the quote that provides the most context in any event. You and NNMNG have been complaining about Caradon quotes, but I'm going to add the account from Lall. Caradon arranged beforhand to have Brown's statements read by the Indian representative so he could say he stood by those declarations. I'll add some quotes from Meir, Rabin, Barak, and Olmert too since no one seems to want to discuss Israeli policy statements. harlan (talk) 19:26, 27 December 2009 (UTC)
- I have repeatedly tried to work with you to find a way to make this article look more like something you'd find in an encyclopedia and less like a quote farm combined with a legal document. You have yet to offer any sort of compromise. Not once. You don't even comment on my suggestions. All you do is delete chunks of text you don't like from the article and flood this page with more quotes without engaging in substantial discussion. I'm tired of this. If you don't start to engage in some real discussion, I'm going to take this to AE.
- That goes for you too, Accredited. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 20:12, 27 December 2009 (UTC)
- The Reagan administration actually did publish statements about the internationalization of Jerusalem, and the President said he would veto any legislation that would recognize Jerusalem as the Capital or move the US Embassy there.
- You have a short memory on cooperation. You complained about the quote farm, so I removed all of the FRUS material and the redundant drafting section material about the missing definite article/border straightening and asked you to restore whatever you thought was necessary. That was a compromise.
- I've explained that this resolution is an international legal instrument that has been incorporated by reference in several binding agreements including: the Camp David Framework Agreement, the Declaration of Principles of the Oslo Accords, and the Quartet Roadmap Agreement. Many states have cited it as the basis for their sanctions and non-recognition. The EU Minister's statement provides an example. You deleted 100 percent of that material about state responsibility for wrongful acts and non-recognition. Inclusion of that material actually is non-negotiable. The article doesn't have any actual policy statements made by Israeli PMs regarding 242. Olmert actually did discuss the steps required to implement the resolution [11] harlan (talk) 21:28, 27 December 2009 (UTC)
Accredited if you want to quote footnote 7 you need to quote the portion of Document 455 where it appears:
Our best answer is that we stand by that pledge, but the only way to make good on it is to have a genuine peace. The tough question is whether we'd force Israel back to 4 June borders if the Arabs accepted terms that amounted to an honest peace settlement. Secretary Rusk told the Yugoslav Foreign Minister: "The US had no problem with frontiers as they existed before the outbreak of hostilities. If we are talking about national frontiers--in a state of peace--then we will work toward restoring them."/7/ But we all know that could lead to a tangle with the Israelis.
/7/Rusk met with Foreign Minister Nikezic on August 30. According to telegram 30825 to Belgrade, September 1, which summarizes the conversation, Rusk said the key to a settlement was to end the state of war and belligerence and that if a way could be found to deal with this, other things would fall into place; the difference between pre-June 5 positions and secure national boundaries was an important difference. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
Rusk subsequently told Eban that US support for secure permanent frontiers doesn't mean we support territorial changes. See Document 487 October 24, 1967. Both Documents were already cited in the FRUS section of the article. Rusk's remarks about straightening the borders already appears in the context section. harlan (talk) 19:55, 2 January 2010 (UTC)
As Johnson's last letter to Tito said "We have no preconception on frontiers as such." Accredited (talk) 17:28, 3 January 2010 (UTC)
- I've gone ahead and added that full quote to the drafting section for you. He was saying that the US does not interpret the draft resolution to mean that Israel could alter the frontiers to the Arabs detriment. I've also corrected numerous misquotes that cited the JCPA, CAMERA, President Johnson's 19 June 1967 speech to the Educators, and George Brown's memoir "In My Way". harlan (talk) 21:50, 3 January 2010 (UTC)
(outdent) Accredited you keep deleting official policy statements made by Brown during the UN debates and another quote that mentions his discussions with Israeli officials and the authenticity of the French version of the resolution. Those quotes are third party verifiable and have been published by WP:RS sources. Your edit summary simply says "Quote unreliable. A statesman in Brown's caliber would not make such an inconsistent statement." Glenn Perry actually cited Brown as a statesman who made contradictory statements:
"Subsequent statements by particular statesmen who were involved in the drafting and passage of the resolution (e.g. George Brown and Lord Caradon) are not conclusive, particularly when they contradict what they said during the UN debates in 1967. For several statements in this category, see Moore, op.cit., II, pp. 1024-1144 and Weil, in Ibid., p. 321."
That observation and source is already cited in the Context section of the article.
The policy in WP:V says "The threshold for inclusion in Wikipedia is verifiability, not truth—that is, whether readers are able to check that material added to Wikipedia has already been published by a reliable source, not whether we think it is true."
A number of quotes from CAMERA, JCPA, and IMRA have been corrected by adding the portions that mentioned the withdrawal clause. Those appear to have been intentionally omitted. harlan (talk) 12:13, 15 January 2010 (UTC)
Here we go again.
I have only replaced Mazzawi's unreliable text with the correct statement as qtd. in the American Journal of International Law.
Mazzawi's text is irrational and clearly unreliable.
On the one hand he says that "It would have been impossible to get the Resolution through if the words "all" or "the" were included." On the other hand he says "But the English text is clear. Withdrawal from territories means just that, nothing more, nothing less." Does that make sense? Furthermore, he contradicts himself by saying that "The French text is equally legitimate. In the French translation the word "des" is used before territories, meaning "from the", implying all the territories seized in the '67 war." Again he switches, "The Israelis knew this. They understood that it called for withdrawal with only minor border changes from the old frontiers - just to straighten the lines." This is quite misleading and an insult to the intelligence of the readers.
However, CAMERA's quote of Brown from the Rostow article is clearly reliable and consistent.
[Resolution 242] does not call for Israeli withdrawal from “the” territories recently occupied, nor does it use the word “all”. It would have been impossible to get the resolution through if either of these words had been included, but it does set out the lines on which negotiations for a settlement must take place. Each side must be prepared to give up something: the resolution doesn’t attempt to say precisely what, because that is what negotiations for a peace-treaty must be about. [7]
The British policy is irrelevant to the meaning of Resolution 242 as I already stated:
You chose to ignore Caradon's subsequent remarks just prior to the adoption of Resolution 242: "Secondly, the draft resolution which we have prepared is not a British text. It is the result of close and prolonged consultation with both sides and with all members of this Council. As I have respectfully said, every member of this Council has made a contribution in the search for common ground on which we can go forward."
Furthermore, British Foreign Secretary George Brown had said:
I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied', and not from 'the' territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories.[8]
Lord Caradon speaks for himself. You are not his spokesman. As he said on Nov. 22, 1967: "All of us, no doubt, have our own views and interpretations and understandings. I explained my own when I spoke on Monday last. On these matters each delegation rightly speaks only for itself." Accredited (talk) 14:26, 15 January 2010 (UTC)
- The CAMERA quote left out Brown's remarks about (i) the de facto annexation of Arab territory that had already occurred; (ii) Israel's desire to permanently colonize the Arab territory; and (iii) that Israel would have to withdraw. The policy regarding CAMERA is that they are not a very reliable source, and that they must be cited with great care. A number of sources comment that Eugene Rostow held extreme views, e.g. Glenn Perry, David Korn, Sidney Freifeld, Donald Neff, etc.
- David Korn and Sidney A. Freifeld both published very significant comments about the meaning of resolution 242 and attacked the credibility of Eugene Rostow's published accounts about his involvement in drafting the resolution and his interpretation.[12] Those remarks keep disappearing from the article. If you are going to cite Rostow and CAMERA, then NPOV requires that those opposing viewpoints be included.
- When Caradon "spoke on Monday" he quoted Brown's policy statements that were made during the General Assembly debates. Each delegation can only "speak for itself" if you stop deleting what they said. The majority of the 15 delegations made statements, for the record, that the acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible and that this resolution requires Israel to withdraw from all the territories occupied during the 1967 war. According to WP:VALID Wikipedia neutrality policy does not state, or imply, that we must "give equal validity" to minority views - and while policy states that we must not take a stand on these issues as encyclopedia writers; that does not stop us from describing the majority views as such. The article already contains plenty of quotes about the vague possibility of "mutually" agreed minor border rectifications, and the omission of the definite article. Putting in more of those doesn't alter the majority viewpoint. You are deleting the only reference to British discussions with Israeli officials and British views about the authenticity of the French version. I don't think you are doing that for educational reasons.
- I don't have to be Caradon's spokesman to cite published statements that he made, or the analysis of those comments from the published works of Michael Lynk, Musa E. Mazzawi, Glenn Perry, Donald Neff, and etc. NOTABILITY is another criteria for inclusion. The observation that Caradon and Brown made some contradictory statements that were not conclusive is mentioned by a number of sources. There is guidance from ArbCom that removal of statements that are pertinent, sourced reliably, and written in a neutral style constitutes disruption. harlan (talk) 16:36, 15 January 2010 (UTC)
Mazzawi's Brown quote is contradicted by the quote from "In My Way, George Brown Memoirs" that appears in the article.
It is inconceivable that after having said that "It would have been impossible to get the Resolution through if the words "all" or "the" were included" --which appears in both quotes--that he would say "But the English text is clear. Withdrawal from territories means just that, nothing more, nothing less." Furthermore, that "The French text is equally legitimate" and that "the Israelis knew this." The French translation only emerged after Resolution 242 had been adopted when the French delegate announced it. But in Mazzawi's quote "I told the Israelis they had better accept it, because if they didn't they could be left with something worse, and with our version there would be something to argue about later."[10] This is absolutely absurd. Accredited (talk) 17:14, 16 January 2010 (UTC)
- You don't get to make disruptive edits because you personally find a statement from a verifiable WP:RS source "absurd". The observation that Brown and Caradon made inconclusive statements that contradicted what they actually said during the United Nations debates is a NOTABLE fact according to several sources that are already cited in the article. It is quite obvious by now that you are engaging in disruptive edits on the basis of your own WP:OR thesis, so I'm going to move this discussion to WP:AE if you persist in deleting the Brown quote.
- Glenn Perry and Arthur Lall both wrote that the issue of the authenticity of the French version arose before the vote, and that the French delegation had ALWAYS stressed that point. Caradon prearranged for the French representative to announce that the French version was equally authentic and that it required withdrawal from all the territories. The statement of Mr. BERARD (France) is readily available online at paragraph 111 of the 1382nd session he said:
We must admit, however, that on the point which the French delegation has always stressed as being essential--the question of withdrawal of the occupation forces--the resolution which has been adopted, if we refer to the French text which is equally authentic with the English, leaves no room for any ambiguity, since it speaks of withdrawal "des territoires occupés", which indisputably corresponds to the expression "occupied territories".
- Perry and Lall say that Caradon also arranged for the representative of India to quote Brown's policy statements which said Israel could not expand its borders and that it must withdraw. Caradon said Great Britain stood by those statements. Perry and Lall say all of that was done to prevent a Soviet veto. I've already explained that I intend to include that information in the article. harlan (talk) 09:49, 17 January 2010 (UTC)
It is quite irrational to admit that "It would have been impossible to get the Resolution through if the words "all" or "the" were included." but maintain that "The French text is equally legitimate. In the French translation the word "des" is used before territories, meaning "from the", implying all the territories seized in the '67 war."
As to the various policy statements, they are irrelevant to Resolution 242 since "each delegation rightly speaks only for itself." Accredited (talk) 11:04, 17 January 2010 (UTC)
- The only thing that is irrelevant is your unpublished thesis. If you don't have anything to discuss here that can be sourced to a verifiable WP:RS publication, then you are wasting everyone's time and abusing the talk page. harlan (talk) 11:36, 17 January 2010 (UTC)
I reiterate my call that you substantiate or retract your allegations. Accredited (talk) 13:00, 17 January 2010 (UTC)
- Here is one of many examples [13] where you deleted Foreign Secretary Brown's quote. You also replaced it with a private unsourced WP:OR analysis and editorial which claimed Secretary Rusk's statement that the US never contemplated any significant grant of territory to Israel as a result of the June 1967 war, and that there were no commitments made by the United States to assist Israel in retaining territories seized in the Six-Day War was "a far outcry from Secretary Rusk's Telegram dated March 2, 1968 to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in Cairo summarizing Eugene Rostow’s conversation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin".
- The telegram doesn't contain any statement or comments made by Rusk. The FRUS says it was Eugene Rostow that approved the telegram, and the comments you quoted are Eugene Rostow's, not Rusk's. The telegram was cited in the footnote to a US policy document which said the US was willing to demand that Israel withdraw to the 4 June 1967 borders. Rostow's comments do reflect the official US policy that Israel cannot retain territory without the agreement of the Arabs. His other remarks to Dobrynin that "he did not see how anyone could seriously argue, in light of history of resolution in Security Council, withdrawal to borders of June 4th was contemplated." or that agreement must precede withdrawal is answered conclusively by the text of the FRUS policy document that mentions the telegram and by other reliable sources including, Sidney Freifeld [14], David Korn [15], and President Johnson himself. The President suggested the use of US peacekeeping forces in his original five point policy address at the State Department's Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, on June 19, 1967 [16]
- Here are some examples where you deleted a citation to the interview where Caradon said the resolution could rectify the so-called bad line by mutual exchanges of small parcels of territory and that recognized borders had nothing to do with geography. [17] [18] Here is an example where you deleted three references, including a citation to a published analysis of his comments by a verifiable WP:RS secondary source.[19] You keep making the bizarre statement that "Caradon speaks for himself". WP:PSTS policy says "Any interpretation of primary source material requires a reliable secondary source for that interpretation."
- Here is where you deleted Donald Neff's observation that the resolution had barely been passed before Israel began challenging its generally accepted meaning in quite extraordinary terms and McHugo's observation about the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' use of words taken out of context in order to support a position which would appear to give Israel a right to acquire parts of the occupied territories.[20]
- The use of quotes from President Johnson and others with the clauses about withdrawal removed has already been identified as a significant propaganda problem in the misuse of quotes subsection above. That was very obviously done with the intention of making it appear that the necessity of not "returning to pre-June 5 positions" meant there would be territorial changes. Secretary Rusk and Caradon both explained that support for recognized borders did not mean support for territorial changes. The telegram to Belgrade which indicates "the difference between pre-June 5 positions and secure national boundaries was an important difference." does not mention any territorial changes or alter the US policy which Secretary Rusk explained to the Yugoslav Foreign Minister: "The US had no problem with frontiers as they existed before the outbreak of hostilities." harlan (talk) 16:13, 17 January 2010 (UTC)
I deleted Mazzawi's Brown quote which is clearly unreliable. It is further contradicted by Brown's interview as Foreign Secretary and the quote from "In My Way, George Brown Memoirs" that appears in the article.
"Caradon speaks for himself" means that you should actually quote his interview in context. He neither said that "recognized borders" had nothing to do with geography nor did he utter the words "mutual exchanges of small parcels of territory." Accredited (talk) 18:32, 17 January 2010 (UTC)
- Brown's statements on British policy were endorsed by Caradon and quoted verbatim at the 1381st meeting of the Security Council, and quoted by other members of the Security Council during the 1382nd meeting. If you think you can keep selectively quoting from the minutes of the Security Council sessions while tendentiously deleting the relevant British policy statements about the withdrawal clause you are sadly mistaken. The matter will be addressed for dispute resolution (sooner rather than later).
- The talk page is not the forum for your rants about the reliability of quotes. I did the footwork and looked up the evidence that established CAMERA, JCPA, and MFA were misusing the original sources and failing to include remarks about the requirement for Israel to withdraw. You haven't done that, and haven't discussed whether or not Musa E.Mazzawi, Ph.D., professor of international law at the Polytechnic of Central London (now the University of Westminster), and Dean of the law faculty there or Garnet Publishing & Ithaca Press are reliable published sources at Wikipedia:Reliable sources/Noticeboard. The same thing goes for Michael Lynk, BA (Hons.) Dalhousie 1974, LLB (Dalhousie) 1981, LLM (Queen's), Associate Dean at Western Law, the University of Western Ontario and the Journal of Palestine Studies or SSRN. You certainly aren't going to continue to edit war on the basis of your own personal say so without the issue of bad faith and tendentious editing being raised at WP:AE.
- Wikipedia policy is that any verifiable and reliable WP:RS secondary source that has published a synthesis or analysis of Caradon's remarks from the GWU Symposium on Resolution 242 and the "Interview with Caradon" from the Journal of Palestine Studies" meets the burden of proof for inclusion in this article. I have corrected the incomplete quotes from CAMERA, JCPA, and MFA, but I have not deleted them. The interviewer did ask Caradon if he was suggesting that resolution 242 could be implemented through the mutual exchange of small parcels of territory, and Caradon answered in the affirmative:
"Q. But how would one change the previous border without the acquisition of territory by war? Are you suggesting mutual concessions, that is, that both Israel and the Arabs would rationalize the border by yielding up small parcels of territory? A. Yes, I'm suggesting that.
- Caradon also said:
"therefore there must be a withdrawal to - let's read the words carefully - "secure and recognized boundaries." They can only be secure if they are recognized. The boundaries have to be agreed; it's only when you get agreement that you get security. I think that now people begin to realize what we had in mind that security doesn't come from arms, it doesn't come from territory, it doesn't come from geography, it doesn't come from one side dominating the other, it can only come from agreement and mutual respect and understanding."
- Golda Meir said the same thing. She said that as she saw it, there was no such thing as a secure boundary - only security. US National Archives, box 2071, 11 January 1971: cable from US Ambassador Yost, USUN to the Secretary of State. Ynet reported the same thing recently:
"As long as the IDF’s doomsday scenarios had to do with Iraqi tanks rushing in our direction through Jordan, the argument of holding on to certain territory in order to curb an invasion carried some weight. Yet the First Gulf War pushed this argument off the agenda, replacing it with the question of missiles. It became unclear why we need the settlement enterprise to defend ourselves against missiles, as the land cannot stop the Scuds."
- The statements made by Brown and Caradon are relevant, notable, easily verifiable, and meet the burden of proof for inclusion. harlan (talk) 20:38, 17 January 2010 (UTC)
The British policy statements have no connection to the withdrawal to secure boundaries clause of Resolution 242. As Lord Caradon made it clear before the vote that this "is not a British text" and that "each delegation rightly speaks only for itself."
As to Mazzawi's Brown quote which admits that "It would have been impossible to get the Resolution through if the words "all" or "the" were included." But maintains that "The French text is equally legitimate. In the French translation the word "des" is used before territories, meaning "from the", implying all the territories seized in the '67 war", is clearly inconsistent and unsuitable.
It is further contradicted by the quote from "In My Way, George Brown Memoirs" that appears in the article:
[Resolution 242] does not call for Israeli withdrawal from “the” territories recently occupied, nor does it use the word “all”. It would have been impossible to get the resolution through if either of these words had been included, but it does set out the lines on which negotiations for a settlement must take place. Each side must be prepared to give up something: the resolution doesn’t attempt to say precisely what, because that is what negotiations for a peace-treaty must be about. [9]
Furthermore, in his interview as British Foreign Secretary George Brown had said:
I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied', and not from 'the' territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories.[10]
As to the Caradon quote, although the article already quotes him at least eight times, I have no objection to add another quote of his actual words in context as appropriate. Accredited (talk) 09:28, 18 January 2010 (UTC)
Arbitrary break
Regarding this revert, so as to not mis-characterize the reasons for it, could you please offer a quick summary? Unomi (talk) 00:44, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Most articles about UN resolutions are little more than stubs. When I first noticed this article, it was literally a WP:COATRACK quote farm consisting of material from the CAMERA and MFA websites. They are certainly reliable sources for their own opinions, but as Secretary Rusk noted, "we never contemplated any significant grant of territory to Israel as a result of the June 1967 war. On that point we and the Israelis to this day remain sharply divided." CAMERA and the MFA are not reliable sources for information on US or UK policy regarding resolution 242.
- I've supplied the statements of three primary sources: UK Foreign Minister - George Brown, the General Legal Counsel of the Indian delegation - Arthur Lall ("the brains behind the delegation"[21]), and the UK representative to the UN - Lord Caradon. I've also supplied analysis of those statements from secondary sources which include Glenn Perry, Musa Mazzawi, Michael Lynk, Donald Neff, John McHugo, and others. NMMNG and Accredited simply ignore the WP:ARBPIA reminder that editors must utilize reliable sources for contentious or disputed assertions. They do not provide any analysis from published sources regarding this material at all.
- This article has a subsection devoted to the legitimacy of the French version. At a minimum, Brown's comments in that regard are obviously relevant. There are several published accounts which say Lord Caradon carried on last-minute negotiations with the French, Indian, Arab, and other representatives to prevent the UK draft resolution from being vetoed. Brown confirmed those accounts in an interview he gave to the London monthly magazine, The Middle East. Brown says the French version is equally legitimate and that it requires withdrawal from the territories seized during the war. He says the Israelis knew this.
- We know that prior to the vote, the Indian delegate read George Brown's statements regarding British policy. Brown said Israel could not use war to enlarge its borders, and that Israel had to withdraw (para 50-51). Caradon replied that the UK stood by those policies and declarations(para 57). Every attempt to add that material to the Context section of this article has resulted in a WP:TEDIOUS revert. The French delegate quoted George Brown's policy statement on Jerusalem. He also explained that the French version called for withdrawal from the occupied territories, and that the French version was equally authentic with the English (paras 111-112). [22] None of the other delegates disagreed.
- Mazzawi cited two portions of the interview in the London monthly magazine, The Middle East. His comments and the second portion read: "George Brown then gives an interesting insight into the political manoeuvring that went on in the lobbies of the United Nations about Resolution 242. He is reported by the same source to have said this":
We arranged that the Indian delegate, who was leading the non-aligned block with their own version, should make a statement declaring that the reference to territories should mean all territories. We arranged with them beforehand that we would not respond to the statement and therefore this interpretation would remain on the record. And the Indian delegate did, obligingly and in cohorts with the United Kingdom delegate, make that statement as we have seen.[23]
- Arthur Lall wrote a similar account:
"A crucial meeting took place at 3 p.m. [on November 22] between the Arabs and Caradon. He was able to reassure them that their position on the question of withdrawal remained unprejudiced. Further negotiations followed between Parthasarathi [the Indian representative} and Caradon which involved also the French and Nigerian delegates. As a result of these late exchanges Caradon agreed to delete from his proposed response to the Indian delegate's projected statement the words "But the Indian interpretation is not binding on the Council." On this basis Parthasarathi decided to vote for the resolution and so informed the Soviet Union." -- See Arthur Lall, The United Nations and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 260-261
- All of this is discussed at length by Perry, Lynk, Neff, McHugo, et al. harlan (talk) 03:56, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
The answer clearly appears above. Repetition unnecessary. Accredited (talk) 09:56, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- If you are unwilling to restate your reasons for arguing against the addition of content then you run the risk of having them misinterpreted. From what I can see above you seem to largely base your resistance to the inclusion on the grounds that the material is inconsistent with what is presented in other sources. When such an event happens, which is quite often, the proper thing to do is represent all sides in a neutral tone according to weight and presumptions of reliability. As I read it, Harlan has offered a bevy of scholarly and official sources which confirm that his position is supported by the literature available. If I missed additional arguments that you have forwarded please do have the courtesy to restate them below. Best, un☯mi 11:14, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Have you read this article? Do you think it's in good condition? Do you think it needs more quotes? Have you read the discussions in the archives? Or did you just knee jerkingly restore something you think someone on "your" side of the IP conflict wanted in the article? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 11:45, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- I have read the article, and I agree that it could use some general cleanup, lets first get it balanced yet unpolished and then we can whittle down after that. We are unlikely to be able to agree on big changes just yet, lets focus on small collaborative gains first. un☯mi 11:47, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- I tried to do that for months. I suggest you read the archives.
- Do you feel the issue of why the word "the" isn't in the text is not covered sufficiently in the article? I mean, there are only about 10 paragraphs talking about it, is that not enough? Is it not balanced? Is one POV not represented? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 11:59, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- I find that the article is somewhat unbalanced, yes, my position as a person who is not intimate with the sources gives me the impression that instead of a balance within sections, there is a tendency to seek a balance between sections. As an example the interpretations section and those following it seem to present what I assume to be the Israeli pov quite convincingly. I must again reaffirm that I agree that we need to tighten the article up and hopefully end up with a version that we all can agree to defend later, as it were. I find that quotes are often used due to the difficulty of agreeing on mutually acceptable summaries, so defensible quotes are used in lieu of that, hopefully we can work together to overcome that necessity. un☯mi 12:13, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- You feel it is unbalanced? How's that? There are practically the same amount of paragraphs/quotes/piles of repetition for both POVs. I invite you to show me numbers that prove otherwise.
- We should be removing some of this repetition rather than adding to it. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 12:25, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- I find that the article is somewhat unbalanced, yes, my position as a person who is not intimate with the sources gives me the impression that instead of a balance within sections, there is a tendency to seek a balance between sections. As an example the interpretations section and those following it seem to present what I assume to be the Israeli pov quite convincingly. I must again reaffirm that I agree that we need to tighten the article up and hopefully end up with a version that we all can agree to defend later, as it were. I find that quotes are often used due to the difficulty of agreeing on mutually acceptable summaries, so defensible quotes are used in lieu of that, hopefully we can work together to overcome that necessity. un☯mi 12:13, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- I have read the article, and I agree that it could use some general cleanup, lets first get it balanced yet unpolished and then we can whittle down after that. We are unlikely to be able to agree on big changes just yet, lets focus on small collaborative gains first. un☯mi 11:47, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Have you read this article? Do you think it's in good condition? Do you think it needs more quotes? Have you read the discussions in the archives? Or did you just knee jerkingly restore something you think someone on "your" side of the IP conflict wanted in the article? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 11:45, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- If you are unwilling to restate your reasons for arguing against the addition of content then you run the risk of having them misinterpreted. From what I can see above you seem to largely base your resistance to the inclusion on the grounds that the material is inconsistent with what is presented in other sources. When such an event happens, which is quite often, the proper thing to do is represent all sides in a neutral tone according to weight and presumptions of reliability. As I read it, Harlan has offered a bevy of scholarly and official sources which confirm that his position is supported by the literature available. If I missed additional arguments that you have forwarded please do have the courtesy to restate them below. Best, un☯mi 11:14, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
(outdent) Accredited previously offered a synthetic argument that a great statesman would not make inconclusive or contradictory statements. That is nothing more than your unpublished personal opinion. In fact, Glenn Perry, John Norton Moore, and Prosper Weil (in Moore) went out of their way to document inconclusive and apparently contradictory statements made by Caradon and Brown after the fact. Perry says
Subsequent statements by particular statesmen who were involved in the drafting and passage of the resolution (e.g. George Brown and Lord Caradon) are not conclusive, particularly when they contradict what they said during the UN debates in 1967. For several statements in this category, see Moore, op.cit., II, pp. 1024-1144 and Weil, in Ibid., p. 321."
You have repeatedly deleted secondary analysis by Lynk regarding the "Interview with Lord Caradon", in order to insert an unrelated quote that doesn't come from the same interview and which isn't supported by any published analysis. You are violating a very basic requirement that any analysis come from published sources. WP:ARBPIA simply reaffirmed that editors must utilize reliable sources for contentious or disputed assertions.
Arthur Lall described the position of Lord Caradon during the deliberations and negotiations as one of "resolute adherence" to the principle of "complete withdrawal by Israel," along with that of the right of all states to exist. See Arthur Lall, The United Nations and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), page 226.
Glenn Perry says
He [Caradon] also said that "we stand by our votes and we stand by our declarations," a matter of some significance, since this was in response to the Indian delegate's statement that quoted George Brown, in the earlier General Assembly debates, as having strongly supported the principle of full withdrawal. Caradon had already stated, following the introduction of the British draft, that the goals of withdrawal and secure borders were not contradictory, that the draft was clear, that non-extension of borders by war meant full withdrawal, and that the British draft was based "on principles which the Latin American delegates had declared". Thus in a slightly roundabout, but unmistakable way, the author of the resolution had at least twice endorsed the "full withdrawal" interpretation. See Security Council Resolution 242: The Withdrawal Clause, page 429
You are welcome to include opposing published views, but the time has come to stop making disruptive edits to this article. harlan (talk) 12:18, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- The time has come to stop trying to flood this and other articles with ever more quotes that you think will overwhelm the reader into seeing things the way you personally do. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 12:28, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- I think that is a somewhat unhelpful attitude in the face of the number and and quality of sources which seem to support Harlans position. I think we should add the proposed edit at this time, and then turn our collective attention to how we can distill the varying positions as indicated by quality sources to succinct prose. un☯mi 12:34, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- NMMNG you and Steve flooded the talk page and the article with WP:OR nonsense and wikilawyering. The only place I'm going to have another long discussion with you is at AN/I or WP:AE. You have assisted Attributed in adding material that obfuscates US policy statements. You have also deleted summaries of secondary sources on non-recognition, the inadmissibility principle, and etc. The notion that you have been trying to help, while tag-teaming multiple articles with topic banned users including Drork, LoveroftheRussianQueen, Stellarkid, & etc is nonsense. harlan (talk) 12:45, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Did you just accuse me of "flooding" the talkpage? That's too funny. I'd be surprised if I've used 10% as many words as you have.
- As I told you many times before, report me wherever you like. I'm completely open to my behavior being scrutinized. Are you? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 12:50, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Anyway, lets get back to the issue, can we go ahead and add the quote then start slimming from the top? un☯mi 12:55, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- No, this issue is already covered sufficiently and all POVs are represented. We should cut this down not add more repetition. Please see my reply to you above. I know, it's hard to follow the discussion when harlan keeps posting walls of text. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 13:32, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Nonsense. Where else in the article does it say that George Brown said the French version is equally authentic? Where else in the article does it say that Israel knew about that? Why are Brown's quotes, that were deliberately read aloud by secret agreement, not included anywhere in the article? There isn't a hint anywhere in the article that Brown said the Indian and UK representative were working in cooperation to get his policy statement on full withdrawal read into the record and reaffirmed by Caradon. harlan (talk) 13:42, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- We have a large paragraph with Perry saying the French version is equally authentic. Then Rosenne saying it isn't. Then we have CAMERA saying only the English is binding after which the French SC rep saying they're both binding. If we ignore the fact we start with McHugo saying that it doesn't matter if there's a definite article or not, that seems pretty balanced. Do we need 3 more people saying the same thing? That's like 8 paragraphs (with 2 large quotes) dedicated to this one technical issue. Seems like more than enough WEIGHT-wise and well within NPOV. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 14:28, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Get real. NPOV requires that all of the significant published views get included and fairly represented.
- The fact that both the US Secretary of State and UK Foreign Secretary say the French version of the withdrawal clause was equally authentic, and that Brown said the government of Israel knew about that, is much more important than the current contents of the paragraph in the English vs French subsection. Neither CAMERA nor Rosenne can veto a negotiated agreement between the members of the Security Council regarding the meaning of the withdrawal clause.
- The details of the meeting with Caradon and the representatives of France, India, the Arab states, and etc., which is independently attested by both Brown and Lall, is more important than the current contents of the Context, English vs French, Interpretations, and FRUS subsections. The study done for President Carter and the CRS Study from the State Department's Foreign Press Corps website confirm Rusks account regarding US policy. harlan (talk) 16:29, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Get real. NPOV requires that all of the significant published views get included and fairly represented.
- We have a large paragraph with Perry saying the French version is equally authentic. Then Rosenne saying it isn't. Then we have CAMERA saying only the English is binding after which the French SC rep saying they're both binding. If we ignore the fact we start with McHugo saying that it doesn't matter if there's a definite article or not, that seems pretty balanced. Do we need 3 more people saying the same thing? That's like 8 paragraphs (with 2 large quotes) dedicated to this one technical issue. Seems like more than enough WEIGHT-wise and well within NPOV. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 14:28, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Nonsense. Where else in the article does it say that George Brown said the French version is equally authentic? Where else in the article does it say that Israel knew about that? Why are Brown's quotes, that were deliberately read aloud by secret agreement, not included anywhere in the article? There isn't a hint anywhere in the article that Brown said the Indian and UK representative were working in cooperation to get his policy statement on full withdrawal read into the record and reaffirmed by Caradon. harlan (talk) 13:42, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- No, this issue is already covered sufficiently and all POVs are represented. We should cut this down not add more repetition. Please see my reply to you above. I know, it's hard to follow the discussion when harlan keeps posting walls of text. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 13:32, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Anyway, lets get back to the issue, can we go ahead and add the quote then start slimming from the top? un☯mi 12:55, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- NMMNG you and Steve flooded the talk page and the article with WP:OR nonsense and wikilawyering. The only place I'm going to have another long discussion with you is at AN/I or WP:AE. You have assisted Attributed in adding material that obfuscates US policy statements. You have also deleted summaries of secondary sources on non-recognition, the inadmissibility principle, and etc. The notion that you have been trying to help, while tag-teaming multiple articles with topic banned users including Drork, LoveroftheRussianQueen, Stellarkid, & etc is nonsense. harlan (talk) 12:45, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- I think that is a somewhat unhelpful attitude in the face of the number and and quality of sources which seem to support Harlans position. I think we should add the proposed edit at this time, and then turn our collective attention to how we can distill the varying positions as indicated by quality sources to succinct prose. un☯mi 12:34, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Nobody should have to argue with you over the inclusion of relevant sourced material in the first place, so drop the nonsense about talk page usage. Tell us how many times you deleted the material on the statehood of the Palestine mandate without ever bothering to read the State Department Digest citations. In 1950 a jerk sued Secretary of State Dulles claiming that Palestine was not a state in order to retain his US citizenship. The government argued the executive branch had recognized Palestine as a separate foreign state in 1932 and won the case. See Kletter v Dulles, United States District Court, District of Colombia - in Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law Reports, Volume 20, Editors Elihu Lauterpacht, Hersch Lauterpacht, Cambridge UP, 1957, ISBN 0521463653, page 254.[24] You intentionally engaged in editorial conflict and WP:TEDIOUS deletions across multiple articles for weeks on that one. Your behavior here is just another example. harlan (talk) 13:17, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
(outdent) If this article is going to have subsections on context and the authenticity of the French version, then Lall's account and Brown's remarks in the London magazine interview need to be mentioned along with the analysis by Perry & etc. harlan (talk) 13:28, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- I think it is hard to argue that the matter of the relative authenticity is one which doesn't deserve full treatment from available sources, it seems like an issue that is brought up repeatedly and that all the sides of the dispute spend quite a bit of time presenting their interpretations of, I wouldn't find it inappropriate to say that it is one of the major focal points of contemporary discussion regarding 242. Length is not an issue, and the 'right balance' is, by wikipedia policy, that which represents the weight of reliable sources. un☯mi 16:49, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- Relative authenticity is hardly one of the major focal points. On what basis do you make this statement? Surely not based on the fact that harlan keeps adding more and more quotes I hope. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 17:28, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- No More Mr Nice Guy, I've supplied several reliable sources which say that the other UN delegations only agreed to vote in favor of the UK draft resolution after they struck a deal to quote George Brown's policy statements regarding Israeli withdrawal into the record prior to the vote, and for Lord Caradon to reaffirm those policy statements.
- Relative authenticity is hardly one of the major focal points. On what basis do you make this statement? Surely not based on the fact that harlan keeps adding more and more quotes I hope. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 17:28, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
- The quotes I've added are all relevant content. This article discusses the dispute over the authenticity of the French version and casts doubt on the meaning of the withdrawal clause. Despite your claim that all of these viewpoints are already reflected in the article, they certainly are NOT. The article does not reflect the fact that the British Foreign Minister (a) told the General Assembly emergency session that Israel could not use the war to enlarge its borders and that Israel must withdraw; (b) that he considered the French version equally authentic; (c) that he said he discussed the implications of the French version with the government of Israel; (d) that Brown and Lall said the Indian and UK representatives agreed to cooperate in order to read Brown's statements on British policy regarding Israeli withdrawal into the record prior to the vote. harlan (talk) 15:26, 25 August 2010 (UTC)
- I didn't participate in the RSN discussion mainly because I wasn't aware of it on since you neglected to mention it here.
- The main problems with the way you tried to add this information into the article are:
- You tend to use huge quotes for every single bit of information you try to add to the article, which makes it even harder to read than it is now, not to mention causes UNDUE problems. If someone who doesn't know much about this resolution (like Unomi) reads the article and thinks that the English vs French versions is one of the major focal points, we have a serious problem.
- You add quotes without explaining their relevance (WP:QUOTEFARM).
- I don't think we need to note what every single delegate had read into the protocol (WP:N, WP:UNDUE).
- The issues you raise above are reflected in the article POV-wise. If it's so important to you to note that Brown also thought the French was equally authentic, you could add a few words noting the fact after the full paragraph of Perry explaining why he thought so, for example. But you want to add a whole new couple of paragraphs just say the same thing again. I'm sure you understand why this is problematic. Same goes for the inadmissibility principle, or any of the other issues you keep trying to add walls of text about, in a transparent attempt to lead the reader to conclusions you want them to reach. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 18:11, 25 August 2010 (UTC)
- The quotes I've added are all relevant content. This article discusses the dispute over the authenticity of the French version and casts doubt on the meaning of the withdrawal clause. Despite your claim that all of these viewpoints are already reflected in the article, they certainly are NOT. The article does not reflect the fact that the British Foreign Minister (a) told the General Assembly emergency session that Israel could not use the war to enlarge its borders and that Israel must withdraw; (b) that he considered the French version equally authentic; (c) that he said he discussed the implications of the French version with the government of Israel; (d) that Brown and Lall said the Indian and UK representatives agreed to cooperate in order to read Brown's statements on British policy regarding Israeli withdrawal into the record prior to the vote. harlan (talk) 15:26, 25 August 2010 (UTC)
Israeli conditional acceptance of 242
The article currently contains a discussion of Syria's evolving attitude towards 242 and eventual acceptance. A hidden comment in the text suggests this should be done also for Israel, which I agree with. But the earliest reference that follows of Israel's attitude towards it isn't until a year later! Abba Eban was at the UN during deliberations and participated in those proceedings, although he had no vote. He made his government's position perfectly clear from the beginning. The delegate from India stated:
Members of the Council will recall that during the fifth emergency special session an overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations, whether they voted for the Latin American draft resolution 2/ or the non-aligned, Afro-Asian draft resolution, had reaffirmed the principle of non-acquisition of territory by military conquest and had supported the call for the withdrawal of Israel armed forces to the positions they held prior to the outbreak of the recent conflict on 5 June 1967. On this point there was universal agreement among the membership of the United Nations.... The principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force is absolutely fundamental to our approach and we cannot accept or acquiesce in any decision that leaves out territories occupied by military conquest from the provision of withdrawal.... It is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by the Council, will commit it to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories--I repeat, all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict which began on 5 June 1967. In other words, the draft commits the Council to the withdrawal of Israel forces from the whole of Sinai, Gaza, the Old City of Jerusalem, Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River and the Syrian territory. This being so, Israel cannot use the words "secure and recognized boundaries", contained in sub-paragraph (ii) of operative paragraph 1 of the United Kingdom draft resolution, to retain any territory occupied in the recent conflict. Of course, mutual territorial adjustments are not ruled out, as indeed they are not in the three-Power draft resolution co-sponsored by India. This is our clear understanding of the United Kingdom draft resolution.
Abba Eban responded with his own interpretation:
I reiterate that in negotiations with our neighbors we shall present a concrete vision of peace. Before saying what that vision is, I should like to make one comment on the course of this debate with special reference to the remarks of the Indian representative. The establishment of a peace settlement, including secure and recognized boundaries, is quite different from what he had been proposing, namely, withdrawal, without final peace, to demarcation lines. The representative of India has now sought to interpret the resolution in the image of his own wishes. For us, the resolution says what it says. It does not say that which it has specifically and consciously avoided saying.
In other words, while members of the Security Council explicitly stated that the draft resolution called on Israel to fully withdraw from the occupied territory, Eban stated that his government would interpret it to mean that withdraw would only occur subsequent to a final border settlement. Numerous other voting delegates observed that this unilateral Israeli interpretation was just that, and that the intent of the Security Council was that Israel should withdraw unconditionally, in accordance with the inadmissibility principle.
I therefore propose the following to be added to the paragraph on the Israeli acceptance of 242:
The Israeli representative to the U.N. Abba Eban expressed approval of the resolution prior to the vote, but conditioned his acceptance upon the unilateral Israeli interpretation that it meant final borders must be established and recognized before withdrawal would take place, an interpretation explicitly rejected by members of the Security Council.[29] JRHammond (talk) 10:33, 1 September 2010 (UTC)
- ^ The Jerusalem Post, 23 January 1970
- ^ http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10C11F73C541B7B93C2A8178AD85F4C8685F9&scp=1&sq=de+Gaulle+dignified+minorities&st=p Text of de Gaulle's Answer to Letter From Ben-Gurion
- ^ (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28068.htm
- ^ http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xx/2665.htm
- ^ http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=7&x_issue=9&x_article=1267 In My Way, pgs 226-27, qtd. in the American Journal of International Law
- ^ The Jerusalem Post, 23 January 1970
- ^ http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=7&x_issue=9&x_article=1267 In My Way, pgs 226-27, qtd. in the American Journal of International Law
- ^ The Jerusalem Post, 23 January 1970
- ^ http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=7&x_issue=9&x_article=1267 In My Way, pgs 226-27, qtd. in the American Journal of International Law
- ^ The Jerusalem Post, 23 January 1970