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==Kharkhov operations== |
==Kharkhov operations== |
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Want to be sure I understand your intent here Mrg. You've change all the battles of Kharkov to their numeric numbering. Here you have a number of redlinks with different names, but referring to the same operations. You've been the primary editor on this page, so I wanted to ask you what you'd think of me inserting links to those operations - since all four of them do have articles. [[User:Buckshot06|Buckshot06]]([[User:Kirill Lokshin/Professionalism|prof]]) 10:55, 19 May 2008 (UTC) |
Want to be sure I understand your intent here Mrg. You've change all the battles of Kharkov to their numeric numbering. Here you have a number of redlinks with different names, but referring to the same operations. You've been the primary editor on this page, so I wanted to ask you what you'd think of me inserting links to those operations - since all four of them do have articles. [[User:Buckshot06|Buckshot06]]([[User:Kirill Lokshin/Professionalism|prof]]) 10:55, 19 May 2008 (UTC) |
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:How about this. YOU go and buy Keitel's fucking book in Irving's fucking translation and then YOU write the fucking articles based on that and see how same they look ok. You are so big on talk, but will not spend the money on the books, but the books have nothing. They are written for a perspective of a very senior officer in Berlin. SO, the articles you refer to are NOT same as those on this list. They are the German POV base on a single source, and I will tag them as such when I find the template. Then they will sit there for another year as stubs until someone tries to improve them using Glantz's Kharkov 1942 book. THIS entire sorry issue with these three articles is the sort of bullshit that drives people away from Wikipedia. Enjoy. I have taken all three off my watch list. All yours now, or whoever.--[[User:mrg3105|mrg3105]] ([[User talk:mrg3105|comms]]) ♠<font color="#BB0000">♥</font><font color="#BB0000">♦</font>♣ 11:14, 19 May 2008 (UTC) |
Revision as of 11:15, 19 May 2008
Military history: Russian & Soviet Start‑class | |||||||||||||||||||||
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I primarily created this article because in the West, including Germany, there does not seem to be a systematic periodisation of the Eastern Front to the extent there is in USSR.--Mrg3105 (talk) 03:47, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- Hi Buckshot06. I appreciate your contribution, and I have Glanz's book, but that is his opinion, and not that of the Soviet military history school of thought. How Glantz makes his periodisation will undoubtedly be included in the article eventually, but the structure I have is for some 70 large and nearly 200 smaller operations that just don't fit well into the overall picture Glantz paints regardless of the respect I have for his work. Please bear with me as I build this up :o)--Mrg3105 (talk) 05:16, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- It was my impression that Glantz was merely mirroring the Soviet structure; otherwise I wouldn't have inserted the data. Your 'periodisation structure', by the way, is the second, winter campaign, and fits better there. Buckshot06 (talk) 06:08, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- Buckshot06, Glantz was not mirroring Soviet Structure. I am still translating and making them publishable, but I have a spreadsheet for each campaign and their participating Fronts and Armies with hundreds of entires. The 'periodisation structure' is only there to illustrate the future structure of the whole and is not a part of the overall whole-war structure. I appreciate you are trying to help, but right now its not helping. I PROMISE all the operations will be there with all their Fronts and Armies for you to tack the Corps and Divisions onto. It will be a work of beauty, but please bear with me and ask first before you change anything (I am not immune to mistakes). I am going to undo your last until I am able to restore at a later stage. Eventually I will also insert the German 'equivalents' so the reader will have a frame of reference from both sides.--Mrg3105 (talk) 07:02, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- Right. Compromise. I won't muck around with your time periods - you're the expert there - if you won't change the links to the formations. To link them properly, you have to include Soviet Western Front - otherwise you'll get the Western Front of WW1 and WW2 - and Soviet Reserve Front and Soviet Southwestern Front. Also it might pay you to take a look at the general instruction at the bottom of each edit page 'If you don't want your writing to be edited mercilessly or redistributed for profit by others, do not submit it.' I'm working with your direction in mind, and I'm frustrated. Is there any reason why, for example, you insert the first winter offensive both as an example and to fill the section in, right now? Buckshot06 (talk) 07:35, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- Buckshot06, Glantz was not mirroring Soviet Structure. I am still translating and making them publishable, but I have a spreadsheet for each campaign and their participating Fronts and Armies with hundreds of entires. The 'periodisation structure' is only there to illustrate the future structure of the whole and is not a part of the overall whole-war structure. I appreciate you are trying to help, but right now its not helping. I PROMISE all the operations will be there with all their Fronts and Armies for you to tack the Corps and Divisions onto. It will be a work of beauty, but please bear with me and ask first before you change anything (I am not immune to mistakes). I am going to undo your last until I am able to restore at a later stage. Eventually I will also insert the German 'equivalents' so the reader will have a frame of reference from both sides.--Mrg3105 (talk) 07:02, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- It was my impression that Glantz was merely mirroring the Soviet structure; otherwise I wouldn't have inserted the data. Your 'periodisation structure', by the way, is the second, winter campaign, and fits better there. Buckshot06 (talk) 06:08, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
Ok, I was going to find out why they were redlinking, honest! What do you mean by "do not submit it"?The section is just an introductory example of how the hierarchical periodisation works. I just happen to have picked the winter campaign, but if you like I can pick another. Are you suggesting the example should be elsewhere?--Mrg3105 (talk) 08:06, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- I didn't say do not submit it. It's at the bottom of every edit box, under the buttons and the wikimarkup symbols - just scroll down, and you'll find it. The example? My question is, why don't you leave it there as an example, but also insert it in its proper place - isn't that what you're going to do eventually - it's going to be there twice? And for heaven's sake, if it's an example campaign, consider calling it 'example of campaign in detail' rather than over-jargonisation which even I, as a specialist who might reasonably expect to understand, don't understand it at all! Best regards from over the ditch, and Happy Christmas, Buckshot06 (talk) 09:12, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
Categorisation
What is the problem with massive categorisation?--Mrg3105 (talk) 05:26, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- Categories for an article need to be core classifications of the main topic, not just anything tangentially related to it; and more specific categories are preferred over more general ones (see WP:MILMOS#SPECIFIC). Simply throwing in a dozen top-level categories (military art?!) isn't going to help readers in navigating to related articles, since almost everything they'll find will be completely unrelated. Generally speaking, categories follow "is-a" relationships; for example, a particular operation is a "military operation involving the Soviet Union". More rarely, categorization can take in strongly related topic categories; for example, discussion of strategic operations is related to "military strategy". But tenuous relationships between subsidiary aspects of the main topic and other topics—particularly when nothing in the article text actually relates to that other topic—ought to be avoided. Kirill 05:56, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- Yep, I know—"art of war" and all that; the category, though, only contains topics related to actual art. ;-) Kirill 17:21, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- Hmmm, and I suppose Military science is only about physical science? There is no Soviet military doctrine, so I'll have to look and see? This is ridiculous! The categorisation for Sun Tzu is Categories: Zhou Dynasty | Chinese non-fiction writers | Chinese philosophers | Chinese military writers | 544 BC births | 496 BC deaths | Martial arts writers!
I would like to propose that there should be four distinct categories
Military Art theory and Military artists and Military Science theory and Military scientists. For entertainers who serve in the militaries like the Soviet WW2 troupes, these should be in the Military entertainers, and for scientific projects that were a product of Military research should be Military scientific research. How about this? The artists and scientists can go into the Category:People associated with war. There is Category:Non-combatant military personnel, but I think this is too general. Military Science is a bit more difficult. Ok, so Under Military Science there needs to be a subcategory a Military Theory subcategory. Let's face it, every science starts with a theory, and there are theories in the military history :o) All the current subcategories in Military Science are in fact applied science. I think the Military writers can also go under Military Theory because they are either writing it, or analyzing it, or critiquing it, or are military historians (doctrinal writers go under Military doctrine) - BTW, I just looked up Bob Hope. It seems the creator and editors of that page don't know about 'massive over-categorisation' either :o)--Mrg3105 (talk) 20:37, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- Hmmm, and I suppose Military science is only about physical science? There is no Soviet military doctrine, so I'll have to look and see? This is ridiculous! The categorisation for Sun Tzu is Categories: Zhou Dynasty | Chinese non-fiction writers | Chinese philosophers | Chinese military writers | 544 BC births | 496 BC deaths | Martial arts writers!
- Actually, the intent was to have Category:Military science cover everything related to military theory, not merely physical science; cf. military science. This is why Category:Military strategy, Category:Military doctrines, etc. are sub-categories of it. (Pure applied physical science is more the province of Category:Military technology.) I suppose it would be possible to rename it to Category:Military theory instead, but that's really terminological quibbling, particularly given that our article on the actual topic currently matches the category name.
- "Military art" is, I think, so ambiguous—the average reader will almost certainly think "artists" rather than "art of war"—that using it as a top-level category for actual military affairs is unworkable. Kirill 20:51, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- So maybe Military Art of war? The issue is not quite terminological. Strategy implies 'application of'. Doctrine is also 'application of' as in process and procedure. Technology is yet again 'application of' since for the most part its applied science and engineering. There is just no Theory which is a significant part of military history. Consequently Clausewitz is categorised as Categories: 1780 births | 1831 deaths | People from Saxony-Anhalt | Deaths from cholera | German military writers | German nobility | Prussian generals | German people of the Napoleonic Wars | Napoleonic Wars prisoners of war (was he ever a general?!) . However It is often hard to match a theoretical concept to a specific writer as in any scientific theory.--Mrg3105 (talk) 22:10, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- So perhaps we could simply create Category:Military theory (and a sub-category for Category:Military theorists) under Category:Military science? That would allow us to cover the purely theoretic writings and developments without forcing us to adopt overly ostentatious literary terms to everything. Kirill 22:17, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
Title
The title seems a bit convoluted; I'd suggest something like Strategic operations of the Red Army in World War II. Kirill 05:59, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- Thank you for your suggestion Kirill. I actually wanted to capture both the strategic and the operational aspects of these operations, but maybe I can move the operational pat into the text. Can't remember how to change article namespace though--Mrg3105 (talk) 07:13, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
- Click on that 'move' tag right next to history along the top bar. Buckshot06 (talk) 09:14, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
Vyborg operation dates
In Soviet histography the ending date is given as 20 June. But on the ground offensive continued under direct Stavka orders until July 12, when Stavka ordered Govorov to stop offensive. It took a while for an order to disseminate through all levels, so last units fighting at Vuosalmi received the order at 15 July. --Whiskey (talk) 11:08, 2 May 2008 (UTC)
- Not quite. The Fins had to be persuaded that the offensive as not ended,a nd the Germans had to be persuaded that this was still a place of effort for the Red Army because of deception operations for Bagration, so although NOW it is know that the official end of offensives was 20 June, Govorov continued to keep the Fins worried until much later at the time.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 13:55, 2 May 2008 (UTC)
- Quite a deception, I'd say. Especially as Stavka ordered at 21 June Govorov to advance to Imatra and Käkisalmi. Govorov asked additional reinforcements then, but received only material, tanks and guns, while his request for additional divisions was refused. So you say that the order which Stavka gave to Govorov was a feint? I'd say that Govorov fell into that beautifully, as he lost more men trying to fulfill that order than he lost during the offensive to Vyborg.--Whiskey (talk) 01:23, 3 May 2008 (UTC)
- I think from memory Glantz briefly mentions this in his book on Deception, but not ready to look at it today. However, I also think that there was internal "Stalin politics" here at work also. Govorov had spent much of the war defending the second city in USSR, and now found himself in a third (if) most important strategic direction of the war. He wanted to badly be seen as still of use to Stalin, and putting pressure on the Fins was his way of doing so, so he did. The order from Stavka was probably issued on the assurance from Govorov that he can achieve its objectives, a "requested order" as it were. There was even a formulaic way of doing this at the time, "Zhelayu predlozhit komandovaniyu..." (I wish to propose to the command...) IMHO the actions after the taking of Vyborg were completely unnecessary either tactically, operationally or strategically, but I had not seen any serious discussion of this in English, as this is not something most books deal with because this is seen as a very minor aspect of the "end" of Finland's participation in the war, and I am (pleasantly) surprised you raised it. If you can find more evidence, including anything that suggests I'm wrong in my analysis, by all means include it.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 03:11, 3 May 2008 (UTC)
- If we look end dates of the other Soviet operations, they are either the date when Stavka orders forces to the defensive or intensity of the fighting decreases notably. This is not the case here: We have orders to continue offensive, and the order to move defensive is only given in the middle July, and the most intensive phase of the fighting was only to begun at Tali-Ihantala. Also in Platonov's Bitva za Leningrad, which is written on the military viewpoint, there is no separation in method of operation before and after the capture of Vyborg. The only comment is that after the fighting Soviet forces failed to reach their objective.
- So, in my opinion, this 20 June ending date is artifically inserted by Soviet historians, in an attempt to get rid of awkward issue: The handling of those battles in Soviet historians would certainly raise interest of their Finnish counterparts and Finnish general public, which could create unwanted complications to the Soviet foreign policy towards Finland. (Soviets had burned their fingers already with their claim: "Vyborg, old Russian city", which created uproar and ridicule in Finland and damaged Soviet (and communist) interests here.) So, by ending the operation conveniently at June 20, they could domestically claim great success, and with the clear success in Vyborg, they could silence Finnish historians by offering unquestionable Soviet triumph as an ending. --Whiskey (talk) 08:27, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
- I think from memory Glantz briefly mentions this in his book on Deception, but not ready to look at it today. However, I also think that there was internal "Stalin politics" here at work also. Govorov had spent much of the war defending the second city in USSR, and now found himself in a third (if) most important strategic direction of the war. He wanted to badly be seen as still of use to Stalin, and putting pressure on the Fins was his way of doing so, so he did. The order from Stavka was probably issued on the assurance from Govorov that he can achieve its objectives, a "requested order" as it were. There was even a formulaic way of doing this at the time, "Zhelayu predlozhit komandovaniyu..." (I wish to propose to the command...) IMHO the actions after the taking of Vyborg were completely unnecessary either tactically, operationally or strategically, but I had not seen any serious discussion of this in English, as this is not something most books deal with because this is seen as a very minor aspect of the "end" of Finland's participation in the war, and I am (pleasantly) surprised you raised it. If you can find more evidence, including anything that suggests I'm wrong in my analysis, by all means include it.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 03:11, 3 May 2008 (UTC)
- Quite a deception, I'd say. Especially as Stavka ordered at 21 June Govorov to advance to Imatra and Käkisalmi. Govorov asked additional reinforcements then, but received only material, tanks and guns, while his request for additional divisions was refused. So you say that the order which Stavka gave to Govorov was a feint? I'd say that Govorov fell into that beautifully, as he lost more men trying to fulfill that order than he lost during the offensive to Vyborg.--Whiskey (talk) 01:23, 3 May 2008 (UTC)
How about:
- Instruction Stavka Supreme Main Command No 220119
- The commander armies of the Leningrad front
- About continuation of approach on Karelian isthmus.
- On June, 21st, 1944
- 02 hour of 15 minutes
- Stavka Supreme Main Command orders:
- 1. To armies of the Leningrad front, acting Karelian isthmus to continue approach with a task 26-28.06.1944 the main forces to take possession a boundary Imatra, Lappenranta, Virojoki. A part of forces to attack Keksgolm, Elisenvara with the purpose of clarification from the opponent of Karelian isthmus to northeast from the river and lake Vuoksi.
- 2. In the further the main forces to develop approach with a task to take possession boundary Kuovola, Kotka and will be fixed on east coast (bank)of the river Kjumin-Joki. To provide the main grouping from the north.
- 3. To install about 24.00 6/21/1944 a following differentiating line between Karelian and Leningrad fronts: up to Korovkino - former and further southern and western coast of Ladoga lake, Tervus, Elisenvara, Tajpionkoski, Lappenranta, Lahti (all points for the Leningrad front inclusive).
- 4. On the given orders to inform.
- Stavka Supreme Main Command
- I. STALIN
- A. ANTONOV
- CAMD. f. 148a, i. 3763, f. 166, s. 376, 377. The original. [RA. GPW. vol. 16 - 5 (4), pp. 97,98]
--Whiskey (talk) 12:17, 5 May 2008 (UTC)
And Govorov's response:
- The report of commander armies of Leningrad front No 8831
- To Supreme Commander in Chief of the plan for development of approach on Karelian isthmus.
- On June, 21st, 1944
- 19 hour of 30 minutes
- I represent the decision on development of approach on Karelian isthmus to execution of Your instruction No 220119 from 21.06.1944.
- 1. Tasks of operation.
- Armies of the Karelian direction of the Leningrad front continue approach with a task 26-28.06.1944 main forces to take possession a boundary Imatra, Lappenranta, Surpjalja. Simultaneously clear of the opponent Karelian isthmus to northeast from the rivers and lakes Vuoksi approach of a part of forces on Hitola, Keksgolm.
- 2. A plan of operation.
- To put the main impact on Lappenranta with the subsequent expansion of impact of two armies on the West with the purpose of an exit them on a boundary Lappenranta, Surpjalja and one army, will be forwarded through the river Vuoksi at the front Antrea - Enso, to come in the general direction on Hitola.
- 3. Planning of operation.
- The first a stage (immediate task) - 22-24.06.1944.
- Since boundary Kukauppi, station Kavantsari, JUustila, Tienhara to develop impact in a northwest direction, striking the main blow to Lappenranta and, being covered on the river Vuoksi, not later 6/24/1944 to leave on boundary Enso, lake Nuijama-jarvi, Lajnela, Nisalahti.
- The second stage (the subsequent task of armies) - 24.-25.06.1944.
- Developing impact to Lappenranta, Imatra with consecutive expansion of approach to the West with a task for not later 26.06.1944 to leave on a boundary Imatra, Lappenranta, Surpjalja, having grasped straight off the basic strong points of a defensive strip of the opponent of construction 1940/41; simultaneously to prepare for force break of this strip.
- 59-th army is entered since boundary Penttilja, Lajnela, having united 109-th rifle corps and 9-th rifle corps operating in a direction of Lappenranta.
- 21-st army from now on unites 108-th rifle corps and 110-th rifle corps, acting a seaside direction, and 30-th Guards rifle corps, transmitted of a front reserve.
- Border between armies: Lajnela, Meta (all for 59-th army).
- 23-rd army forces the river Vuoksi and develops impact in the general direction on Hitolu.
- 115 rifle corps it is forwarded through the river Vuoksi in area in area Kiviniemi and in interaction with 23-rd army strikes in the general direction on Keksgolm.
- 4. Construction of operation.
- The immediate task is solved by 23-rd and 21-st Armies in structure of: 23-rd Army two rifle corps; 21-st Army - three rifle corps.
- The subsequent task is solved by 23-rd, 59-th and 21-st Armies in structure of: 23-rd Army - three rifle corps's; 59-th Army - two rifle corps; 21-st Army - three rifle corps.
- For performance of the put tasks I ask:
- 1. To strengthen front:
- Two rifle corps (as it is not enough available forces for performance of put tasks) ;
- One engineering-sapper a brigade;
- Two motorized pontoon-roadways battalions with parks N2L;
- One battalion of dogs-mine detectors [battalion dogs for search of mines]
- Two parks NLP (for two engineering brigades);
- Two motor-battalions of special destination (amphibian).
- 2. To release to front:
- Tanks T-34 - 30 pieces;
- Self-propelled artillery SU-76 - 30 pieces (for restoration of tank units);
- Mines for GMU M-31 - 7000, M-13 - 10 000;
- 100 motor vehicles "studebekker" (for pontoon and engineering units)
- Commander armies of the Leningrad front
- the Marshal of Soviet Union GOVOROV
- Member of the Military council of the Leningrad front
- general-colonel ZHDANOV
- The chief of a staff of the Leningrad front
- general-colonel POPOV
- CAMD. f. 217, i. 1227, f. 95, s. 161-163. The original. [RA. GPW. vol. 16 - 5 (4), pp. 286,287]
--Whiskey (talk) 12:34, 5 May 2008 (UTC)
And Stavka's rebuke:
- Instruction Stavka Supreme Main Command No 220121
- the commander armies of the Leningrad front
- about the statement of the plan of approach on Karelian isthmus.
- On June, 22nd, 1944
- 02 hours of 00 minutes
- Stavka Supreme Main Command approves your decision presented by the code of 21.06.1944 of year for No 8831, and specifies:
- 1. On strengthening of front in addition by two rifle corps to not hope.
- The front has enough forces and means for performance of the put task.
- 2. The others you means will be, whenever possible, are given.
- Stavka Supreme Main Command
- I. STALIN
- A. ANTONOV
- CAMD f. 148à, i. 3763, f. 166, s. 378. The original. [RA. GPW. vol. 16 - 5 (4), p. 98]
Translations are not mine, so Finnish names are somewhat scrambled. Need more? --Whiskey (talk) 12:44, 5 May 2008 (UTC)
I'm not sure. While fudging history to hide non-achievement of objectives by Soviet historians may seem a reasonable assumption in the political circumstances, the fact does remain that the rest of the in Belorussia did begin on the 23 June. It seems to me that this is the reason the two extra Corps were denied, and not because the operation had always been planned to go for longer and Govorov just wanted more troops to do what he failed to do within the set time. I need to look more into this because there is as you point out some unanswered questions, but I seem to have already previously decided for myself why that is, so may need to re-examine how I came to that decision (some years ago). Can you hold off on date changing for a week or so?--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 09:27, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
- That's ok for me, no hurry. I'd also like to point that in addition to Bagration, also the Petrozavodsk part of the offensive has started at June 20. Govorov's request for additional troops was given at June 21, before he continued the offensive, and at that time everything was going according to the plan, including the timetable. It was only during the preparations for Tali-Ihantala when his timetable started to lag. Also, according to some Finnish military historians, the easiness how Soviets had captured Vyborg (which they haven't been able to do in the Winter War) may have deluded Stavka to believe that it indicated that the capability of the Finnish army to resist Soviet offensive had broken, so there shouldn't be any need for additional forces. In fact, if you look Govorov's plans for force division, the time when he planned to need those corps was when he had reached the 1940 border, and preparing to overcome Salpaline fortifications before reaching the Kymijoki river. --Whiskey (talk) 09:47, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
Kharkhov operations
Want to be sure I understand your intent here Mrg. You've change all the battles of Kharkov to their numeric numbering. Here you have a number of redlinks with different names, but referring to the same operations. You've been the primary editor on this page, so I wanted to ask you what you'd think of me inserting links to those operations - since all four of them do have articles. Buckshot06(prof) 10:55, 19 May 2008 (UTC)
- How about this. YOU go and buy Keitel's fucking book in Irving's fucking translation and then YOU write the fucking articles based on that and see how same they look ok. You are so big on talk, but will not spend the money on the books, but the books have nothing. They are written for a perspective of a very senior officer in Berlin. SO, the articles you refer to are NOT same as those on this list. They are the German POV base on a single source, and I will tag them as such when I find the template. Then they will sit there for another year as stubs until someone tries to improve them using Glantz's Kharkov 1942 book. THIS entire sorry issue with these three articles is the sort of bullshit that drives people away from Wikipedia. Enjoy. I have taken all three off my watch list. All yours now, or whoever.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 11:14, 19 May 2008 (UTC)