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::::Points 6 and 7 still stand. There is no citation or explanation of 6. For point 7 there is no reason to assume that Dennett isn't considering quantum mechanics, after all to create his story he also had to abandon aspects of known technology and classical mechanics. All we know is the first person account of the story not the theoretical frame work.--[[User:OMCV|OMCV]] ([[User talk:OMCV|talk]]) 17:41, 25 August 2009 (UTC) |
::::Points 6 and 7 still stand. There is no citation or explanation of 6. For point 7 there is no reason to assume that Dennett isn't considering quantum mechanics, after all to create his story he also had to abandon aspects of known technology and classical mechanics. All we know is the first person account of the story not the theoretical frame work.--[[User:OMCV|OMCV]] ([[User talk:OMCV|talk]]) 17:41, 25 August 2009 (UTC) |
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The statement in the article is "by copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities". This is, it seems, not part of the argument made in Dennett's book, since clearly the atoms in a brain and in an uploaded system are not going to be the same. Therefore, this does, in my view, constitute synthesis, and does not belong on WP - unless, of course, there is some ''other'' book that does make this exact argument, in which case we need to cite that. [[User:Anaxial|Anaxial]] ([[User talk:Anaxial|talk]]) 20:13, 25 August 2009 (UTC) |
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Archive 1 (March 2006 - June 2008) |
Metaphysics, not Science
Hi, I'm new to Wikipedia. There are already existing science articles (e.g. quantum mechanics. Is this not a metaphysical article? Shouldn't it be written with a lighter touch? Please discuss. Trelawnie (talk) 04:53, 7 June 2009 (UTC)
Interpretation vs. Theory
There is no sharp demarcation between "fact" and "interpretation" in quantum mechanics. The only facts are that quantum mechanics gives you the probabilities of certain experimental outcomes, when the interaction of the experimental devices and the quantum system is particularly simple. When talking about how the perception of observers emerges in quantum theory, it's all philosophy. The rewrite made things less clear.
For example: the many worlds interpretation is not the most preferred by mystics, it is the least preferred. Mystics prefer Copenhagen interpretation, because it explicitly rejects describing observers with quantum mechanics. No source is needed for the obvious statement "the atoms of the brain do not stay the same", since all atoms enter and leave the body. The discussion of subtle points of consciousness is not improved by introducing the sentence "mystics believe" every once in a while, because non-mystics also need to answer the question of what consciousness is just as well, or leave it alone.
That means that the discussion is going to be completely philosophical, it can't be helped, hinging on the most annoying points of "what is my experience made of" and "how is this consciousness-stuff represented in quantum mechanics".
- There are some very clear facts associated with quantum mechanics: Double-slit experiment, Hydrogen spectral series, and the time evolution of Bose–Einstein condensate are all facts and the Bohr model of the atom could be considered a stipulation. Its important to remember that all applications of modeling reality off a wave functions are extrapolated from hydrogen like atoms. Its not a fact that "wave functions spread into the world" its an interpretation of a sparse number of facts, readers should be reminded that there are many interpretation of quantum mechanics. Its very important to distinguish between "fact" and "interpretation" especially when describing QM's relationship to "mysticism".
- The problem with the atoms and brain statement is not the idea that the atoms of the brain change.
- "It has been suggested that the brain can't be explained though atoms since the atoms which constitute the brain do not stay the same."
- The problem is that by changing a classical explanation based around atoms is in sufficient since they change location. This is similar to saying that classical mechanics is insufficient to explain the solar system because the planets move. Classical methods fail it both situation but not for the implied reasons. The sentence contains wp:synthesis I was giving the author an opportunity to attribute the sentence before I or another editor deletes the text.
- As for the "mystic believe" qualifiers not everyone believes in philosophical zombie. But the bigger problem is whole premising of the hypothetical question in "Mind/body problem in Newtonian mechanics" includes a host of assumptions and is contextualized in a mystic belief system. For example the idea that consciousness is a "stream" is inane from my perspective I think of it as a temporal physical pattern, given the right tools and resources a pattern could be replicated an infinite number of times. But I would never add that to the text because that would be wp:synthesis so I qualified, through attribution, the verifiable text. Thats what I can say for now.--OMCV (talk) 02:11, 14 August 2009 (UTC)
- Don't be ridiculous--- that whole history section is the toughest thing to source, as is anything else on this subject. The issue is this--- quantum mechanics is not classical mechanics. It does not describe the positions of atoms. It describes wavefunctions. So even if you take the perspective the consciousness is the clockwork in the brain, that doesn't tell you what consciousness is in quantum mechanics because quantum mechanics does not describe clockwork. It describes wavefunctions.Likebox (talk) 05:58, 16 August 2009 (UTC)
- A Newtonian clockwork consciousness model does not need to meet the standards of QM, it only needs to meet its own standards which still allows atoms to exchange. If the classical model of mind and brain is failing by QM's standards the sentence needs to be rewritten and no matter what the sentence still needs citation. Furthermore if something is difficult to cite wp:verify odds are that it doesn't belong in an encyclopedia.--OMCV (talk) 12:50, 16 August 2009 (UTC)
Consciousness Causes Collapse
This needs to be separated out from this article. This article should focus on mysticism and relations between mysticism and QM. CCC is just a straighforward add-on to Copenhagen, a half-way house between Copenhagen and full blown many-worlds. Many worlds can best be described as : consciousness seems to cause collapse from its own point of view.Likebox (talk) 05:53, 13 August 2009 (UTC)
If the main CCC article is going to be Wigner's interpretation of quantum mechanics then Consciousness causes collapse should presumably redirect there, not here. 1Z (talk) 06:38, 13 August 2009 (UTC)
Removed Paragraph
The laws of quantum physics allow by calculation the prediction of observables, which can be tested in repeated experiments to a very high precision. This is a property shared with all other physical theories, but not with mystical beliefs. However, Ken Wilber asserts that meditation with the aim of experiencing higher consciousness may be regarded an experimental science (as it was and is regarded by some Buddhist sect. [1][2]
- This paragraph has no purpose except to misrepresent quantum mechanics as a mundane kind of physical theory, sort of like Newton's theory, except more precise and probalistic. That's not quantum mechanics. Nobody who knows quantum mechanics ever thinks of it that way.
- Quantum mechanics does allow prediction of experimental outcomes after interpretation. The theory distinguishes between "measurements" and "physical processes", and this distinction is essential. A person is always performing measurements, and there is no obvious way of making sense out of the quantum state of a person. More generally, the entire classical world can only be extracted out of the theory itself by taking a many-worlds type interpretation. Otherwise, the theory is dualistic, just the same as mysticism.
- Mysticism is not science, but the type of mysticism supported by quantum mechanics is of a very limited sort: it is just the statement that the consciousness-stuff is not reducible in an obvious way to material-stuff. The reason is that no classical-stuff is reducible in an obvious way to wavefunction-stuff. That separation is the entire content of quantum mysticism.Likebox (talk) 19:01, 13 August 2009 (UTC)
- A deterministic perspective is a very common interpretation of quantum mechanics. More importantly most researchers (regardless of their religious or mystical beliefs) treat quantum mechanics as a mathematical formalism when they work; which means they are agnostic to determinism or more likely assume some form of determinism as is the norm in all physical sciences. With that said I see know reason to keep the paragraph other than it being a well cited opinion of a quantum mystics, even if a lesser quantum mystics. Did you know that the double-slit experiment has been conducted with bucky balls (Arndt, M. et al. Nature 401, 680–682 (1999)). I don't think the double-slit experiment has been conducted with humans yet but it would be a reason experiment to conducted if we wanted to quantitatively measure how much our wave component contributed to our physical behavior.--OMCV (talk) 02:44, 14 August 2009 (UTC)
- Mysticism is not science, but the type of mysticism supported by quantum mechanics is of a very limited sort: it is just the statement that the consciousness-stuff is not reducible in an obvious way to material-stuff. The reason is that no classical-stuff is reducible in an obvious way to wavefunction-stuff. That separation is the entire content of quantum mysticism.Likebox (talk) 19:01, 13 August 2009 (UTC)
- Scientists before they conduct experiments make the assumption that cause and event are linked through the material world, that some aspect of the world they are trying to understand is going to have intelligible deterministic behavior. Likebox you appear to be very hung up on theoretical perspectives and seem to have trouble distinguishing between QM models of reality and known experimental facts. Most of these perspectives over step their data otherwise their wouldn't be so many perspectives. As stated before we are going to have to do better to distinguish between "facts" and "interpretations".--OMCV (talk) 13:01, 16 August 2009 (UTC)
- What do you mean "cause and effect are linked through the material world?" Do you mean that if you do something twice you get the same results? That's certainly wrong. Do you mean that if you do something twice you get the same probabilities? That's also incorrect, if you do certain experiments. Please don't impose your own pet philosophy on this article--- it is discussing subtle issues which are difficult to explain.Likebox (talk) 18:00, 16 August 2009 (UTC)
- I agree that it's a little off topic, but I want to know where you are coming from. If our discussion here is free enough, we might come to agree on a text by mutual understanding. So be patient, I am just core-dumping my POV, so that you can do the same, and we can compare our POV and see if it is possible to make the article pleasing to both of us.
- The "science is about measurements" philosophy is so minimalistic, it suggests that science has absolutely nothing to say about consciousness or mysticism in any way. While this is a self-consistent point of view, and was held by Bohr, it is no secret that many people believe that a theory is about reality. So if you say that "electrons are fully described by wavefunctions", some will go further and say "electrons can be identified with wavefunctions". This was explicitly the point of view of Everett. It rejects the Bohr notion that science is just about explicitly described feasable measurements, and it incorporates the Wigner point of view that the rules of conscious perception is why we percieve collapse.
- This point of view is not very sensible sounding to Bohr people, because they think of the wavefunction as somehow representing "information about the system", but the Bohr perspective is not self-evident. One reason is that the wavefunction is not a probability, so an "ignorance" interpretation makes it natural to ask "ignorance of what exactly?" a Bohrist would say it is ignorance of incompatible classical position and momentum, but a modern person would say "but position and momentum are fully quantum concepts, not classical ones. The classical ones are just approximations. And there are probably no hidden variables underneath to be ignorant of." Bohr would say "that's complementarity!" and so on.
- Some people view the idea that the quantum description does not describe systems that include observers as mystical all by itself--- since it separates out the world of physics and the world of experience. Some people view the role of consciousness in CCC as mystical, because it separates out "experience" from "physical description". But it's always the same thing that people are pointing out as "mystical", and I wanted to explain what it is as clearly as possible.Likebox (talk) 04:44, 17 August 2009 (UTC)
What's wrong with the rewrite
Within Newtonian mechanics, the question of consciousness is not directly addressed since consciousness can not be directly measured and or quantified.
- Yes, yes, we know, and everyone who reads this knows this. It is not useful to state the obvious.
Adaptation of a Newtonian mechanic perspective to explain the nature of consciousness suggests the content and function of a mind might be identified with the position and velocity of the atoms of the brain. Knowing the state of the atoms determines the future, so in a verificationalist sense it determines all measurable aspects of conscious behavior[3].
- This is exactly what was said more pithily before. It is not useful to say "adaptation of a Newtonian mechanic perspective" instead of "In Newtonian mechanics", because that obfuscates the issue
Proponents of Quantum mysticism claim that even in a Newtonian universe, there are philosophical doubts about explain consciousness through the position and velocity of atoms.
- Proponents of quantum mysticism do not specifically claim this. This is stuff that nobody disputes (as far as I know). This is an expository paragraph, designed to get the reader to the point where the explanations of mysticism in a physical theory can make sense. So it explains why you can't obviously point to a certain collection of atoms and say "that's my consciousness", because 1. what if the pattern moves into different atoms, like when atoms get replaced in the brain? And what if you copy the pattern into a duplicate, but keep the original, which way does the consciousness go subjectively? These two questions need to be asked to get the reader to understand the perspective of Everett. These questions are only raised by not answered, because if you haven't thought about these before, you aren't going to understand anything.
It has been suggested that the brain can't be explained though atoms since the atoms which constitute the brain do not stay the same.[citation needed] Individuals have put forward certain contrived thought experiments in which they claim the identity of mind and brain can become confused. For example, when a conscious Newtonian observer is duplicated, by copying all the relative positions and velocities of the observer's atoms. It is is argued that it is not obvious which way the stream of conscious experience for the observer will go but it assumed to go one way or both (but not duplicated). If the consciousness only goes one way, the duplicate will be left a philosophical zombie, without a consciousness of its own. But if the consciousness goes both ways, both observers start off with the same internal state, so that the subjective experience of the consciousness after the split requires extra information to describe. This information is what determines which path the consciousness will take. It has been argued that the value of this information is subjectively very important for the duplicated- since the information predicts the relative futures' of the duplicated pair - but this information is not contained in the relative positions and velocities of the observer's internal atoms.[4]
- This is OK, but overqualified. The Dennett stuff is classical, no QM, it just talks about copying consciousnesses. This is implicit in Everett too. It is not particularly mystical, and the "suggestion" is overly strong: the suggestion is not that the brain cannot be explained through atoms, the suggestion is that there is more information in the pattern of consciousness than what you can see in the position of the atoms. For example, which way a duplicated observer's consciousness "goes" is a bit of information like that.
- The source for moving the brain pattern into a different system (a remote electronic machine in this case) was discussed by Dennett in "Where am I". This is the source for the statement "The atoms don't stay the same", but it is a loose paraphrase of ideas, as is the whole thing, frankly.Likebox (talk) 06:20, 16 August 2009 (UTC)
- The first section states how Newtonian Mechanics sees the world and I'm glad we agree its accurate but I disagree that it will be obvious to anyone who comes to this page. There is a great deal of misunderstandings of scientific philosophy that revolves around quantum mysticism and its best to be clear, especially when it takes a single sentence. In the next section "Adaptation of a Newtonian mechanic perspective to explain the nature of consciousness..." is stated the way it is because there has never been an experiment based in Newtonian physics conducted on the "nature of consciousness" this line of thought is extrapolation. If there was such research it would be worth citing here.
Proponents of Quantum mysticism claim that even in a Newtonian universe, there are philosophical doubts about explain(ing) consciousness through the position and velocity of atoms.
- This sentence has been attributed to "Proponents of Quantum mysticism" because it is a disputable statement. Seriously the "Newtonian model" of the universe lacks a proper description of atoms, the whole idea pitting the two models against each other in this way is contrived and thus needs attribution. It seems the following hypothetical statements are primers for Everett's theories, or perhaps from Everett's works, and as such be attributed to Everett or purged as wp:synth. I've already stated that the hypothetical question is bad. The idea that our "stream of consciousness" is hiding in the subatomic activities of ground state atoms/molecules flies in the face of modern neuroscience which at no point invokes subatomic activity. Consider they whole hypothetical question in need of citation or deletion. Paraphrasing even if its loose should be attributed and if its too loose its wp:synth.--OMCV (talk) 13:42, 16 August 2009 (UTC)
- It's only SYNTH if people who aren't familiar with the ideas think it is. Everyone knows that there is nothing original about these ideas--- they have been kicking around for 60 years. The statement that there are "philsoophical doubts about explaining all the contents of consciousness through positions of atoms" is not debatable--- the doubts exist. Whether they are justified or not is another story.
- To explain these doubts--- if someone makes a copy of you, and puts the copy in Antarctica--- do you feel that you are still where you are, or that you are teleported to Antarctica? What if it is the original that is moved very very quickly to Antarctica, while the copy is left here? What if the atoms are split between you and copy half/half.
- If its been around for 60 years it should be very easy to cite as it is I've deleted it as OR. Someone who understands QM would realize that two observers whose atoms relative positions and relative velocities are identical would be identical. They would also realize that the situation of identical observers could theoretically never be achieved because of the uncertainty principle even if all the practical difficulties are ignored.
- The vast majority of biochemical activity contributing to all of life can be explained without QM. There are two exception that I know of, quantum tunneling must be invoked to explain the reaction rates of H+ and e-. All heavier atoms are well explained through classical chemical kinetics. Subatomic states play no known role in consciousness for example the magnetic alignment of nuclei that occurs in an MRI machine has not been demonstrated to the biological activity of anything. It seems the contrived hypothetical question concerning the twin observers, the stream of consciousness, and their "feelings" is Likebox's OR as such its been deleted.--OMCV (talk) 04:26, 17 August 2009 (UTC)
- It is well cited--- it is in Dennett and Hofstadter. The sentence you give "Someone who understands QM would realize that two observers whose atoms relative positions and relative velocities are identical would be identical" shows that you do not understand QM at all, and should not edit this article.Likebox (talk) 04:49, 17 August 2009 (UTC)
- What I meant by that cryptic statement above is that it is impossible to even imagine that two observers' atoms have a definite position and definite momentum. It is not allowed in QM, even hypothetically. You can't view the uncertainty principle as a limitation to measuring the position and momentum (but they exist anyway secretly inside). That's a completely wrong point of view.
- Your hypothetical unknown simultaneous position and momentum would be local hidden variables, and would violate Bell's inequality. They would not obey Newton's laws, and they would have to be in constant communication faster than the speed of light. This type of misunderstanding is not shared by ANY quantum mechanics practitioner, and it is serious enough error for me to ask you to please get a better understanding for quantum mechanics before mucking around with this article.Likebox (talk) 05:02, 17 August 2009 (UTC)
- If "it is impossible to even imagine that two observers' atoms have a definite position and definite momentum" than the hypothetical needs to be restated. I was thinking well within the ridiculous hypothetical to say that two observers with identical atoms and velocities are identical, I never said that they would stay identical, its best not to make to many interpretations your bound to get something wrong.--OMCV (talk) 05:27, 17 August 2009 (UTC)
- The hypothetical is a pure hypothetical, in Newtonian mechanics. It imagines that you make a clone of a classical observer, and the clone then goes off and does other things. But at the instant that the clone is made, it has the same relative (classical) positions and velocities. This thought experiment assumes the world is classical, and that a classical world could include conscious beings just like ourselves. This might not be clear enough in the article.
- In quantum mechanics, there is no analogous copying, because you can't precisely duplicate a quantum state. But the analogous thing in QM is just a macroscopic superposition itself. In Everett's view, an observer in a superposition "feels" unsuperposed. This is the main point, echoed in Wigner's consciousness causes collapse article.Likebox (talk) 21:58, 17 August 2009 (UTC)
- Its a hypothetical! You say it not possible to "precisely duplicate a quantum state" well in classical mechanics its not possible precisely position a collection of atoms and the classical mechanics doesn't even have the Bohr model. What I think you real mean is that quantum states spread infinitely so internal states can't be distinguished from external states thus the idea of duplicating internally relative state is a fallacy. I'm fine with that. Then again that assumes a quantum state at infinity is relevant. In the practical application of quantum mechanics, "Matter" has a very localized wave function and the influence of more distant aspects of these wave functions are considered inconsequential for everyone but mystics. That's why delocalizing matter in a Bose–Einstein condensate was such a big deal.--OMCV (talk) 14:18, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
(deindent) I think you are confusing "quantum mysticism" with the unrelated idea that Quantum Mechanics has something to do with the functioning of the brain and consciousness itelf. Those two ideas have nothing to do with one another.
"Quantum mysticism" is an interpretation of the fact that the laws of quantum mechanics make reference to an observer, and that these references are unavoidable, unlike in classical mechanics.
The idea that quantum effects or tunneling have to do with the functioning of the brain is a completely separate idea with very little support. This is called "quantum consciounsness" or something.
Quantum mechanics is still mystical even if you view the mind as clockwork. The reason is that quantum mechanics does not describe clockwork, it describes clockwork in superposition.Likebox (talk) 17:42, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
- Also from reading your comment again, you seem to suggest that objects in the classical limit have "tight" compressed wavefunctions which lump around the classical position and momentum. This is incorrect. It is correct for the part of the wavefunction which describes the relative state, meaning the relative positions and momentum of the different interacting particles, but the overall state of a system will always end up in a gross superposition of macroscopically different possibilities. This doesn't require a sophisticated Bose-Einstein condensate, it's just Schrodinger's cat.Likebox (talk) 17:46, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
- First, Schrodinger's cat is intended to illustrate difference in interpretations. The thought experiment would have very little meaning without actual experimental evidence of quantum mechanic phenomenon like the double-slit experiments. Its backwards to say that Schrodinger's cat is evidence of phenomenon. Second this line of exchange is hopelessly off topic and I won't respond here again.--OMCV (talk) 02:05, 21 August 2009 (UTC)
- It is not off topic. This article is on quantum mysticism. You must understand quantum mechanics to understand what it is all about. I think you don't have a very good grasp of quantum mechanics, so you don't understand why some people think it is mystical. If you learn the quantum mechanics, you will have a better perspective on the text you wish to delete.
- The "double slit experiment" or "stern Gerlach experiment" are preliminaries. They are designed to get a person used to thinking in terms of probability amplitudes. Once you understand that a particle's position and spin is described by a wavefunction, you next have to understand that two particles position is described by a single wavefunction in six dimensional space. That three particles are described in nine dimensions, and that 20 particles live in 60 dimensions.
- These enormous spaces are required in QM, and they are not illustrated in regular explanations. The point of "Schrodinger's cat" is to explain what kinds of things happen in this enormous space. The cat becomes a superposition of dead and alive. But does a wavefunction in 10^25 dimensions really describe cats? If it does, and the cat is superposed, does the cat "feel" simultaneously dead and alive?
Why the edits in the next section are no good
Unlike classical mechanics, in quantum mechanics, there is no naive way of identifying the true state of the world or its components such as observers. The state of all parts of reality is believed to be measurably indefinite as described by the uncertainty principle.
- This is not just about the uncertainty principle. It is about the wavefunction. Using the uncertainty principle in this context can make it sound like there is a secret hidden variable underneath.
The implications of this finding on the nature of reality is unclear since there are many interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) the wavefunction, that describes matter and energy, spreads out describing an ever larger superposition of different worlds. In this interpretation an observer observing a superposition can be described by a superposition of different observers seeing different things, but in actual experience, an observer never feels a superposition, but always feels that one of the outcomes has occurred with certainty. This apparent conflict between a wavefunction description and classical experience is called the problem of observation.[citation needed] The founders of quantum mechanics each interpreted the theory and associated assumptions different, each interpretation has different implications on an observer and their relationship to the world.
- To quote Wigners conclusions on his own paper:
"The present writer is well aware of the fact that he is not the first one to discuss the questions which form the subject of this article and that the surmises of his predecessors were either found to be wrong or unprovable, hence, in the long run, uninteresting. He would not be greatly surprised if the present article share the fate of those of his predecessors."
- Lets say you heard someone say that they thought my sister could be a slut. I still want this non-fact cited and attributed. But thats not what the problem is the version I edited stated to the effect that "quantum mechanics states this", I changed it to "an interpretation of quantum mechanics states this". There is a big difference in one quantum mechanics is treated as a single entity, I would be fine with that if you where dealing with things a mathematical formalism. Instead you are invoking ideas almost whole derived from an interpretation of quantum mechanics completely unrelated to the mathematical formalism and its supporting experimental evidence.--OMCV (talk) 14:27, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
(deindent) I agree that there is some justification necessary for the emphasis on many-worlds in this section. I believe this is justified, because the many-worlds article came somewhat before Wigner's article on consciousness, and some have suggested that it inspired Wigner's article. Wigner's point of view directly inspired some of the quantum mysticism, but Schrodinger's point of view also was somewhat similar, and everyone was aware of the pitfalls of describing an observer using quantum theory.
The many-worlds literature is the historical source for nearly all modern interpretations of QM. The interesting part is that Everett's point of view has also been influential in the philosophy of mind, through the work of Dennett and Hofstadter. That's because the mind-subtleties that arise in many-worlds can be made to arise in any mechanistic theory of consciousness. So I think the emphasis is appropriate.
But the main issue of what quantum mechanics says and so on is pretty much without dispute, and independent of intepretational details, so I didn't bother to qualify it. Maybe you could be more specific about what statements are underqualified.Likebox (talk) 17:25, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
Cites for Mind/Body Problem in Classical Mechanics
All the philosophy there is contained in great detail in the articles by Dennett from the late 70's early 80's, and reprinted and expanded upon in the Hofstadter/Dennett book cited. To be clear: there is no quantum mechanics in what Dennett and Hofstadter discuss, it's all about representing consciousness as a pattern in atoms, but the ideas are certainly inspired by Many Worlds interpretation.
Please do not make this section less clear: the statement that is made is that which way you "feel" yourself to go when your atoms are duplicated is an extra bit of information which is not present before the split, but is present after. This bit is apparent to you, as a subjective observer, but it has no objective meaning inside the atoms, because your consciousness goes both ways. This point is a little subtle, and I ask you to understand it before editing the section. The wording needs to be clear that it is exactly one bit that is not present in the atoms. Not "extra information" or "some claim that there is extra information". It is exactly one bit, and no more.
This extra bits is the "world selection" in many worlds, or equivalently the "results of past measurements" in some variants of Copenhagen, or with the "outcome of the consciousness collapse" in CCC, or with the "actually realized histories" in decoherent histories, or any other of the equivalent up-to-philosophy intepretations. The role of consciousness here in making the world appear as it is is similar to the role of consciousness in making time "go forward" subjectively. The feeling of time "going forward" is not obviously derivable from physical law, because it is a perceptual property, not a physical property. It is obviously related to entropy production, but exactly how is hard to say. Similarly, the feeling of "probabilistic measurements" is a subjective feeling in many-worlds, and an additional axiom associated with observers in standard Copenhagen style interpretations.Likebox (talk) 01:07, 17 August 2009 (UTC)
- For the hypothetical question its not good enough to say the philosophy is out there in papers for the 70's and 80's. Please cite and attribute the hypothetical question plainly so that I and other editors can verify that it isn't a hypothetical of your own creation. Its troubling that "The wording needs to be clear that it is exactly one bit that is not present in the atoms." Does it need to be so exact because its quoted or does it need to be so exact because its your personal idea that needs to be protected. The idea that there is one bit connected to: "world selection", "results of past measurements", "outcome of the consciousness collapse", and "actually realized histories" needs to attributed and cited as well as the idea that those are equivalent concepts . This is not a forum for individuals to present their own thoughts stick to what can be cited. For now the offending section has been deleted.--OMCV (talk) 05:05, 17 August 2009 (UTC)
- (moved from OMCV's talk page)::: About "Citing a whole book" please look at it: the book contains a lot of articles that discuss thought experiments like the copying of an observer. The articles are very long-winded, because they are written to convince a skeptic, but you can just skim them (although they are pleasant to read). The original article is (I think--- I haven't read this in years) "where am I" by Dennett, and "Who am I?" (a sequel). I think they are both reprinted there, with extra commentary. The many-worlds article by Hofstadter is reprinted in "Metamagical Themas" (I am pretty sure). I didn't cite a particular page, because the thought experiment I wrote about is a very condensed summary of "Where am I". That is written as a fable about someone whose consciousness is copied into circuits (if my memory serves me right). I really don't mind if you change stuff here, but please read this literature first. Dennett is a very non-mystical philosopher of consciousness.Likebox (talk) 22:07, 17 August 2009 (UTC)
- First this talk page is the place to respond to my specific concerns about the article. Second this clearly demonstrates that the "hypothetical question" is of Likeboxes' own invention. If it was adapted from a "fable about someone whose consciousness is copied into circuit" than there has been significant WP:Synth since at no point does it mention circuitry. His ownership issues over the language are also disconcerting. If the "hypothetical question" needs to be deleted until it can be specifically cited and attributed and Likebox's personal thoughts don't qualify as "WP:RS".--OMCV (talk) 12:59, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
- I just looked at where am i very briefly and you might as well be citing the gholas of the Dune series or something by Williams Gibson. I understand that Dennett is a prominent philosopher and I'll look at the piece and see if it can be paraphrased and attributed. This is generous of me since the burden of citation is not on the editor you challenges the material but the editor that adds it. I expect the hypothetical question to remain deleted until it is correctly cited.--OMCV (talk) 14:39, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
- You are supposed to use your common sense. There is an entire book devoted to copying consciousness, an article about copying consciousness, a decade of philosophical discourse about the copying of consciousness, and I paraphrase this old 80s discussion here. I do NOT say that Dennett is the only source, there are others, the particular example might not occur in the exact same words, but that's not the point. Anyone can see that its the exact same idea, perhaps illustrated differently (although I think the duplication example is given too in "Where am I" or one of the later articles in the book).Likebox (talk) 17:09, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
(deindent) About "ownership": the reason I object to the rewrite is because the rewrite suggested in the subtext that there is a deterministic point of view, where quantum mechanics is just an uncertainty, or ignorance, on top of what is basically classical mechanics. This makes quantum mysticism into gibberish, because the mysticism comes out of realizing that the quantum uncertainty is not like a classical probability. If it's not a probability, how come if "FEELS" like one? There's the mysticism.
This type of mistake made me queasy about the rest of the rewrite. It wasn't terrible, though.Likebox (talk) 17:13, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
Clean up refs from above
- ^ Wilber Ken A Brief History of Everything, 1st ed. 1996, 2nd ed. 2001: ISBN 1-57062-740-1
- ^ Wilber, Ken Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World's Great Physicists (editor), 1984, rev. ed. 2001: ISBN 1-57062-768-1
- ^ For example, Wigner states in "Remarks on the mind body question":"Until not many years ago, the "existence" of a mind or soul would have been passionately denied by most physical scientists. The brilliant successes of mechanistic and, more generally, macroscopic physics and of chemistry overshadowed the obvious fact that thoughts, desires, and emotions are not made of matter, and it was nearly universally accepted among physical scientists that there is nothing beside matter. The epistome of this belief was the conviction that, if we knew the positions and velocities of all atoms at one instant of time, we could compute the fate of the universe for all future"
- ^ Dennett, Daniel C. (2001-01). The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self & Soul. Basic Books. ISBN 0465030912.
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Picking apart this rewrite
What's wrong with this rewrite (in addition to the obvious fact that it deleted Dennett/Hofstadter, which was the only point of the section)
Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics
Newtonian mechanics has historically been associated with the assumption that the world could be observed consistently from any vantage point, a strong concept of determinism, reductionism, and positivism. These philosophies, in their most extreme form, lead to the belief that given the positions and velocities of all atoms at one instant of time, we could compute the fate of the universe for all future times.[1][2] When various forms of these beliefs are applied to consciousness and the mind-body problem the result is physicalistic monisms such as eliminative materialism.
The development of quantum mechanics and relativistic physics both elevated and limited the role of the "observer" in philosophically significant ways. The uncertainty principle relationship to the observer also placed theoretical limits on what could potentially be "known" about physical matter. The development of these theories lead to a critical reevaluation of the beliefs through which physics is contextualized and experimental results are interpreted. This reevaluation ultimately lead to the destabilization and speciation of physic's dominant philosophical context. The role and importance of determinism differed greatly between the various interpretations of quantum mechanics. This diverse environment provided fertile ground for the development of mystical interpretations and mystical extensions to the material interpretation of quantum mechanics both by professional scientists and mystics.[1][3]
- ^ a b Wigner, Eugene (1967-12). "Symmetries and Reflections, Scientific Essays". American Journal of Physics. 35 (12): 1169–1170. doi:10.1119/1.1973829. Retrieved 2009-07-30.
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suggested) (help) - ^ Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich Philip (1992). The Riddle of the Universe. Prometheus Books. ISBN 0879757469, 9780879757465.
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value: invalid character (help) - ^ Zukav, Gary (2001-08-01). Dancing Wu Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics. HarperOne. ISBN 0060959681.
What's wrong with this paragraph: a bunch of things.
- Logical positivism is NOT associated with Newtonian mechanics, and never was. It is associated with relativity and quantum mechanics. It was developed partly as a challenge to the metaphysical concept of absolute space and time which underly Newton's mechanics.
- "These philosophies, in their most extreme form... (lead to determinism)" That's absolutely false. Newton's mechanics in its most obvious form leads to the theorem that if you know the present position and momentum (and if the force law is sufficiently regular) then you know the future. This was said explicitly in a famous quote by Laplace, and was echoed for 300 years. It is also mathematically true. The previous text just takes it for granted (and assumes you understand it).
- "Relativity and quantum mechanics ... elevated the observer..." this is bullshit. Relativity did not elevate the observer much more than Newtonian mechanics. In the final reckoning, the theory of relativity describes a reality which is independent of the observer just like any other classical theory, but whose most natural description in terms of time-slices depends on the observer's state of motion. Quantum mechanics was always completely different. It requires the act of observation even to define the primitive concepts in the theory, like the wavefunction. This distinction is absolutely essential. Nobody would ever talk about "Relativistic mysticism", and relativity is not a particularly positivist theory.
- "The uncertainty principle placed a limit on what could be known..." This statement shows profound ignorance of quantum mechanics. The uncertainty principle is not a limit on what "can be known", it is a limit on simultaneous measurement of position and momentum, for the simple reason that a quantum description does not have a simultaneous position and momentum. It is misleading to state it as a limitation on our knowledge, because it is not clear "knowledge of what, exactly?"
- This sentence "The development of these theories lead to a critical reevaluation of the beliefs through which physics is contextualized and experimental results are interpreted. This reevaluation ultimately lead to the destabilization and speciation of physic's dominant philosophical context." sounds like it was written by an illiterate. Do not use big words for no reason: you could say the exact same thing like this "When these theories came along, they turned physical philosophy upside down", which is much more readable. Big words == Dumb people.
I restored the previous text. If you are going to change the text, at least make a minor effort to write readably, without pompous big words.Likebox (talk) 18:24, 19 August 2009 (UTC)
- Ok, aside from the relatively trivial style issues (that's a pet peeve, sorry), the rest of the points I made above are not very convincing:
- I understand why you said positivism now--- you mean predicting the behavior of a mind is the same as understanding consciousness. This also takes care of point 2. I put that back in the merge.
- I fixed the Dennett stuff to be clearer.
- The relativity business, while not mystical, did involve one point which was positivist. Time seems to "go forward" in Newtonian mechanics, but not in relativity. This point was lost on me when I wrote the above comment. Go figure. I still think it's a little out of the way to mention it.
- The uncertainty principle is certainly not the right way to say it--- I stand by this one.
- I also stand by the style issue, but it's not very important.
Hopefully the merge made it clearer. Perhaps it is also possible to ease your doubts about the Dennett stuff (he really does discuss copying consciousness in the Mind's I--- it's in there. Two minds (one a backup copy) diverge after a glitch, and then the backup copy becomes hopelessly unhappy).Likebox (talk) 07:10, 20 August 2009 (UTC)
Sticking to the subject
This is getting ridiculous. Please read WP:synth. The section on Dennett/Hofstadter contains substantial synth and there has been no compelling argument to the contrary.
- The section on Dennett/Hofstadter is connected to Dennett/Hofstadter perspective on the Mind/Body problem but nothing directly connects it to the "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics".
- There is a huge amount of work associated with the Mind/Body that could be connected to "Newtonian mechanics". Focusing on the work of Dennett/Hofstadter in detail is disproportionate.
- As it stand this Dennett/Hofstadter section does not fairly represent what could be described as the "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics" but rather provides a venue to for an editor to imply that aspects of Newtonian mechanics foreshadowed quantum mysticism.
- This is not the section to discuss the many-worlds interpretation or Copenhagen interpretation as it doesn't relate to "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics".
- "The atoms which make up the brain get replaced, but the information gets copied into new atoms." This statement is just poorly thought out. Its meaning is entirely unclear as is its connection to Newtonian mechanics. I expect that this is inspired form the transcript of Feynman's speech the "Value of Science". This idea was presented well after well after the introduction of quantum mechanics and Feynman clearly explains how he relates consciousness to the fact that "The radioactive phosphorus content of the cerebrum of a the rate decreases to one-half in a period of two weeks." [1]. (Still Feynman was some what misrepresenting the study since it was probably concerned with the uses and exchanges ATP, the brains fuel and not its structure. Its akin to saying the fuel I have in my car today is not the same as the fuel I had in my car yesterday yet it is still my car.)
Of these concerns I'm most worried about (3) and (1) their relationship to WP:synth and the possibility that these are not unique edits but indicative of a more pervasive misrepresentation of material. I've attempted to offer reasonable arguments and they seem to have failed. As I see it the next step is some form of arbitration. I've never initiated arbitration and have no desire to do so but it seems this situation may demand a third party, I hope you see share my views on this Likebox.--OMCV (talk) 03:23, 21 August 2009 (UTC)
- I don't think I read that Feynman thing, but I may have. It certainly isn't the inspiration for the changing atoms. That's just to make sure that people understand that copying the information in the brain to new atoms is a normal thing, because that's the only process that Dennett uses to make the intuitive paradoxes in his fables.
- While I agree that there is a huge literature on consciousness in philosophy, all of it is useless for this article, because it is not informed by the quantum thinking. Dennett's paradoxes are essentially the same type of effects which are naturally suggested by the many-worlds interpretation, and so they help explain the relationship of consciousness and intepretation of QM. It is possible that Dennett was directly inspired by many-worlds (although there is no source for this assertion).
- There is no synth. The ideas stated in this article are those of Dennett and Hofstadter, with next to no alteration. I used my own language, but the ideas are not original. These ideas are not quantum mechanical, they are classical by default (the machines which Dennett refers to never involve any quantum mechanics). In this article, that fact needs to be emphasized. That's why I wrote in "Newtonian" mechanics. It really doesn't have to be newtonian, you could retitle the section "Mind/Body problem with a deterministic brain".
- The classical problem (informed by Dennett) makes the quantum paradoxes clearer. There is no other work in philosophy of mind that I know of which is at all related to quantum mechanical perspectives. While I agree that some editorial judgement has been used to select which philosophy and physics articles are relevant, that is not SYNTH, that's writing an article. If you have other sources you think should be added, there's plenty of room.Likebox (talk) 04:26, 21 August 2009 (UTC)
- The section titled "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics" should not be informed by quantum thinking.
- Dennett's story deals with the speed of light, electronics, radio waves, and many other things which are not described by any "Newtonian" model. Newtonian physics (classical physics) is a model of reality whose relevance is limited to the translational motion of large objects (generally atoms or bigger) moving slowly (well below the speed of light) in the observers frame of reference. There is the cultural concept of "Newtonian Physics" which is tied to the philosophical idea of a clock-work universe, the idea of a perfectly accessible determinism. This idea should be described in its own terms and not through a quantum thinking informed filter.
- The ideas of Dennett are distinctly different from the thought experiment in the article. The concept of "consciousness stream" and a "single bit of information" is not contained in DENNETT's Where Am I?, these two ideas need to be cited and attributed if they are going to be included without dispute.
- "The classical problem (informed by Dennett) makes the quantum paradoxes clearer." The classical system presented authentically had no use or knowledge of quantum paradoxes. Researchers ignored any philosophical concern that could resemble a quantum paradox until the discovery of specific phenomenon such as spectral lines. As it stands now the section should be titled "Mind/Body problem as perceived by physicalist in the opinion of Dennet". But then again, Dennet's work came well after the development of quantum mechanics and as its written now the article doesn't represent Dennet's ideas.--OMCV (talk) 05:17, 21 August 2009 (UTC)
- Thank you for the link to the Mind's I website. The original "Where Am I" contains the copying procedure, "Hubert" is the computational copy. The idea that there is a way for a consciousness to go when it is duplicated is contained in this work. The stuff you are complaining about, the "bit of information", etc, is so trivial and obvious, I think it is silly to argue about.Likebox (talk) 04:34, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
(deindent) To respond to your comment: by the phrase "Newtonian mechanics" I did not mean just Newtonian mechanics, I meant Maxwell's equations too and even special relativity, since they are all pretty much identical as far as mind issues are concerned.Likebox (talk) 21:48, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
Accusations of SYNTH
I think all of these accusations are caused by not reading "The Mind's I". The relevant article is a sequel to "Where Am I?" where there is a copy of the consciousness, and the copy diverges from the original because of a computer glitch. From this point on, the copy and the original are two separate consciousnesses, but there was only one before. This leads to trouble, because only one of them can control Dennett's body, and neither consciousness want its body to be passively controlled by the other.Likebox (talk) 04:33, 21 August 2009 (UTC)
- I just read Where was I? and it doesn't help your case. The "diverging copy" is actually from the end of "The Mind's I" by Dennett [2], I recommend you reread the article. As I stated above the thought experiment now in the article is SYNTH.--OMCV (talk) 05:41, 21 August 2009 (UTC)
- I quickly skimmed it--- you are right. The diverging copy has a "switch" (one bit of information) which is useless at first, but then diverges. This is the mysterious "bit" that you complain about. Dennett says explicitly "I don't know which one I am, Yorick or Hubert", which is paraphrased into "this bit is blah blah blah" in the article. Really, there is no new idea here. Honest.Likebox (talk) 04:46, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
- The differences between Yorick and Hubert is far more than a "bit". Dennett never offers a theory as to why they diverge only that they do. The switch is used to move between two different systems that started indistinguishable from each other but have many unobserved differences and thus diverge to observably different states. This is very much synth.--OMCV (talk) 13:43, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
- Its akin to saying that I have two painted balls of the exact same size, elasticity, and density, they behave the same in almost every situation except a when placed in magnetic fields. The difference is because one ball is a metal and the other is wood. This isn't one "bit" of information from a physics point of view even if it is from a linguistic point of view. Every atom in the two balls is different. The same is true for "Yorick" and "Hubert" and concluding the switch to be one "bit" of different between the two systems is just absurd.--OMCV (talk) 14:18, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
Summary of Complaints about Mind/Body Section
Perhaps the title of the section should be "Mind body problem disregarding quantum mechanics" instead of "Mind body problem in Newtonian mechanics. But since "Newtonian mechanics" is just a stand-in for "what people normally think of as physical law", the change would only be slight.
The point of the Dennett experiments is to show how different the mind can be from the material property of the brain. This discussion came after the analogous discussion in quantum mechanics, so you can't say it's not derived from this.Likebox (talk) 04:11, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
- The section is now titled Classical Mind/Body problem. Hopefully that will get rid of the specious arguments about classical theories other than Newtonian mechanics.Likebox (talk) 21:49, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
- Form a "proper" classical perspective there is only measurable "body" and unmeasurable "mind" is not addressed, thus the mind/body problem does not exist in a classical framework that deals only with body. The invented content must go no matter what title it is given.--OMCV (talk) 02:32, 24 August 2009 (UTC)
- The section is now titled Classical Mind/Body problem. Hopefully that will get rid of the specious arguments about classical theories other than Newtonian mechanics.Likebox (talk) 21:49, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
In re third opinion
For whoever provides a third opinion here, the current dispute seems to be about the inclusion or removal of the following two paragraphs:
"But even for these hypothetical Newtonian observers, philosophers have raised doubts. The atoms which make up the brain get replaced, but the information gets copied into new atoms. In certain contrived thought experiments, this type of copying leads to strange outcomes. For example, take a conscious Newtonian observer and duplicate all the information in the brain, by copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains. The two brains start out exactly the same, but diverge afterwards, since they will have different experiences from this point on. In this situation, it is not obvious which way the subjective stream of conscious experience for the observer will go. If the copy is not a philosophical zombie, the consciousness had better go both ways. But each copy feels to have gone only one way.
"So the subjective experience after the split requires an extra bit of information to describe--- the bit which tells the observer which way thier consciousness has gone. The value of this bit is subjectively very important for the duplicated--- it predicts the future--- but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms. These types of thought experiments were widely discussed in philosophy in the 1980s [1], but similar ideas appeared earlier as part of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics."
- ^ [Dennett, Daniel C. (2001-01). The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self & Soul. Basic Books. ISBN 0465030912.]
(Diffs of removal and re-addition from article history.) — Athaenara ✉ 18:40, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
- That's is correct from my perspective, I deleted the text on the grounds that it is synth. Less importantly this text does not address the issue of "Mind/body problem in Newtonian mechanics" for which the section is titled. A more detailed presentation of both sides of the argument are located in the preceding text of this talk page.--OMCV (talk) 19:35, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
- Yes, that's correct from my perspective too. This type of discussion, outside of quantum mechanics, is useful for a person who is unfamiliar with philosophy of mind. It explains why the question of consciousness has been considered somewhat slippery, and it is the same sort of slipperiness that is involved in the stranger case of quantum mechanics. It might be badly titled: "Classical Mind/Body problem" might be better.
- The reason I think this belongs in an article on quantum mysticism is because the discussion of observer splitting/copying as far as I know first appeared in the quantum literature. These questions about consciousness were then reexamined in the non-quantum context in the 1980s by Dennett and Hofstadter. So I think that the link to the Dennett things is informative and relevant.Likebox (talk) 20:20, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
Third Opinion So the main reason being given for the deletion of this material is that it is SYNTH? If so, it should be possible to point to specific parts that appear in none of the sources quoted. Perhaps then, we can find a form of words that avoids those specific claims. I'll note, as an aside, that "some philosophers have raised doubts" should be accompanied by a citation stating who at least some of those philosophers are, and where they published their doubts.
As to the lesser problem (if I'm reading you both correctly) of the section not belonging here, perhaps the section could be re-titled, and re-phrased to say something like "in his book [X] on quantum mysticism [Y] argues that...", thus clearly indicating that somebody, at least, thinks the subjects are relevant to each other? Anaxial (talk) 12:54, 24 August 2009 (UTC)
- The following is adapted from my talk page: You can't paraphrase something as original as Dennett's work to the point that you can't attribute it to Dennett or some one else.
- Dennett never supposed that consciousness would "stream" to only one of the copies he describes in his scenario, he never even suggested it. The concept consciousness "stream" and the two split alternatives are currently full inventions.
- In fact Dennett points out that each copy is fully conscious and indistinguishable untill they split for undisclosed reasons.
- In the current form Dennett's scenario is contradicted by saying the experiment is "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains". What Dennett actually described was two copies of physical minds tied to the same body through some form of radio transmission.
- Furthermore its a major omission to ignore that the minds presented by Dennett are made up of vastly different material one an uploaded mind and the other a Brain in a vat far more than one "bit" of difference by any reasonable interpretation an diffidently not "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains".
- Dennett never said the two copies differed by only one bit, that claim is based on an unusual interpretation of the "switch".
- The part on "atoms which make up the brain get replaced" is not sourced (nor explained/described in a reasonable way).
- At no point does Dennett claim to be addressing the mind/body problem from the perspective of Newtonian or classical mechanics nor does he claim to exclude quantum mechanics. Rather he addressing classic philosophical questions like demonic deceiver and Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde scenarios in a modern yet still unrealistic context.
- Philosophical zombies are not discussed in any cited source.
- Basically the entire section and hypothetical as presented right now is a very original piece of work. I could come up with more details but that's the bulk of it.--OMCV (talk) 16:27, 24 August 2009 (UTC)
- Dennett did too talk about "streams", except perhaps not in that language. You can substitute "train of thought" or "sequence of memories" or diverging experience.
- YES, that's the whole point--- they are indistinguishable, except for hardware, until they split. So which way do you go? He adresses this too--- he says "I don't know which one I am, Yorick or Hubert".
- NO NO NO. The case is YORICK/HUBERT, as I explained before. TWO BRAINS, SAME MIND, and they diverge. The radio stuff is just a red herring. Stop bringing it up.
- That's a part of the essay I wished to ignore, because it is irrelevant for the present discussion.
- It's obvious. Don't force people to source the obvious.
- Ditto. It would be better if you only bring up stuff you are sincere about.
- "Newtonian/Classical" just means "Not quantum", or if you like "Capable of being simulated on a deterministic computer", which is true of Yorick.
- Philosophical Zombie is a link to an introductory article here on philosophy of mind.
- Let me be more explicit with points 3 and 4. The statement "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains" is not related to the idea producing two copies of a consciousness in two different forms, one a brain in a vat and the other an uploaded mind. This idea of "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains" is central to the entire hypothetical and is not supported by any reference.--OMCV (talk) 17:04, 25 August 2009 (UTC)
Please, less of the accusations of bad faith; they are unlikely to help resolve the issue. With regard to points 5 and 6, I would suggest that in this case, we should, indeed, cite the obvious, since it's clear that at least one party doesn't find it "obvious" - and, if its obvious to you, a cite won't be hard to find. It also seems clear to me that, if you're copying a brain in a vat into an uploaded mind then, no matter what else you may be doing, you're "copying all the relative positions and velocities into two separate brains" (arguably you might be if you were copying one uploaded mind into another, but I gather that's not the case here). So I would suggest altering that phrasing, and perhaps some explanation as to why this would be relevant, since, if you're not copying the particles, it's not obvious to me what it has to do with quantum physics. Perhaps you can clarify for me? Anaxial (talk) 17:16, 25 August 2009 (UTC)
- Copying positions and relative velocities, as far as I see it, is exactly the same as two copies in two different forms. I didn't remember the precise details of Dennett's example when I wrote it, and I wrote something which seemed equivalent to me. What's the difference exactly? If you don't like it, I can replace it with copying into a computer. You still can't tell which copy you "are" until the glitch. The glitch still reveals an extra bit of information to you, an extra bit which wasn't there before the split.Likebox (talk) 17:14, 25 August 2009 (UTC)
- Hmm... it seems to me that it's actually very different. If all the positions and velocities were the same, what you would have would look the same to an outside observer as well as being the same from an internal perspective; a brain in the vat does not look the same as an uploaded mind, and the "mind" itself is running on completely different hardware, so the positions and velocities would, ipso facto have to be different, wouldn't they?. Anaxial (talk) 17:19, 25 August 2009 (UTC)
- All of this discussion is predicated on Dennett's philosophy of mind, where the mind can be identified with the information content in the brain. The information content in the vat-brain and the computer-program brain is identical--- they will answer the same to any question. So it is effectively the same as any other copy. I melded the two examples in my mind (uploading and copying atoms), because I agree with Dennett. But I don't know. Why is this difference essential? Also, I replaced the one I wrote with Dennett's below.Likebox (talk) 17:24, 25 August 2009 (UTC)
- Now that we have established the brain in a vat and the uploaded mind are different I think we can also conclude that there is more than one "bit" of difference between the two (point 5). Since there are substantial differences, as usually assumed with uploaded minds, I don't think anyone would debate there are potentially strange outcomes when people theorize about uploaded minds, be it within the framework of classical mechanics or informed by quantum mechanics.
- Points 6 and 7 still stand. There is no citation or explanation of 6. For point 7 there is no reason to assume that Dennett isn't considering quantum mechanics, after all to create his story he also had to abandon aspects of known technology and classical mechanics. All we know is the first person account of the story not the theoretical frame work.--OMCV (talk) 17:41, 25 August 2009 (UTC)
The statement in the article is "by copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities". This is, it seems, not part of the argument made in Dennett's book, since clearly the atoms in a brain and in an uploaded system are not going to be the same. Therefore, this does, in my view, constitute synthesis, and does not belong on WP - unless, of course, there is some other book that does make this exact argument, in which case we need to cite that. Anaxial (talk) 20:13, 25 August 2009 (UTC)
Would this be better?
But even for hypothetical Newtonian observers, philosophers have raised doubts. The atoms which make up the brain get replaced, but the information gets copied into new atoms. In certain contrived thought experiments, one could imagine moving all the information into a computer. This leads to strange outcomes. For example, take a conscious Newtonian observer and simulate all the information in the brain, by simuating all the atoms relative positions and velocities in a computer program. If the two brains get identical experiences, they stay exactly the same. But if there is a different experience for one of the two copies, the copies diverge afterwards. In this situation, it is not obvious which way the subjective stream of conscious experience inside the system will go. Both you and the program should have a consciousness in this scenario, to avoid making one of you a philosophical zombie. But it is impossible for each copy to be aware of the other.
So the subjective experience after the split requires an extra bit of information to describe--- the bit which tells the observer which way their consciousness has gone. The value of this bit is subjectively very important for the duplicated--- it predicts the future--- but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms.Likebox (talk) 17:24, 25 August 2009 (UTC)