→Abortive coup and anti-communist purge: well, the listed source uses "commanded". I'm sure this means take control of, but does it mean surrounded or entered? |
→Abortive coup and anti-communist purge: how about this then? |
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[[File:Suharto at funeral.jpg|thumb|As Major General, Suharto (''at right, foreground'') attends funeral for assassinated generals October 5 1965. (Photo by the Department of Information, Indonesia)]] |
[[File:Suharto at funeral.jpg|thumb|As Major General, Suharto (''at right, foreground'') attends funeral for assassinated generals October 5 1965. (Photo by the Department of Information, Indonesia)]] |
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On the night of September 30–October 1, 1965 six senior army generals were kidnapped and executed in Jakarta by a battalion of soldiers from the Presidential Guard in an attempted coup.<ref>Ricklefs (1991), page 281</ref> Backed by elements of the armed forces, the insurgents |
On the night of September 30–October 1, 1965 six senior army generals were kidnapped and executed in Jakarta by a battalion of soldiers from the Presidential Guard in an attempted coup.<ref>Ricklefs (1991), page 281</ref> Backed by elements of the armed forces, the insurgents occupied Merdeka Square including the areas in front of the Presidential Palace, the national radio station, and telecommunications centre. At 7:10 a.m. a Lieutenant-Colonel Untung announced on radio that a "[[30 September Movement]]" had forestalled a coup by "power-mad generals", and that it was "an internal army affair". Apart from Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General [[Abdul Harris Nasution]]—who was targeted for assassination but narrowly escaped, and was in hiding—Suharto was the most senior general not removed by the 30 September group.<ref>Vickers (2005), page 156</ref> On the night of 30 September, Suharto had been in hospital with his three-year old son [[Tommy Suharto|Tommy]] who had a scalding injury. It was here that Colonel Abdul Latief was the only principal of ensuing events with whom Suharto spoke that evening.<ref name="Friend 2003, page 104"/> Suharto had no affinity to Sukarno, nor any special Islamic conviction with which to oppose him. He despised disorder, but was known for prizing opportunity; General Yani and disciplined him several years before for the Diponegoro smuggling affair, thus removing any affinity he might have for Yani.<ref name="Friend 2003, page 104">Friend (2003), page 104</ref> |
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Upon being told of the disappearance of the generals and shootings, Suharto went to Kostrad headquarters just before dawn from where he could see soldiers occupying Merdeka Square. He led Kostrad in seizing control of the centre of Jakarta, capturing key strategic sites. Now joined by Nasution, Suharto announced over the radio at 9:00 p.m. that six generals had been kidnapped by "counter-revolutionaries", that he was in control of the army, and that he would crush the 30 September Movement and safeguard Sukarno.<ref>Ricklefs (1991), p. 282.</ref> Suharto issued an ultimatum to Halim Air Force Base, where the G30S had based themselves and where Sukarno (the reasons for his presence are unclear and were subject of claim and counter-claim), General [[Omar Dhani]] and Aidit had gathered. The coup leaders fled Jakarta<ref>Ricklefs (1991), page 281–282</ref> while G30S-sympathetic battalions in Central Java quickly came under Suharto control,<ref name="Friend 2003, page 105">Friend (2003), page 105</ref> and it was clear that the incompetently organised and poorly coordinated coup had failed.<ref name="Ricklefs 1991, pages 281–282">Ricklefs (1991), pages 281–282</ref> By 2 October, Suharto's faction was firmly in control of the army. Sukarno's obedience to Suharto's 1 October ultimatum to leave Halim is seen as changing all power relationships.<ref name="Friend 2003, page 105"/> Sukarno's fragile balance of power between the military, political Islam, communists, and nationalists that underlay his "[[Guided Democracy (1957–1965)|Guided Democracy]]" was now collapsing.<ref name="Ricklefs 1991, pages 281–282"/> Complicated and partisan theories continue to this day over the identity of the attempted coup's organisers and their aims: in addition to the army's version (which became the [[Orde Baru|"New Order's"]] official version) that the PKI was solely responsible, other theories include Suharto being behind the events; that the army and Suharto was merely taking advantage of a poorly executed coup; and that Sukarno was behind the events (see [[30 September Movement#Theories about the 30 September Movement|30 September Movement]]). |
Upon being told of the disappearance of the generals and shootings, Suharto went to Kostrad headquarters just before dawn from where he could see soldiers occupying Merdeka Square. He led Kostrad in seizing control of the centre of Jakarta, capturing key strategic sites. Now joined by Nasution, Suharto announced over the radio at 9:00 p.m. that six generals had been kidnapped by "counter-revolutionaries", that he was in control of the army, and that he would crush the 30 September Movement and safeguard Sukarno.<ref>Ricklefs (1991), p. 282.</ref> Suharto issued an ultimatum to Halim Air Force Base, where the G30S had based themselves and where Sukarno (the reasons for his presence are unclear and were subject of claim and counter-claim), General [[Omar Dhani]] and Aidit had gathered. The coup leaders fled Jakarta<ref>Ricklefs (1991), page 281–282</ref> while G30S-sympathetic battalions in Central Java quickly came under Suharto control,<ref name="Friend 2003, page 105">Friend (2003), page 105</ref> and it was clear that the incompetently organised and poorly coordinated coup had failed.<ref name="Ricklefs 1991, pages 281–282">Ricklefs (1991), pages 281–282</ref> By 2 October, Suharto's faction was firmly in control of the army. Sukarno's obedience to Suharto's 1 October ultimatum to leave Halim is seen as changing all power relationships.<ref name="Friend 2003, page 105"/> Sukarno's fragile balance of power between the military, political Islam, communists, and nationalists that underlay his "[[Guided Democracy (1957–1965)|Guided Democracy]]" was now collapsing.<ref name="Ricklefs 1991, pages 281–282"/> Complicated and partisan theories continue to this day over the identity of the attempted coup's organisers and their aims: in addition to the army's version (which became the [[Orde Baru|"New Order's"]] official version) that the PKI was solely responsible, other theories include Suharto being behind the events; that the army and Suharto was merely taking advantage of a poorly executed coup; and that Sukarno was behind the events (see [[30 September Movement#Theories about the 30 September Movement|30 September Movement]]). |
Revision as of 16:21, 16 August 2009
Suharto | |
---|---|
2nd President of Indonesia | |
In office 12 March 1967 – 21 May 1998 | |
Vice President | Hamengkubuwana IX Adam Malik Umar Wirahadikusumah Sudharmono Try Sutrisno Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie |
Preceded by | Sukarno |
Succeeded by | Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie |
16th Secretary General of Non-Aligned Movement | |
In office 7 September 1992 – 20 October 1995 | |
Preceded by | Dobrica Ćosić |
Succeeded by | Ernesto Samper Pizano |
4th Indonesian Armed Forces Commander | |
In office 1969–1973 | |
Preceded by | Abdul Harris Nasution |
Succeeded by | Maraden Panggabean |
8th Indonesian Army Chief of Staff | |
In office 1965–1967 | |
Preceded by | Pranoto Reksosamudra |
Succeeded by | Maraden Panggabean |
1st Armed Force and Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) Commander | |
In office 1961–1965 | |
Preceded by | Position created |
Succeeded by | Umar Wirahadikusumah |
Personal details | |
Born | Kemusuk, Dutch East Indies | 8 June 1921
Died | 27 January 2008 Jakarta, Indonesia | (aged 86)
Nationality | Indonesian |
Political party | Golkar |
Spouse | Siti Hartinah (d. 1996) |
Children | Siti Hardiyanti Hastuti[1] Sigit Harjojudanto Bambang Trihatmodjo Siti Hediyati Hariyadi Hutomo Mandala Putra Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih |
Profession | Military |
Suharto (8 June 1921 – 27 January 2008) was the second President of Indonesia, holding the office from 1967 to 1998.
Suharto was born in a small village near Yogyakarta, during the era of Dutch colonial control. His ethnic Javanese peasant parents divorced not long after his birth, and he passed between several foster parents for much of his childhood. After a brief and unsuccessful stint as a village bank clerk, Suharto joined the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army in 1940. During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, Suharto served in various Japanese-organized Indonesian security forces. He joined the newly formed Indonesian army, during Indonesia's independence struggle, in which he rose through the ranks to command a garrison against Dutch offensives at the Republican capital of Yogyakarta. Following Indonesian independence, Suharto rose to the rank of Major General.
An attempted coup on 30 September 1965 was countered by Suharto-led troops.[3] The Suharto-led army blamed the attempt on the Indonesian Communist Party, which was subsequently outlawed, and led a violent anti-communist purge, which is thought to have killed over half a million people. Suharto wrested power from the weakened incumbent and founding president, Sukarno, who relied on the ICP for support, in 1966 and took over the reins of power. He became president in March 1967.
Popular, military and political support in Indonesia for Suharto's presidency eroded dramatically following the devastating effect of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis on Indonesia's economy and standard of living. Suharto was forced to resign from the presidency in May 1998 following mass demonstrations and violence. Suharto lived his post-presidential years in near seclusion, and died at the age of 86 in Jakarta in 2008.
The legacy of Suharto's 32-year rule is debated both in Indonesia and abroad. Under his "New Order" administration, Suharto constructed a strong, centralized and military-dominated government. An ability to maintain stability over a sprawling and diverse Indonesia and an avowedly anti-Communist stance won him the economic and diplomatic support of the West during the Cold War. For most of his presidency, Indonesia experienced significant economic growth and industrialisation,[4] dramatically improving health, education and living standards.[5] Against the backdrop of Cold War international relations, Suharto's "New Order" invasion of East Timor, and the subsequent 24-year occupation, resulted in an estimated minimum of 102,800 deaths.[6] By the 1990s, the New Order's authoritarianism and widespread corruption—estimates of government funds misappropriated by the Suharto family range from US$1.5 billion and US$35 billion[7][8]—was a source of much discontent, and was referred as one of the world's most corrupt leaders.[9] In the years since his presidency, attempts to try him on charges of corruption and genocide failed because of his poor health.
Like many Javanese, Suharto had only one name.[8] In religious contexts, he is sometimes called “Haji” or “el-Haj Mohammed Suharto”, but this Islamic title is not part of his formal name or generally used. The spelling "Suharto" reflects current Indonesian spelling rules, but people's names were always exempt from this. The English-language press generally uses the spelling 'Suharto', but Suharto and his family, as well as the Indonesian government and media, use 'Soeharto'.[10]
Early life
Suharto was born on 8 June 1921 during the Dutch East Indies era, in a plaited bamboo walled house in the hamlet of Kemusuk, a part of the larger village of Godean, 15 kilometres west of Yogyakarta the Javanese cultural heartland.[5]
The facts of Suharto's childhood and youth are, according to Western biographies, steeped in both uncertainty and myth. Standard and apocryphal accounts of his early years and family life exist, many loaded with political meaning. Suharto's parents, his mother Sukirah and father Kertosudiro, were ethnic Javanese and peasant class, living in an area without electricity or running water. His father Kertosudiro's marriage to Sukirah was his second; he already had two children from his previous marriage. Kertosudiro's marriage to Sukirah is believed to have ended in divorce early in Suharto's life, though exactly when is inconsistent—the account in Roeder's biography The Smiling General claims the divorce came within years of his birth; the account in Suharto's autobiography Pirakan states that it came within mere weeks. Both his parents later remarried.
Suharto was estranged from alternately each or both his parents for extended periods of time, being passed around several households for much of his early life. The marriage of his paternal aunt to a low-level Javanese official named Prawirowiharjo, who took to raising Suharto as his own, is believed by Elson (2001) to have provided both a father-figure and role model for Suharto, as well as a stable home in Wuryantoro, from where he received much of his primary education. Suharto boarded with a dukun ("guru") of Javanese mystical arts and faith healing; an experience that deeply affected Suharto who would later, as president, surround himself in powerful symbolic language.[5]
The absence of official documentation and certain aspects of Suharto's early life that are inconsistent with that of a Javanese peasant (Suharto received, for example, an education fairly early on), has led to several rumours of Suharto being the illegitimate child of a well-off benefactor, which included being the child of a Yogyakarta aristocrat or a well-off Chinese Indonesian merchant.[11] Suharto biographer Robert E. Elson believes that such rumours cannot be entirely ruled out, given that much of the information Suharto has given on his origins has been tinged with political meaning.[11]
As noted by Elson and others, Suharto's upbringing stood in contrast to that of leading Indonesian nationalists such as Sukarno in that he is believed to have had little interest in anti-colonialism, or political concerns beyond his immediate surroundings. He was also, unlike Sukarno and his circle, illiterate in Dutch or other European languages. He would, however, learn Dutch upon his induction into the Dutch military in 1940.[12]
Military career
World War II and Japanese occupation
After a brief stint in a clerical job at a village bank (from which he was forced to resign after a bicycle mishap tore his only working clothes),[13] followed by a spell of unemployment, Suharto joined the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) in 1940, and studied in a Dutch-run military school in Gombong near Yogyakarta. With the Netherlands under German occupation and the Japanese pressing for access to Indonesian oil supplies, the ranks of the KNIL had been opened to large intakes of previously excluded Javanese.[14] After graduation, Suharto was assigned to Battalion XIII at Rampal. His service there was unextraordinary, but for his contracting malaria requiring hospitalisation while on guard duty, and then gaining promotion to sergeant.[15]
The March 1942 invasion of Imperial Japanese forces was initially welcomed by many Indonesians as a key step towards independence and Suharto was one of thousands of Indonesians who volunteered for Japanese organised security forces.[14] He first joined the Japanese sponsored police force at the rank of keibuho (assistant inspector), where he claimed to have gained his first experience in the intelligence work so central to his presidency[citation needed] ("Criminal matters became a secondary problem," Suharto remarked, "what was most important were matters of a political kind").[16]
Suharto shifted from police work toward the Japanese-sponsored militia, the Peta (Defenders of the Fatherland) in which Indonesians served as officers. In his training to serve at the rank of shodancho (platoon commander) he encountered a localized version of the Japanese bushido, or "way of the warrior", used to indoctrinate troops. This training encouraged an anti-Dutch and pro-nationalist thought, although toward the aims of the Imperial Japanese militarists. The encounter with a nationalistic and militarist ideology is believed to have profoundly influenced Suharto's own way of thinking.[17] The Japanese turned ex-NCOs, including Suharto, into officers and gave them further military education, including lessons in the use of the samurai sword. Suharto's biographer, O.G. Roeder, records in The Smiling General (1969) that Suharto was "well known for his tough, but not brutal, methods".
Indonesian National Revolution
The Japanese surrender to the Allies in World War II brought forth the opportunity for the leaders of the Indonesian Nationalist cause Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta to hastily declare the complete independence of Indonesia and the beginning of the Indonesian National Revolution. International recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty, however, would only come after armed action — a task at which Suharto would prove himself adept.
Expulsion of the Japanese
After the Japanese surrender, Suharto joined the Indonesian republicans struggling to secure Indonesian independence. He became a deputy to Umar Slamet in the service of the revolutionary government's People's Security Body (BKR). Suharto claims to have led a number of attacks against remaining Japanese forces around Yogyakarta. The central role he commonly portrayed himself playing in his reminisces on the period during his presidency is debatable; however, it may be acknowledged that Suharto's familiarity with military functioning helped in the organisation of the disparate independence forces into a unified fighting force. In the early years of the War, Suharto organized local armed forces into Battalion X of Regiment I; Suharto was promoted to the rank of Major and became Battalion X's leader.[18]
Return of the Dutch
The arrival of the Allies, under a mandate to return the situation to the status quo ante bellum, quickly led to clashes between Indonesian republicans and Ally forces, namely returning Dutch and assisting British forces. Suharto led his Division X troops towards halting an advance by the Dutch T ("Tiger") Brigade on May 17, 1946. It earned him the respect of his superior, Lieutenant Colonel Sunarto Kusumodirjo, who invited him to draft the working guidelines for the Battle Leadership Headquarters (MPP), a body created to organise and unify the command structure of the Indonesian Nationalist forces.[19] The military forces of the still infant Republic of Indonesia were constantly restructuring. By August 1946, Suharto was head of the 22nd Regiment of Division III (the "Diponegoro" Division) stationed in Yogyakarta. In late 1946 the Diponegoro Division became responsible for defence of the west and southwest of Yogyakarta from Dutch forces. Conditions at the time are reported in Dutch sources as miserable; Suharto himself is reported as assisting smuggling syndicates in the transport of opium through the territory he controlled, to make income.[20]
In December 1948, the Dutch launched "Operation Crow," which decimated much of the Indonesian fighting forces, resulting in the capture of Sukarno and Hatta, the civilian leadership of Indonesia. Suharto, for his part, took severe casualties as the Dutch invaded the area of Yogyakarta; the retreat was equally humiliating.[20]
During the Revolution, Suharto married Siti Hartinah, known as Madam Tien, daughter of a minor noble in the Mangkunegaran royal house of Solo,[5] which in the years of the revolution, lost its prestige and income. The arranged marriage was enduring and supportive. The couple had six children: Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Tutut, born 1949), Sigit Harjojudanto (born 1951), Bambang Trihatmodjo (born 1953), Siti Hediati (Titiek, born 1959), Hutomo Mandala Putra (Tommy, born 1962), and Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih (Mamiek, born 1964). Within the Javanese upper class, it was considered acceptable if the wife pursued genteel commerce to supplement the family budget, allowing her husband to keep his dignity in his official role. The commercial dealings of Tien, her children and grandchildren became extensive and ultimately undermine Suharto's presidency.[5]
Guerrilla warfare and victory
It is widely believed that the humiliating nature of this defeat engrained a sense of guilt in Suharto, as well as a sense of obligation to avenge his honour. Suharto, and the aggrieved Indonesian armed forces, attempted to do this by means of guerrilla warfare, using intelligence and supply networks established at the village level. During this time ambushes became a favoured tactic; villagers were enlisted to attack Dutch patrols with weapons as primitive as bamboo spears. The desired effect was to remind the populace of the continuing resistance to Dutch rule. However, these attacks were largely ineffective and were often comparable to suicide.
Suharto's efforts to regain the national honour culminated in an attack on Dutch forces at Yogyakarta at dawn on 1 March 1949.[21] Suharto would later embellish his role as the singular plotter; according to more objective sources, however, the nationalist Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (who still remained in power), as well as the Panglima of the Third Division ordered the attack. General Nasution would recall, however, that Suharto took great care in preparing the "General Offensive" (Indonesian Serangan Umum). In a series of small-scale raids, Suharto's forces and local militia captured the city, holding it until noon.[21] Civilians sympathetic to the Republican cause within the city had been galvanised by the show of force, and internationally, the United Nations took notice, with the Security Council putting pressure on the Dutch to cease Police Action and to re-embark on negotiations.
The return of the Dutch to the negotiating table all but assured, Suharto took an active interest in the peace agreements, though they were much to his dissatisfaction.[22]
Post-Independence military career
During the following years he served in the Indonesian National Army, stationed primarily on Java. In 1950, Colonel Suharto led the Garuda Brigade in suppressing a rebellion of largely Ambonese colonial-trained supporters of the Dutch-established State of Eastern Indonesia and its federal entity the United States of Indonesia; the rebellion was led by Andi Azis a former officer of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL).[23] During his one-year stay in Makassar, Suharto became acquainted with his neighbours the Habibie family, whose eldest son BJ Habibie would later became Suharto's vice-president and went on to succeed him as President. In 1951, Suharto led his troops in a cautious blocking campaign against the Islamic-inspired rebellion of Battalion 426 in Central Java before it was broken by the 'Banteng (Wild Buffalo) Raiders' led by Ahmad Yani.[24] Between 1954 and 1959, Brigadier General Suharto served in the important position of commander of Diponegoro Division, responsible for Central Java and Yogyakarta provinces. His relationship with prominent businessmen Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan, which would extend throughout his presidency, began in Central Java where he was involved in series of "profit generating" enterprises conducted primarily to keep the poorly funded military unit functioning.[25] Army anti-corruption investigations implicated Suharto in 1959 smuggling scandal. Suharto was relieved of his position, and transferred to the army's Staff an Command School (Seskoad) in the city of Bandung.[26] While in Bandung, he was promoted to brigadier-general, and in late 1960, promoted to chief of army intelligence.[5] In 1961, he was given an additional command, as head of the army's new Strategic Reserve (later Kostrad), a ready-reaction air-mobile force.
In January 1962 he was promoted to the rank of major general and appointed to lead Operation Mandala, a joint army-navy-air force command which formed the military side of the campaign to win western New Guinea (which Sukarno called "West Irian), from the Dutch who were preparing it for its own independence separate from Indonesia.[5] In 1965 Soeharto was assigned operational command of Sukarno's Konfrontasi, against the newly formed Malaysia. Fearful that Konfrontasi would leave Java thinly covered by the army, and hand control to the 2-million strong Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), he authorised a Kostrad intelligence officer, Ali Murtopo, to open contacts with the British and Malaysians.[5]
Overthrow of Sukarno (1965)
Background
From the late 1950s, political conflict and economic deterioration worsened; by the mid-1960s, the cash-strapped government had to scrap critical public sector subsidies, estimates put annual inflation at 500-1,000%, export revenues were shrinking, infrastructure crumbling, and factories were operating at minimal capacity with negligible investment. Severe poverty and hunger were widespread, and Sukarno led his country in a military confrontation with Malaysia whilst stepping up revolutionary and anti-western rhetoric.[27]
Described as the great dalang ("puppet master"), President Sukarno's position came to depend on balancing the opposing and increasingly hostile forces of the army and Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). His anti-imperial ideology saw Indonesia increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and then communist China. By 1965 at the height of the Cold War, the PKI penetrated all levels of government extensively, and with the support of Sukarno and the air force, successfully pursued policies to gain influence at the expense of the army, thus ensuring the army's enmity.[28] By late 1965, the army was divided between a left-wing faction allied with the PKI, and a right-wing faction that was being courted by the United States.[29]
Abortive coup and anti-communist purge
On the night of September 30–October 1, 1965 six senior army generals were kidnapped and executed in Jakarta by a battalion of soldiers from the Presidential Guard in an attempted coup.[30] Backed by elements of the armed forces, the insurgents occupied Merdeka Square including the areas in front of the Presidential Palace, the national radio station, and telecommunications centre. At 7:10 a.m. a Lieutenant-Colonel Untung announced on radio that a "30 September Movement" had forestalled a coup by "power-mad generals", and that it was "an internal army affair". Apart from Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Abdul Harris Nasution—who was targeted for assassination but narrowly escaped, and was in hiding—Suharto was the most senior general not removed by the 30 September group.[31] On the night of 30 September, Suharto had been in hospital with his three-year old son Tommy who had a scalding injury. It was here that Colonel Abdul Latief was the only principal of ensuing events with whom Suharto spoke that evening.[32] Suharto had no affinity to Sukarno, nor any special Islamic conviction with which to oppose him. He despised disorder, but was known for prizing opportunity; General Yani and disciplined him several years before for the Diponegoro smuggling affair, thus removing any affinity he might have for Yani.[32]
Upon being told of the disappearance of the generals and shootings, Suharto went to Kostrad headquarters just before dawn from where he could see soldiers occupying Merdeka Square. He led Kostrad in seizing control of the centre of Jakarta, capturing key strategic sites. Now joined by Nasution, Suharto announced over the radio at 9:00 p.m. that six generals had been kidnapped by "counter-revolutionaries", that he was in control of the army, and that he would crush the 30 September Movement and safeguard Sukarno.[33] Suharto issued an ultimatum to Halim Air Force Base, where the G30S had based themselves and where Sukarno (the reasons for his presence are unclear and were subject of claim and counter-claim), General Omar Dhani and Aidit had gathered. The coup leaders fled Jakarta[34] while G30S-sympathetic battalions in Central Java quickly came under Suharto control,[35] and it was clear that the incompetently organised and poorly coordinated coup had failed.[36] By 2 October, Suharto's faction was firmly in control of the army. Sukarno's obedience to Suharto's 1 October ultimatum to leave Halim is seen as changing all power relationships.[35] Sukarno's fragile balance of power between the military, political Islam, communists, and nationalists that underlay his "Guided Democracy" was now collapsing.[36] Complicated and partisan theories continue to this day over the identity of the attempted coup's organisers and their aims: in addition to the army's version (which became the "New Order's" official version) that the PKI was solely responsible, other theories include Suharto being behind the events; that the army and Suharto was merely taking advantage of a poorly executed coup; and that Sukarno was behind the events (see 30 September Movement).
In early October, a military propaganda campaign began to sweep the country, successfully convincing both Indonesian and international audiences that it was a Communist coup, and that the murders were cowardly atrocities against Indonesian heroes.[37] The army led the campaign to purge Indonesian society, government and armed forces of the communist party and other leftist organisations.[37] The purge quickly spread from Jakarta to the rest of the country.[38] (see: Indonesian killings of 1965–66) In mid-October, Suharto sent loyal paracommando units into Central Java, and ordered out of those of suspect loyalty. Anti-PKI killings were then instigated in the province and the army supported youths to find Communists.[39] The situation varied across the country; in some areas the army organised civilian groups and local militias, in other areas communal vigilante action preceded the army.[40] The most widely accepted estimates are that at least half a million were killed.[41] As many as 1.5 million were imprisoned at one stage or another.[42] As a result of the purge, one of Sukarno's three pillars of support, the Indonesian Communist Party, had been effectively eliminated by the other two, the military and political Islam.
In 1990, American investigative journalist Kathy Kadane revealed the extent of secret American collaboration in the massacres. In a series of interviews with former US officials, she wrote "They systematically compiled comprehensive lists of communist operatives. As many as 5,000 names were furnished to the Indonesian army, and the Americans later checked off the names of those who had been killed or captured." Joseph Lazarsky, the deputy CIA station chief in Jakarta, said that confirmation of the killings came straight from Suharto's headquarters.[43]
Power struggle
On 2 October, Suharto accepted Sukarno's order for him to take control of the army, but on the condition that Suharto personally have authority to restore order and security. The 1 November formation of Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Keteriban, or Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), formalised this authority.[44] By January 1966 the PKI, President Sukarno's strongest pillar of support, had been effectively eliminated, the army now saw its opportunity to occupy the apex of Indonesian power.[45] Sukarno was still the Supreme Commander by virtue of the constitution, thus Suharto was careful not to be seen to be seizing power in his own coup. For eighteen months following the quashing of the 30 September Movement, there was a complicated process of political manoeuvers against Sukarno, including student agitation, stacking of parliament, media propaganda and military threats.[46]
On 1 February 1966, Sukarno promoted Suharto to the rank of Lieutenant General. The same month, Gen. Nasution had been forced out of his position of Defence Minister,[47] and the power contest had been reduced to Suharto and Sukarno. The Supersemar decree of 11 March 1966 transferred much of Sukarno's power over the parliament and army to Suharto,[46] ostensibly allowing Suharto to do whatever was needed to restore order. On 12 March 1967, Sukarno was stripped of his remaining power by Indonesia's provisional Parliament, and Suharto named Acting President.[citation needed] Sukarno was placed under house arrest and little more was heard from him, and he died in June 1970.[48] On 21 March 1968, the Provisional Peoples Representative Assembly formally elected Suharto for the first of his five-year terms as President.[49]
The "New Order" (1967–1998)
Institutionalisation of the New Order
At first, many saw Suharto as a comparatively obscure officer who had been thrust to prominence by the events of late 1965 and assumed he would not remain in power long. His great political skill, however, quickly became apparent.[50] In contrast to the communal and political conflicts, economic collapse and social breakdown of the late-1950s and mid-1960s, Suharto's "New Order" —so-termed to distinguish it from Sukarno's "old order"—was committed to achieving political order, economic development, and the removal of mass participation in the political process. In place of Sukarno's revolutionary rhetoric, Suharto showed a pragmatic use of power, and in contrast to the liberal parliamentary democracy of the 1950s, Suharto headed an authoritarian, military-dominated government.[48] The "New Order" featured a weak civil society, the bureaucratisation and corporatisation of political and societal organisations, and selective but effective repression of opponents.[51]
To maintain domestic order, Suharto greatly expanded the funding and powers of the Indonesian state apparatus. He established two intelligence agencies—the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) and the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (BAKIN)—to deal with threats to the regime. Suharto also established the Bureau of Logistics (BULOG) to distribute rice and other staple commodities granted by USAID. These new government bodies were put under the military regional command structure, that under Suharto was given a "dual function" as both a defence force and as civilian administrators. The New Order rolled Indonesian political parties into two — nationalists and Christian parties became the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and Muslim parties into the People's Development Party (PPP).[11] The regime used corporatist ideology similar to that of early 20th century fascism in Europe, and built an army-sponsored co-operative movement, Golkar, a coalition of society's "functional groups", into an official party of secular development. Golkar, PDI, and PPP were the only parties allowed to contend elections with the latter two prevented from forming an effective opposition. 100 seats in the electoral college for electing the President were set aside for military representatives. Suharto was elected unopposed as president in 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998.
Suharto became a strong advocate for Chinese assimilation rather than integration. As part of 1967s 'Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem' and other measures, all but one Chinese-language papers were closed, all Chinese religious expressions had to be confined to their homes, Chinese-language schools were phased out, Chinese script in public places was banned, and Chinese were encouraged to take on Indonesian-sounding names.[52] Most of this legislation were revoked following Suharto's fall from power in 1998.[citation needed]
The economy
From 1965 to 68, hyper-inflation was brought under control. A number of measures were implemented to re-encourage foreign investment within Indonesia. These included the privatisation of its natural resources to promote investment by industrialised nations, labour laws favourable to multinational corporations, and soliciting funds for development from institutions including the World Bank, Western banks, and friendly governments.[53] Suharto brought a shift in policy from firebrand Sukarno that allowed for USAID and other relief agencies to resume operations within the country. Suharto opened Indonesia's economy by divesting state owned companies, and Western nations in particular were encouraged to invest and take control of many of the mining and construction interests in Indonesia.
Within a few years, the Indonesian economy was revived from its near collapsed state of the mid-1960s. It grew by an average 7% for 25 years, although much of these gains would be lost in the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. Suharto claimed to have provided Indonesia with self-sufficiency in rice production by the mid-1980s, basic education to almost all citizens, and a successful family planning program.[5][54] Subsidies on basics such as food and fuel to maintain grass-roots support were highly costly to government budgets.
Although the Suharto regime claimed to have had success in reducing poverty, four of five Indonesians still lived below or only slightly above the level of $1 a day near the end of his rule. Suharto's former government ministers flatly said the alleged lowering of poverty rates was false. The Suharto regime's definition of poverty was also inflated: it was a monetary sum, a rupiah base sufficient to enable the poor to get the internationally accepted norm of 2,100 calories a day. The cash amount had been less than the globally accepted poverty line of $1 a day. Until the 1998 crisis, it was only about half that in Indonesia's cities, and less in the countryside.[55]
Influence and business opportunity became increasingly concentrated within Suharto's family, relatives, favoured generals and a number of ethnic Chinese businessmen that he had known since his time in Semarang in particular Liem Siu Liong and Bob Hasan. Much of the funds flowed to foundations (yayasan) controlled by the Suharto family.[56] By the late '80s the extent of the first family's business activities concerned even long-time military associates, such as General Benny Murdani. By the pre-financial crisis peak of the mid-1990s, the family's annual revenue was estimated in the billions of US dollars. Much of it was recycled back into pay-offs, patronage, military subsidies, and campaign funding that supported the regime.[5]
In Geneva, the Sultan's team were known as the "Berkeley Mafia". Listing the principle selling points of his country and its people, the Sultan offered "... abundance of cheap labor ... a treasure house of resources ... and a vast potential market".[57]
Foreign policy, Irian Jaya, East Timor and Aceh
Upon his assumption of power, Suharto quickly dispatched his foreign minister, Adam Malik to mend strained relations with the United States, United Nations, and end the Sukarno-instigated Konfrontasi with Malaysia. Previously increasingly close relations with China were cut (diplomatic ties were restored in 1990). Suharto played an important role in the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the early 1990s.[54] Officially, the "New Order" followed a foreign policy of neutrality.[5]
In 1969, Suharto's government reached an agreement with the United States and United Nations, to hold a referendum on self-determination for western New Guinea. The 1969 "Act of Free Choice" was open to 1022 "chiefs" to vote and the unanimous vote was for integration with Indonesia lead to doubts of its validity.[58] In 1975, Indonesia invaded Portuguese Timor and the following year declared East Timor the 27th province of Indonesia, a status never recognised by the United Nations. Following Suharto's 1998 resignation from the Presidency, the Indonesian government ceded control of East Timor in 1999 following a referendum vote for independence. An estimated minimum of 102,800 conflict-related deaths occurred in East Timor during the period 1974–1999, namely, approximately 18,600 killings and 84,200 'excess' deaths from hunger and illness.[59] In 1976, the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM, who demanded independence for Aceh from Indonesia. Suharto authorized troops to put down the rebellion, forcing several of its leaders into exile in Sweden.[60] Prolonged fighting between GAM and the Indonesian military and police led Suharto to declare martial law in the province, by naming Aceh a "military operational area" (DOM) in 1990.
Politics and dissent
In 1970, corruption prompted student protests and an investigation by a government commission. Suharto responded by banning student protests, forcing the activists underground. Only token prosecution of the cases recommended by the commission was pursued. The pattern of co-opting a few of his more powerful opponents while criminalising the rest became a hallmark of Suharto's rule.
On May 5, 1980 a group of prominent military men, politicians, academics and students calling themselves the "Petition of Fifty" questioned Suharto's use of the national ideology Pancasila. The Indonesian media suppressed the news and the government placed restrictions on the signatories. After the group's 1984 accusation that Suharto was creating a one-party state, some of its leaders were jailed.[citation needed]
In the same decade, it is believed by many scholars that the Indonesian military split between a nationalist "red and white faction" and an Islamist "green faction." As the 1980s closed, Suharto is said to have been forced to shift his alliances from the former to the latter, leading to the rise of Jusuf Habibie in the 1990s.
After the 1990s brought end of the Cold War, Western concern over communism waned, and Suharto's human rights record came under greater international scrutiny. The 1991 killing of over 200 East Timorese civilians in Dili, East Timor, resulted in the Congress of the United States passing limitations on IMET assistance to the Indonesian military.[61] Noam Chomsky has referred to the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor as the worst instance of genocide relative to population since the Holocaust.[62] In 1993, under President Bill Clinton, the U.S. delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission helped pass a resolution expressing deep concern over Indonesian human rights violations in East Timor.[63]
Despite concerns over Indonesian human rights, the Clinton administration was seen as supportive of Suharto—Indonesia was seen to serve US interests.[64][65] Suharto deregulated Indonesia's economy and opened Indonesia to foreign investors.[64] "He's our kind of guy," commented a senior US Administration official who dealt often on Asian policy.[64]
Resignation
In 1996 Suharto was challenged by a split over the leadership of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), one of three legal parties shackled by the "New Order". Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno, had become PDI's chairwoman and was increasingly critical of Suharto's "New Order". In response, Suharto backed a co-opted faction led by Deputy Speaker of Parliament Suryadi. The Suryadi faction announced a party congress to sack Megawati would be held in Medan from June 20 - June 22.
In response, Megawati proclaimed that if sacked, her supporters would hold demonstrations in protest. The Suryadi faction went through with its sacking of Megawati, and the demonstrations manifested themselves throughout Indonesia. This led to several confrontations on the streets between protesters and security forces. A deal was made with the military to allow Megawati's supporters to take over PDI headquarters in Jakarta, in exchange for a pledge of no further demonstrations. During this time, Megawati supporters organized "democracy forums" at the site, with several activists making speeches denouncing Suharto and his regime.[66]
After one month of this, police, soldiers, and persons claiming to be Suryadi supporters stormed the headquarters, killing Megawati supporters and arresting two-hundred. Those arrested were tried under the Anti-Subversion and Hate-spreading laws.[67] The day would become known as "Black Saturday"[68] and mark the beginning of a renewed crackdown by the New Order government against supporters of democracy, now called the "Reformasi" or Reformation.
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had dire consequences for the Indonesian economy and society, and Suharto's regime. The Indonesian currency, the rupiah, took a sharp dive in value. Suharto came under scrutiny from international lending institutions, chiefly the World Bank, IMF and the United States, over long-time misappropriation of state funds and resources and protectionist policies. In December, Suharto's government signed a letter of intent to the IMF, pledging to enact austerity measures, including cuts to public services and removal of subsidies, in return for receiving the aid of the IMF and other donors.[69]
Beginning in early 1998, the austerity measures approved by Suharto had started to erode domestic confidence in the regime. Prices for commodities such as kerosene and rice, and fees for public services including education rose dramatically. The effects were exacerbated by widespread corruption.
Suharto stood for re-election for the seventh time in March 1998, justifying it on the grounds of the necessity of his leadership during the crisis. As in past years, he was unopposed for re-election, but this time was met with protests and riots throughout the country. Dissension within the ranks of his own Golkar party and military finally weakened Suharto, and on May 21, 1998 he stood down from power, taking with him severance pay estimated at $15 billion, the equivalent of almost 13% of his country's foreign debt, much of it owed to the World Bank.[70] He was replaced by his deputy Jusuf Habibie.[69]
Post-presidency
After his resignation, Suharto retired to a family compound in Central Jakarta, making few public appearances. Efforts to prosecute Suharto have mostly centred around alleged mismanagement of funds, and their force has been blunted due to health concerns. Suharto was never prosecuted.
Investigations of wealth
In May 1999, Time Asia estimated Suharto's family fortune at US$15 billion in cash, shares, corporate assets, real estate, jewelry and fine art. Of this, US$9 billion is reported to have been deposited in an Austrian bank. The family is said to control about 36,000 km² of real estate in Indonesia, including 100,000 m² of prime office space in Jakarta and nearly 40% of the land in East Timor. Suharto was placed highest on Transparency International's list of corrupt leaders with an alleged misappropriation of between US $15–35 billion during his 32-year presidency.[9]
On May 29, 2000, Suharto was placed under house arrest when Indonesian authorities began to investigate the corruption during his regime. In July 2000, it was announced that he was to be accused of embezzling US$571 million of government donations to one of a number of foundations under his control and then using the money to finance family investments. But in September court-appointed doctors announced that he could not stand trial because of his declining health. State prosecutors tried again in 2002 but then doctors cited an unspecified brain disease. On March 26, 2008, a civil court judge acquitted Suharto of corruption but ordered his charitable foundation, Supersemar, to pay US$110 m (£55 m).[71]
Related legal cases
Unable to legally prosecute Suharto, the state has instead pursued legal actions against his former subordinates and members of his family. Suharto's son Hutomo Mandala Putra, more widely known as Tommy Suharto, was initially sentenced to 15 years in jail for arranging the murder of a judge who sentenced him to 18 months for his role in a land scam in September 2000. He became the first member of the Suharto family to be found guilty and jailed for a criminal offence. Tommy Suharto maintained his innocence, and won a reduction of his sentence to ten years in June 2005. On October 30, 2006, he was freed on "conditional release."[72]
In 2003, Suharto's half-brother Probosutedjo was tried and convicted for corruption and the loss of $10 million from the Indonesian state. He was sentenced to four years in jail. He later won a reduction of his sentence to two years, initiating a probe by the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission into the alleged scandal of the "judicial mafia" which uncovered offers of $600,000 to various judges. Probosutedjo confessed to the scheme in October 2005, leading to the arrest of his lawyers. His full four year term was reinstated. After a brief standoff at a hospital, in which he was reportedly protected by a group of police officers, he was arrested on November 30, 2005.
On July 9, 2007, Indonesian prosecutors filed a civil lawsuit against former President Suharto, to recover state funds ($440 m or £219 m, which allegedly disappeared from a scholarship fund, and a further $1.1 billion in damages).[73]
On September 4, 2007, mediation at the Attorney General's Office (AGO) between prosecutors and lawyers for Suharto over the Supersemar foundation civil lawsuit succeeded and thus the trial will have to commence.[74]
On September 10, 2007, Indonesia's Supreme Court awarded Suharto damages against Time Asia magazine, ordering it to pay him one trillion rupiah ($128.59 million). The High Court reversed the judgment of an appellate court and Central Jakarta district court (made in 2000 and 2001). Suharto had sued the U.S.-based Time magazine seeking more than $US 27 billion in damages for libel over a 1999 article which reported that he transferred stolen money abroad.[75]
Health crises
After resigning from the presidency, Suharto was hospitalized repeatedly for stroke, heart, and intestinal problems. His declining health negatively affected the many attempts to prosecute Suharto on charges of corruption and human rights violations, as his lawyers successfully claimed that his condition rendered him unfit for trial.
On May 6, 2005, Suharto was taken to Pertamina Hospital in Jakarta with intestinal bleeding, believed to be from diverticulosis. The political elite of Indonesia, including President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, visited his bedside. He was released and returned home, May 12, 2005.
On May 26, 2005, the Jakarta Post reported that amid an effort by the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to crack down on corruption, Indonesian Attorney General Abdurrahman Saleh appeared before a Parliamentary commission to discuss efforts to prosecute New Order figures, including Suharto. Attorney General Abdurrahman remarked that he hoped Suharto could recover so that the government could begin inquiries into New Order human rights violations and corruption for purposes of compensation and recovery of state funds, but expressed scepticism that this would be possible. As a result, the Supreme Court of Indonesia has issued a decree making the office of the Attorney General responsible for supervising Suharto's medical care.
On April 24, 2006, Attorney General Abdurrahman announced that a team of twenty doctors would be asked to evaluate Suharto's health and fitness for trial. One physician, Brigadier General Dr Marjo Subiandono, stated his doubts about by noting that "[Suharto] has two permanent cerebral defects."[76] In a later Financial Times report, Attorney General Abdurrahman discussed the re-examination, and called it part of a "last opportunity" to prosecute Suharto criminally. Attorney General Abdurrahman left open the possibility of filing suit against the Suharto estate."[77]
On May 4, 2006, Suharto was again admitted to Pertamina Hospital for intestinal bleeding. His doctors stated further that Suharto was suffering from partial organ failure and in unstable condition.[78]
Death
Template:Wikinewspar2 On January 4, 2008, Suharto, 86, was rushed to the Pertamina hospital, Jakarta with complications arising from a weak heart, swelling of limbs and stomach, and partial renal failure.[79] His health fluctuated for several weeks but progressively worsened with anaemia and low blood pressure due to heart and kidney complications, internal bleeding, fluid on his lungs, and blood in his feces and urine which caused a haemoglobin drop.[80] Doctors reported his "very critical condition" after almost all his organ functions failed, and that there was only a 50-50 chance that he would survive, though some Indonesians believed Suharto would not die easily because he practiced Kejawen mysticism.[81] On January 23, 2008 Suharto's health worsened further, as a sepsis infection spread through his body.[82] His family consented to the removal of life support machines, and he died on January 27 at 1:10 p.m. local time.[83][84]
Suharto's body was taken from Jakarta to the Giri Bangun mausoleum complex, part of the Mangkunegaran burial site in Karanganyar, near the Central Java city of Solo. He was buried alongside his late wife in a state military funeral with full honours, with the Kopassus elite forces and Kostrad commandos as the honour guard and pallbearers and Commander of Group II Kopassus Surakarta Lt.Colonel Asep Subarkah.[85] In attendance were the incumbent president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as "Ceremony Inspector", and vice-president, government ministers, and armed forces chiefs of staff. Suharto's eldest daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana spoke at the funeral requesting, in accordance with Javanese custom, forgiveness for her any misdoings of her father. Tens of thousands of people lined the streets to see the convoy.[86] Condolences were offered by many regional heads of state, although certain regional leaders such as Helen Clark, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, boycotted the funeral,[87] and Indonesia's President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono declared a week of official mourning.[88]
See also
References
Notes
- ^ Berger, Marilyn (2008-01-28). "Suharto Dies at 86; Indonesian Dictator Brought Order and Bloodshed". New York Times. Retrieved 2008-01-30.
- ^ Schwarz (1994), p. 175
- ^ Friend (2003), pages 107–109; Chris Hilton (writer and director) (2001). Shadowplay (Television documentary). Vagabond Films and Hilton Cordell Productions.; Ricklefs (1991), pages 280–283, 284, 287–290
- ^ Miguel, Edward (January 2005). "Does Social Capital Promote Industrialization? Evidence from a Rapid Industrializer". Econometrics Softare Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley.
{{cite conference}}
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suggested) (help) - ^ a b c d e f g h i j k McDonald, Hamish (28 January 2008), "No End to Ambition", Sydney Morning Herald Cite error: The named reference "SMH_McDONALD" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ A detailed statistical report prepared for the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group (February 9, 2006). "The Profile of Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste, 1974–1999". A Report to the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation of Timor-Leste. Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG).
- ^ Ignatius, Adi (2007-09-11). "Mulls Indonesia Court Ruling". TIME. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
- ^ a b Haskin, Colin, "Suharto dead at 86", Globe and Mail, January 27, 2008
- ^ a b "Suharto tops corruption rankings". BBC News. March 25, 2004. Retrieved 2006-02-04.
- ^ Romano, Angela Rose (2003). Politics and the press in Indonesia. p. ix.
- ^ a b c McDonald (1980), page 9
- ^ Elson, Robert E. (2001). Suharto: A Political Biography. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–6. 052177326.
- ^ McDonald (1980), pages 12–13
- ^ a b McDonald (1980), pages 13
- ^ Elson, Robert E. (2001). Suharto: A Political Biography. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. p. 8. 052177326.
- ^ Oudang, R. (1954). Perkembangan kepolisian di Indonesia. Jakarta: Mahabarata. p. 36.
- ^ Elson, R.E. (2001). Suharto: A Political Biography. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. p. 9. 052177326.
- ^ Elson, R.E. (2001). Suharto: A Political Biography. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 14–15. 052177326.
- ^ Elson, R.E. (2001). Suharto: A Political Biography. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 15–17. 052177326.
- ^ a b Elson, R.E. (2001). Suharto: A Political Biography. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 20–25, 28–29. 052177326.
- ^ a b Reid (1974)
- ^ Elson, R.E. (2001). Suharto: A Political Biography. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 29–38, 42–44. 052177326.
- ^ McDonald, Hamish (1980). Suharto's Indonesia. Fontana Books. pp. 24–25. ISBN 0-00-635721-0.
{{cite book}}
: Cite has empty unknown parameter:|coauthors=
(help) - ^ McDonald, Hamish (1980). Suharto's Indonesia. Fontana Books. p. 25. ISBN 0-00-635721-0.
{{cite book}}
: Cite has empty unknown parameter:|coauthors=
(help) - ^ McDonald, Hamish (1980). Suharto's Indonesia. Fontana Books. pp. 30–31. ISBN 0-00-635721-0.
{{cite book}}
: Cite has empty unknown parameter:|coauthors=
(help) - ^ McDonald, Hamish (1980). Suharto's Indonesia. Fontana Books. pp. 31–32. ISBN 0-00-635721-0.
{{cite book}}
: Cite has empty unknown parameter:|coauthors=
(help) - ^ Schwarz (1994), pages 52–57, Sheriden, Greg (28 January 2008). "Farewell to Jakarta's Man of Steel". The Australian. Retrieved 2008-12-30.
- ^ Ricklefs (1991), page 282
- ^ Ricklefs (1991), pages 272–280
- ^ Ricklefs (1991), page 281
- ^ Vickers (2005), page 156
- ^ a b Friend (2003), page 104
- ^ Ricklefs (1991), p. 282.
- ^ Ricklefs (1991), page 281–282
- ^ a b Friend (2003), page 105
- ^ a b Ricklefs (1991), pages 281–282
- ^ a b Vickers (2005), page 157
- ^ Ricklefs (1991), page 287
- ^ Ricklefs (1991), pp. 287-288.
- ^ Vickers (2005), pages 158–159
- ^ Ricklefs (1991), p. 288; Friend (2003), p. 113; Vickers (2005), p. 159; Robert Cribb (2002). "Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966". Asian Survey. 42 (4): 550–563. doi:10.1525/as.2002.42.4.550.
- ^ Vickers (2005), pages 159–60
- ^ San Francisco Examiner, May 20, 1990; Washington Post, May 21, 1990.
- ^ Ricklefs (1991), p. 287.
- ^ Schwartz (1994), pages 2 & 22
- ^ a b Vickers (2005), page 160
- ^ "Sukarno Removes His Defence Chief". New York Times. 22 February 1965.
- ^ a b Schwartz (1994), page 2
- ^ Ricklefs (1991), p. 295.
- ^ Aspinal (1999), p.ii
- ^ Schwartz (1994), p. 3.; Aspinall (1999), pp. i & ii.
- ^ Schwartz (1994), page 106
- ^ "Indonesia Economic". Commanding Heights. PBS/WBGH. Retrieved 23 May 2005.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|dateformat=
ignored (help) - ^ a b Sheriden, Greg (28 January 2008). "Farewell to Jakarta's Man of Steel". The Australian. Retrieved 2008-12-30.
- ^ Speak No Evil: Why the World Bank Failed to Anticipate Indonesia's Deep Crisis by Marcus W. Brauchli. Wall Street Journal. (Eastern edition). New York, N.Y.: Jul 14, 1998. pg. A.1
- ^ Koerner, Brendan (March 26, 2004). "How Did Suharto Steal $35 Billion? Cronyism 101". Slate. Retrieved 2006-02-04.
- ^ David Ransom, "The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre', Ramparts, no. 4, October 1970.
- ^ Simpson, Brad (July 9, 2004). "Indonesia's 1969 Takeover of West Papua Not by "Free Choice"". National Security Archive.
- ^ Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group (February 9, 2006). "The Profile of Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste, 1974–1999". A Report to the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation of Timor-Leste. Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG).
- ^ Miller, Michelle Ann. (2008). Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia. Jakarta's Security and Autonomy Policies in Aceh, London, Routledge, pp.5-6. ISBN 978-0-415-45467-4
- ^ "H.AMDT.647 (A003): An amendment to prohibit any funds appropriated in the bill to be used for military education and training assistance to Indonesia". THOMAS (Library of Congress). Retrieved 2006-02-04.
- ^ "Indonesia at the Crossroads: U.S. Weapons Sales and Military Training". Worldpolicy.org. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
- ^ "United Nations High Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/97: Situation in East Timor". United Nations. Retrieved 2006-02-04.
- ^ a b c SANGER, DAVID (1995-10- 31). "Real Politics: Why Suharto Is In and Castro Is Out". New York Times. Retrieved 2009-01-13.
{{cite news}}
: Check date values in:|date=
(help); Cite has empty unknown parameter:|coauthors=
(help) - ^ "The Great Allan Nairn on Indonesia — Indonesia's anti-terror police". Normanfinkelstein.com. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
- ^ Aspinall, Ed (October–December 1996). "What happened before the riots?". Inside Indonesia.
- ^ "Indonesia: Arrests, torture and intimidation: The Government's response to its critics". Amnesty International. November 27, 1996.
- ^ Tarrant, Bill. Reporting Indonesia: The Jakarta Post Story. Equinox Publishing. p. 161.
- ^ a b Vickers (2005), pp. 203–207.
- ^ World Bank reports, September 1997 and March 1998, cited in "Focus on the Global South, CUSRI, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand: www.focusweb.org
- ^ "Suharto charity told to pay $110 m". 2008.
{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|source=
ignored (help) - ^ "Asia-Pacific | Tommy Suharto freed from prison". BBC News. 2006-10-30. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
- ^ "Civil suit filed against Suharto". BBC News. July 9, 2007.
- ^ "Jakartapost.com, Mediation fails, Soeharto civil trial continues".
- ^ From correspondents in Jakarta (2007-09-10). "News.com.au, Suharto wins $128 m in damages". News.com.au. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
- ^ "Former Indonesian dictator unfit to stand trial — doctor". Associated Press. April 23, 2006.
- ^ Donnan, Shawn (April 28, 2006). "Jakarta makes final attempt to pursue Suharto charges". Financial Times.
- ^ "Suharto's condition is 'unstable'". BBC News. May 5, 2006.
- ^ "Indonesia's ailing Suharto 'getting worse': doctors". Arabtimesonline.com. 2008-01-05. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
- ^ "Suharto condition 'deteriorating'". BBC News. 2008-01-08. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
- ^ Doctor gives Suharto "only 50-50 chance" Reuters
- ^ Jakarta Post, Suharto's health deteriorates, infection spreads, January 24 2008; OkeZone.com
- ^ "Indonesia ex-leader Suharto dies". BBC News. 2008-01-27. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
- ^ [1]
- ^ "— Presiden Tiba di Astana Giribangun". Tempointeraktif.com. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
- ^ Tedjasukmana, Jason (2008-01-29). "Indonesia Bids Farewell to Suharto". TIME. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
- ^ "''NZ won't sign Suharto condolence book'', January 29, 2008". News.com.au. 2008-01-29. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
- ^ "Geoff Thompson, ''Suharto's body arrives home'', ABC News January 27 2008". Abc.net.au. 2008-01-27. Retrieved 2009-08-09.
General
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Further reading
- McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, Fontana Books, 1980, Blackburn, Australia, ISBN 0006357210
- McGlynn, John H. et al., Indonesia in the Soeharto years. Issue, incidents and images, Jakarta 2007, KITLV
- Schwarz, A. 1999, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability, Westview Press; 2nd edition (October 1999), ISBN 0-8133-3650-3
- "Vengeance with a Smile", Time Magazine, Friday, Jul. 15, 1966
External links
- news.bbc.co.uk, Life in pictures: Indonesia's Suharto BBC
- Financial Times obituary
- The Guardian obituary
- Obituary in The Times, January 28, 2008
- "Suharto, Inc." May 1999 Time Magazine exposé on Suharto's regime and family, published on the first anniversary of Suharto's resignation
- Shadow Play — Website accompanying a 2002 PBS documentary on Indonesia, with emphasis on the Suharto-era and the transition from New Order to Reformation
- "Suharto to Iraq: Nothing has changed" – Article by British journalist and Suharto critic John Pilger on the fortieth anniversary of the Transition to the New Order in Zmag (originally published in the New Statesman).
- Tiger Tales: Indonesia — Website accompanying a 2002 BBC World Service radio documentary on Indonesia, focusing on early Suharto era. Features interviews with Indonesian generals and victims of the regime. Program is available in streaming RealAudio format.