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[[File:ToledoElecciones15Jun77.jpg|350px|thumb|People waiting to vote in the [[Spanish general election, 1977|1977 general election]] in [[Toledo, Spain|Toledo]]. The 1977 general election was the first free election since [[Spanish general election, 1936|February 1936]].]] |
[[File:ToledoElecciones15Jun77.jpg|350px|thumb|People waiting to vote in the [[Spanish general election, 1977|1977 general election]] in [[Toledo, Spain|Toledo]]. The 1977 general election was the first free election since [[Spanish general election, 1936|February 1936]].]] |
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{{History of Spain|image= |caption= |
{{History of Spain|image= |caption=}} |
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The '''Spanish transition to democracy''' ({{lang-es|Transición española a la democracia}}), known in Spain as '''the Transition''' ({{lang-es|La Transición}}), or the '''Spanish transition''' ({{lang-es|Transición española}}) is a period of [[history of Spain|modern Spanish history]], that started on 20 November 1975, the date of death of [[Francisco Franco]], who had established [[Francoist Spain|a military dictatorship]] after the victory of the Nationalists in the [[Spanish Civil War]]. However, historians disagree on the exact date the transition completed:<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ortuño Anaya|first1=Pilar|title=Los socialistas europeos y la transición española ( |
The '''Spanish transition to democracy''' ({{lang-es|Transición española a la democracia}}), known in Spain as '''the Transition''' ({{lang-es|La Transición}}), or the '''Spanish transition''' ({{lang-es|Transición española}}) is a period of [[history of Spain|modern Spanish history]], that started on 20 November 1975, the date of death of [[Francisco Franco]], who had established [[Francoist Spain|a military dictatorship]] after the victory of the Nationalists in the [[Spanish Civil War]]. However, historians disagree on the exact date the transition completed:<ref>{{cite book |last1=Ortuño Anaya |first1=Pilar |title=Los socialistas europeos y la transición española (1959–1977) |trans-title=European socialists and the Spanish transition (1959–1977) |language=Spanish |date=2005 |publisher=Marcial Pons |location=Madrid |isbn=84-95379-88-0 |quote=Con respecto al final del proceso de la transición española, existen diferencias de opinión entre los especialistas de este periodo. |page=22}}</ref> some say it ended after the [[Spanish general election, 1977|1977 general election]]; while others place it later, when the [[Constitution of Spain|1978 Constitution]] was approved. Others suggest it ended with the failure of the [[23-F|1981 coup d'êtat attempt]]. At its latest, the Transition is said to have ended with the first peaceful transfer of executive power, after the victory of the [[Spanish Socialist Workers' Party]] (PSOE) in the [[Spanish general election, 1982|1982 general election]]. |
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== Political role of Juan Carlos I == |
== Political role of Juan Carlos I == |
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The realisation of the democratic project required that the leftist opposition restrain its own most radical elements from provocation, and that the army refrain from intervening in the political process on behalf of Francoist elements within the existing government. |
The realisation of the democratic project required that the leftist opposition restrain its own most radical elements from provocation, and that the army refrain from intervening in the political process on behalf of Francoist elements within the existing government. |
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[[Juan Carlos I of Spain|King Juan Carlos]] began his reign as head of state without leaving the confines of Franco's legal system. As such, he swore fidelity to the Principles of the ''[[Falange|Movimiento Nacional]]'', the sole legal party of the Franco era; took possession of the crown before the Francoist ''[[Cortes Generales#The Cortes Generales under the Franco's regime ( |
[[Juan Carlos I of Spain|King Juan Carlos]] began his reign as head of state without leaving the confines of Franco's legal system. As such, he swore fidelity to the Principles of the ''[[Falange|Movimiento Nacional]]'', the sole legal party of the Franco era; took possession of the crown before the Francoist ''[[Cortes Generales#The Cortes Generales under the Franco's regime (1939–1978)|Cortes Generales]]''; and respected the [[:es:Ley Orgánica del Estado|''Ley Orgánica del Estado'']] (Organic Law of the State) for the appointment of his first [[head of government]]. Only in his speech before the ''Cortes'' did he indicate his support for a transformation of the Spanish political system. |
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==The government of Arias Navarro (November 1975–July 1976)== |
== The government of Arias Navarro (November 1975–July 1976) == |
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===The project of governmental reform=== |
=== The project of governmental reform === |
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[[File:Manuel Fraga durante la Transicion (cropped).jpg|thumb|150px|[[Manuel Fraga Iribarne]], the most important Minister of the Arias Navarro government.]] |
[[File:Manuel Fraga durante la Transicion (cropped).jpg|thumb|150px|[[Manuel Fraga Iribarne]], the most important Minister of the Arias Navarro government.]] |
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Arias Navarro had not planned a reform of the Francoist regime; in the [[National Council of the Movement]] he declared that the purpose of his government was the continuity of Francoism through a "Spanish democracy".({{lang-es|democracia a la española}}).<ref>{{harv|Tusell|1997|p=22}}</ref><ref>{{harv|Ruiz|2002|p=21}}</ref> He believed the political changes should be limited: he would give the [[Cortes Generales]] the task of "updating our laws and institutions the way Franco would have wanted."<ref>{{harv|Gil Pecharromán|2008|p=329}}</ref> |
Arias Navarro had not planned a reform of the Francoist regime; in the [[National Council of the Movement]] he declared that the purpose of his government was the continuity of Francoism through a "Spanish democracy".({{lang-es|democracia a la española}}).<ref>{{harv|Tusell|1997|p=22}}</ref><ref>{{harv|Ruiz|2002|p=21}}</ref> He believed the political changes should be limited: he would give the [[Cortes Generales]] the task of "updating our laws and institutions the way Franco would have wanted."<ref>{{harv|Gil Pecharromán|2008|p=329}}</ref> |
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The reform programme adopted by the government was the one proposed by [[Manuel Fraga]], rejecting Antonio Garrigues' plan to elect a [[constituent assembly]]. The programme of Fraga had the goal of achieving a "liberal democracy" that was "comparable to rest of Western European countries" through a "gradual and controlled process", through a series of reforms of the pseudo-constitutional [[Fundamental Laws of the Realm]]. This is why his proposal was dubbed as a "reform in the continuity", and his support came mostly from those who defended a Francoist sociological model.<ref>{{harv|Juliá|1999|p=215}}</ref> |
The reform programme adopted by the government was the one proposed by [[Manuel Fraga]], rejecting Antonio Garrigues' plan to elect a [[constituent assembly]]. The programme of Fraga had the goal of achieving a "liberal democracy" that was "comparable to rest of Western European countries" through a "gradual and controlled process", through a series of reforms of the pseudo-constitutional [[Fundamental Laws of the Realm]]. This is why his proposal was dubbed as a "reform in the continuity", and his support came mostly from those who defended a Francoist sociological model.<ref name="auto">{{harv|Juliá|1999|p=215}}</ref> |
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In order for the project to be successful, it had to earn the support of the hardcore Francoist faction known as the ''[[búnker]]'', which had a major presence in the [[National Council of the Movement]] and in the Cortes, which were the two institutions that would have to eventually approve the reforms of the Fundamental Laws. It also had to garner support within the [[Spanish Armed Forces|Armed Forces]] and in the [[Spanish Labour Organisation]]. Besides, it needed to please the democratic opposition to Francoism. The approach towards the dissenters was that they would not be part of the reform process, but their political participations would be allowed, with the exception of the [[Communist Party of Spain|Communist Party]].<ref |
In order for the project to be successful, it had to earn the support of the hardcore Francoist faction known as the ''[[búnker]]'', which had a major presence in the [[National Council of the Movement]] and in the Cortes, which were the two institutions that would have to eventually approve the reforms of the Fundamental Laws. It also had to garner support within the [[Spanish Armed Forces|Armed Forces]] and in the [[Spanish Labour Organisation]]. Besides, it needed to please the democratic opposition to Francoism. The approach towards the dissenters was that they would not be part of the reform process, but their political participations would be allowed, with the exception of the [[Communist Party of Spain|Communist Party]].<ref name="auto" /> This conservative reform was partly inspired by the historical period of the semi-democratic [[Restoration (Spain)|Bourbonic Restoration]] (1876–1931), and it was criticised for not taking into account the social and political circumstances of the time.<ref>{{harv|Tusell|1997|p=19}}</ref> |
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The project materialized into a reform proposal of three of the Fundamental Laws, and the changes were to be determined by a mixed comission between the Government and the National Council of the Movement proposed by Fernández Miranda and Suárez.<ref>{{harv|Tusell|1997|p=21}}</ref> This meant that Fraga and the reformists lost control of much of the legislative direction of the country.<ref>{{harv|Gil Pecharromán|2008|p=30}}</ref> The reformists were planning the elaboration of "Laws of Assembly and Association", which included a reform of the Spanish Criminal Code. The new Law of Assembly was passed by the Francoist Cortes on 25 May 1976, and it allowed public demonstration with government authorization.<ref>{{harv|Juliá|1999|p=215-16}}</ref> On the same day the Law of Political Associations, defended by Suárez, was also approved, who affirmed in parliamentary session that "if Spain is plural, the Cortes cannot afford to deny it". This intervention shocked many, including Juan Carlos I.<ref>{{harv|Tusell|1977|p=22}}</ref> This intervention was key in Juan Carlos' decision to appoint Suárez as Prime Minister in the following month.<ref>{{harv|Gil Pecharromán|2008|p=331}}</ref> |
The project materialized into a reform proposal of three of the Fundamental Laws, and the changes were to be determined by a mixed comission between the Government and the National Council of the Movement proposed by Fernández Miranda and Suárez.<ref>{{harv|Tusell|1997|p=21}}</ref> This meant that Fraga and the reformists lost control of much of the legislative direction of the country.<ref>{{harv|Gil Pecharromán|2008|p=30}}</ref> The reformists were planning the elaboration of "Laws of Assembly and Association", which included a reform of the Spanish Criminal Code. The new Law of Assembly was passed by the Francoist Cortes on 25 May 1976, and it allowed public demonstration with government authorization.<ref>{{harv|Juliá|1999|p=215-16}}</ref> On the same day the Law of Political Associations, defended by Suárez, was also approved, who affirmed in parliamentary session that "if Spain is plural, the Cortes cannot afford to deny it". This intervention shocked many, including Juan Carlos I.<ref>{{harv|Tusell|1977|p=22}}</ref> This intervention was key in Juan Carlos' decision to appoint Suárez as Prime Minister in the following month.<ref>{{harv|Gil Pecharromán|2008|p=331}}</ref> |
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The Arias-Fraga reform collapsed on 11 June, when the Cortes rejected the modification of the Criminal Code, which considered a crime being affiliated to a political party that was not [[FET y de las JONS]].<ref>{{harv|Juliá|1999|p=216}}</ref> The ''procuradores'', who vehemently opposed the legalization of the [[Communist Party of Spain|Communist Party]] (PCE), added an amendment to the law that banned political organizations that were "submitted to an international discipline" and "advocated for the implantation of a totalitarian regime". Javier Tusell pointed out that "those who in the past were in bed with totalitarianism now felt entitled to prohibit the totalitarianism of others". The reforms of the laws of Cortes and Succession, designed by Fraga, also failed. Fraga intented to create a bicameral Cortes: one elected by universal suffrage and the other having an "organic" character.<ref>{{harv|Tusell|1977|p=23-24}}</ref><ref>{{harv|Ruiz|2002|p=26}}</ref> |
The Arias-Fraga reform collapsed on 11 June, when the Cortes rejected the modification of the Criminal Code, which considered a crime being affiliated to a political party that was not [[FET y de las JONS]].<ref>{{harv|Juliá|1999|p=216}}</ref> The ''procuradores'', who vehemently opposed the legalization of the [[Communist Party of Spain|Communist Party]] (PCE), added an amendment to the law that banned political organizations that were "submitted to an international discipline" and "advocated for the implantation of a totalitarian regime". [[Javier Tusell]] pointed out that "those who in the past were in bed with totalitarianism now felt entitled to prohibit the totalitarianism of others". The reforms of the laws of Cortes and Succession, designed by Fraga, also failed. Fraga intented to create a bicameral Cortes: one elected by universal suffrage and the other having an "organic" character.<ref>{{harv|Tusell|1977|p=23-24}}</ref><ref>{{harv|Ruiz|2002|p=26}}</ref> |
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== First government of Adolfo Suárez (July 1976 |
== First government of Adolfo Suárez (July 1976 – June 1977) == |
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[[File:Adolfo Suarez 03 cropped.jpg|thumb|Adolfo Suárez in 1981.]] |
[[File:Adolfo Suarez 03 cropped.jpg|thumb|Adolfo Suárez in 1981.]] |
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[[Torcuato Fernández-Miranda]], the president of the Council of the Kingdom, obtained [[Adolfo Suárez]]'s placement on the new list of three candidates for King Juan Carlos to choose to become the new head of government. The king chose Suárez because he felt he could meet the challenge of the difficult political process that lay ahead: persuading the Cortes (Spanish parliament), which was composed of installed [[Francoist]] politicians, to dismantle Franco's system. In this manner he would formally act within the Francoist legal system and thus avoid the prospect of military intervention in the political process. Suárez was appointed as the 138th Prime Minister of Spain by Juan Carlos on 3 July 1976, a move opposed by leftists and some centrists given his Francoist history. |
[[Torcuato Fernández-Miranda]], the president of the Council of the Kingdom, obtained [[Adolfo Suárez]]'s placement on the new list of three candidates for King Juan Carlos to choose to become the new head of government. The king chose Suárez because he felt he could meet the challenge of the difficult political process that lay ahead: persuading the Cortes (Spanish parliament), which was composed of installed [[Francoist]] politicians, to dismantle Franco's system. In this manner he would formally act within the Francoist legal system and thus avoid the prospect of military intervention in the political process. Suárez was appointed as the 138th Prime Minister of Spain by Juan Carlos on 3 July 1976, a move opposed by leftists and some centrists given his Francoist history. |
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=== The Law for Political Reform === |
=== The Law for Political Reform === |
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[[File:MITING CNT MONTJUÏC.jpg|thumb|200px|left|[[Federica Montseny]] speaks at the meeting of the [[w:Confederación Nacional del Trabajo|CNT]] in Barcelona in 1977 after 36 years of exile.]] |
[[File:MITING CNT MONTJUÏC.jpg|thumb|200px|left|[[Federica Montseny]] speaks at the meeting of the [[w:Confederación Nacional del Trabajo|CNT]] in Barcelona in 1977 after 36 years of exile.]] |
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The draft of the Law for Political Reform (''Ley para la Reforma Política'') was written by [[Torcuato Fernández-Miranda|Don Torcuato Fernández-Miranda]], speaker of the Cortes, who handed it over to the Suárez government in July 1976. The project was approved by the Suarez Government in September 1976.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.adurcal.com/iu/historia/historia_de_un_cambio.htm |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928130049/http://www.adurcal.com/iu/historia/historia_de_un_cambio.htm|archivedate=28 September 2007|title=Historia de un Cambio|publisher=Ayuntamiento de Dúrcal}}</ref> To open the door to parliamentary democracy in Spain, this legislation could not simply create a new political system by eliminating the obstacles put in place by the Franco regime against democracy: it had to liquidate the Francoist system through the Francoist Cortes itself. Throughout the month of November the Cortes, under the presidency of Fernández-Miranda, debated this law, which it ultimately approved with 425 votes in favor, 59 against, and 13 abstentions. |
The draft of the Law for Political Reform (''Ley para la Reforma Política'') was written by [[Torcuato Fernández-Miranda|Don Torcuato Fernández-Miranda]], speaker of the Cortes, who handed it over to the Suárez government in July 1976. The project was approved by the Suarez Government in September 1976.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.adurcal.com/iu/historia/historia_de_un_cambio.htm |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928130049/http://www.adurcal.com/iu/historia/historia_de_un_cambio.htm |archivedate=28 September 2007 |title=Historia de un Cambio |publisher=Ayuntamiento de Dúrcal}}</ref> To open the door to parliamentary democracy in Spain, this legislation could not simply create a new political system by eliminating the obstacles put in place by the Franco regime against democracy: it had to liquidate the Francoist system through the Francoist Cortes itself. Throughout the month of November the Cortes, under the presidency of Fernández-Miranda, debated this law, which it ultimately approved with 425 votes in favor, 59 against, and 13 abstentions. |
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The Suárez government sought to gain further legitimacy for the changes through a popular referendum. On 15 December 1976, with a 77.72% participation rate, 94% of voters indicated their support for the changes. From this moment, it was possible to begin the electoral process (the second part of the Suárez program), which would serve to elect the members of the [[Constituent Cortes]], the body that was to be responsible for creating a democratic constitution.<ref>Jiménez-Díaz, José-Francisco (2016): “Adolfo Suárez González”, in Jiménez-Díaz, José-Francisco & Delgado-Fernández, Santiago -Editors-: ''Political Leadership in the Spanish Transition to Democracy ( |
The Suárez government sought to gain further legitimacy for the changes through a popular referendum. On 15 December 1976, with a 77.72% participation rate, 94% of voters indicated their support for the changes. From this moment, it was possible to begin the electoral process (the second part of the Suárez program), which would serve to elect the members of the [[Constituent Cortes]], the body that was to be responsible for creating a democratic constitution.<ref>Jiménez-Díaz, José-Francisco (2016): “Adolfo Suárez González”, in Jiménez-Díaz, José-Francisco & Delgado-Fernández, Santiago -Editors-: ''Political Leadership in the Spanish Transition to Democracy (1975–1982)''. Nueva York: Nova Science Publishers, 2016, pp. 41-58.</ref> |
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With this part of his plan fulfilled, Suárez had to resolve another issue: should he include the opposition groups who had not participated at the beginning of the transition? Suárez also had to deal with a third problem: coming to terms with the anti-Francoist opposition. |
With this part of his plan fulfilled, Suárez had to resolve another issue: should he include the opposition groups who had not participated at the beginning of the transition? Suárez also had to deal with a third problem: coming to terms with the anti-Francoist opposition. |
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=== Relations of the Suárez government with the Spanish army === |
=== Relations of the Suárez government with the Spanish army === |
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Adolfo Suárez knew well that the "[[Búnker]]" |
Adolfo Suárez knew well that the "[[Búnker]]"—a group of hard-line Francoists led by [[José Antonio Girón]] and [[Blas Piñar]], using the newspapers ''[[El Alcázar]]'' and ''[[Arriba (newspaper)|Arriba]]'' as their mouthpieces— had close contacts with officials in the army and exercised influence over important sectors of the military. These forces could constitute an insurmountable obstacle if they brought about military intervention against political reform. |
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To resolve the issue, Suárez intended to support himself with a liberal group within the military, centered on General [[Díez Alegría]]. Suárez decided to give the members of this group the positions of authority with the most responsibility. The most notable personality of this faction within the army was General [[Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado]]. But in July 1976, the Vice President for Defense Affairs was General Fernando de Santiago, a member of a hardline group within the army. De Santiago had shown his restlessness before, during the first amnesty in July 1976. He had opposed the law granting the right to unionize. Suárez dismissed Fernando de Santiago and nominated instead Gutiérrez Mellado. This confrontation with General de Santiago caused a large part of the army to oppose Suárez, opposition that further intensified when the PCE was legalized. |
To resolve the issue, Suárez intended to support himself with a liberal group within the military, centered on General [[Díez Alegría]]. Suárez decided to give the members of this group the positions of authority with the most responsibility. The most notable personality of this faction within the army was General [[Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado]]. But in July 1976, the Vice President for Defense Affairs was General Fernando de Santiago, a member of a hardline group within the army. De Santiago had shown his restlessness before, during the first amnesty in July 1976. He had opposed the law granting the right to unionize. Suárez dismissed Fernando de Santiago and nominated instead Gutiérrez Mellado. This confrontation with General de Santiago caused a large part of the army to oppose Suárez, opposition that further intensified when the PCE was legalized. |
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=== Resurgence of terrorist activity === |
=== Resurgence of terrorist activity === |
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{{ |
{{See also|Neofascist terrorism in Spain}} |
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The Basque Country remained, for the better part of this period, in a state of political turbulence. Suárez granted a multi-stage amnesty for numerous Basque political prisoners, but the confrontations continued between local police and protesters. [[ETA (separatist group)|ETA]], which in the middle of 1976 seemed open to a limited truce after Franco's death, resumed armed confrontation again in October. |
The Basque Country remained, for the better part of this period, in a state of political turbulence. Suárez granted a multi-stage amnesty for numerous Basque political prisoners, but the confrontations continued between local police and protesters. [[ETA (separatist group)|ETA]], which in the middle of 1976 seemed open to a limited truce after Franco's death, resumed armed confrontation again in October. 1978–1980 would be ETA's three deadliest years ever.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/acciones/estadistica07.jsp |title=Acciones Terroristas: Víctimas Policiales de ETA |publisher=La Guardia Civil}}</ref> But it was between December 1976 and January 1977 that a series of attacks brought about a situation of high tension in Spain. |
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The Maoist [[GRAPO]] (''Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre'') began its armed struggle by bombing public locations, and then continued with the kidnapping of two important figures of the regime: the President of the Council of the State [[José María de Oriol y Urquijo|José María de Oriol]], and General Villaescusa, President of the Superior Council of the Military Justice. From the right, during these kidnappings, members of the neo-fascist ''[[Triple A (Spain)|Alianza Apostólica Anticomunista]]'' [[1977 Massacre of Atocha|murdered five members of the PCE]], three of them labor lawyers, in an office on Atocha Street in Madrid in January 1977. |
The Maoist [[GRAPO]] (''Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre'') began its armed struggle by bombing public locations, and then continued with the kidnapping of two important figures of the regime: the President of the Council of the State [[José María de Oriol y Urquijo|José María de Oriol]], and General Villaescusa, President of the Superior Council of the Military Justice. From the right, during these kidnappings, members of the neo-fascist ''[[Triple A (Spain)|Alianza Apostólica Anticomunista]]'' [[1977 Massacre of Atocha|murdered five members of the PCE]], three of them labor lawyers, in an office on Atocha Street in Madrid in January 1977. |
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== First elections and the draft of the Constitution == |
== First elections and the draft of the Constitution == |
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[[ |
[[File:TransicionCartelesCongreso1.jpg|200px|thumb|Political posters in an exhibition celebrating 20 years of the Spanish Constitution of 1978.]] |
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[[Spanish general election, 1977|The elections]] that were held on June 15, 1977, confirmed the existence of four important political forces at the national level. The votes broke down in the following manner: |
[[Spanish general election, 1977|The elections]] that were held on June 15, 1977, confirmed the existence of four important political forces at the national level. The votes broke down in the following manner: |
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*[[Democratic Centre Union (Spain)|Union of the Democratic Centre]] (UCD, ''Unión de Centro Democrático''): 34.61% |
* [[Democratic Centre Union (Spain)|Union of the Democratic Centre]] (UCD, ''Unión de Centro Democrático''): 34.61% |
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*[[Spanish Socialist Workers' Party]] (PSOE, ''Partido Socialista Obrero Español''): 29.27% |
* [[Spanish Socialist Workers' Party]] (PSOE, ''Partido Socialista Obrero Español''): 29.27% |
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*[[Communist Party of Spain (main)|Communist Party of Spain]] (PCE, ''Partido Comunista de España''): 9.38% |
* [[Communist Party of Spain (main)|Communist Party of Spain]] (PCE, ''Partido Comunista de España''): 9.38% |
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*[[Popular Alliance (Spain)|Popular Alliance]] (AP, ''Alianza Popular''): 8.33%<ref>{{cite web |url=http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/spain/es_appen.html#table2 |title=Appendix A: Table 2. Selected Election Results for the Congress of Deputies, |
* [[Popular Alliance (Spain)|Popular Alliance]] (AP, ''Alianza Popular''): 8.33%<ref>{{cite web |url=http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/spain/es_appen.html#table2 |title=Appendix A: Table 2. Selected Election Results for the Congress of Deputies, 1977–86 |work=Country Studies: Spain |publisher=Library of Congress}}</ref> |
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With the success of the [[Basque Nationalist Party]] (PNV, ''Partido Nacionalista Vasco'') and the [[Democratic Pact for Catalonia]] (PDC, ''Pacte Democrátic per Catalunya'') in their respective regions, [[Nationalisms and regionalisms of Spain|nationalist]] parties also began to show their political strength in these elections. |
With the success of the [[Basque Nationalist Party]] (PNV, ''Partido Nacionalista Vasco'') and the [[Democratic Pact for Catalonia]] (PDC, ''Pacte Democrátic per Catalunya'') in their respective regions, [[Nationalisms and regionalisms of Spain|nationalist]] parties also began to show their political strength in these elections. |
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⚫ | The Constituent Cortes (elected Spanish parliament) began to draft a constitution in the middle of 1977. In 1978 the [[Moncloa Pact]] was passed: an agreement amongst politicians, political parties, and trade unions to plan how to operate the economy during the transition.<ref>[[Gonzalo Garland]] study case Spain: from Transition to modern times http://openmultimedia.ie.edu/OpenProducts/caso_espana_i/caso_espana_i/pdf/pdf_casoespana.pdf</ref> The [[Spanish Constitution of 1978]] went on to be approved in a referendum on December 6, 1978.<ref name="Edles Seidman 1998 p. 104">{{cite book | last=Edles | first=L.D. | last2=Seidman | first2=S. | title=Symbol and Ritual in the New Spain: The Transition to Democracy After Franco | publisher=Cambridge University Press | series=Cambridge Cultural Social Studies | year=1998 | isbn=978-0-521-62885-3 | url=https://books.google.dk/books?id=k4sgEOcbKbUC&pg=PA104 | access-date=April 22, 2018 | page=104}}</ref> |
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⚫ | The Constituent Cortes (elected Spanish parliament) began to draft a constitution in the middle of 1977. In 1978 the [[Moncloa Pact]] was passed: an agreement amongst politicians, political parties, and trade unions to plan how to operate the economy during the transition.<ref>[[Gonzalo Garland]] study case Spain: from Transition to modern times http://openmultimedia.ie.edu/OpenProducts/caso_espana_i/caso_espana_i/pdf/pdf_casoespana.pdf</ref> The [[Spanish Constitution of 1978]] went on to be approved in a referendum on December 6, 1978. |
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== Governments of the UCD == |
== Governments of the UCD == |
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<!-- Deleted image removed: [[ |
<!-- Deleted image removed: [[File:Tejero golpe.jpg|right|thumb|300px|Antonio Tejero, breaking into the Congress of Deputies 23 February 1981, attempting a coup. Below to the right is the defense minister [[Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado]].]] --> |
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The UCD received a [[Plurality (voting)|plurality]], but not an [[absolute majority]], in both the June 1977 and [[Spanish general election, 1979|March 1979]] elections. To exercise power, the UCD had to form [[Coalition government|parliamentary coalitions]] with other political parties. |
The UCD received a [[Plurality (voting)|plurality]], but not an [[absolute majority]], in both the June 1977 and [[Spanish general election, 1979|March 1979]] elections. To exercise power, the UCD had to form [[Coalition government|parliamentary coalitions]] with other political parties. |
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The government spent much of its time from 1979 working to hold together the many factions within the party itself, as well as their coalitions. In 1980, the Suárez government had for the most part accomplished its goals of transition to democracy and lacked a further clear agenda. Many UCD members were fairly conservative and did not want further change. For example, a bill to legalize divorce caused much dissension inside the UCD, in spite of being supported by the majority of the populace {{Citation needed|date=February 2007}}. The UCD coalition fell apart. |
The government spent much of its time from 1979 working to hold together the many factions within the party itself, as well as their coalitions. In 1980, the Suárez government had for the most part accomplished its goals of transition to democracy and lacked a further clear agenda. Many UCD members were fairly conservative and did not want further change. For example, a bill to legalize divorce caused much dissension inside the UCD, in spite of being supported by the majority of the populace {{Citation needed|date=February 2007}}. The UCD coalition fell apart. |
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While the democratic normalization had succeeded in convincing [[ETA (pm)]], the "political-military" faction of ETA, to abandon arms and enter parliamentary politics, it did not stop the continuation of terrorist attacks by [[ETA (m)]] ("ETA Military"; later simply "ETA"), and, to a lesser extent, by GRAPO. Meanwhile, restlessness in various sections of the armed forces created fear of an impending [[military coup]]. The attempted coup known as [[23-F]], in which Lieutenant Colonel [[Antonio Tejero]] led an occupation by a group of ''[[Guardia Civil (Spain)|Guardia Civil]]'' of the [[Spanish Congress of Deputies|Congress of Deputies]] on the afternoon of 23 February 1981 failed, but demonstrated the existence of insurrectionary elements within the army. |
While the democratic normalization had succeeded in convincing [[ETA (pm)]], the "political-military" faction of ETA, to abandon arms and enter parliamentary politics, it did not stop the continuation of terrorist attacks by [[ETA (m)]] ("ETA Military"; later simply "ETA"), and, to a lesser extent, by GRAPO. Meanwhile, restlessness in various sections of the armed forces created fear of an impending [[military coup]]. The attempted coup known as [[23-F]], in which Lieutenant Colonel [[Antonio Tejero]] led an occupation by a group of ''[[Guardia Civil (Spain)|Guardia Civil]]'' of the [[Spanish Congress of Deputies|Congress of Deputies]] on the afternoon of 23 February 1981 failed, but demonstrated the existence of insurrectionary elements within the army. |
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==First government of Felipe González (1982–1986)== |
== First government of Felipe González (1982–1986) == |
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{{ |
{{See also|Felipe González}} |
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Calvo Sotelo dissolved parliament and called elections for October 1982. In the 1979 election the UCD had achieved a plurality, but in 1982 it suffered a spectacular defeat with only 11 seats in the Parliament. The [[Spanish general election, 1982|elections]] gave an absolute majority to the PSOE, which had already spent many years preparing its image of an alternative government. |
Calvo Sotelo dissolved parliament and called elections for October 1982. In the 1979 election the UCD had achieved a plurality, but in 1982 it suffered a spectacular defeat with only 11 seats in the Parliament. The [[Spanish general election, 1982|elections]] gave an absolute majority to the PSOE, which had already spent many years preparing its image of an alternative government. |
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== See also == |
== See also == |
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{{Div col|3}} |
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* [[1977 Massacre of Atocha]] |
* [[1977 Massacre of Atocha]] |
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* [[Metapolitefsi|Greece transition to democracy (Metapolitefsi)]] |
* [[Metapolitefsi|Greece transition to democracy (Metapolitefsi)]] |
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* [[Turno pacifico]] |
* [[Turno pacifico]] |
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* [[Franquismo sociológico]] |
* [[Franquismo sociológico]] |
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{{div col end}} |
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==References== |
== References == |
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{{Reflist}} |
{{Reflist}} |
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==Bibliography== |
== Bibliography == |
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{{refbegin}} |
{{refbegin}} |
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* {{cite book |last=Gil Pecharromán |first=Julio |date=2008 |title=Con permiso de la autoridad. La España de Franco (1939–-1975) |trans-title=With Permission from Authoritary: Franco's Spain (1939–1975) |url= |language=Spanish |location=Madrid |publisher=Temas de Hoy |isbn=978-84-8460-693-2}} |
* {{cite book |last=Gil Pecharromán |first=Julio |date=2008 |title=Con permiso de la autoridad. La España de Franco (1939–-1975) |trans-title=With Permission from Authoritary: Franco's Spain (1939–1975) |url= |language=Spanish |location=Madrid |publisher=Temas de Hoy |isbn=978-84-8460-693-2}} |
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* {{cite book |last=Juliá |first=Santos |date=1999 |title=Un siglo de España. Política y sociedad |trans-title=A century of Spain. Politics and society |url= |language=Spanish |location=Madrid |publisher= |isbn=84-9537903-1}} |
* {{cite book |last=Juliá |first=Santos |date=1999 |title=Un siglo de España. Política y sociedad |trans-title=A century of Spain. Politics and society |url= |language=Spanish |location=Madrid |publisher= |isbn=84-9537903-1}} |
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* {{cite book |last=Preston |first=Paul |date=2003 |title=Juan Carlos. El Rey de un pueblo |trans-title=Juan Carlos. The King of a people |url= |language=Spanish |location=Barcelona |publisher=Plaza & Janés |isbn=84-01-37824-9}} |
* {{cite book |last=Preston |first=Paul |date=2003 |title=Juan Carlos. El Rey de un pueblo |trans-title=Juan Carlos. The King of a people |url= |language=Spanish |location=Barcelona |publisher=Plaza & Janés |isbn=84-01-37824-9}} |
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* {{cite book |last=Ruiz |first=David |date=2002 |title=La España democrática ( |
* {{cite book |last=Ruiz |first=David |date=2002 |title=La España democrática (1975–2000). Política y sociedad |trans-title=Democratic Spain (1975–2000). Politics and society |url= |language=Spanish |location=Madrid |publisher=Síntesis |isbn=84-9756-015-9}} |
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* {{cite book |last=Tusell |first=Javier |date=1977 |title=La transición española. La recuperación de las libertades |trans-title=The Spanish transition. The recovery of liberties |url= |language=Spanish |location=Temas de Hoy |publisher=Madrid |isbn=84-7679-327-8}} |
* {{cite book |last=Tusell |first=Javier |date=1977 |title=La transición española. La recuperación de las libertades |trans-title=The Spanish transition. The recovery of liberties |url= |language=Spanish |location=Temas de Hoy |publisher=Madrid |isbn=84-7679-327-8}} |
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* [[Josep Colomer]]. ''[https://works.bepress.com/josep_colomer/34/ Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy. The Spanish Model, Edward Elgar, 1995]''. |
* [[Josep Colomer]]. ''[https://works.bepress.com/josep_colomer/34/ Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy. The Spanish Model, Edward Elgar, 1995]''. |
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* Daniele Conversi. 'The smooth transition: Spain's 1978 Constitution and the nationalities question', ''National Identities'', vol. 4, no 3, November 2002, pp. 223–244 |
* Daniele Conversi. 'The smooth transition: Spain's 1978 Constitution and the nationalities question', ''National Identities'', vol. 4, no 3, November 2002, pp. 223–244 |
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* Paul Preston. The Triumph of Democracy in Spain. London: Routledge, 2001. |
* Paul Preston. The Triumph of Democracy in Spain. London: Routledge, 2001. |
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* [[Javier Tusell]]. Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy. London: Blackwell, 2007. |
* [[Javier Tusell]]. Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy. London: Blackwell, 2007. |
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*''[http://www.adurcal.com/iu/historia/historia_de_un_cambio.htm Historia de un Cambio]'' (in [[Spanish Language|Spanish]]). Retrieved on August 24, 2006. |
* ''[http://www.adurcal.com/iu/historia/historia_de_un_cambio.htm Historia de un Cambio]'' (in [[Spanish Language|Spanish]]). Retrieved on August 24, 2006. |
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* [[Gonzalo Garland]]. Spain: from Transition to modern times, Instituto de Empresa, 2010. |
* [[Gonzalo Garland]]. Spain: from Transition to modern times, Instituto de Empresa, 2010. |
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* José-Francisco Jiménez-Díaz & Santiago Delgado-Fernández -Editors-: ''Political Leadership in the Spanish Transition to Democracy ( |
* José-Francisco Jiménez-Díaz & Santiago Delgado-Fernández -Editors-: ''Political Leadership in the Spanish Transition to Democracy (1975–1982)''. Nueva York: Nova Science Publishers, 2016 (Series: Political Leaders and Their Assessment). |
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{{refend}} |
{{refend}} |
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== External links == |
== External links == |
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*[http://countrystudies.us/spain/25.htm LOC Country Studies-Spain Post-Franco Era] |
* [http://countrystudies.us/spain/25.htm LOC Country Studies-Spain Post-Franco Era] |
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*[http://www.voicesofthetransition.net/ Voices of the Transition |
* [http://www.voicesofthetransition.net/ Voices of the Transition – A Political History of Spain, 1975–1982] |
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*[http://nick.frejol.org/democracy-and-after/ Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy and After, |
* [http://nick.frejol.org/democracy-and-after/ Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy and After, 1975–2007] |
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*[http://openmultimedia.ie.edu/openproducts/caso_espana_i/caso_espana_i/index.html The economy during the transition] |
* [http://openmultimedia.ie.edu/openproducts/caso_espana_i/caso_espana_i/index.html The economy during the transition] |
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{{Spain topics}} |
{{Spain topics}} |
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Spanish Transition To Democracy}} |
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[[Category:Spanish transition to democracy| ]] |
[[Category:Spanish transition to democracy| ]] |
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[[Category:1970s in Spain]] |
[[Category:1970s in Spain]] |