Operation Storm | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Croatian War of Independence and the Bosnian War | |||||||||
Map of Operation Storm | |||||||||
| |||||||||
Belligerents | |||||||||
Bosnia and Herzegovina |
Republic of Serbian Krajina
Republika Srpska | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Zvonimir Červenko Ante Gotovina Mirko Norac Miljenko Crnjac Ivan Basarac Petar Stipetić Luka Džanko Atif Dudaković |
Mile Mrkšić | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
Croatia: 130,000 soldiers ARBIH: 3,000 soldiers | RSK: 27,000–34,000 soldiers | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
174–211 soldiers killed, 1,100–1,430 wounded |
560 soldiers killed 4,000 POWs | ||||||||
Serb civilian deaths: 214 (Croatian claim) – 1,192 (Serbian claim) Refugees: 150,000–200,000 Serbs from the former RSK 21,000 Bosniaks from the former APWB 22,000 Bosniaks and Croats from Republika Srpska |
Operation Storm (Croatian and Serbian: Operacija Oluja, Serbian Cyrillic: Oпeрaциja Oлуja) was the last large battle of the Croatian War of Independence and a decisive victory of the Croatian Army (HV) supported by the Croatian special police advancing across a 630-kilometre (390 mi) frontline and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBIH) located in the Bihać pocket against the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). The battle, launched to restore Croatian control to 10,400 square kilometres (4,000 square miles) of territory, representing 18.4% of the country, was the largest European land battle since the Second World War. Operation Storm commenced at dawn of 4 August and was declared completed in the evening of 7 August despite significant mop-up operations against pockets of resistance which lasted until 14 August.
Operation Storm was also a strategic victory in the Bosnian War as the siege of Bihać was lifted and the HV, Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the ARBIH were in position to change the military balance of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the subsequent Operation Mistral. The operation was built up on HV and HVO advances gained during Operation Summer '95 when strategic positions allowing the rapid capture of the RSK capital Knin were made, and on the continued arming and training of the HV since the beginning of the Croatian War of Independence, when the RSK was created during the Serb rebellion and Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) intervention. The operation itself followed an unsuccessful United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission and diplomatic efforts to settle the conflict.
The HV's success was a result of a series of improvements to the HV itself, and crucial breakthroughs made in the RSK positions that were subsequently exploited by the HV and the ARBIH. The attack was not successful at once at all points, but seizing key positions led to the collapse of the RSK command structure and overall defensive capability. The HV capture of Bosansko Grahovo just before Operation Storm and the special police's advance to Gračac made it nearly impossible to defend Knin. In Lika, two guards brigades quickly cut the area lacking tactical depth and mobile reserve forces, isolating pockets of resistance and positioning the a mobile force for a decisive northward thrust into the Karlovac Corps area of responsibility (AOR) pushing RSK forces towards Banovina. The defeat of the RSK at Glina and Petrinja after tough defence defeated the RSK Banija Corps as well, as its reserve was pinned down by the ARBIH. The RSK relied on the Republika Srpska and the Yugoslav militaries as its strategic reserve, but they did not intervene in the battle.
The HV and the special police suffered 174–211 killed or missing, while the RSK had 560 soldiers killed. Four UN peacekeepers were also killed. The HV captured 4,000 prisoners of war. The number of Serb civilian deaths is disputed—Croatia claims that 214 were killed, while Serbian sources cite 1,192 civilians killed or missing. Following the offensive, nearly the entire Serb population of the area formerly held by the RSK fled and a variety of crimes were committed against the remaining civilians there. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) later tried three Croatian generals charged with war crimes and partaking in a joint criminal enterprise designed to force the Serb population out of Croatia—but all of them were ultimately acquitted. As of November 2012, the Croatian judiciary has convicted 2,380 persons for various crimes committed during Operation Storm.
Background
The 1990 revolt of the Croatian Serbs was centered on the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around the city of Knin,[1] parts of Lika, Kordun, Banovina regions and in eastern Croatian settlements with significant Serb population,[2] and the areas were subsequently named the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). The RSK declared intention of political integration with Serbia and was viewed by the Government of Croatia as a rebellion.[3] By March 1991, the conflict escalated to war—the Croatian War of Independence.[4] In June 1991, Croatia declared its independence as Yugoslavia disintegrated,[5] followed by a three-month moratorium on the decision,[6] thus the decision came into effect on 8 October.[7] A campaign of ethnic cleansing was then initiated by the RSK against Croatian civilians and most non-Serbs were expelled by early 1993. By November 1993, less than 400 and 1,500–2,000 ethnic Croats remained in UN protected areas Sector South,[8] and Sector North respectively.[9]
As the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) increasingly supported the RSK and the Croatian Police was unable to cope with the situation, the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) was formed in May 1991. The ZNG was renamed the Croatian Army (HV) in November.[10] The establishment of the military of Croatia was hampered by a United Nations (UN) arms embargo introduced in September.[11] The final months of 1991 saw the fiercest fighting of the war, culminating in the Battle of the barracks,[12] the Siege of Dubrovnik,[13] and the Battle of Vukovar.[14]
In January 1992, the Sarajevo Agreement was signed by representatives of Croatia, the JNA and the UN, and fighting between the two sides was paused.[15] Ending the series of unsuccessful ceasefires, United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed to Croatia—to supervise and maintain the agreement.[16] The conflict largely passed on to entrenched positions, and the JNA soon retreated from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a new conflict was anticipated,[15] but Serbia continued to support the RSK.[17] HV advances restored small areas to Croatian control—as the siege of Dubrovnik was lifted,[18] and in Operation Maslenica.[19] Croatian towns and villages were intermittently attacked by artillery,[20] or missiles.[2][21] Republika Srpska, Serb-held territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was involved in the war in a limited capacity, through military and other aid to the RSK, occasional air raids launched from Banja Luka, and most significantly through artillery attacks against several cities.[22][23]
Prelude
In November 1994, the Siege of Bihać, a battle of the Bosnian War, entered a critical stage as the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) and the RSK neared the town's capture. Bihać was seen as a strategic area, and it was thought that its capture by Serb forces would intensify the war and worsen the division of the United States on one side and France and the United Kingdom on the other, advocating different approaches to the preservation of the area.[24] In addition, it was feared that Bihać would become the worst humanitarian disaster of the war.[25] Furthermore, denying Bihać to the Serbs was strategically important to Croatia,[26] and Janko Bobetko, the Chief of the Croatia's General Staff, considered the potential fall of Bihać to represent an end to Croatia's war effort.[27]
In a meeting of Croatian and US government and military officials held on 29 November 1994, the Croatian representatives proposed to attack Serb-held territory from Livno in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to draw off a part of the force besieging Bihać and to prevent its capture by the Serbs. As the US officials gave no response to the proposal, Operation Winter '94 was ordered the same day, to be carried out by the HV and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO)—the main military force of the Bosnian Croats. Besides contributing to the defence of Bihać, the attack shifted the line of contact of the HV and the HVO near the supply routes of the RSK.[27]
The meeting was one in a series held in Zagreb and Washington, D.C. following the March 1994 Washington Agreement.[27] The agreement ended the Croat–Bosniak War and provided Croatia with US military advisors from the Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI). The MPRI was hired because the UN arms embargo was still in place, ostensibly to prepare the HV for NATO Partnership for Peace programme participation. They trained HV officers and personnel for 14 weeks from January to April 1995. It was also speculated that the MPRI also provided doctrinal advice, scenario planning and US government satellite information to Croatia.[28] MPRI and Croatian officials dismissed such speculation.[29][30] In November 1994, the United States unilaterally ended the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina,[31] in effect allowing the HV to supply itself as arms shipments flowed through Croatia.[32] The US involvement reflected a new military strategy endorsed by Bill Clinton since February 1993.[33]
In 1994, the United States, Russia, the European Union (EU) and the UN sought to replace the 1992 peace plan drafted by Cyrus Vance, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, which brought in the UNPROFOR. They formulated the Z-4 plan giving Serb-majority areas in Croatia substantial autonomy.[34] After numerous and often uncoordinated development of the plan, including leaking of its draft elements to the press in October, the Z-4 plan was presented on 30 January 1995. Neither Croatia nor the RSK liked the plan. Croatia was concerned that the RSK might accept it, but Croatian President Franjo Tuđman realised that Slobodan Milošević, who would ultimately make the decision for the RSK,[35] would not accept the plan for fear that it would set a precedent for a political settlement in Kosovo—allowing Croatia to accept the plan with little possibility for it to be implemented.[34] The RSK refused to receive, let alone accept the plan.[36]
In December 1994, Croatia and the RSK made an economic agreement to restore road and rail links, water and gas supplies and use of a part of the Adria oil pipeline. Even though a part of the agreement was never implemented,[37] a section of the Zagreb–Belgrade motorway passing through RSK territory near Okučani and the pipeline were opened. Following a deadly incident that occurred in late April 1995 on the recently opened motorway,[38] Croatia reclaimed the entire RSK territory in the western Slavonia in Operation Flash,[39] taking full control of the territory by 4 May, 3 days after the battle began. In response, the RSK attacked Zagreb using M-87 Orkan missiles with cluster munitions.[40] Subsequently, Milošević sent a senior Yugoslav Army officer to command the RSK military, along with arms, field officers and thousands of Serbs born in the RSK area to be forcibly conscripted by the RSK.[41]
On 17 July, the military of the RSK and the VRS started a fresh effort to capture Bihać by expanding on gains made during Operation Spider. The move provided the HV with a chance to extend their territorial gains from Operation Winter '94 by advancing from the Livno valley. On 22 July, Tuđman and Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović signed Split Agreement on mutual defence, permitting the large-scale deployment of the HV in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The HV and HVO responded quickly through Operation Summer '95 (Croatian: Ljeto '95), capturing Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč on 28–29 July,[42] The attack drew off some RSK units away from Bihać,[42][43] but not as many as expected. However, it put the HV in an excellent position,[44] as it isolated Knin from Republika Srpska and FR Yugoslavia.[45]
In late July and early August, there were two more attempts at resurrecting the Z-4 plan and the 1994 economic agreement. Talks proposed on 28 July were ignored by the RSK, and last-ditch talks were held in Geneva on 3 August. The Geneva talks quickly broke down as Croatia and the RSK rejected a compromise proposed by Thorvald Stoltenberg, a Special Representative of the UN General Secretary, essentially calling for further negotiations later on. In addition, the RSK dismissed a set of Croatian demands, including a demand to disarm, and failed to endorse the Z-4 plan once again. The talks were used by Croatia to prepare diplomatic ground for the imminent Operation Storm,[46] whose planning was completed during the Brijuni Islands meeting of Tuđman and military commanders on 31 July.[47] The HV started large-scale mobilization in late July, soon after Staff General Zvonimir Červenko became its new Chief of General Staff on 15 July.[48]
Order of battle
HV divided the operational plans by areas of responsibility (AOR) of assigned to its corps, designating them as Storm-1 through 4, assigning them a schedule 4–5 days long.[48] HV forces set to attack the RSK were organised in five army corps—Split, Gospić, Karlovac, Zagreb and Bjelovar Corps—[49] with a zone assigned to the Croatian special police at the boundary of the Split and Gospić Corps AORs.[50] The special police zone was within the Split Corps AOR.[51] The HV Split Corps, located in the far south of the theatre of operations and commanded by Lieutenant General Ante Gotovina, was assigned the Storm-4 plan, the primary component of Operation Storm.[51] The Split Corps issued orders for the battle using name Kozjak-95 instead, which was not an unusual practice.[52] The 30,000-strong corps was opposed by the 10,000-strong RSK 7th North Dalmatia Corps,[51] headquartered in Knin and commanded by Major General Slobodan Kovačević.[50] The 3,100-strong special police, deployed to the Velebit Mountain on the left flank of the Split Corps, were directly subordinated to the HV General Staff commanded by the Lieutenant General Mladen Markač.[53]
The 25,000-strong HV Gospić Corps assigned the Storm-3 component of the operation,[54] to the left of the special police zone. It was commanded by the Staff Colonel Mirko Norac, and opposed by the RSK 15th Lika Corps, headquartered in Korenica and commanded by Major General Stevan Ševo.[55] The Lika Corps commanded about 6,000 troops facing the Gospić corps along a 150 kilometres (93 miles) front or the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBIH) in the Bihać pocket in RSK rear, forming a wide but a very shallow area. The ARBIH 5th Corps deployed about 2,000 troops in the zone. The Gospić Corps was tasked with cutting the RSK in half and linking up with the ARBIH, while the ARBIH was planned to pin down RSK forces that were in contact with the Bihać pocket.[54]
The HV Karlovac Corps, commanded by Major General Miljenko Crnjac, on the left flank of the Gospić Corps, covered the area extending from Ogulin to Karlovac including Kordun,[56] executing Storm-2 plan. The corps comprised 15,000 troops, and was tasked with pinning down the RSK forces in the area to protect flanks of the Zagreb and Gospić Corps.[57] It had a forward command post in Ogulin. The Karlovac Corps was opposed by the RSK 21st Kordun Corps headquartered at Petrova Gora,[56] comprising 4,000 troops in the AOR as one of its brigades was facing the Zagreb Corps.[57] Initially, it was commanded by Colonel Veljko Bosanac, but he was replaced by Colonel Čedo Bulat in the evening of 5 August. In addition, bulk of the RSK Special Units Corps was present in the area, commanded by Major General Milorad Stupar.[56] It was 5,000-strong, largely facing the Bihać pocket at the onset of Operation Storm. The RSK armour and artillery in the AOR outnumbered that of the HV.[57]
The HV Zagreb Corps, assigned the Storm-1 plan, initially commanded by Major General Ivan Basarac, on the left flank of the Karlovac Corps, was deployed at three main axes of attack—towards Glina, Petrinja and Hrvatska Kostajnica. It was opposed by the RSK 39th Banija Corps, headquartered in Glina and commanded by Major General Slobodan Tarbuk.[58] The Zagreb Corps was tasked with bypassing Petrinja to neutralize RSK artillery and missiles potentially targeting Croatian cities, with a secondary thrust from Sunja towards Hrvatska Kostajnica. The latter part of the task was compromised when a battalion of the special police and the 81st Guards Battalion planned to spearhead the advance were deployed elsewhere forcing modifications of the plan. The Zagreb Corps comprised 30,000 troops, while the RSK had 9,000 facing them or about 1,000 ARBIH troops in the Bihać pocket to their rear. At the start of Operation Storm, about 3,500 RSK troops were in contact with the ARBIH.[59] HV Bjelovar Corps, on the left flank of the Zagreb Corps, covering the area along the Una River, had a forward command post in Novska. The corps was commanded by Major General Luka Džanko. Opposite the Bjelovar Corps was a part of the RSK Banija Corps. The Bjelovar corps were included in the attack on 2 August and were therefore not issued a separate operations plan as other HV corps.[60]
The RSK divided its forces in the area in two subordinating the North Dalmatia and Lika Corps to the RSK General Staff, and grouping the rest into the Kordun Operational Group commanded by Lieutenant Colonel General Mile Novaković. Territorially, the division corresponded to the sectors North and South of the UN protected areas.[61]
Estimates of total strength of troops deployed by the belligerents vary considerably. Croatian forces are estimated from under 100,000 to 150,000,[39][62] but most sources put the figure at about 130,000 troops.[63][64] RSK troop strength in the Sectors North and South was estimated by the HV prior to Operation Storm at approximately 43,000.[65] More detailed HV estimates of the manpower by RSK corps indicated 34,000 soldiers,[66] while Serb sources quote 27,000 troops.[67] The discrepancy is usually reflected in literature as an estimate of about 30,000 RSK troops.[63] The ARBIH deployed approximately 3,000 troops against the RSK positions near Bihać.[57] In late 1994, Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APWB)—a sliver of land northwest of Bihać between its ally RSK and the pocket—commanded 4,000–5,000 soldiers deployed south of Velika Kladuša against the ARBIH force.[68]
Corps | Unit | Note |
---|---|---|
Split Corps | 4th Guards Brigade | In Bosansko Grahovo area |
7th Guards Brigade | ||
81st Guards Battalion | In Glamoč area | |
1st Croatian Guards Corps | Held in reserve in Bosansko Grahovo area | |
6th Home Guard Regiment | In Sinj area | |
126th Home Guard Regiment | ||
144th Home Guard Regiment | ||
142nd Home Guard Regiment | In Šibenik area | |
15th Home Guard Regiment | ||
113th Infantry Brigade | ||
2nd Battalion of the 9th Guards Brigade | In Zadar area | |
112th Brigade | ||
7th Home Guard Regiment | ||
134th Home Guard Regiment | ||
10th Artillery-Missile Regiment of the HVO | Supporting the Split Corps | |
14th Artillery Squadron | ||
20th Howitzer Squadron | ||
Elements of the artillery squadron of the 5th Guards Brigade | ||
11th Antitank Artillery-Missile Squadron | ||
Gospić Corps | 138th Home Guard Regiment | In Saborsko area |
133rd Home Guard Regiment | ||
9th Guards Brigade | Without its 2nd Battalion, in Gospić area | |
118th Home Guard Regiment | In Gospić area | |
111th Infantry Brigade | ||
12th Artillery Squadron | Supporting the Gospić Corps | |
1st Guards Brigade | Directly subordinated to the HV General Staff; Temporarily assigned to the Gospić Corps in 4–6 August | |
Karlovac Corps | 104th Brigade | In Karlovac area |
110th Home Guard Regiment | ||
137th Home Guard Regiment | ||
14th Home Guard Regiment | In Ogulin area | |
143rd Home Guard Regiment | ||
99th Brigade | ||
1 battalion of the 148th Brigade | In reserve | |
7th Antitank Artillery-Missile Squadron | Supporting the Karlovac Corps | |
13th Antitank Artillery-Missile Squadron | ||
33th Engineers Brigade | ||
Zagreb Corps | 17th Home Guard Regiment | In Sunja area |
103rd Brigade | ||
151st Brigade | ||
2nd Guards Brigade | In Petrinja area | |
57th Brigade | ||
12th Home Guard Regiment | ||
20th Home Guard Regiment | In Petrinja and Glina areas | |
153rd Brigade | In Glina area | |
202nd Artillery-Missile Brigade | Supporting the Zagreb Corps | |
67th Military Police Battalion | ||
252nd Independent Signals Company | ||
502nd Mechanized NBC Warfare Company | ||
1 battalion of the 33rd Engineers Brigade | ||
31st Engineers Battalion | ||
36th Engineers-Pontoon Battalion | ||
1st Riverine Corps | ||
6th Artillery Squadron | ||
8th Howitzer-Artillery Squadron | ||
1 squadron of the 16th Artillery-Missile Brigade | ||
5th Antitank Artillery-Missile Squadron | ||
1 squadron of the 15th Antitank Artillery-Missile Brigade | ||
Bjelovar Corps | 125th Home Guard Regiment | In Jasenovac area |
52nd Home Guard Regiment | ||
34th Engineers Battalion | ||
24th Home Guard Regiment | ||
18th Artillery Squadron | ||
121st Home Guard Regiment | In Okučani area |
Corps | Unit | Note |
---|---|---|
North Dalmatia Corps | 75th Motorized Brigade | Opposite Split Corps |
92nd Motorized Brigade | ||
1st Light Brigade | ||
4th Light Brigade | ||
2nd Infantry Brigade | ||
3rd Infantry Brigade | ||
7th Mixed Artillery Regiment | ||
7th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment | ||
7th Light Artillery-Missile Regiment | ||
Special Units Corps | 2nd Guards Brigade | |
Lika Corps | 9th Motorized Brigade | Opposite Gospić Corps |
18th Infantry Brigade | ||
50th Infantry Brigade | ||
103rd Light Brigade | ||
37th Infantry Battalion | ||
15th Mixed Artillery Squadron | ||
15th Mixed Antitank Artillery Squadron | ||
70th Infantry Brigade | Opposite Gospić and Karlovac Corps | |
Kordun Corps | 11th Infantry Brigade | Opposite Karlovac Corps |
13th Infantry Brigade | ||
19th Infantry Brigade | ||
21st Border Squadron | ||
21st Reconnaissance Squadron | ||
21st Mixed Artillery Squadron | ||
75th Mixed Antitank Artillery Squadron | ||
75th Engineers Battalion | ||
Special Units Corps | Missing its 2nd Guards Brigade; Opposite Karlovac Corps | |
Banija Corps | 24th Infantry Brigade | Opposite Zagreb Corps |
33th Infantry Brigade | ||
31st Motorized Brigade | ||
RSK General Staff Artillery Group | ||
26th Infantry Brigade | Opposite Zagreb and Bjelovar Corps | |
Army of Republika Srpska | 11th Brigade | In the Republika Srpska, on the right flank of the RSK Banija Corps |
Corps | Unit | Note |
---|---|---|
5th Corps | 501st Mountain Brigade | Opposite Lika Corps |
502nd Mountain Brigade | ||
505th Mountain Brigade | Opposite Banija Corps | |
511th Mountain Brigade |
Operation timeline
4 August 1995
Operation Storm started at 5 in the morning on 4 August 1995 as coordinated attacks of the reconnaissance and sabotage detachments were carried out, as well as Croatian Air Force (CAF) strikes aimed at disrupting RSK command, control, and communications.[70] UN Peacekeepers, known as United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) since March 1995,[71] were notified 3 hours in advance of the attack when President Tuđman's chief of staff, Hrvoje Šarinić, telephoned UNCRO commander, French Army Gerneral Bernard Janvier. In addition, each HV Corps ordered to attack notified UNCRO sector in its path of the attack, requesting a written confirmation of receipt of the information. The UNCRO passed the information on to the RSK,[72] confirming the warnings RSK received from the Yugoslav Army General Staff the previous day.[73]
Sector South
In the Split Corps AOR, the 7th Guards Brigade advanced from Bosansko Grahovo south towards high ground ahead of Knin at 5 am, after artillery preparation. It moved against the RSK 3rd Battlegroup comprising elements of the North Dalmatian Corps and RSK police, achieved its objectives for the day and allowed the 4th Guards Brigade to attack. HV Sinj Operational Group (OG) on the left flank of the two brigades joined in as the 126th Home Guard Regiment captured Uništa to control the area overlooking Sinj–Knin road, with the 144th Brigade and the 6th Home Guard Regiment also pushing RSK forces back. Šibenik OG units faced the RSK 75th Motorized Brigade and a part of the RSK 2nd Infantry Brigade of the RSK North Dalmatian Corps. There, the 142nd and the 15th Home Guard Regiments made minor progress in area between Krka and Drniš, while the 113th Infantry Brigade made a barely greater advance on their left flank, to Čista Velika. In Zadar OG area, the 134th Home Guard Regiment (without its 2nd Battalion) failed to advance, while the 7th Home Guard Regiment and the 112th HV Brigade gained little ground against the RSK 92nd Motorized and 3rd Infantry Brigades at Benkovac. On the Velebit, the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Guards Brigade, reinforced with a company from the 7th Home Guard Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 134th Home Guard Regiment met stiff resistance but advanced sufficiently to secure use of Obrovac–Sveti Rok road. At 16:45, a decision to evacuate population in the Northern Dalmatia and Lika areas of RSK was made by RSK President Milan Martić.[74][75] In the evening the RSK General Staff moved from Knin to Srb,[74] about 35 kilometres (22 miles) to the northwest.[76]
At 5 am, Croatian special police advanced to Mali Alan pass on the Velebit, encountering strong resistance from the RSK Lika Corps' 4th Light Brigade and elements of the 9th Motorized Brigade. The pass was captured at 1 pm, and Sveti Rok village at about 5 pm. The special police advanced further beyond Mali Alan, meeting more resistance at 9 pm and then bivouacking until 5 am. The RSK 9th Motorized Brigade withdrew to Udbina after loss of positions on the Velebit. In the morning, the special police captured Lovinac, Gračac and Medak.[77]
In the Gospić Corps AOR, the 138th Home Guard Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 1st Guards Brigade began eastward attack in Mala Kapela area, against heavy resistance of the RSK 70th Infantry Brigade in the morning. The rest of the 1st Guards joined in around midnight. The 133rd Home Guard Regiment attacked east of Otočac, towards Vrhovine, attempting to encircle the RSK 50th Infantry Brigade and elements of the RSK 103rd Infantry Brigade in a pincer movement. Even though the regiment advanced, it failed to achieve its objective for the day. On the regiment's right flank, the HV 128th Brigade advanced together with the 3rd Battalion of the 8th Home Guard Regiment and cut Vrhovine–Korenica road. The rest of the 9th Guards Brigade, the bulk of the 118th Home Guard Regiment and the 111th Infantry Brigade of the HV advanced east from Gospić and Lički Osik against very strong resistance of the RSK 18th Infantry Brigade. However, objectives of the Gospić Corps set for the day were not met.[78]
Sector North
In Ogulin area of the HV Karlovac Corps AOR, the 99th Brigade reinforced with the Saborsko Company of the 143rd Home Guard Regiment moved towards Plaški at 5 am, but the force was stopped and turned back in complete disarray by 6 pm. The 143rd Home Guard Regiment advanced from Josipdol towards Plaški, encountering strong RSK resistance and minefields. Its elements linked up with the 14th Home Guard Regiment advancing through Barilović towards Slunj. Near the city of Karlovac, the 137th Home Guard Regiment deployed four reconnaissance groups around midnight of 3–4 August, followed by artillery preparation and crossing of the Korana River at 5 am. The advance was fiercely resisted by the RSK 13th Infantry Brigade, but the bridgehead was stable by the end of the day. The 110th Home Guard Regiment, reinforced by a company of the 137th Home Guard Regiment, advanced east to the road leading south from Karlovac to Vojnić and Slunj, where it met heavy resistance and suffered more casualties to landmines, demoralizing the unit and preventing its further advance. In addition, the attached company of the 137th Home Guard Regiment and the 104th Brigade failed to secure regiment's flanks. The 104th Brigade tried to cross the Kupa River since 5 am, failed and fell back to its starting position by 8 am, when it was shifted to the bridgehead established by the 110th Home Guard Regiment. A company of the 99th Brigade was attached to the 143rd Home Guard Regiment for operations of the next day, and a 250-strong battlegroup was removed from the brigade and subordinated to the Karlovac Corps directly.[79]
In the Zagreb Corps area, HV moved across the Kupa River at two points towards Glina—in and near Pokupsko using the 20th Home Guard Regiment and the 153rd Brigade. Both crossings established bridgeheads, although the bulk of the units were forced to retreat as the RSK counter-attacked—only a battalion of the 153rd Brigade and elements of the 20th Home Guard Regiment held their ground. The crossings prompted the RSK General Staff to order the 2nd Armoured Brigade of the Special Units Corps to move from Slunj to the bridgeheads,[80] as the HV advance threatened a vital road in Glina.[57] HV's 2nd Guards Brigade and the 12th Home Guard Regiment were tasked with quick capture of Petrinja from the RSK 31st Motorized Brigade in a pincer movement.[80] The original plan, involving thrusts 6 to 7 kilometres (3.7 to 4.3 miles) south of Petrinja was amended by General Basarac to a direct assault on the city.[51] On the right flank, the regiment was soon stopped by minefields and forced to retreat, while the bulk of the 2nd Guards Brigade advanced until it wavered following loss of a company commander and 5 soldiers. The rest of the 2nd Guards Brigade—reinforced 2nd Battalion and elements of the 12th Home Guard Regiment, the 5th antitank artillery squadron and the 31st engineering battalion—formed the Tactical Group 2 (TG2) operating on the left flank of the attack. The TG2 advanced from Mošćenica, short distance from Petrinja, but was stopped after the 2nd Battalion commander was killed along with 6 soldiers. The RSK 31st Motorized Brigade also panicked but managed to stabilize its defences as it received reinforcements. The 57th Brigade of the HV advanced south of Petrinja intent on reaching the Petrinja–Hrvatska Kostajnica road, but it ran into a minefield where the brigade commander was killed, while the 101st Brigade to its rear suffered heavy artillery fire and casualties. In Sunja area, the 17th Home Guard Regiment and a company of the 151st Brigade unsuccessfully attacked the RSK 26th Infantry Brigade. Later on, a separate attack of the rest of the 151st Brigade also failed. The 103rd Brigade of the HV advanced to the Sunja–Sisak railroad, but had to retreat under heavy fire. The Zagreb Corps failed to meet any objective of the first day. The Corps believed that the failure was due to inadequate manpower and requested the HV General Staff to mobilize the 102nd Brigade, and the 1st and the 21st Home Guard Regiments. The 2nd Guards Brigade was reinforced by the 1st Battalion of the 149th Brigade previously held in reserve in Ivanić Grad.[80]
In the Bjelovar Corps AOR, two battalions of the 125th Home Guard Regiment crossed the Sava River near Jasenovac, secured a bridgehead for trailing HV units and advanced towards Hrvatska Dubica. The two battalions were followed by an additional company of the same regiment, a battalion of the 52nd Home Guard Regiment, 265th reconnaissance company and finally the 24th Home Guard Regiment battlegroup. A reconnaissance platoon of the 52nd Home Guard Regiment crossed the Sava River into the Republika Srpska, established a bridgehead for two infantry companies and subsequently disabling the Bosanska Dubica–Gradiška road before returning to Croatian soil. The Bjelovar Corps units reached outskirts of Hrvatska Dubica by the evening. During the night, the town was evacuated by the RSK troops and civilian population across the Sava River—representing the border of Croatia in the region.[81]
5 August 1995
Sector South
HV did not advance towards Knin in the night of 4–5 August, when the RSK General Staff ordered a battalion of the 75th Motorized Brigade north of Knin. The RSK North Dalmatian Corps became increasingly uncoordinated as the HV 4th Guards Brigade advanced south towards Knin, protecting the right flank of the 7th Guards Brigade. The latter met little resistance and entered the town at about 11 am. General Ivan Čermak was appointed commander of the newly established HV Knin Corps. Sinj OG completed its objectives capturing Kozjak and Vrlika, meeting little resistance as the RSK 1st Light Brigade disintegrated retreating to Knin and on to Lika. By 8 pm, Šibenik OG units advanced to Poličnik (113th Brigade), Đevrske (15th Home Guard Regiment), and captured Drniš (142th Home Guard Regiment) while the RSK 75th Motorized Brigade retreated towards Srb and Bosanski Petrovac together with the 3rd Infantry and the 92th Motorized Brigades, leaving Zadar OG units with little opposition. The 7th Home Guard Regiment captured Benkovac, while the 112th Brigade entered Smilčić and elements of the 9th Guards Brigade reached Obrovac.[82]
The 138th Home Guard Regiment and the 1st Guards Brigade advanced to Lička Jasenica, the latter pressing attack further towards Saborsko, with the 2nd Battalion of the HV 119th Brigade reaching the area in the evening. HV reinforced the 133rd Home Guard Regiment with a battalion of the 150th Brigade enabling the regiment to achieve its objectives of the previous day, partially encircling the RSK force in Vrhovine. The 154th Home Guard Regiment was mobilized and deployed to Ličko Lešće area. The 9th Guards Brigade (without its 2nd Battalion) advanced towards Udbina Air Base, where RSK forces started to evacuate. The 111th Brigade and the 118th Home Guard Regiment also made small advances, linking up behind RSK lines.[83]
Sector North
The 143rd Home Guard Regiment advanced towards Plaški, capturing it that evening, while the 14th Home Guard Regiment captured Primišlje, 12 kilometres (7.5 miles) northwest of Slunj. At 0:30 am, the RSK 13th Infantry Brigade and a company of the 19th Infantry Brigade counter-attacked at the Korana bridgehead, causing the bulk of the 137th Home Guard Regiment to panic and flee across the river. A single platoon of the regiment remained but the RSK troops did not exploit the opportunity to smash the bridgehead. In the morning, the regiment reoccupied the bridgehead, reinforced by a 350-strong battlegroup drawn from the 104th Brigade (with a tank platoon and multiple rocket launchers), and a company of the 148th Brigade from the Karlovac Corps operational reserve. The regiment and the battlegroup managed to extend the bridgehead towards the Karlovac–Slunj road. The 110th Home Guard Regiment attacked again south of Karlovac, but was thrown back by prepared RSK defences. That night, the Karlovac Corps decided to move elements of the 110th Home Guard Regiment and the 104th Brigade to the Korana bridgehead, while the RSK 13th Infantry Brigade retreated to the right bank of Korana in an area extending about 30 kilometres (19 miles) north from Slunj.[84]
The Zagreb Corps made little or no progress on day two of the battle. A part of the 2nd Guards Brigade was ordered to drive towards Glina with the 20th Home Guards Regiment but they made a modest advance, while the 153rd Brigade abandoned its bridgehead. In the area of Petrinja, the HV advanced gradually to be pushed back in some areas by a RSK counter-attack. The results were reversed at significant cost by a renewed push by the 2nd Guards Brigade. The Zagreb Corps commander was replaced by Petar Stipetić on orders from President Tuđman. The HV reassigned the 102nd Brigade to drive to Glina, and the 57th Brigade was reinforced with the 2nd Battalion of the 149th Brigade. The 145th Brigade was moved from Popovača to Sunja area, where the 17th Home Guard Regiment and the 151st Brigade made minor advances into the RSK held area.[85]
In the Bjelovar Corps AOR, Hrvatska Dubica was captured by the 52nd and the 24th Home Guard Regiments advancing from the east and the 125th Home Guard Regiment approaching from the north. The 125th Home Guard Regiment garrisoned the town, while the 52nd Home Guard Regiment moved northwest towards expected Zagreb Corps positions, but delays of the Zagreb Corps prevented any link-up. The 24th Home Guard Regiment advanced about 4 kilometres (2.5 miles) towards Hrvatska Kostajnica when it was stopped by the RSK troops. In response, the Corps called in a battalion and a reconnaissance platoon of the 121st Home Guard Regiment from Nova Gradiška to aid the push to the town.[86] The ARBIH 505th and 511th Mountain Brigades advanced north to Dvor and engaged the RSK 33rd Infantry Brigade—the only reserve unit of the Banija Corps.[87]
6 August 1995
HV conducted mop-up operations in the areas of Obrovac, Benkovac, Drniš and Vrlika as President Tuđman visited Knin.[88] After completing their objectives on or near Velebit, the special police was deployed on foot behind RSK lines to hinder movement of RSK troops there—capturing strategic intersections in villages of Bruvno (at 7 am) and Otrić (at 11 am).[89]
At midnight, elements of the ARBIH 501st and 502nd Mountain Brigades advanced west from Bihać against a skeleton force of the RSK Lika Corps left behind since the beginning of the battle. The 501st moved about 10 kilometres (6.2 miles) deep on Croatian soil, to Ličko Petrovo Selo and Plitvice Lakes by 8 am. The 502nd captured an RSK radar and communications facility on Plješivica Mountain, and proceeded towards Korenica where it was stopped by the RSK units. The HV 1st Guards Brigade reached Rakovica and linked up with the Bosnia-Herzegovina 5th Corps in area of Drežnik Grad by 11 am.[90] It was supported by the 119th Brigade and a battalion of the 154th Home Guard Regiment deployed in Tržačka Raštela and Ličko Petrovo Selo areas.[91] In the afternoon, a link-up ceremony was held for the media in Tržačka Raštela.[92] The 138th Home Guard Regiment completed encirclement of Vrhovine, which were captured by the end of the day by the 8th and the 133rd Home Guard Regiments reinforced with a battalion of the 150th Brigade. The HV 128th Brigade entered Korenica while the 9th Guards Brigade continued towards Udbina.[91]
The 143rd Home Guard Regiment advanced to Broćanac where it linked up with the 1st Guards Brigade. From there the regiment continued towards Slunj, accompanied by elements of the 1st Guards Brigade and the 14th Home Guard Regiment, capturing the town at 3 pm. Advance of the 14th Home Guard Regiment was supported by the 148th Brigade guarding its flanks. The RSK 13th Infantry Brigade retreated from Slunj, together with civilian population, north towards Topusko. An attack of the 137th Home Guard Regiment, and the elements of various units reinforcing it, extended the bridgehead and linked up with the 14th Home Guard Regiment in Veljun, 18 kilometres (11 miles) north of Slunj. The rest of the 149th Brigade (without the 1st Battalion) was reassigned from the Zagreb to Karlovac Corps to reinforce the 137th Home Guard Regiment.[93] At 11 am, evacuation of civilians was agreed between RSK military and civilian authorities in Glina and Vrginmost.[75] The ARBIH 502nd Mountain Brigade also moved north flanking APWB capital of Velika Kladuša from the west, capturing the town by the end of the day.[94]
The TG2 advanced to Petrinja at about 7 am after a heavy artillery preparation. The 12th Home Guard Regiment entered the city from the west and was subsequently assigned to garrison Petrinja and its surroundings. After loss of Petrinja to the HV, bulk of the RSK Banija Corps started to retreat towards Dvor. The HV 57th Brigade advanced against light resistance and took control of the Petrinja–Hrvatska Kostajnica road. During the night of 6–7 August, the 20th Home Guard Regiment, supported by Croatian police and elements of the 153rd Brigade, captured Glina despite strong resistance. The 153rd brigade then took positions that allowed continued advance towards village of Maja in coordination with the 2nd Guards Brigade, which drove south from Petrinja towards Zrinska gora conducting mop-up operations. The 140th Home Guard Regiment flanked the 2nd Guards Brigade on the northern slope of Zrinska gora, while the 57th Brigade captured Umetić. The 103rd and the 151st Brigades and the 17th Home Guard Regiment advanced towards Hrvatska Kostajnica, with an addition of a battalion of the 145th Brigade of the HV to the drive in the afternoon. Around noon, the 151st Brigade linked up with the Bjelovar Corps units on Sunja–Hrvatska Dubica road. They were assigned to secure roads in the area afterwards.[95]
By capturing Glina, HV trapped the bulk of the RSK Kordun Corps and about 35,000 evacuating civilians in the area of Topusko, prompting its commander to request UNCRO protection. The 1st Guards Brigade, approaching Topusko from Vojnić, received orders to engage the RSK Kordun Corps, but the orders were cancelled at midnight by the chief of the HV General Staff. Instead, the Zagreb Corps were instructed to prepare a brigade-strength unit to escort unarmed persons and RSK officers and non-commissioned officers with side arms to Dvor and allow them to cross to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Based on information from the UN troops, it was believed that the RSK forces in Banovina were about to surrender.[96]
The battalion of the 121st Home Guard Regiment entered Hrvatska Kostajnica, while the 24th Home Guard Regiment battlegroup secured the national border behind them. The 52nd Home Guard Regiment linked up with the Zagreb Corps and then turned south to the town, reaching it in the evening. Capture of Hrvatska Kostajnica marked fulfilment of all objectives of the Bjelovar Corps.[97]
7 August 1995
The 1st Croatian Guards Corps arrived to the Knin area to link up with the 4th, the 7th and elements of the 9th Guards Brigades, tasked with a northward advance the next day. Split Corps command moved to Knin as well.[98] The Croatian special police proceeded to Gornji Lapac and Donji Lapac by 2 pm, completing the boundary between Gospić and Split Corps AORs—making contact with the 4th Guards Brigade in Otrić, and Gospić Corps units in Udbina by 3 pm. By 7 pm, a battalion of the special police reached the border near Kulen Vakuf, securing the area.[99]
In the morning, the 9th Guards Brigade (without its 2nd Battalion) captured Udbina, where it linked up with the 154th Home Guard Regiment, approaching from the opposite side of the Krbava Polje. By the end of the day, Operation Storm objectives assigned to the Gospić Corps were completed.[100]
A forward command post of the HV General Staff was moved from Ogulin to Slunj, and it assumed direct command of the 1st Guards Brigade, the 14th Home Guard Regiment and the 99th Brigade. The 14th Home Guard Regiment secured Slunj area and deployed to the left bank of Korana to link up with the advancing Karlovac special police. Elements of the regiment and the 99th Brigade secured the national border in the area. The 1st Guards Brigade advanced towards Kordun, as the Karlovac Corps reoriented its main axis of attack. The 110th Home Guard Regiment and the elements of the 104th Brigade reached largely deserted Vojnić in early afternoon, followed by the 1st Guards Brigade, the 143rd Home Guard Brigade and the 137th Home Guard Regiment as well as other HV units joining them by the evening.[101]
The 2nd Guards Brigade advanced from Maja towards Dvor, but was stopped approximately 25 kilometres (16 miles) short by RSK units protecting withdrawal of the RSK military and civilians towards the town. Elements of the brigade performed mop-up operations in the area. The RSK 33rd Infantry Brigade held road bridge in Dvor connecting the RSK and the Republika Srpska across the Una River. The brigade was overwhelmed by the ARBIH 5th Corps, and it retreated south of Una, as the RSK 13th Infantry Brigade and Kordun civilians were reaching Dvor. Elements of the 17th Home Guard Regiment, the 145th and the 151st Brigades of the HV reached Dvor via Hrvatska Kostajnica and came into contact with the RSK 13th Infantry Brigade and elements of the RSK 24th Infantry and 2nd Armoured Brigades who had retreated from Glina.[94][102] As the expected surrender of the RSK Kordun Corps did not materialize, the HV was ordered again to reengage it.[96] Despite major pockets of resistance, Croatia's defence minister Gojko Šušak declared major operations to be over at 6 pm,[94] 84 hours after the battle started.[103]
8–14 August 1995
On 8 August, the 4th and the 7th Guards Brigades, the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Guards Brigade and the 1st Croatian Guards Corps advanced north to Lička Kaldrma and the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina, achieving all the objectives of the Split Corps in Operation Storm,[98] and eliminating the last major pocket or RSK resistance in Donji Lapac and Srb area by 8 pm.[104] After the capture of Vojnić, the bulk of the Karlovac Corps units was tasked with mop-up operations in the Corps AOR.[105] Elements of the 2nd Guards Brigade reached the Croatian border southwest of Dvor, where fighting for full control of the town was in progress, and linked up with the ARBIH 5th Corps.[106]
As president Tuđman ordered the cessation of military operations that afternoon, the RSK Kordun Corps accepted unconditional surrender. Negotiations of the terms of surrender were held the same day at 1:20 pm at the Ukrainian UNCRO troops command post in Glina, and the surrender document was signed at 2 pm in Topusko. Croatia was represented by Lieutenant General Stipetić, while the RSK was represented by Colonel Čedo Bulat, commander of the RSK Kordun Corps, and interior minister Tošo Pajić. The terms of surrender specified the handover of weapons, except officers' side arms, on the following day, and the evacuation of persons from Topusko via Glina, Sisak and the Zagreb–Belgrade motorway to Serbia, protected by the Croatian military and civilian police.[107]
On 9 August, the special police turned over their positions to the HV, after covering more than 150 kilometres (93 miles) on foot in 4 days.[99] The 1st Guards Brigade, followed by other HV units, entered Vrginmost. The 110th and the 143rd Home Guard Regiments conducted mop-up operations around Vrginmost and Lasinja, the 137th Home Guard Regiment in Vojnić area and the 14th Home Guard Regiment in Slunj, Cetingrad and Rakovica area.[108] The HV secured Dvor late in the evening, shortly after the civilians completed evacuation. Numerous HV Home Guard units were later tasked with mop-up operations.[106]
On 10 August, the HV 57th Brigade reached the Croatian border south of Gvozdansko, elements of the 2nd Guards Brigade reached Dvor and the 12th Home Guard Regiment captured Matijevići, just to the south of Dvor, on the Croatian border. The Zagreb Corps reported that all its objectives related to Operation Storm were achieved and that the entire national border in its AOR was secured. Mop-up operations in Banovina lasted until 14 August, and special police units joined the operations on the Zrinska Gora and Petrova Gora mountains.[109]
Air force operations
On 4 August 1995, the CAF had at its disposal 17 MiG-21s, 5 attack and 9 transport helicopters, 3 transport airplanes and 2 reconnaissance aircraft. 13 MiG-21s were used to destroy or disable 6 targets in areas assigned to Gospić and Zagreb Corps on the first day, at the cost of one severely and three slightly damaged jets. The same day, three Mi-8s were used for medical evacuation.[110] US Navy EA-6Bs and F/A-18s on patrol as part of Operation Deny Flight fired at RSK surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at Udbina and Knin as SAM radars locked onto the jets.[111] Few sources claim that they were deployed as a deterrent as the UN troops came under HV fire,[112] but subsequent UN Security Council report only notes that the deployment was a result of deterioration of military situation and low security of the peacekeepers in the area.[113] On 4 August, the RSK 105th Air Force Brigade based at Udbina, deployed helicopters against the Croatian special police on Velebit and targets in Gospić area to virtually no effect.[110]
On 5 August, the RSK air force started evacuating to Zalužani Airbase near Banja Luka, completing the move within the day. At the same time the CAF deployed 11 MiG-21s to strike a communications facility and a storage site, as well as 5 other military positions throughout the RSK, a Mi-24 to attack RSK armour near Sisak and 5 Mi-8s to transport casualties, move troops and cargo. Five MiG-21s sustained light damage in the process. The next day, jets struck a RSK command post, a bridge and at least four other targets near Karlovac and Glina. A Mi-24 was deployed to Slunj area to attack RSK tanks, while three Mi-8s transported wounded and supplies. An additional pair of MiG-21s was deployed to patrol Ivanić Grad airspace and intercept two VRS fighter jets, but they failed to do so due to their low level of flight and fog in the area.[110] The VRS aircraft managed to strike Petrokemija chemical plant in Kutina.[113]
The following day, on 7 August, two VRS air force jets attacked a village in Nova Gradiška area, just north of the Sava River—the international border in the area.[114] The CAF struck a RSK command post, a storage facility and several tanks near Bosanski Petrovac. On 8 August, CAF performed its last combat sorties in the operation, striking tanks and armoured vehicles between Bosanski Novi and Prijedor, and two of its MiG-21s were damaged. Overall, the CAF performed 67 close air support, three attack helicopter, seven reconnaissance, four combat air patrol and 111 transport helicopter sorties during Operation Storm.[110]
Other coordinated operations
In order to protect areas of Croatia away from the Sectors North and South, the HV conducted defensive operations while the HVO started a limited offensive north of Glamoč and Kupres to pin down a part of the VRS forces, exploit the situation and gain positions for further advance. In the eastern Slavonia, HV Osijek Corps was tasked with preventing RSK or Yugoslav Army forces from advancing west in the region, and counter-attacking into the RSK-held area around Vukovar. The Osijek Corps mission was codenamed Operation Phoenix (Croatian: Operacija Fenix). The Corps commanded the 3rd Guards and the 5th Guards Brigades, as well as six other HV brigades and seven Home Guard regiments. Those were reinforced by elements of specialized units otherwise directly subordinated to the HV General Staff, including a part of the Mi-24 gunship squadron. Even though artillery rounds and small arms fire were traded between the HV and the RSK 11th Slavonia-Baranja Corps in the region, no major attack occurred.[115] The most significant effort of the RSK troops came about on 5 August, when the exchange was compounded by three RSK air raids and an infantry and tank assault targeting Nuštar, northeast of Vinkovci.[116] Operation Storm led the Yugoslav Army to mobilize and deploy considerable artillery, tanks and infantry to the border area near the eastern Slavonia, but it took no part in the battle.[117]
In the south of Croatia, the HV deployed to protect the Dubrovnik area against the VRS Herzegovina Corps and Yugoslav Army situated in and around Trebinje and Bay of Kotor. The plan codenamed Operation Maestral entailed deployment of the 114th, 115th and 163rd Brigades, the 116th and 156th Home Guard Regiments, the 1st Home Guard Battalion (Dubrovnik), the 16th Artillery Squadron, the 39th Engineers Battalion and a mobile coastal artillery battery. The area was reinforced on 8 August with the 144th Brigade as the unit completed its objectives in Operation Storm and moved to Dubrovnik. The CAF committed two MiG-21s and two Mi-24s based in Split to Operation Maestral. Croatian Navy supported the operation deploying Korčula, Brač and Hvar Marine Detachments, missile boats, minesweepers, anti-submarine warfare ships and coastal artillery. In the period, the VRS attacked the Dubrovnik area intermittently using artillery only.[118]
On 5 August, the HVO 2nd and 3rd Guards Brigades attacked VRS positions north of Tomislavgrad, achieving small advances to secure more favourable positions for future attacks towards Šipovo and Jajce, while tying down a part of the 2nd Krajina Corps of the VRS.[119] As a consequence of the overall battlefield situation, the VRS was limited to few counter-attacks around Bihać and Grahovo as it was short of reserves.[117] The most significant one was launched by the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps on the night of 11–12 August. It broke through HV reserve infantry, reaching outskirts of Bosansko Grahovo, only to be beaten back by two HV Guards battalions.[120]
Assessment of the battle
Operation Storm became the largest European land battle since the World War II,[121] encompassing a 630-kilometre (390 mi) frontline.[39] It was a decisive victory for Croatia,[122] restoring 10,400 square kilometres (4,000 square miles) of territory, representing 18.4% of the country, to its control.[123] Losses sustained by the HV and the special police are most often cited as 174 killed and 1,430 wounded,[124] but a government report prepared weeks after the battle specified 211 killed or missing, 1,100 wounded and 3 captured troops. By 21 August, Croatian authorities recovered and buried 560 RSK troops killed in the battle. The HV captured 4,000 prisoners of war,[125] 54 armoured and 497 other vehicles, 6 aircraft, hundreds of artillery pieces and over 4,000 infantry weapons.[123] Four UN peacekeepers were killed—three as a result of HV actions and one as a result of RSK activities—and 16 injured. The HV destroyed 98 UN observation posts.[113]
The HV's success was a result of a series of improvements to the HV itself and crucial breakthroughs made in the RSK positions that were subsequently exploited by the HV and the ARBIH. The attack was not immediately successful everywhere, but seizing of key positions led to collapse of the RSK command structure and overall defensive capability. HV's capture of Bosansko Grahovo just before Operation Storm and special police's advance to Gračac made Knin nearly impossible to defend. In Lika, two guards brigades rapidly cut the area lacking tactical depth or mobile reserve forces, isolating pockets of resistance and placing the 1st Guards Brigade in a position that allowed it to move north into the Karlovac Corps AOR, pushing RSK forces towards Banovina. Defeat of the RSK at Glina and Petrinja, after heavy fighting, defeated the RSK Banija Corps too, as its reserve was pinned down by the ARBIH. The RSK force was capable of containing or substantially holding assaults by regular HV brigades and the Home Guard, but attacks of the Guards Brigades and the special police proved to be decisive.[126] Colonel Andrew Leslie, commanding the UNCRO in Knin area,[127] assessed Operation Storm as a textbook operation that would have "scored an A-plus" by NATO standards.[128]
Were there no aid from the ARBIH, the HV would almost certainly have defeated the Banija Corps on its own, but at greater cost. The lack of reserves was the key weakness of the RSK that was exploited by the HV and the ARBIH as static defence could not cope with fast-paced attacks. The RSK military was unable to check outflanking maneuvers and the RSK Special Units Corps failed as a mobile reserve, holding back the HV's 1st Guards Brigade south of Slunj for no more than a single day. The RSK traditionally counted on the VRS and the Yugoslav military as its strategic reserve, but the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina pinned-down the VRS reserves and Yugoslavia did not intervene militarily as Milošević did not order it to do so. Even if he wished to intervene, the speed of the battle allowed very limited time for Yugoslavia to deploy appropriate force to the RSK.[126]
Aftermath
The defeat of the RSK led the Serbs in Bosnia to realise that a settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be negotiated as soon as possible,[126] and reversed the tide of the war against the Serbs,[128] giving US diplomacy a strong boost.[129] The success of Operation Storm also represented a strategic victory in the Bosnian War as it lifted the siege of Bihać,[130] and allowed Croatian and Bosnian leadership to plan a full-scale military intervention in the VRS-held Banja Luka area—aimed at creating a new balance of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a buffer zone along the Croatian border, and contributing to the resolution of the war.[126] The intervention materialized as Operation Mistral of September 1995, albeit combined with a NATO air campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina,[126] leading to the start of peace talks that would result in the Dayton Agreement a few months later.[131] The development also led to the restoration of the remaining Serb-held areas in eastern Slavonia and Baranja to Croatian control through the Erdut Agreement,[132] ending the Croatian War of Independence in November.[133]
The ease with which the HV achieved victory surprised many observers as western intelligence services predicted a Croatian defeat.[134] International reactions to Operation Storm quickly evolved from emotional, supportive of either side in the battle, to those calmly assessing the situation on the ground.[135] UN officials and most international media criticized Croatia.[136] Carl Bildt, a EU negotiatior for the former Yugoslavia, publicly condemned Croatia, while Stoltenberg urged the UN Secretary General Personal Representative Yasushi Akashi to request NATO strikes against the HV.[135] German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel expressed regret but added that "... the years of Serb aggression ... have sorely tried Croatia's patience".[137] The US response was mixed. While Secretary of Defense William Perry reflected favourably on the military development,[136] US ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith declared his disapproval. On 10 August, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1009 demanding that Croatia halt military operations, condemned the targeting of UN peacekeepers, and called for the resumption of talks—but not calling for a HV withdrawal.[135] By 18 August, US diplomats on Robert Frasure's team tasked to mediate in the Bosnian War believed Operation Storm lent their diplomatic mission a chance to succeed,[138] reflecting the opinion of US President Bill Clinton that the Serbs would not negotiate seriously unless they sustain major military defeats.[139]
In Serbia, Milošević condemned the Croatian attack, but the Milošević-influenced press also denounced the leadership of the RSK as being incompetent,[140] while the most extreme politicians, including Vojislav Šešelj, demanded retaliation against Croatia.[141] Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić begged for the Yugoslav Army to help while accusing Milošević of treason.[142]
In Croatia, HV units returning to their bases were given heroes' welcome in numerous cities, and a commemorative medal was created to be issued to HV troops who took part in the operation.[143] On 26 August, Croatia organised a Freedom Train—railroad tour taking President Tuđman and the bulk of Croatia's government officials, public personalities, journalists and the diplomatic corps in Croatia from Zagreb to Karlovac, Gospić, Knin and Split.[144] Tuđman held a speech at each of the stops.[145] During the final rally in Split, which drew a crowd of 300,000, Tuđman vowed to liberate Vukovar as well.[146]
Croats and Serbs hold opposing views of the operation.[147] In Croatia, 5 August—the day that the HV captured Knin—was chosen as the Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day and the Day of Croatian Defenders, a public holiday in the country, when Operation Storm is officially celebrated.[148] In Serbia and the Republika Srpska, the day is marked by mourning the Serbs killed or exiled during or after the operation.[149]
Refugee crisis
The evacuation and following mass exodus of the Serbs from the RSK area led to a significant humanitarian crisis. In August 1995, the UN estimated that only 3,500 Serbs remained in Kordun and Banovina (former Sector North) and 2,000 in Lika and Northern Dalmatia (former Sector South), while more than 150,000 had fled to Yugoslavia, and 10,000–15,000 arrived in the Banja Luka area.[113] The number of Serb refugees was reported to be up to 200,000 by the international media,[150] and organizations.[151] Also, 21,000 Bosniak refugees from the former APWB fled to Croatia.[113] After Operation Storm, the expulsion of all Croats and Muslims from the Banja Luka area was ordered by the Republika Srpska,[152] and 22,000 refugees fled to Croatia by the end of August.[153] EU envoy Bildt accused Croatia of the most efficient ethnic cleansing carried out in the Yugoslav Wars,[154] but his view was rejected by US ambassador Galbraith.[155]
While approximately 35,000 Serb refugees, trapped with the surrendered RSK Kordun Corps, were evacuated to Yugoslavia via Sisak and the Zagreb–Belgrade motorway,[96] the bulk of the refugees followed a route through Republika Srpska, arriving there via Dvor in Banovina or Srb in Lika—two corridors to Serb-held territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina left as the HV advanced.[75] The two points of retreat were created as a consequence of the delay of a northward advance of the HV Split Corps after the capture of Knin, and the decision not to employ the entire HV 2nd Guards Brigade to spearhead the southward advance from Petrinja.[130] The retreating RSK military, transporting large quantities of weaponry and ammunition, artillery and tanks, and evacuating or fleeing civilians often intermingled, having few roads to use.[156] The escaping columns were reportedly intermittently attacked by CAF jets, HV artillery,[75] and ARBIH troops,[157] as well as by VRS jets and run down by retreating RSK tanks.[158] The refugee column moving towards the motorway was attacked by Croat civilians along the way on 9 August.[113] The next day, US ambassador Galbraith joined the column to protect them.[159] The refugees moving through Republika Srpska were demanded bribes at checkpoints and required to pay extra for fuel and other services.[160]
Aiming to reduce evidence of the political failure, Yugoslav authorities sought to disperse the refugees in various parts of Serbia and prevent their concentration in the capital, Belgrade.[161] Government encouraged the refugees to settle in predominantly Hungarian areas of Vojvodina, and in Kosovo, largely populated by Albanians, leading to increased instability in the regions.[162] Moreover, the refugees were reluctant to settle in Kosovo.[163] After 12 August, the Serbian authorities started to deport some of the refugees who were of military age, declaring them illegal immigrants.[75] They were turned over to the VRS or the RSK military in the eastern Croatia for conscription.[164] Some of the conscripts were publicly humiliated and beaten for abandoning the RSK.[75] In some areas, ethnic Croats of Vojvodina were evicted by the refugees themselves from their homes to claim new accommodation.[165] Similarly, the refugees moving through Banja Luka forced Croats and Muslims out of their homes.[166]
Return of the refugees
At the beginning of the Croatian War of Independence, in 1991–1992, a non-Serb population of more than 220,000 was forcibly removed from Serb-held territories in Croatia, as the RSK was established.[167] In the wake of Operation Storm, a part of those refugees, as well as Croat refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, settled in a substantial number of housing units in the area formerly held by the RSK, presenting an obstacle to return of the Serb refugees.[168] As of September 2010, out of 300,000–350,000 Serbs who fled from Croatia during the entire war,[169] 132,707 registered as having returned,[170] but only 60–65% of those are believed to reside permanently in the country. However, only 20,000–25,000 more are interested in returning to Croatia.[169] As of 2010, approximately 60,000 Serb refugees from Croatia remained in Serbia.[171]
The return of refugees has been hampered by several types of obstacles. These include property ownership and accommodation as Croat refugees settled in the vacated homes,[168] and Croatian war-time legislation that stripped the refugees once living in government-owned housing of their tenancy rights. The legislation was abolished after the end of the war,[172] and alternative accommodation is offered to returnees.[173] 6,538 housing units were allocated by November 2010. Other obstacles comprised obtaining of residency or Croatian citizenship. Applicable legislation has been relaxed since and Croatia has allowed the validation of identity documents issued by the RSK.[170] Even though Croatia declared a general amnesty, refugees fear legal prosecution,[172] as the amnesty does not pertain to war crimes.[174] The final obstacle to the return of refugees is the lack of livelihood opportunities due to the poor economic situation in Croatia.[175]
War crimes
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), set up in 1993 based on the UN Security Council Resolution 827,[176] indicted HV generals Gotovina, Čermak and Markač for war crimes, specifically for their roles in Operation Storm, citing their participation in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) aimed at the permanent removal of Serbs from the RSK-held part of Croatia. The ICTY charges specified that other participants in the JCE were Croatia's President Tuđman, defence minister Šušak, and generals Bobetko and Červenko,[177] however all except Bobetko were dead before the first relevant ICTY indictment was issued in 2001.[178] General Bobetko was indicted by the ICTY, but died a year later, before he could be transferred to the ICTY.[179] The Trial of Gotovina et al began in 2008,[180] leading to convictions of Gotovina and Markač and acquittal of Čermak after three years.[181] Gotovina and Markač were acquitted on appeal in November 2012,[182] in a ruling that exonerated the two generals as well as Croatia's political leaders of the 1990s.[183]
The number of civilian casualties in Operation Storm is disputed. The State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Croatia claims that 214 civilians were killed—156 in 24 instances of war crimes and that another 47 were victims of murder—during the battle and in its immediate aftermath. The Croatian Helsinki Committee disputes the claim and reports that 677 civilians were killed in the period,[184] however their report was rejected by the ICTY when submitted as evidence due to unsourced statements and double entries contained in the report.[185] Serbian sources quote 1,192 civilians dead or missing.[186] The ICTY prosecutors set the civilian deaths to 324.[187]
Although it was very difficult to determine the number of properties destroyed during or after Operation Storm since a large number of houses sustained some degree of damage since the beginning of the war,[167] Human Rights Watch estimated that more than 5,000 houses were destroyed in the area during and after the battle.[75] Out of the 122 Serbian Orthodox churches in the area, one was destroyed and 17 were damaged, but most of the damage to the churches occurred prior to the Serb retreat.[188]
As of November 2012, Croatian authorities have received 6,390 reports of crimes committed in the area during or after Operation Storm and have convicted 2,380 persons for looting, arson, murders, war crimes and other illegal acts. At the same time, 24 further trials of war crimes related to Operation Storm were in progress.[189] In 2012, Serbian authorities were investigating five cases of war crimes committed during Operation Storm.[190] The military operation also allowed Croatian authorities access to areas where a part of 144 mass graves and 1,200 individual graves were discovered as of March 2012, in which 3,809 Croatian civilians and military personnel were buried.[191]
References
- ^ "Roads Sealed as Yugoslav Unrest Mounts". The New York Times. Reuters. 19 August 1990. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
- ^ a b "The Prosecutor vs. Milan Martic - Judgement" (PDF). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 12 June 2007. Retrieved 11 August 2010.
- ^ Chuck Sudetic (2 April 1991). "Rebel Serbs Complicate Rift on Yugoslav Unity". The New York Times. Retrieved 18 January 2013.
- ^ Stephen Engelberg (3 March 1991). "Belgrade Sends Troops to Croatia Town". The New York Times. Retrieved 18 January 2013.
- ^ Chuck Sudetic (26 June 1991). "2 Yugoslav States Vote Independence To Press Demands". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 29 July 2012. Retrieved 12 December 2010.
{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|deadurl=
ignored (|url-status=
suggested) (help) - ^ Chuck Sudetic (29 June 1991). "Conflict in Yugoslavia; 2 Yugoslav States Agree to Suspend Secession Process". The New York Times. Retrieved 12 December 2010.
- ^ Croatian Parliament (8 October 1991). "Odluka [Klasa: 021-03/91-05/07]". Narodne novine (in Croatian) (53/1991). Retrieved 12 July 2012.
- ^ U.S. Department of State (31 January 1994). "CROATIA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993; Section 2, part d". Retrieved 28 December 2012.
- ^ "SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, Section J, Points 147 and 150". United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights. 31 January 1994. Retrieved 28 December 2012.
- ^ EECIS 1999, pp. 272–278
- ^ Christopher Bellamy (10 October 1992). "Croatia built 'web of contacts' to evade weapons embargo". The Independent. Retrieved 28 December 2012.
- ^ Alan Cowell (24 September 1991). "Serbs and Croats: Seeing War in Different Prisms". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 December 2012.
- ^ Bjelajac & Žunec 2009, pp. 249–250
- ^ Chuck Sudetic (18 November 1991). "Croats Concede Danube Town's Loss". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 December 2012.
- ^ a b Chuck Sudetic (3 January 1992). "Yugoslav Factions Agree to U.N. Plan to Halt Civil War". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 December 2010.
- ^ Carol J. Williams (29 January 1992). "Roadblock Stalls U.N.'s Yugoslavia Deployment". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 28 December 2010.
- ^ Thompson 2012, p. 417
- ^ Michael T. Kaufman (15 July 1992). "The Walls and the Will of Dubrovnik". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 December 2012.
- ^ Chuck Sudetic (24 January 1993). "Croats Battle Serbs for a Key Bridge Near the Adriatic". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 December 2012.
- ^ "SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, Section K, Point 161". United Nations Economic and Social Council. Retrieved 28 December 2012.
- ^ "Rebel Serbs List 50 Croatia Sites They May Raid". New York Times. 13 September 1993. Retrieved 14 October 2011.
- ^ Peter Maass (16 July 1992). "Serb Artillery Hits Refugees – At Least 8 Die As Shells Hit Packed Stadium". The Seattle Times. Retrieved 23 December 2010.
- ^ Raymond Bonner (17 August 1995). "Dubrovnik Finds Hint of Deja Vu in Serbian Artillery". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 December 2010.
- ^ Emma Daly; Andrew Marshall (27 November 1994). "Bihac fears massacre". The Independent. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
- ^ Halberstam 2003, pp. 284–286
- ^ Hodge 2006, p. 104
- ^ a b c Vlado Vurušić (9 December 2007). "Krešimir Ćosić: Amerikanci nam nisu dali da branimo Bihać". Jutarnji list (in Croatian). Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ Dunigan 2011, pp. 93–94
- ^ Avant 2005, p. 104
- ^ Ankica Barbir-Mladinović (20 August 2010). "Tvrdnje da je MPRI pomagao pripremu 'Oluje' izmišljene" (in Croatian). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved 3 January 2013.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ Bono 2003, p. 107
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 439
- ^ Woodward 2010, p. 432
- ^ a b Armatta 2010, pp. 201–204
- ^ Ahrens 2007, pp. 160–166
- ^ Galbraith 2006, p. 126
- ^ Bideleux & Jeffries 2007, p. 205
- ^ Roger Cohen (2 May 1995). "Croatia hits area rebel Serbs hold, crossing U.N. lines". The New York Times. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
- ^ a b c Goldstein 1999, pp. 252–253
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 456
- ^ Stephen Kinzer (15 July 1995). "Frustrated Croats Are Openly Preparing a Major Assault on a Serbian Enclave". The New York Times. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
- ^ a b Bjelajac & Žunec 2009, p. 254
- ^ Raymond Bonner (31 July 1995). "Croats Confident As Battle Looms Over Serbian Area". The New York Times. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
- ^ Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, pp. 364–366
- ^ Burg & Shoup 2000, p. 348
- ^ Ahrens 2007, pp. 171–173
- ^ Ivo Pukanić (3 April 2005). "Otkrivena tajna brijunskih vrpci" (in Croatian). Nacional (weekly). Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ a b Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, p. 367
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 59
- ^ a b Marijan 2007, pp. 67–69
- ^ a b c d Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, pp. 369–370
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 67
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 76
- ^ a b Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, p. 369
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 81–82
- ^ a b c Marijan 2007, pp. 90–92
- ^ a b c d e Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, pp. 368–369
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 100–101
- ^ Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, p. 368
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 115
- ^ Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, pp. 367–368
- ^ Henriksen 2007, p. 104
- ^ a b Thomas 2006, p. 55
- ^ Zvonko Alač (5 August 2011). "Oluja: 16 godina od hrvatskog rušenja Velike" (in Croatian). Index.hr.
{{cite web}}
:|access-date=
requires|url=
(help); Missing or empty|url=
(help); Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 37–38
- ^ a b c Marijan 2007, pp. 67–116
- ^ Sekulić 2000, p. 262
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 451
- ^ Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, pp. 372–374
- ^ Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, p. 370
- ^ "United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation". United Nations. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 129
- ^ Sekulić 2000, p. 173
- ^ a b Marijan 2007, pp. 70–72
- ^ a b c d e f g "Croatia: impunity for abuses committed during "Operation Storm" and the denial of the right of refugees to return to the Krajina". Human Rights Watch. 1996. Retrieved 31 December 2012.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|month=
ignored (help) - ^ Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, p. 371
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 76–77
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 82–84
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 92–93
- ^ a b c Marijan 2007, pp. 101–103
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 116–117
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 72–73
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 84–85
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 93–95
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 103–105
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 117
- ^ Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, pp. 372–373
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 73
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 77–78
- ^ Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, p. 372
- ^ a b Marijan 2007, pp. 86–87
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 96
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 95–96
- ^ a b c Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, pp. 373–374
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 105–106
- ^ a b c Marijan 2007, p. 111
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 117–118
- ^ a b Marijan 2007, p. 74
- ^ a b Marijan 2007, p. 78
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 87–88
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 96–97
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 106–107
- ^ "Dan pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti - godišnjica oslobađanja Knina" (in Croatian). Croatian Radiotelevision. Retrieved 16 January 2013.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, p. 374
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 97
- ^ a b Marijan 2007, p. 107
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 111–112
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 98
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 108–109
- ^ a b c d Marijan 2007, pp. 119–121
- ^ "NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia". NATO. 4 July 1997. Retrieved 31 December 2012.
- ^ Mueller 2000, notes 77 & 81
- ^ a b c d e f "Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1009 (1995)" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 23 August 1995. p. 6. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 128
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 124–126
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 127
- ^ a b Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, p. 376
- ^ Marijan 2007, p. 125
- ^ Marijan 2007, pp. 125–126
- ^ Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, p. 379
- ^ Riley 2010, p. 216
- ^ Newark 2005, p. 195
- ^ a b Marijan 2007, p. 137
- ^ Nation 2003, p. 190
- ^ Sadkovich 1998, p. 222
- ^ a b c d e Balkan Battlegrounds 2002, pp. 374–377
- ^ Raymond Bonner (4 August 1995). "Croatian Army Begins Attack on Rebel Serbs". The New York Times. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
- ^ a b Dunigan 2011, p. 94
- ^ Daalder 2000, p. 173
- ^ a b Marijan 2007, p. 134
- ^ Kevin Fedarko (11 September 1995). "NATO and the Balkans: Louder than words". Time (magazine). Retrieved 9 September 2010.
- ^ Ramet & Matić 2007, p. 46
- ^ Chris Hedges (12 November 1995). "Serbs in Croatia resolve key issue by giving up land". The New York Times. Retrieved 14 January 2013.
- ^ Ahrens 2007, p. 173
- ^ a b c Ahrens 2007, pp. 176–179
- ^ a b Sadkovich 1998, p. 137
- ^ Kevin Fedarko (14 August 1995). "The Guns of August". Time (magazine). Retrieved 18 May 2008.
- ^ Holbrooke 1999, p. 73
- ^ Riley 2010, pp. 214–215
- ^ Michael Sheridan (5 August 1995). "Serbia demands international action". The Independent. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
- ^ Michael Sheridan (6 August 1995). "Fanatics turn on Milosevic". The Independent. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
- ^ Emma Daly (9 August 1995). "Bosnian Serb leader accuses Milosevic of treason". The Independent. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
- ^ "Odluka o ustanovljenju medalja za sudjelovanje u vojno-redarstvenim operacijama i u iznimnim pothvatima (NN 060/1995)" (in Croatian). Government of Croatia. 7 August 1995. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ Tanner 2001, p. 298
- ^ "Govori Predsjednika Tuđmana u Vlaku slobode" (in Croatian). Office of the President of Croatia. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ "Oblio me znoj kad je Tuđman rekao Srbima da se ne vraćaju". Nacional (weekly) (in Croatian). 17 May 2005. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ "17th anniversary of Operation Storm marked". B92. 4 August 2012. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
- ^ "Dan pobjede i 17. obljetnica Oluje" (in Croatian). Croatian Radiotelevision. 5 August 2012. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ "У Цркви светог Марка служен парастос убијенима у Олуји". Politika (in Serbian Cyrillic). Tanjug. 4 August 2010. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help)CS1 maint: unrecognized language (link) - ^ Prodger, Matt (5 August 2005). "Evicted Serbs remember Storm". BBC News. Retrieved 20 May 2010.
- ^ "U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 2001 - Croatia". United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 20 June 2001. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
- ^ Patrick Moore (15 August 1995). ""Sinister" development in Banja Luka exodus". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved 5 July 2013.
- ^ Narodne novine (in Croatian). 7 July 1998 http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1998_07_92_1248.html. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
{{cite journal}}
: Missing or empty|title=
(help); Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ Pearl & Cooper 2002, p. 224
- ^ "Ex-U.S. envoy: No ethnic cleansing in Croatia". B92. 19 April 2011. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
- ^ Sekulić 2000, p. 218
- ^ Filip Švarm (10 August 2006). "Oluja, zločin i video kamera" (in Serbian). Vreme. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ "Puhovski: Srpski tenkovi gazili su kolonu izbjeglica" (in Croatian). 24sata (Croatia). 13 February 2009. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ Raymond Bonner (13 August 1995). "The Serbs' Caravan of Fear". The New York Times. Retrieved 5 January 2012.
- ^ Michael Sheridan (9 August 1995). "Belgrade counts cost of ethnic dreams". The Independent. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
- ^ Thomas 1999, p. 239
- ^ Goldman 1997, p. 372
- ^ van Selm 2000, pp. 4–5
- ^ Markotich 1996, p. 125
- ^ Jonathan Steele (14 June 1999). "Break the cycle of abuse". The Guardian. Retrieved 6 January 2013.
- ^ "Serb refugees flex muscle in Bosnia". The Baltimore Sun. 13 August 1995. Retrieved 6 January 2013.
- ^ a b Biondich 2004, p. 438
- ^ a b Leutloff-Grandits 2006, pp. 3–4
- ^ a b HRW 18-7 2006, p. 1
- ^ a b "2010 Human Rights Report: Croatia". United States Department of State. 8 April 2011. Retrieved 8 January 2012.
- ^ Jasmina Popović; Branimir Bradarić; Vesna Brnabić (19 July 2010). "Srpske izbjeglice: Ne nadamo se povratku u Hrvatsku". Večernji list (in Croatian). Retrieved 8 January 2013.
{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ a b "Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 - Croatia". Human Rights Watch. 1 January 1999. Retrieved 8 January 2013.
- ^ HRW 18-7 2006, pp. 4–8
- ^ "Zakon o općem oprostu". Narodne novine (in Croatian) (80). 1996. Retrieved 8 January 2013.
{{cite journal}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ "2012 Regional Operations Profile - South-Eastern Europe". United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved 8 January 2013.
- ^ Schabas 2006, pp. 3–4
- ^ "The prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak, Mladen Markač - Amended jointer indictment" (PDF). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 17 May 2007. Retrieved 12 January 2012.
- ^ "The prosecutor of the Tribunal against Ante Gotovina". International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 21 May 2001. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
- ^ "Janko Bobetko, 84, Is Dead; Fought to Free Croatians". The New York Times. 30 April 2003. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
- ^ Marlise Simons (12 March 2008). "War Crimes Trial Begins for Croatian General Who Worked With Americans". The New York Times. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
- ^ "Judgement Summary for Gotovina et al" (PDF). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 15 April 2011. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
- ^ "Appeals Judgement Summary for Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač". International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 16 November 2012.
{{cite web}}
:|access-date=
requires|url=
(help);|format=
requires|url=
(help); Missing or empty|url=
(help) - ^ Ian Traynor (16 November 2012). "Croatia's 'war crime' is no longer a crime after UN tribunal verdict". The Guardian. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
- ^ Dževad Sabljaković (4 August 2011). "Prijepori oko broja žrtava "Oluje"" (in Croatian). Deutsche Welle. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ "Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak, Mladen Markač - Judgement volume I of II" (PDF). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 15 April 2011. p. 30. Retrieved 14 January 2013.
- ^ "Molitva za žrtve i ubijenu pravdu" (in Serbian). Radio Television of Serbia. 18 November 2012. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ "UN war crimes court frees Croatian generals". ABC News (Australia). Agence France-Presse. 17 November 2012. Retrieved 14 January 2013.
- ^ Blaskovich 1997, p. 96
- ^ Ivanka Toma (27 November 2012). "Zbog zločina tijekom Oluje i nakon nje osuđeno 2380 osoba". Večernji list (in Croatian). Retrieved 12 January 2013.
{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ "Oluja: B92 otkriva šta se istražuje" (in Serbian). B92. 21 November 2012. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - ^ "Ministar branitelja obišao novu masovnu grobnicu: Kod Petrinje zakopano osam žrtava" (in Croatian). Index.hr. 15 March 2012. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help)
Bibliography
- Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995. Diane Publishing Company. 2003. ISBN 978-0-7567-2930-1. Retrieved 1 January 2013.
- Croatia, a Decade of Disappointment: Continuing Obstacles to the Reintegration of Serb Returnees. Human Rights Watch. 2006. Retrieved 8 January 2013.
- Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Routledge. 1999. ISBN 978-1-85743-058-5.
- Ahrens, Geert-Hinrich (2007). Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conflict and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-8557-0. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Armatta, Judith (2010). Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-4746-0. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Avant, Deborah D. (2005). The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-61535-8. Retrieved 1 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Bideleux, Robert; Jeffries, Ian (2007). The Balkans: A Post-Communist History. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-415-22962-3. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Biondich, Mark (2004). "Croatia". In Richard C. Frucht (ed.). Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-57607-800-6. Retrieved 8 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Blaskovich, Jerry (1997). Anatomy of deceit: an American physician's first-hand encounter with the realities of the war in Croatia (PDF). Dunhill Publishing. ISBN 0-935016-24-4. Retrieved 31 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Bjelajac, Mile; Žunec, Ozren (2009). "The War in Croatia, 1991–1995". In Charles W. Ingrao; Thomas Allan Emmert (eds.). Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative. Purdue University Press. ISBN 978-1-55753-533-7. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Bono, Giovanna (2003). Nato's 'Peace Enforcement' Tasks and 'Policy Communities': 1990–1999. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7546-0944-5. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Burg, Steven L.; Shoup, Paul S. (2000). The War in Bosnia Herzegovina: Ethic Conflict and International Intervention. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 978-1-56324-309-7. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Daalder, Ivo H. (2000). Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy in 1995. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-1692-1. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Dunigan, Molly (2011). Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies' Impact on Military Effectiveness. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-7459-8. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Galbraith, Peter (2006). "Negotiating peace in Croatia: a personal account of the road to Erdut". In Brad K. Blitz (ed.). War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-67773-8. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Goldman, Minton F. (1997). Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Political, Economic, and Social Challenges. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 978-1-56324-758-3. Retrieved 6 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Goldstein, Ivo (1999). Croatia: A History. C. Hurst & Co. ISBN 978-1-85065-525-1. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Halberstam, David (2003). War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7475-6301-3. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Henriksen, Dag (2007). Nato's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998–1999. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-358-1. Retrieved 14 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Hodge, Carole (2006). Britain And the Balkans: 1991 Until the Present. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-29889-6. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Holbrooke, Richard (1999). To end a war. Modern Library. ISBN 978-0-375-75360-2. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Leutloff-Grandits, Carolin (2006). Claiming Ownership in Postwar Croatia: The Dynamics of Property Relations and Ethnic Conflict in the Knin Region. LIT Verlag Münster. ISBN 978-3-8258-8049-1. Retrieved 8 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Marijan, Davor (2007). Oluja (PDF) (in Croatian). Croatian memorial-documentation center of the Homeland War of the Government of Croatia. ISBN 978-953-7439-08-8. Retrieved 30 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help); Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - Markotich, Stan (1996). "Serbian Leader Stays Ahead of the Game". In Josephine Schmidt (ed.). The OMRI Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1995: Building Democracy. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 978-1-56324-924-2. Retrieved 6 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Mueller, Karl (2000). "The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses". In Robert C. Owen (ed.). Deliberate force a case study in effective air campaigning. Air University Press. ISBN 1585660760, 9781585660766. Retrieved 26 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Check|isbn=
value: invalid character (help); Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Nation, R. Craig (2003). War in the Balkans, 1991–2002. Strategic Studies Institute. ISBN 978-1-58487-134-7. Retrieved 13 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Newark, Tim (2005). Turning the Tide of War: 50 Battles That Changed the Course of Modern History. Hamlyn (publishers). ISBN 978-0-681-33787-9. Retrieved 14 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Pearl, Daniel; Cooper, Helene (2002). At Home in the World: Collected Writings from The Wall Street Journal. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-7432-4317-9. Retrieved 31 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building And Legitimation, 1918–2006. Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-34656-8. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Ramet, Sabrina P.; Matić, Davorka (2007). Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education & Media. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 978-1-58544-587-5. Retrieved 13 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Riley, Jonathon (2010). Decisive Battles: From Yorktown to Operation Desert Storm. Continuum International Publishing Group. ISBN 978-1-84725-250-0. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Sadkovich, James J. (1998). The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia: 1991–1995. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-275-95046-0. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Schabas, William A. (2006). The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-84657-8. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Sekulić, Milisav (2000). Knin je pao u Beogradu (in Serbian). Nidda Verlag. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help); Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help) - van Selm, Joanne (2000). Kosovo's Refugees in the European Union. Continuum International Publishing Group. ISBN 978-1-85567-641-1. Retrieved 6 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Tanner, Marcus (2001). Croatia: A Nation Forged in War. Yale Nota Bene. ISBN 978-0-300-09125-0. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Thompson, Wayne C. (2012). Nordic, Central & Southeastern Europe 2012. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1-61048-891-4. Retrieved 28 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Thomas, Nigel (2006). The Yugoslav Wars (1): Slovenia & Croatia 1991–95. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-963-9. Retrieved 14 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Thomas, Robert (1999). Serbia Under Milošević: Politics in the 1990s. C. Hurst & Co. ISBN 978-1-85065-367-7. Retrieved 6 January 2013.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Woodward, Susan L. (2010). "The Security Council and the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia". In Vaughan Lowe; Adam Roberts; Jennifer Welsh; Dominik Zaum (eds.). The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-161493-4. Retrieved 29 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help)
External links
- An analysis of Operation Storm and TV footage of the operation, Croatian Radiotelevision, 5 August 2011 Template:Hr icon