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|commander1=[[David Elazar]] <br>[[Shmuel Gonen]] <br>[[Avraham Adan]] |
|commander1=[[David Elazar]] <br>[[Shmuel Gonen]] <br>[[Avraham Adan]] |
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|commander2=[[Saad El Shazly]]<br>[[Saad Mamoun]]<br>[[Abdel Muneim Wassel]] |
|commander2=[[Saad El Shazly]]<br>[[Saad Mamoun]]<br>[[Abdel Muneim Wassel]] |
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|strength1= |
|strength1=280-300 tanks (3 brigades)<br />436 soldiers (Bar Lev Line)<br />1 infantry brigade (eastern Sinai)<ref name=herzog243>Herzog and Gazit (2005), p. 243</ref> |
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|strength2=32,000<ref>Shazly p.229</ref> |
|strength2=32,000<ref>Shazly p.229</ref> |
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|casualties1=300 tanks destroyed<br /> ~3,500 killed/wounded<br /> 200+ captured<ref>Goerge Gawrych [http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt3.pdf The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory] p.36</ref> |
|casualties1=280-300 tanks destroyed (nearly all)<br /> ~3,500 killed/wounded<br /> 200+ captured<ref>Goerge Gawrych [http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt3.pdf The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory] p.36</ref><ref name=herzog243/> |
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|casualties2=280 killed<br /> 20 tanks destroyed<ref>Saad El Shzly ''The Crossing of the Suez'' p.233</ref> |
|casualties2=280 killed<br /> 20 tanks destroyed<ref>Saad El Shzly ''The Crossing of the Suez'' p.233</ref> |
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==Bibliography== |
==Bibliography== |
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*{{Cite book |
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| publisher = Vintage |
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| isbn = 1400079632 |
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| pages = 560 |
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| last = Herzog |
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| first = Chaim |
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| coauthors = Shlomo Gazit |
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| title = The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East |
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| date = 2005-07-12 |
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}} |
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*{{Cite book| edition = Revised| publisher = American Mideast Research| isbn = 0960456228| pages = 368| last = Shazly| first = Lieutenant General Saad el| title = The Crossing of the Suez, Revised Edition| date = 2003}} |
*{{Cite book| edition = Revised| publisher = American Mideast Research| isbn = 0960456228| pages = 368| last = Shazly| first = Lieutenant General Saad el| title = The Crossing of the Suez, Revised Edition| date = 2003}} |
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Revision as of 07:27, 14 February 2009
Operation Badr (1973) | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Israel | Egypt | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
David Elazar Shmuel Gonen Avraham Adan |
Saad El Shazly Saad Mamoun Abdel Muneim Wassel | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
280-300 tanks (3 brigades) 436 soldiers (Bar Lev Line) 1 infantry brigade (eastern Sinai)[1] | 32,000[2] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
280-300 tanks destroyed (nearly all) ~3,500 killed/wounded 200+ captured[3][1] |
280 killed 20 tanks destroyed[4] |
Operation Badr was the code name for the Egyptian military operation (October 6, 1973) to cross the Suez Canal and seize the Bar-Lev Line at the start of the Yom Kippur War. It is also known in Egypt as The Crossing (العبور). That term is translated from the word which means "The Crossovering" in Arabic, that was particularly used to indicate the highlight of the Yom Kippur war surprise attack that was initiated by the frontline infantry in contrast to the expected routine airborne start.
Prologue
At the end of the Six Day War, Israel occupied the entire Sinai peninsula upto the Suez Canal. The Egyptian military was severely mauled by the war, losing most of its airforces and much equipment. Reconstruction of the Egyptian Armed Forces following the disastrous Six Day War began only weeks later with much needed Soviet assistance.
By September 1968, the ground forces had sufficiently recovered to challenge Israeli presence east of the canal. The War of Attrition had started that year. It began in the form of artillery barrages along with commando operations that carried out ambushes and raids against military installations and targets in Sinai. The Israelis countered these initial successes by means of deep heli-borne raids deep into Egypt. Egypt was forced to call off its attacks on October 30 after the damage that had been done to the country's infrastructure.
The war resumed five months later. Egyptian artillery caused severe casualties along the entire canal line, and the Israeli Air Force retialated with airstrikes in the canal zone and deep into Egypt. In January 1970, Nasser went to the Soviet Union requesting help. In reply, eighty Mig-21 fighters and SAM battallions with their pilots and ground crews began arriving through February and March, with the mission to protect Egypt's interior only. They became operational in April, and soon their presence was announced. The Israelis finally ceased their deep penetration raids. This gave the Egyptians the oportunity to rebuild their air defences, and Israeli aircraft losses mounted from June 30 to the end of July, when a ceasefire was finally imposed. Nasser died in September that year. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat.
The new Egyptian President's regime was quite unstable and threatened by student demonstrations and political opponents. Sadat's administration were unable to carry out economic reforms that were necessary to Egypt's survival, and there was widespread public dissapointment at Egypt's inablilty to regain Sinai three years after the Six Day War. Sadat repeadetly threatened Israel with war throughout 1972 and 1973, but his threats were ignored. President Sadat hoped to achieve even a limited victory to jump-start diplomatic efforts and regain the Sinai. His Soviet advisors thought otherwise and argued that it would take many days of fighting and a 50% casualty rate for Egypt to capture the canal, but he decided to proceed anyway.
Preparations for War
Background
The Egyptian Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Saad El Shazly, was responsible for contructing the plan for the Egyptian attack. Annual excercises were held in Egypt starting in 1968 simulating an assault across the canal. The excercises were an entirely unrealistic simulation in light of Egypt's weakened military capabilities after the Six Day War. Yet with each each passing year, as the reconstruction of the Egyptian military continued, the excercises became more realistic and their planning more in accordance with the army's capabilities. The excercises represented the first step in preparations for the assault in 1973.[5]
When Shazly assumed the position of Chief of Staff on May 16, 1971, there was as yet no offensive plan into Sinai. All that existed was a defensive plan code-named Operation 200, as well as a more aggressive Operation Granite. Although Granite incorporated raids and assaults into Sinai, it was far from being an offensive plan. Shazly began assessing the capabilities of the Egyptian military prior to formulating an offensive plan.[5]
He concluded that the air force was the military's weakest arm. It had been destroyed almost completely on the ground in 1967, and although very few pilots had been killed, their morale was all but destroyed. The pilots were less experienced than their Israeli counterparts, and their fighters had a smaller payload and shorter range. To cover up for this weakness, the military's air defenses were improved. After the War of Attrition, an increased number of SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 SAM systems were obtained. The army had a total of 800,000 men, but nearly 500,000 of this total was used to provide protection for the country's vast infrastructure in anticipation of Israeli commando raids as in the War of Attrition; possible targets included hundreds of bridges spanning the Nile, installations in the Nile Delta and throughout the Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts, irrigation systems and canals, power plants and insustrial areas, etc... This left 300,000 men available for deployment as field troops.[6]
Planning and preparations
To improve the air force, pilot training was intesified after the War of Attrition, and each airbase was defended with a ring of SAM batteries. The fighter aircraft, especially the older MiG-17, were upgraded with more modern electronic equipment. Furthermore, around 500 concrete shelters were built to prevent the air force from being destroyed on the ground again. Air defence of the canal was improved, and gradually Egyptian personnel replaced Soviet ones manning the SAM batteries, radar installations and electronic jamming equipment. This air defense would provide cover for the assaulting Egyptian troops. Replacing their losses in the Six Day War, the Egyptian army received T-55 and T-62 tanks to replace their obsolete T-34s from 1970 to the beginning of the war.[7] However, in open ground, only the T-62 could effectively counter the Israeli M60 Patton and Centurion tanks in terms of armor and armament.[8]
Shazly began in July 1971, in conjunction with the then Minister of War, General Mohammed Ahmad Sadek, to develop two offensive plans. The first was Operation 41, and it involved an offensive along the entire Suez Canal, with the objective of siezing the key passes of the Sinai, 55-70 km from the Suez Canal. The plan would be developed in full cooperation with the Soviet advisors. As it was, the objectives of the operation was outside the capabilites of the Egyptian military. It's only virtue was that it would force the Soviets to supply more arms and equipments. The plan would be presented to the Syrians to encourage their cooperation in an attack against Israel. Operation 41 was completed by September 1971, and the following month, Sadat flew with Sadek to Moscow to conclude Egypt's largest arm's deal yet, receiving 100 MiG-21 fighters, 10 TU-16 bombers, SA-6 AA missilies and heavy artillery. Operation 41 was later renamed Granite Two.[9]
The second plan was codenamed the High Minarets, and it called for an assault across the canal along five crossing points at a depth of 10-15 km, after which troops would dig in and assume defensive positions. By making only a limited advance meant, Egyptian troops would remain within range of their own SAM defences, negating the Israeli advantage in the air. In this way the High Minarets was planned in accordnace with the capabilities of the Egyptian Army. The plan's outline was complete by Semptember 1971 in absolute secrecy.[10]
In October 1972, Sadek was replaced as War Minister by General Ahmed Ismail. The High Minarets continued to be developed as the only viable offensive plan available, and the spring of 1973 was chosen as a possible date for an assault. Based on intelligence estimates, the main Israeli counterattacks by three armored brigades would come 6-8 hours after the assault began, while the assault infantry would not expect armor support of their own for 12 or more hours. To deal with this, the assault force would be supplied with large numbers of ATGM and RPG weapons. They would advance a limted distance of 6 km and establish bridgeheads 5 km wide to defeat enemy counterattacks. Initially, the attack would receive supporting fire from several sand ramparts built west of the canal.[11] Once friendly armor arrived and the artillery in the Bar Lev line neutralised, SAM units west of the canal would be moved closer to the canal and the Egyptian forces would expand their bridgeheads 15 km. Additionaly airborne and seaborne forces would conduct attacks and ambushes to delay Israeli reserves heading for the Bar Lev line, creating confusion and inflicting as many casualties as possible.[12]
Egyptian engineers had several daunting tasks, crucial to the success of the entire operation. They had to open 70 passages along the entire canal in the sand rampart on the east bank. They must also build 35 ferries, 10 heavy bridges, 5 light bridges, and 10 pontoon bridges. The passages must be opened in 5 to 7 hours, immediately followed by the ferries, then the bridges 2 hours later. All this would occur under enemy fire and airstrikes.[13]
As it happened, no offensive was ever carried out in early 1973. By September 1973 however, war became a certainty. At the request of Ahmed Ismail, Sadat produced a presidential directive for war. Therefore it was only in September, less than a month before the attack, that the date October 6 was finally selected as D-Day. That day would coincide with the tenth of Ramadan. It was in this month that the Muslims won their first victory at the Battle of Badr in the year 634. Opting for something more inspirational the High Minarets as a name, Operation Badr was chosen as the assault's codename.[14]
Israeli defences
The Israelis had constructed a massive line of fortifications along the canal called the Bar Lev Line, which was considered impregnable. The main obstacle of these defences were massive artificial sand banks, 18 m high with a 45-60 degree incline, along the entire Suez Canal. The ramparts were reinforced by concrete, which prevented any attempt by amphibious vehicles to climb the sand wall. Behind this rampart were a series of 35 fortifications. The Israelis had calculated that blasting through the sand barriers would take several hours. The Israelis' back-up plan had been to redirect the nearby oil pipeline into the canal and set it alight.
Egyptian attack
Egypt, in cooperation with Syria, launched the attack on October 6, 1973. The attack began with a major air strike at 1400 hours by 220 Egyptian aircraft against three airbases, ten Hawk SAM batteries, three command centers, artillery positions and several radar stations. The airstrike was coupled with a barrage at 1405 hours from nearly 2,000 artillery pieces, against the Bar-Lev line fortifications, armor concentration areas and artillery positions.[15][16]
At the same time the artillery barrage commenced, the first wave of Egyptian assault infantry, 4,000 men, started to move across the canal in 720 dinghies, crying "Allahu Akbar...Allahu Akbar..." (God is Great)[17]. The wave landed on the opposite bank at 1430, and immediately began to scale the embankment using rope ladders. Once over the embankment they proceeded to assault Israeli fortifications. The assault infantry were armed with anti-tank weapons to counter the threat of Israeli armor until Egyptian tanks crossed the canal. At this time Egyptian aircraft involved in the airstrike had returned, having hit the majority of their targets while losing only 5 aircraft[18]
Behind the initial defensive line the Israelis had a large armoured reserve. These were immediately dispatched to take up positions on prepared ramparts and tank firing postions to support the defenses and to fire upon the approaching Egyptian troops. The first wave included a large number of Sai'qa (literally: lightening infantry). These were commandoes who bypassed the fortifications and proceeded to hamper the advance of Israeli armor, they went on to prepare ambushes against Israeli tanks as they occupied their positions, sometimes arriving before the tanks and mining the ramparts they were to occupy. The commandoes were armed with RPG-7 rockets and RPG-43 grenades, as well as the less numerous but deadly AT-3 Sagger missiles. Air support for the tanks was ineffective due to the Egyptian SAM batteries on the west bank of the canal. The tanks took heavy losses from Egyptian infantry, and from Egyptian tanks positioned on the embankment on the west bank of the canal. Of the 360 tanks stationed at Bar-Lev, 300 were destroyed. [19][20]
At 1500 hours, two more waves of troops had landed, and Egyptian infantry captured the first enemy fortification, the Purkan Strongpoint, near Qantara, and a second strongpoint fell by 1525. Most of the Bar-Lev line was destroyed by 1730, by which time 14 fortifications had been captured and a total of 32,000 troops had crossed the canal.[21][22]
In the assault only 280 Egyptians lost their lives, while most of the Israeli garrison at Bar-Lev was killed or wounded, with 200 men captured.[23] In subsequent days some of the defenders managed to break though Egyptian forces and return to their lines, or were extracted by Israeli forces in counterattacks that came later on.
Aftermath
Operation Badr was the opening battle of the Yom Kippur War in the Sinai, and the first major Arab victory against the Israelis in years.
Subsequently Israeli forces managed to perform their own countercrossing, striking a seam between two Egyptian armies and cuting off the supply lines of the Egyptian Third Army.
A UNSC cease-fire was eventually negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union and implemented to end the Yom Kippur War.
Some of President Sadat's aims were achieved, although in some unexpected ways. Egypt's initial surprise attack and perceived victory domestically, reinforced President Sadat's leadership position in Egypt. For the rest of his life he was referred to as "The Hero of the Crossing," and this status helped his regime stay in power until his assassination in 1981, on the eighth anniversary of the attack.
Eventually Anwar El Sadat went on to be the first Arab leader to visit Israel officially in 1977. Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, and a comprehensive peace treaty in 1979, which among other things saw the Sinai peninsula's return to Egypt, Egypt's official recognition of the State of Israel, its commitment to live in peace with the Jewish state, and establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt.
References
- ^ a b Herzog and Gazit (2005), p. 243
- ^ Shazly p.229
- ^ Goerge Gawrych The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory p.36
- ^ Saad El Shzly The Crossing of the Suez p.233
- ^ a b Shazly p.17-18
- ^ Shazly p.18-23
- ^ Shazly p.137, 156
- ^ Shazly p.236
- ^ Shazly p.28-29, 36-37
- ^ Shazly p.29, 109-118
- ^ Shazly p.189
- ^ Shazly p.31-33
- ^ Shazly p.53
- ^ Shazly p.38-39
- ^ El-Gammasy The October War p.206
- ^ Shazly p.222
- ^ Shazly p.223
- ^ Shazly p.226-227
- ^ Saad El Shzly The Crossing of the Suez p.223, 233
- ^ Hassan El-Badri The Ramadan War, 1973 p.78
- ^ Shazly p.227,229
- ^ Hassan El-Badri The Ramadan War, 1972 p.63
- ^ Goerge Gawrych The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory p.36
Bibliography
- Herzog, Chaim (2005-07-12). The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. Vintage. p. 560. ISBN 1400079632.
{{cite book}}
: Unknown parameter|coauthors=
ignored (|author=
suggested) (help) - Shazly, Lieutenant General Saad el (2003). The Crossing of the Suez, Revised Edition (Revised ed.). American Mideast Research. p. 368. ISBN 0960456228.