Operation Badr (1973) | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Yom Kippur War/October War | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Israel | Egypt | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
David Elazar Shmuel Gonen Albert Mandler Abraham Adan Ariel Sharon |
Ahmed Ismail Ali Saad El Shazly Saad Mamoun Abdul Munim Wassel | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
October 6: 300–360 tanks (1 Division) 8,000 infantry (460–600 in Bar Lev Line)[1][2][3][4] October 8: 3 Divisions 640 tanks |
October 6: 32,000 infantry[5] 1:00am, October 7: 200 tanks[6] October 8: 5 divisions 90,000 infantry, 980 tanks[7] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
400 tanks destroyed ~3,500 killed or wounded 200+ captured[1][8] |
280 killed 20 tanks destroyed[9] (October 6-7) |
Operation Badr | |
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Operational scope | Strategic |
Planned by | Egyptian General Headquarters |
Objective | Cross Suez Canal, destroy Bar Lev Line, establish bridgeheads, repel Israeli counteroffensives. |
Executed by | 18th, 2nd and 16th Infantry Divisions of the Second Army. 7th and 19th Infantry Divisions of the Third Army. |
Outcome | Tactical surprise achieved, all objectives accomplished |
Operation Badr (Arabic: عملية بدر; ʻAmaliyat Badr) or Plan Badr (خطة بدر; Khitat Badr) was the code name for the Egyptian military operation to cross the Suez Canal and seize the Bar-Lev Line of Israeli fortifications on October 6, 1973. Launched in conjunction with a Syrian assault on the Golan Heights, this attack marked the start of the Yom Kippur War.
Operation Badr was preceded by training exercises starting in 1968, operational planning from 1971 onwards and a deception operation. In the opening stages of the attack, known as The Crossing (العبور), combat engineers used water cannons to rapidly clear numerous passages through the sand wall lining the east bank of the canal, laid bridges and operated ferries, allowing armor to cross. Egyptian infantry assaulted the Bar-Lev fortifications and were counterattacked by Israeli armor and infantry.
The attack surprised the Israelis, and by October 7 the crossing was complete, and the east bank of the canal was occupied by five Egyptian infantry divisions. The infantry proceeded to establish defensive positions in bridgeheads spanning the 160 kilometer front. Following a lull in the fighting on October 7, Israeli armor reserves arrived at the front and launched a counterattack on Egyptian forces positioned opposite the city of Ismailia. The Egyptian forces were successful in employing anti-tank weapons to repel the Israeli armor and advanced once more. By the end of October 8, Egyptian forces occupied a strip of territory along the entire east bank of the canal to a depth of approximately 15 kilometers.
In addition to the canal crossing, Egypt laid a successful naval blockade against Israel in the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea.
Prelude: 1967–1970
At the end of the Six Day War, Israel held the entire Sinai peninsula, with the exception of Port Fouad. Israel's victory in the Six Day War brought about a sense of security within Israel; the occupied territory added strategic depth to the country's defense. Consequently, Israel ignored United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242, which called for withdrawal from occupied territories in return for Arab recognition, and negotiations between the countries ceased. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir aimed to maintain the status quo and believed that her country's military strength would secure peace with Arab nations on their terms.[10]
The 1967 war severely depleted Egypt's military strength, as most of their air force and a large quantity of equipment had been destroyed. Soviet assistance helped the Egyptian military to start the rebuilding of their armed forces shortly after the war,[11] and by September 1968 Egyptian ground forces had sufficiently recovered to challenge the Israeli presence east of the Suez canal. The War of Attrition began with Egyptian artillery barrages and commando raids into the Sinai, which were countered by deep-striking Israeli airstrikes and heli-borne raids into Egypt.[12] Egypt was incapable of challenging Israeli air superiority, leading Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to travel to the Soviet Union in January 1970 to request direct assistance. In response, eighty Soviet-operated MiG-21 fighters and SAM battalions arrived in February and March to protect parts of Egypt's interior. The Soviet presence deterred the Israelis from launching their deep penetration raids, allowing the Egyptians time to rebuild their air defenses. The defensive upgrades inflicted increased Israeli air losses, leading to an August 1970 ceasefire that lasted until 1973.[13] Nasser died in September 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat.
Egyptian strategy
President Sadat believed that Egypt's economic, political, and military problems were a result of the Six Day War. He believed the solution to these problems lay with erasing the humiliation of the 1967 defeat, thereby rebuilding Egypt's self-confidence and regaining the international community's respect, and that the recapture of the Sinai would achieve this. In 1971 Sadat began the coordinated political and military groundwork to recover the Sinai. This began in February 1971, when he proposed that if Israel withdrew its forces to the Mitla and Giddi Passes 55–70 kilometres (34–43 mi) from the Suez Canal, Egypt would reopen the waterway, reestablish relations with the United States, and sign a peace agreement with its Jewish neighbor if it fulfilled the provisions of UNSCR 242 by withdrawing from all territories occupied in 1967 and resolving the Palestinian refugee problem. Israel insisted on direct negotiations and retaining territories deemed necessary for its security, causing diplomatic efforts to reach a deadlock.[10]
To fulfill the second part of his strategy, Sadat sought to improve Egypt's military capabilities, and in March began the first of four trips to the Soviet Union to obtain arms and munitions to cover those expended in the War of Attrition. He publicly stated his desire to go to war and marked 1971 the "year of decision". However, the Soviets failed to deliver the promised supplies, and Sadat concluded that Egypt's military capabilities were insufficient for an offensive against Israel. As 1971 saw no changes to the military situation, Sadat's threats were dismissed as hollow Arab rhetoric. In addition to their already weak political position, Arab leaders reached a consensus in 1972 that a diplomatic solution to the conflict with Israel was hopeless. American mediation steadily declined, ceasing entirely by mid-1973.[10]
By 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union were focused on détente. The Arabs were worried, as it meant their military situation vis-à-vis Israel would remain at a disadvantage. Both superpowers favored "military relaxation" in the Middle East; the Egyptians viewed this as giving in to Israel. Consequently Sadat, believing that diplomoatic avenues had been exhausted, decided that decisive military action was necessary. A renewed conflict with Israel would disrupt Soviet-American détente, force superpower intervention and push Israel, the U.S. and the USSR out of their reluctance to talk. The war could thus utilized to restart peace negotiations and recover the Sinai Peninsula.[10][14]
A number of Egyptian commanders wanted to carry out a general war to regain at least a significant part of the Sinai. This view was notably pushed by the Minister of War, General Mohammed Ahmed Sadek, who believed that a limited offensive would not achieve anything. There was one major obstacle however, which was made clear in a meeting involving senior military commanders in January 1971 before any offensive plans had been developed. Sadek stressed that the Egyptian Armed Forces, especially the Air Force, would not have the ability to carry out a land reclamation war for another five to ten years. Sadek cited studies conducted by the army in his advocacy for direct land reclamation. These analyses predicted a casualty estimate of 17,000 men in crossing the Suez Canal alone. Soviet estimates were even more pessimistic, estimating four days of heavy fighting and 35,000 casualties would be sustained in an attempt to cross the canal and capture Israeli defenses. In such a bloody war, Sadek emphasized, the strategic benefit of the seizure of a strip of territory across the canal would not compensate the loss of manpower, so so such an operation would be useless unless was followed by the recapture of all of the Sinai.[14]
For political reasons, Sadat dismissed Sadek's arguments. The government's political position was perilous as the Egyptian public, angered by the "No War, No Peace" situation with Israel, demanded action. The economy, already suffering from the loss of the Suez Canal revenues and the Sinai oil fields, could not cope with the country being on a war footing for an extended period. War was a desperate option, and a limited offensive under the current circumstances was the only solution.[15]
At a session of the Arab League's Joint Defence Council on January 27–30, 1973, Egypt presented a report laying out the strategy for a future war against Israel. The report stressed that an attack against Israel would have to be carried out simultaneously from Egypt, Syria and Jordan because of the Israeli air superiority. According to the report, Egypt and Syria's air forces, if combined with 16 reinforcing air squadrons from other Arab countries, were capable of carrying out 1793 sorties a day and dropping 2265 tons (5 million lb) of munitions upon the enemy. The Israeli Air Force was capable of 1360 sorties delivering 2880 tons (6.35 million lb) of bombs upon the enemy in a single day. The Arab numerical advantage was offset by Israeli superiority in training, avionics, aircraft payload and weaponry, such as the American AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles. A simultaneous Arab attack could dilute the effectiveness of the Israeli Air Force, and would force Israeli ground forces to fight a two-front war.[16]
During that month, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad indicated his intentions of going to war against Israel. After weeks of negotiations, Egypt and Syria agreed to coordinate military action, and the respective Ministers of War formulated a common military strategy. Egypt enlisted the political support of several more Arab countries, who also supplied oil. Sadat also discussed the possibility of using oil as an economic weapon to pressure Western governments into adopting more pro-Arab policies. During the war, oil-producing Arab nations, primarily Libya and Saudi Arabia, initiated an oil embargo, and several sent token forces to the front lines.[10][15]
Sadat bred caution into his commanders, to the point of warning his later Minister of War, Ahmed Ismail Ali, "not to lose the army as had happened in 1967."[17] On 3 June, 1971 he outlined his vision of a limited war:
I want us to plan [the offensive] within our capabilities, nothing more. Cross the canal and hold even ten centimeters of the Sinai. I'm exaggerating, of course, but that will help me greatly and alter completely the political situation internationally and within Arab ranks.[17]
Sadat's strategy was designed to achieve political success without needing a comprehensive military victory, and hence, and in view of the Egyptian military's marked inferiority to the Israeli Defense Forces, this required only a limited war.[10][17]
Preparations
Background
The Egyptian Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Saad El Shazly, was responsible for constructing an attack plan. Starting in 1968, annual exercises were held in Egypt to simulate an assault across the canal. These exercises were considered by Egyptian commanders to be entirely unrealistic simulations due to of Egypt's weakened military capabilities post-1967. With each passing year, the reconstruction of the Egyptian military progressed, so the exercises became more realistic and compared to the army's capabilities. These exercises were the first step in preparing for an assault across the canal.[18]
When Shazly became Chief of Staff on May 16, 1971, no offensive plan existed. All that existed was a defensive plan code named Operation 200, and a more aggressive alternative named Operation Granite. Although Granite incorporated raids and assaults into Sinai, it was essentially defensive. Shazly assessed the capabilities of the Egyptian military before formulating an offensive plan.[18] He concluded that the air force was the military's weakest arm. It had been almost completely destroyed on the ground in 1967, and although few pilots had been killed, their morale was extremely low. Egyptian pilots were less experienced than their Israeli counterparts, and their fighter aircraft had a smaller payload and a shorter range. The MiG-21 and MiG-19 fighter aircraft in service with Arab air forces at the time were regarded as second generation fighter aircraft, while the MiG-17, used heavily in Egypt and Syria, was a first generation. Although the Israeli Air Force had a number of first generation aircraft, the majority were second generation. The pivotal equipment advantage for the IAF was the F-4 Phantom II, a third generation fighter/bomber. By the outbreak of the war in October 1973, the IDF had 122 F-4E and 6 RF-4Es (R denotes the reconnaissance variant) in service.[19][20]
In contrast to the air force, Egypt's ground-based air defenses had proven their capabilities in the final weeks of the War of Attrition, and increased numbers of SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 surface-to-air missile systems were obtained thereafter. As for ground forces, the army had a total of 800,000 men, but nearly 500,000 were used to provide protection for the country's vast infrastructure in anticipation of Israeli commando raids as in the War of Attrition; possible targets included hundreds of bridges spanning the Nile, installations in the Nile Delta and throughout the Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts, irrigation systems and canals, power plants and industrial areas. This left 300,000 men available for front line combat duties.[21]
Planning and preparations
In an effort to improve the air force, pilot training was intensified after the War of Attrition, and a ring of SAM batteries was installed at each airbase. The fighter aircraft, especially the older MiG-17, were upgraded with more modern electronic equipment. Furthermore, around 500 concrete shelters were built to prevent the air force from being destroyed on the ground again. Air defence of the canal was improved, and Egyptian crews gradually replaced their Soviet counterparts manning the SAM batteries, radar installations and electronic jamming equipment. This air defense would provide protection against Israeli air power for the assaulting Egyptian troops. Replacing their losses in the Six Day War, the Egyptian army received T-55 and T-62 tanks, which also replaced their obsolete T-34s from 1970 onwards. However, only the T-62 could effectively counter the Israeli M60 Patton and Centurion tanks on open ground in terms of armor and armament.[7] The size of the army was significantly increased, and hundreds of new units were created. Among these were some 40 engineer battalions, who would come to play a decisive role in the crossing.[22]
Due to the restrictions created by a weaker air force, Shazly believed that only a limited war to capture the west bank of the canal was possible, while Sadek wanted to retake most of the Sinai. However, Sadek authorized the planning of two alternative offensives plan, and work began in July 1971. The first was Operation 41, which involved an offensive along the entire Suez Canal with the objective of seizing the key passes of the Sinai. The plan would be developed in full cooperation with the Soviet advisers. As it was, the objectives of the operation were outside the capabilities of the Egyptian military and Shazly saw it only as a means of inducing the Soviets to supply more arms and equipments. The plan would then be presented to the Syrians to encourage them to join the attack against Israel. Operation 41 was completed by September 1971, and the following month, Sadat and Sadek flew to Moscow to conclude Egypt's largest arms deal yet, receiving 100 MiG-21 fighters, 10 Tu-16 bombers, SA-6 anti-aircraft (AA) missiles and heavy artillery. Operation 41 was later renamed Granite Two.[23]
The second plan – codenamed the "High Minarets" – called for an assault across the canal through five separate crossing points at a depth of 10–15 kilometres (6.2–9.3 mi), after which the troops would dig in and assume defensive positions. By making only a limited advance, Egyptian ground forces would remain within range of their own SAM defences, which would provide a protective "umbrella", negating the Israeli advantage in the air. In this way the High Minarets was planned in accordance with the capabilities of the Egyptian Army. The plan's outline was completed by September 1971 in absolute secrecy.[24]
As Sadek continued to refuse the concept of a limited war, tensions between him and Sadat continued to rise. Following a heated session of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Sadat replaced Sadek with Major General Ahmed Ismail, who believed that only a limited war was possible.[15] The High Minarets continued to be developed as the only viable offensive plan, and the spring of 1973 was chosen as a possible date for an assault. Based on intelligence estimates, the main Israeli counterattacks were expected to be delivered by three armored divisions 6–8 hours after the assault began, while the Egyptian infantry would not receive armored support for 12 or more hours. To deal with this, the Egyptian attackers would be supplied with large numbers of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) and rocket propelled grenades (RPG). The portable anti-tank weapons were principally the RPG-7 and the less numerous wire-guided AT-3 Sagger. The Sagger missile was manually guided, had a long range and was quite powerful but suffered some significant drawbacks, most notably its slow velocity in flight, which allowed the target (such as a tank) to take evasive maneuver or fire upon the gunner, as well as the minimum range of 500–800 metres (1,600–2,600 ft).[25] The RPG was intended to cover the dead ground of the Sagger, and would be used along with the B-10 and B-11 recoilless rifles.[26] In addition, there were RPG-43 anti-tank grenades. To enable infantry to fight effectively at night, the Egyptian troops were equipped with night vision devices, infrared scopes, and welder's goggles to counter a tactic often used by the Israelis; mounting xenon floodlights on tanks and vehicles to immobilize enemy infantry at night. Allowing the assault infantry to carry a variety of weaponry and their ammunition – such as ATGMs, RPGs, flamethrowers, machine guns and mines – before any bridges were set up, and hence before any vehicles had crossed, was achieved by two steps. Firstly, five different field kits were developed to meet the needs of the assault infantry. It took over a year and several trials to develop the kits, which were designed to meet the particular needs of the assault infantry; they were lighter, accommodated larger water bottles and could 24 hours' food supply, and each of the field kits were uniquely designed to meet the needs of the various assault teams. The other solution was to use four-wheel wooden carts to transport equipment, weaponry and ammunition. The Egyptians used over 2,200 such carts in crossing the canal, giving them the capacity to transport 336 tons (150,000 lb) of war matériel. In addition, they developed special rope ladders with wooden steps to enable ammunition and heavy equipment, such as the B-11 recoilless rifle, to be lifted to the top of the sand wall.[27][28]
The assault infantry would advance a limited distance of five kilometers (3 mi) and establish bridgeheads eight kilometers (5 mi) wide to defeat enemy counterattacks; by decreasing a bridgehead's perimeter, its fire density could be increased. Initially, the attack would receive supporting fire from several sand ramparts built west of the canal.[29] The infantry would hold position until friendly armor and other support units had arrived, whereupon the bridgeheads would be expanded to a depth of eight kilometers. This had to be accomplished within 18 hours of the start of the operation.[30] Additionally airborne and seaborne forces would conduct attacks and ambushes to delay Israeli reserves heading for the Bar Lev line, creating confusion and inflicting as many casualties as possible.[31]
The spring of 1973 passed with no offensive being launched. On August 21 of that year, in complete secrecy, six senior Syrian commanders, using false names and passports, arrived from Latakia at Alexandria harbor in a Soviet passenger liner carrying holiday makers. Among the Syrian commanders were, principally, the Minister of Defense General Mustafa Tlass and the Chief of Staff General Yusuf Shakkour. At the harbor the Syrian officers, who were dressed in civilian outfit, were casually met by their Egyptian counterparts, also in civilian clothes; utmost precautions had been taken to keep the Syrian visit a secret.[32]
The Egyptian and Syrian commanders convened at Egyptian Naval Headquarters at Ras el Tin Palace, where meetings took place for the next two days. The discussions revolved around the readiness of the Egyptian and Syrian forces for war, as well as the date for war. By August 23, two documents were ratified by Shazly and Shakkour. The meetings concluded that the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces were ready for war. All that remained was to choose a date; either September 7–11 or October 5–10. The date for an attack was to be chosen jointly by Presidents Sadat and Hafez al-Assad, but they were required to communicate their decision to their commanders fifteen days before the date of attack.[33]
When August 27, fifteen days before September 7, passed without a reply from either Sadat or Assad, it was clear no offensive would take place in September. During August 28 and 29, Sadat met with Assad in Damascus, where they agreed to start the war in October. On September 22, Sadat informed Ismail of the decision to start war on October 6, and likewise Assad informed Tlass of the decision. The Chiefs of Staff were informed by the ministers.[34] At the request of Ahmed Ismail, Sadat produced a presidential directive for war. Therefore it was only in September, less than a month before the attack, that the date October 6 was finally selected as D-Day. In coordination with Syria, the offensive would begin at 14:00 (Cairo Local Time). October 6 was chosen for several reasons. The speed of the water current and the tide were optimal for a crossing operation, and for most of the night there was a full moon, facilitating bridge construction. The date coincided Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement. This was an important factor in choosing October 6 for an attack; Jews fast on that day, abstain from the use of fire or electricity (which meant transportation would be at a standstill), and much of the Israeli army would be demobilised. The sixth of October would also coincide with the tenth of Ramadan, which meant that Muslim soldiers would also be fasting. It was in Ramadan that the Muslims won their first victory at the Battle of Badr in the year 634. Opting for something more inspirational than the High Minarets as a name, Operation Badr was chosen by Egyptian commanders as the codename for the assault.[35][36][10]
Combat engineering
In any crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian forces, the success of the crossing was highly dependent on the performance of the Egyptian Corps of Engineers, which had several daunting tasks to accomplish. They had to clear 70 passages at the five main crossing points in the massive artificial sand barrier that ran 160 kilometres (99 mi) along the east bank of the canal (the exception was the Great Bitter Lake, where the width of the canal made a crossing unlikely). The canal was 180–220 metres (590–720 ft) wide and approximately 18 metres (59 ft) deep. To prevent erosion, the sand barrier was supported by concrete, which was one meter (3⅓ ft) above the water at high tide, and three meters (10 ft) above water at low tide. Engineers had to clear passages seven meters (23 ft) wide, which meant the removal of 1,500 cubic metres (53,000 cu ft) of sand with each passage opened. This alone was a dilemma for the Corps of Engineers. Initially, conventional methods were tested. It was found that, to clear a single passage required 60 men, 1 bulldozer, 600 lb of explosives and five to six hours, uninterrupted by enemy fire. The complications projected by such methods were clear: the crossing site would already be congested without the engineers, making the use of explosives highly hazardous. Furthermore, the crossing site would most likely be under heavy fire, and it was near-impossible to send a bulldozer across the canal whilst the bridges were still unassembled. All this meant the passage clearing would have to be delayed, delaying the construction of the bridges and the arrival of reinforcements.[37]
The solution to this dilemma was simple but nonetheless ingenious. Late in 1971, an Egyptian officer suggested the use of small, light, gasoline fueled pumps that could be ferried across the canal in inflatable rafts to blast through the sand barrier. The suggestion proved worthwhile, and the Egyptian Military ordered some 300 British-made pumps. Tests showed that five of these pumps could remove 1,500 cubic meters of sand in three hours. In 1972 the Corps of Engineers purchased a 150 more powerful German-made pumps. By using three British-made and two German-made pumps, it was possible to clear a passage in two hours.[37]
Once the passages were cleared, engineers had to construct ten heavy bridges, five light bridges, ten pontoon bridges and 35 ferries. The passages had to be opened in five to seven hours, immediately followed by the ferries, then the bridges two hours later, all the while under enemy fire. Of the heavy bridges, the Egyptians had only two Soviet-made PMP heavy folding bridges, which could be erected in a shorter time than most other bridges in their inventory, saving a few hours which could be critical during the crossing offensive. These bridges were also much easier to repair. The speed with which the engineers cleared the passages and laid the bridges and ferries would affect the course of the entire operation. Engineers also had to man 750 rubber boats to be used for the crossing. They furthermore had the task of clearing minefields around Israeli defences, allowing assault infantry to attack them.[37][38]
Israeli defences
The Israelis had constructed a series of fortifications along the canal called the Bar Lev Line, which was considered impregnable. The main obstacle of these defences was a massive artificial sand wall erected by Israeli engineers, 18–25 metres (59–82 ft) high with a 45–60 degree incline, along the entire Suez Canal.[39] The rampart were reinforced by concrete that also prevented any attempt by amphibious vehicles to climb the sand wall.[40] To blast through the sand barrier the Israelis estimated would take at least twenty-four, probably forty-eight hours.[40] Behind this rampart were a series of 22 fortifications comprising 35 strongpoints.[39] On average, the fortifications were 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) apart.[41] A strongpoint was several stories deep into the sand and provided protection from a 1000 pound (~½ ton) bomb. Strongpoints incorporated trenches, barbed wire, minefields 200 meters deep, numerous bunkers and troop shelters, and firing positions for tanks.[40][42] Each strongpoint had an underground reservoir filled with crude oil. The oil could be pumped into the Suez Canal via a pipe system, and ignited to create temperatures reaching 700 °C (1,292 °F).[40] A second defensive line, 300–500 metres (980–1,640 ft) behind the main line, was concentrated at likely crossing areas, and designed to be occupied by armored forces, incorporating tank firing positions. A third defensive line, 3–5 kilometres (1.9–3.1 mi) behind the Bar Lev Line (the defenses on the canal), had its defences concentrated on the main roads and principal routes of advance for an attacker. Behind the main line on the canal were concentration areas for armor and infantry, supply depots, numerous artillery positions and so forth.[43]
The Israeli command developed a basic defensive plan codenamed Dovecoat (Shovach Yonim), the details of which were known to the Egyptians.[44] The plan divided the Bar Lev Line into three sectors: the northern sector defended Arish on the coast to Qantara, the central sector defended Ismailia to Abu-Ageila, and the southern sector defended the area from the Great Bitter Lake to the end of the Suez Canal, and prevented a thrust to the Mitla and Gedy Passes.[4] The 252nd Armored Division, led by Major General Albert Mandler, was charged with the defense of the Bar Lev Line, and incorporated three armored brigades.[4] Positioned 5–9 kilometres (3.1–5.6 mi) behind the series of fortifications was a brigade of 110–120 tanks, led by Colonel Reshef, split into three battalions of 36–40 tanks each, with one battalion to a sector. In case of an Egyptian attack, the brigade was to move forward to occupy tank platforms and firing positions along the Bar Lev Line. A further 20–35 kilometres (12–22 mi) behind the canal were two additional armored brigades led by Colonels Gabi Amir and Dan Shomron, each with around 120 tanks. One brigade was to reinforce the forward armored brigade, while the other brigade counterattacked against the main Egyptian assault.[4]
The Sinai garrison numbered 18,000 men. The overall commander was Shmuel Gonen, who served as head of the Israeli Southern Command. Of the garrison stationed in the Sinai, one infantry brigade occupied the strongpoints on the canal on October 6, while a further 8,000 could be deployed to the line within 30 minutes to two hours along with the armor.[2][40]
Deception and final days to war
Operation Badr was to be carried out by two Egyptian field armies, the Second Army with three infantry divisions, and the Third Army with two infantry divisions. It was necessary to have the bridges in place at the crossing points, as they would be laid eight to ten hours from the start of the assault. Positioning both armies and their bridging equipment along the canal in preparation for a crossing would alert the Israelis and allow them to fully prepare for an assault. Subsequently Egyptian forces would suffer high casualties in the attack (estimates for casualties already ran in the thousands). The Directorate of Military Intelligence (abbreviated Aman), which formulated Israel's intelligence estimate and was known for its competency, was tasked with detecting troop movements and activity along Egyptian and Syrian forces; military activity which would be particularly intensive in the last days preceding the assault.[45][10]
The deception plan mounted by the Egyptians, which included their intelligence services, relied on producing a series of events and incidents, militarily and politically, internationally and nationally, aimed at convincing Israeli intelligence analysts that the Arab world was not preparing for war. Among the plan's requirements was that senior echelon commanders preserve superficial normality while working secretly on the final preparations for the offensive.[46]
The core of the Egyptian deception plan was based on the prevalent Israeli mentality following the their lightning-quick victory over Arab forces in the 1967 Six Day War. This mentality is clearly illustrated in the following Israeli saying:
Damascus is only one hour's drive away, and Cairo perhaps two.
In his thesis of the Yom Kippur War, USMC Major Michael C. Jordan explains that this quote and the prevailing opinion it represented pre-October 1973:
...also reflects the contempt Israelis held for the military abilities of Arab neighbors Egypt and Syria. The 1967 preemptive victory was so complete and won so cheaply, Israelis viewed their military forces as invincible, their intelligence service as unmatched, and their Arab foes as inferior and incapable.[10]
The Israelis expected a forty-eight hour warning beforehand from their intelligence services. At any rate, they were confident that any Arab attack would be swiftly decimated by the Israeli Air Force.[47][10]
The Egyptians sought to exploit this Israeli belief to their advantage. Ever since assuming office, Sadat had continually threatened Israel with war, engaging in brinkmanship, until eventually his threats became ignored by Israel and the world. In order to position their forces for the attack against Israel, the Egyptians announced an exercise by the canal. Exercises had been conducted numerous times before, and in May and August 1973 exercises conducted by the Egyptians near the canal caused Israel to mobilize its reserves in response, costing Israel some $10 million in each mobilization. This time, when Egyptian commanders issued instructions for training maneuvers, to begin on October 1 and last until October 7, Aman, discovering troop movements along the canal, disregarded them as training maneuvers. Troop movements on the Syrian front were detected as well, but Aman concluded that the Syrians would not go to war without the Egyptians.[10][48]
The exercise gave the Egyptians the opportunity to position their forces for a crossing. This task was made easier by the fact that the Egyptian Second and Third Field Armies, which were tasked with implementing Operation Badr, were normally stationed along the Suez Canal to defend against Israeli forces. Troops, armor, and more importantly, the bridging equipment, had to be moved to their concentration areas. This was accomplished during a period of fifteen nights up to the night of October 5/6, with a peak of activity over the final five nights. By moving forces and equipment in this fashion, preparations for the crossing would be concealed.[49]
Ever since it occupied the Sinai in 1967, Israel had openly declared it would remain in Sharm el-Sheikh to ensure its sea lanes to Eilat through the Straits of Tiran remained opened (the closing of the Straits to Israeli shipping in 1967 was one of the causes of the Six Day War). Egypt aimed to nullify Sharm el-Sheikh's importance to Israel by imposing a naval blockade at the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, almost 2,500 kilometres (1,600 mi) from Israel.[50]
In order to position the Egyptian Navy so as to impose a blockade against Israel once the war started, arrangements were made with Pakistan to receive Egyptian vessels for repair early in 1973. Approval was sought, and obtained, from Sudan and Yemen to receive the submarines on their way to Pakistan in Port Sudan and Aden as a friendly visit. Preparations were undertaken to make public Pakistan's approval to receive Egyptian vessels for repairs. On October 1, a force containing several submarines, destroyers and missile boats set sail on a route specifically planned to ensure their arrival at the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb on October 6. The fleet was fully equipped for combat, and their commanding officers were ordered to main complete radio silence; which meant there was no way whatsoever of recalling the submarines. The commanding officers, unaware of their real mission, were issued sealed envelopes detailing their orders and mission, and were instructed to open the envelopes on October 6, only a few hours before the war was to begin, whereupon they would break their radio silence. Once the fleet had set sail that day, October 1, "the war had effectively begun".[10][51][52]
The military sought to maintain an impression of normality. Just before the month of Ramadan in the Muslim calendar was to begin on September 26, the Ministry of War announced through newspapers and the armed forces that military personnel wanting to take leave to go to Mecca on Umrah (pilgrimage) could register to do so. Egyptian newspapers announced that sailboat races would be held, in which the commander of the Egyptian Navy and several other naval officers would participate. In addition, a visit planned for October 8 (two days after the scheduled attack) by the Romanian Minister of Defense to Egypt was publicized by the Ministry of War, and a program for his visit was announced. The coincidental visit by the Romanian Minister would be promptly canceled once war broke out on October 6, but it proved useful as part of the deception plan.[53][54]
On September 27, a large batch of reservists were given orders for mobilization. To lull suspicion, on that day Ismail invited all the Cabinet Ministers of the Egyptian Government to spend a day at General Headquarters, where all planning and coordination of the operation took place. Another batch of reservists were called up on September 30. To lull suspicion once more, the Egyptians publicly announced on October 4 the demobilization of the reservists who had been called up on September 27, but only demobilized 20,000 men.[55]
To ensure the intention for war remained a secret, it was only from October 1 onwards that the order for war began to spread outside the circle of senior commanders in Egypt. That day, Generals Saad Mamoun and Abdel Munim Wasel, commanders of the Second and Third Field Armies respectively, were informed of the decision to implement Operation Badr. On October 3, they informed their divisional commanders. Brigade commanders were told on October 4, battalion and company commanders on October 5, while platoon commanders and troops were told on October 6, six hours before the start of the attack.[56]
Sadat himself was a part of the deception plan; he had attended the Non-Aligned conference in Algeria in September of that year, and upon his return was rumored to be ill. Sadat remained, for several days leading up to October 6, out of public sight. Egyptian intelligence planted false stories of his illness in the press and initiated a search for a home in Europe, where Sadat would receive treatment, thus adding to the credibility of the rumor.[57]
Implementing the deception plan did not go through entirely without encountering setbacks. At first, the Soviets were not told of the decision to go to war. Instead, on October 2, they were told that an Israeli raid was expected. Over the next two days the director of the Defense Intelligence Service, General Fouad Nassar, informed the Chief Soviet Liaison Officer, General Samakhodsky, that the raid was expected to be a large-scale attack, coupled with an air strike. Though Samakhodsky appeared at first to believe Nassar's story, it became clear to the Egyptians that the Soviets were suspicious. In particular, there were several experts serving with Egyptian and Syrian units, and by October 3–4 were reporting the unusually heightened activities of the Egyptian and Syrian forces to their superiors. Both Sadat and Assad decided to inform the Soviets of their intention to go to war on October 3. Promptly, the Soviets requested permission to evacuate their personnel in Egypt along with their families, and both men reluctantly agreed. Egyptian commanders were taken completely by surprise, when, beginning late evening on October 4, Soviet experts serving with field units, embassy personnel and their families were hurriedly evacuated. By October 5, the evacuation was complete. This incident would be an important factor in convincing the Israelis that war was possible.[58][59][60]
October 4 also provided another worrying incident to Egyptian commanders, who became aware that evening that EgyptAir, the country's national airline, had canceled all its flights and was arranging the protection of its civil air fleet by dispersing its aircraft to refuges outside Egypt. The orders came from the Minister of Aviation, Ahmed Nuh. Immediate intervention by General Headquarters though ensured that the dispersal orders were quickly canceled, and by October 5 flights were back to their normal schedule. It was believed the incident was a breach of security and a result of a leak of information on Egyptian plans for war. It was not clear to Egyptian commanders however, whether the Israelis were aware of the incident.[61][62]
On September 13, 1973, an air battle took place between Syrian and Israeli fighters. It was an alarming incident in which twelve Syrian aircraft were shot down while the Israelis lost only one fighter. Tension ran high between both countries. The Egyptians in particular were very concerned; on April 7, 1967, an air battle between Syria and Israel had escalated the military situation and was one of the causes of the Six Day War. Aware that war was to be launched only days later, the Syrian command decided not to retaliate. The air battle aided the Syrians in concentrating their forces for the war, a move interpreted by the Israelis as a defensive reaction on the part of the Syrians. Over the following days, the Israelis closely followed the buildup of Syrian forces near the front, but their intelligence maintained that Syria would not go to war without Egypt, which the Israelis believed were currently occupied with internal issues, and would not venture to enter war.[63][64][65]
Throughout September 1973, Aman had received eleven warnings, including a warning from Jordan's King Hussein, that Egypt and Syria were bent on waging war, but they were all disregarded, as Aman maintained the belief that the Arabs would not launch an attack. Mossad director Zvi Zamir remained of the opinion that war was not an Arab option.[66]
However there remained too many worrying events for the Israelis to ignore. Most notable of all was the sudden and inexplicable Soviet evacuation from Cairo and Damascus, and the constant buildup of forces on the Syrian front. Though the Chief of Staff, David Elazar, was assured that the probability of war remained low, he took precautionary steps on October 5. Elazar placed the entire military on alert, canceled all leaves, and ordered the Air Force to assume a full-alert posture. He also ordered the 7th Armored Brigade to relocate from the Sinai to the Golan Heights. As a result of this move, Israeli forces in the Golan Heights numbered 177 tanks and 44 artillery pieces on October 6. To replace the 7th Armored Brigade, the Armor School, under the command of Colonel Gabi Amir, received the order to activate its tank brigade for immediate airlift; the tank brigade was in the Sinai by October 6, before the war began. Ultimately though, no orders for mobilization were issued to reservists; Elazar and other senior commanders still expected a 24–48 hour advance warning from the intelligence services if the Arab nations intended to enter war.[60]
During the night of October 5/6, Zvi Zamir went to Europe to meet personally with Ashraf Marwan, an Egyptian double agent. Marwan informed Zamir that a joint Egyptian-Syrian attack was imminent. Combined with other warnings and incidents, Marwan's warning finally convinced Zvi Zamir of the imminence of war. Eli Zeira, the director of Aman, sent a definite warning of war to the Israeli leadership at 04:30 on October 6. Aman erred when it concluded the Arabs were to attack at 18:00, an estimation in fact four hours late. Israel's Prime Minister Golda Meir met with Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and General David Elazar at 08:05, in a meeting lasting more than an hour. Meir asked both men to present their views, which were conflicting: Dayan continued to believe war was not a certainty, while Elazar believed otherwise, arguing for a preemptive air strike against Syria. Dayan also proposed a partial mobilization of reserves, while Elazar favored a mobilization of the entire Air Force, and four armored divisions, totaling around 100,000–120,000 troops. Meir concluded the meeting by stating that no preemptive strike would be launched, in order to ensure the backing of the United States, but she sided with Elazar on the issue of mobilization, and orders were issued to reservists to mobilize.[60]
Aman delivered its warning to Israeli commanders just nine and a half hours before the outbreak of hostilities, falling behind the expected 24–48 hours warning period. The Arabs had won the intelligence war, achieving full surprise and gaining the initiative on the battlefield.[10][67]
Course of the Operation
October 6 - The Crossing
Badr began at 14:00 on October 6, 1973. As the Israelis expected the attack to begin four hours later, only part of the troops and none of the armor assigned to man the Bar Lev Line were in position, except for a few platoons in the northernmost forts. Sixteen fortifications on the line were fully manned, and another two were partially manned.[41]
The Egyptian attack began with a major air strike involving more than 200 aircraft against three airbases, ten Hawk SAM batteries, three command centers, artillery positions and several radar stations, employing MiG-21s, MiG-17s, and Su-7s. This was supported with artillery strikes starting at 14:05 from nearly 2,000 pieces against the Bar-Lev line, and against armor concentration areas and artillery positions, using field guns, howitzers, mortars, tank guns, B-10 and B-11 recoilless rifles. The self-propelled 152 mm howitzers and 130 mm field guns were assigned counter-battery fire missions against Israeli artillery. The 53-minute long fire preparation, one of the largest in history, was divided into four barrages. The first, fifteen minutes long, was aimed at enemy targets on the eastern bank up to a depth of 1.5 kilometers. An estimated 10,500 shells were fired against Israeli targets in the first minute alone.[68]
With the start of the fire preparation, tank hunting detachments – groups of ten equipped with RPG-7 rockets, RPG-43 grenades, and AT-3 Sagger missiles – crossed the canal to deploy initially at a depth of around one kilometer. They moved to occupy tank ramparts and proceeded to lay mines and prepare ambushes. When the first barrage was over, Egyptian artillery began the second barrage, planned to be 22 minutes long, against targets at a range of 1.5–3 kilometers. At this time, 14:20, the first wave of Egyptian assault infantry, consisting of 4,000 men, began crossing the canal, crying "Allahu Akbar...Allahu Akbar..." (God is Great). Around 2,500 dinghies and wooden boats were used to transport the troops. Smoke canisters were used at the crossing points to provide cover. During the night of October 5, engineers had blocked the underwater pipes on the opposite bank, preventing the Israelis from releasing flammable oil into the canal and igniting it. The first wave was lightly armed, equipped with RPG-7s, Strela 2 AA missiles and rope ladders to deploy on the sand wall. Among the first wave were several units of Sa'iqa (lit. lightening; these were commando forces), who were tasked with setting up ambushes on reinforcement routes. The Sa'iqa attacked command posts and artillery batteries in order to deny the Israelis control over their forces. Combat engineers also crossed with the first wave to clear paths through minefields surrounding Israeli defences for the assault infantry. Immediately following them, military engineers crossed to determine where passages in the sand wall would be opened, and to decide on other technicalities. Five minutes later, engineer groups crossed in wooden boats carrying the water pumps, and on reaching the east bank they began preparing the pumps for operation. At this time Egyptian aircraft involved in the air strike began returning, having lost five aircraft. The air strike succeeded in putting the Meleez and Bir Thamada air bases out of operation for 48 hours and in destroying ten HAWK batteries, two artillery batteries, an electronic jamming center at Umm Khashib, and various radar stations. The Egyptian Air Force was able to operate for the rest of the war without any communications interference after destroying the jamming center at Umm Khashib. The only other jamming center in the Sinai was located at el-Arish, located considerably behind the front, close to the Israeli border. The success of the air strike caused the Egyptians to cancel a planned second air strike.[5][69]
At the Great Bitter Lake, the Egyptian 130th Amphibious Brigade performed a separate crossing, with the mission of seeking and destroying enemy installations at the entrances of the Gedy and Mitla Passes. The brigade was composed of 1,000 men, including a Sagger anti-tank battalion, an anti-air battalion, 20 PT-76 tanks and 100 amphibious armored personnel carriers. It reached the opposite bank around 14:40 without sustaining a single casualty. The sand rampart that lined the entire Suez Canal did not exist in the Bitter Lakes, and there were no Israeli defences or units to be encountered. Upon landing on the other bank, the brigade discovered a minefield blocking its advance, and military engineers were brought forward to clear a path.[70][71]
Egyptian troops raised their national flag on the eastern bank of the canal at 14:35. By that time company and battalion-size units of Israeli tanks and infantry began reaching the Bar Lev Line, but ambushes by Egyptian troops prevented them from reaching their positions. A few Israeli tanks that managed to break through ambushes to reach the Bar Lev Line were fired upon by Egyptian forces on the west bank of the canal. At 14:45, the second wave of infantry landed on the opposite bank. Subsequent waves of infantry arrived at fifteen-minute intervals until the fourth wave. After the fourth wave, exhaustion among the boat crews, along with technical problems with the boats, began to affect the time intervals. The rate at which successive waves crossed the canal decreased, forcing the Egyptians to abandon their schedules. Priority was given to anti-tank teams and combat equipment that could affect the progress of the battle. Amphibious vehicles were also used to transport equipment to the west bank. The wooden carts were transported to the opposite bank via boats with their ammunition/weapon load. Initially, the carts were moved to the top of the sand wall with their loads. However this method proved awkward, and soon the Egyptians first emptied the carts of their load before pulling them over the sand wall. Once over the sand wall, they were refilled with their load, and dragged to troops on the front line. The carts proved to be essential in supplying soldiers with supplies and in transporting weapons.[72]
In the meantime the Israeli Southern Command attempted to determine the main Egyptian effort to launch a concerted counterattack with Dan Shomron's armored brigade. In reality, there was no main effort; Egyptian strategy planned for a broad assault on the entire front. As a result Southern Command lost several critical hours. When Reshef moved his tank brigade to support the Bar Lev Line, Israeli commanders failed to conduct reconnaissance beforehand, which caused the Israelis to fall into Egyptian ambushes. In the confusion ensuing the surprise Egyptian assault, no attempt was made at evacuating the Bar Lev garrison.[73]
One of the amphibious brigade's battalions, the 603rd, after landing on the east bank near the southern end of the Bitter Lake, was regrouping outside the minefield at around 16:00 when it was attacked by a company of tanks from Kibrit East, a fortification of the Bar Lev (codenamed Putzer by the Israelis) located on the Bitter Lake. The battalion was reinforced with a tank hunting detachment from the 7th Division to the south. The Israeli tank company withdrew after losing two tanks and three armored vehicles. Following this engagement, the battalion was ordered to capture the fortification at Kibrit East (Fort Putzer), instead of attacking Israeli installations along the Mitla Pass.[74]
At 15:30, Egyptian forces captured the first position of the Bar Lev Line, Fort Lahtzanit.[75] At the same time, engineers began operating their water pumps to breach the sand wall. The first passage was opened in less than an hour, and the Egyptians moved their bridging units to the canal. By 16:30 eight waves had brought across the canal ten infantry brigades in all five bridgeheads, totaling 23,500 men (around 4,700 at each bridgehead). Each bridgehead was on average six kilometers (3¾ mi) wide and around two kilometers deep.[76]
At 17:30, three hours into the war, the twelfth and final infantry wave landed, bringing the total in all five bridgeheads to 32,000 men (around 6,400 in each bridgehead).[77] By then Israeli losses to Egyptian anti-tank weaponry and artillery fire had reached around 100 tanks.[78] The magnitude of Israeli losses stemmed from their insistence to reach their comrades in the Bar Lev Line defences, and they repeatedly ran into aggressive ambushes by Egyptian soldiers.[8][79]
Taking advantage of dusk, at 17:50 four Sa'iqa battalions were airdropped deep into the Sinai by helicopters flying at low altitude. The Sa'iqa were assigned the objective of hampering reserves en route from Israel. The helicopters left the range of friendly SAMs and were not provided air cover, resulting in a number of them being shot down.[80]
Some time after dusk, the 602nd battalion of the amphibious brigade began to move east towards its objectives. It stumbled upon an Israeli battalion of 35 tanks along Artillery Road, some 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) from the Bitter Lake. The battalion's ten PT-76s with 76 mm guns were outmatched and outnumbered by the heavier Israeli M48 Pattons with 105 mm guns. The manually guided Saggers were difficult to operate at night, and furthermore the Israeli tanks were employing blinding xenon floodlights. Caught in the open Sinai desert, the 602nd was defeated and lost many of its tanks and armored vehicles, along with significant casualties. The remaining troops retreated to Third Army lines.[81]
At 18:00 Egyptian armor and anti tank units on the west bank started moving towards the crossing sites.[77] Fifteen minutes later engineers completed the assembly of all 35 ferries and waited for the breaches to be opened. By 18:30 the bridgeheads had reached a depth of around five kilometers (3 mi). With Israeli artillery on the Bar Lev Line eliminated, the immobile SA-2 and SA-3 units were moved forward. From 22:30 to 01:30 after midnight, all bridges – eight heavy and four light bridges – were laid, and along with the ferries, began transporting reinforcements to the opposite bank. In the far south of the canal, at 19th Division's sector, the engineers found that the sand turned into mud making it difficult to clear. Consequently four ferries and three bridges assigned to that division were deployed seven hours behind schedule. From time to time the bridges were moved to different locations to confuse Israeli air strikes targeting them – the Egyptians had opened 60 passages but were operating only 12 bridges, allowing each bridge to be moved to one of five passages. Throughout the night and up to the following morning, tanks and vehicles kept crossing the canal. Military police were responsible for directing this enormous traffic, utilizing color coded signs.[80][82]
Port Said Sector
The Port Said Sector was an independent military command in the Egyptian Army, unattached to the Second Army.[83] It incorporated Port Said, Port Fouad and their vicinity. The sector contained two infantry brigades. Military operations in this area were directed against three fortifications: Budapest, Orkal and Lahtzanit.[84] As with the rest of the front, the offensive here began with the fire preparation. The use of high trajectory weapons was forbidden however because Egyptian aircraft were flying through the sector's airspace, hence only recoilless rifles and anti-tank guns were used to bombard Israeli positions.[85]
Fort Lahtzanit, 19 kilometres (12 mi) south of Port Fouad, was isolated from all directions by Egyptian infantry prior to the attack. This prevented Israeli reinforcements from reaching the fort. At 15:00, the Egyptians managed to breach the minefield and barbed wire surrounding the fort, at which point approximately a company-sized force of Egyptian troops assaulted the defenses. By 15:30, the fort was under Egyptian control. They proceeded to clear a few bunkers still occupied by Israeli soldiers, some of whom surrendered when the Egyptians began employing flamethrowers. By 18:00, the Egyptians had cleared the fort completely.[86]
Fort Orkal, 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) south of Port Fouad, was also isolated prior to an attack. The Egyptians attacked by land from Port Fouad, and across the Suez Canal. However, the attack soon came to a stop as the force approaching from the north failed to breach the minefield, leaving the force attacking across the canal on its own, pinned down at the sand wall. To renew the attack, an infantry company attacked the fort from the south, seizing several positions. Additional positions were captured after the company was reinforced. On October 7, the Israeli defenders attempted to break out of their remaining positions to join friendly forces. The attempt was a failure however, as the Israelis were intercepted and in the process either killed or captured.[87]
Located on a narrow strip of land southeast of Port Fouad, Fort Budapest was surrounded by water on two sides. The fort came under air and artillery strikes at 14:00. A Sa'iqa company cut off the only route to the fort for reinforcements, while a battalion attacked from Port Fouad, advancing along a narrow strip of land bereft of natural cover. The attack was bogged down at the minefield, which was 600 metres (2,000 ft) deep. The battalion came under air attacks, as the fort was outside of the SAM "umbrella", and faced stiff resistance from the fort's garrison. The attack was soon broken off and the Egyptians retreated. The Sa'iqa unit east of the fort prevented reinforcements from reaching the fort for four days before retreating to Egyptian lines. After another attack on October 15 failed, Fort Budapest became the only position of the Bar Lev Line to be remain in Israeli hands. (see Battles of Fort Budapest)[88]
By October 6 the Egyptian naval vessels tasked with carrying out the blockade were at Bab-el-Mandeb, where they broke radio silence. When Operation Badr began at 14:00, Rear Admiral Fuad Abu Zikry authorized the blockade to proceed, and the fleet was notified via a codeword. Egyptian submarines and destroyers intercepted ships destined for Eilat, and all Israeli maritime navigation in the Red Sea was stopped, which constituted a 100% success rate for the Egyptian Navy. The blockade was a strategic success for Egypt, while the Israeli Air Force and Navy were incapable of lifting the blockade due to the long distance between Israel and Bab-el-Mandeb. A naval blockade was enforced in the Mediterranean Sea as well, with a success rate exceeding 80%. Mines were laid at the entrance to the Gulf of Suez, preventing Israel from transporting oil from the Sinai fields to Eilat. In Israel, news of the blockade was censored. The sea routes to Egypt's principal ports – Alexandria on the Mediterranean and Port Safaga on the Red Sea – remained secure and open to shipping for the duration of the war.[89]
Aside from the blockade, the Egyptian Navy carried out several other missions. Coastal artillery at Port Said participated in the fire preparation by bombarding Fort Budapest and Fort Orkal, two fortifications of the Bar Lev Line. The former was located on the Mediterranean Sea, the latter 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) south of Port Fouad. Coastal artillery at Suez assisted in the preparation, hitting targets opposite the Third Army. Missile boats bombarded Rumana and Ras Beyron on the Mediterranean, Ras Masala and Ras Sidr on the Gulf of Suez, and Sharm el Sheikh. Naval frogmen raided the oil installations at Bala'eem, disabling the massive driller. Several naval engagements took place between Egyptian and Israeli missile boats off the coast between Port Said and Damietta. According to Egyptian sources, both sides lost several vessels.[90] However, almost all Western and Israeli sources state that the Israeli Navy lost no vessels during the war.[91][92][93][94]
October 7
In the early hours of Sunday October 7, just after midnight, Egyptian infantry, now with tank support, advanced to expand their bridgeheads. Israeli armored formations had experienced heavy losses in trying repeatedly to reach the Bar Lev Line and were disorganized and confused. Many Israeli units, however, stubbornly resisted the Egyptian advance.[95] Twice during the night of October 6 to October 7, groups of tanks and infantry penetrated the bridgeheads to reach the canal line. They bombarded the bridges, damaging two of them and destroying a few other transportation vehicles. Surrounded on all sides, however, these units were soon destroyed.[96] Before sunrise the bridgeheads had reached a depth of 6–9 kilometres (3.7–5.6 mi), and the remaining Israeli units retreated. With sufficient numbers of armor finally across, reinforcements of infantry began to cross the canal in bridges and ferries. Dawn on October 7 saw a total of 50,000 men (around 10,000 to each bridgehead) and 400 Egyptian tanks occupying five bridgeheads in the Sinai across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces reorganised and entrenched themselves in anticipation of Israeli counterattacks.[82][97]
David Elazar continued to instruct Gonen to evacuate soldiers from strongpoints which were not yet surrounded, even though by October 7 most Israeli defences were encircled. Egyptian losses up to the morning of October 7 were only 280 killed and 20 tanks destroyed. Israeli losses were far more heavy; the brigade in the Bar Lev Line was completely surrounded and most of its men were casualties while 200 were captured. Around 280–300 Israeli tanks had been destroyed.[8][98] In subsequent days some of the defenders in the Bar Lev Line managed to break though Egyptian forces and return to their lines, or were extracted by Israeli forces in counterattacks that came later on.
As the magnitude of Israeli losses became clearer, Gonen made the decision at noon to form a defensive line on the Lateral Road, 30 kilometres (19 mi) east of the canal, and ordered his divisional commanders to pull back and deploy accordingly.[99] This brought a pause to the fighting along the front, and Egyptian forces used this opportunity to consolidate their gains and establish defences.[9] At noon, elements of Abraham Adan's 162nd Division and Ariel Sharon's 143rd Division began to reach the fronts. Consequently Gonen divided the front into three divisional commands: Adan was deployed in the northern sector, Sharon in the central sector, and Mandler in the southern sector.[100]
During the afternoon, Southern Command received optimistic reports from the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Air strikes continued throughout the day, and according to the reports seven bridges had been knocked out of action, and the IAF expected to destroy the remaining ones by evening. In fact, several of the bridges that had been destroyed were dummies. The real bridges, in the meantime, were quickly repaired and returned to service.[100] In the crossing, the Egyptians had laid ten heavy bridges (two bridges in the south were laid but not operational), and kept two in reserve. Now, on October 7, five of these bridges were removed and kept in reserve, leaving each division across the canal with one heavy bridge and one light bridge.[101]
Egyptian forces widened their bridgeheads that day to narrow the 14–15 kilometres (8.7–9.3 mi) gaps that existed between the bridgeheads. Meanwhile General Headquarters worked on organizing its forces on the east bank of the canal. Egyptian troops had crossed with supplies that sufficed them for 24 hours. By Sunday it became necessary to resupply these forces, but the administrative and supply units charged with this responsibility were disorganized, and to the south problems with laying the bridges further handicapped supply efforts there. October 7 offered a relative lull from the intense fighting that had taken place, and this gave an opportunity to organize battlefield administration. At 19th Division's bridgehead to the south, all efforts to lay three bridges there were abandoned due to difficulties with the terrain. Instead, supplies and reinforcement destined for the division were transferred over 7th Division's bridges to the north, where engineers were more successful in laying the bridges.[102]
Fighting throughout the front did not cease entirely for the rest of the day. Egyptian forces besieged Israeli defences and strongpoints that had not yet been captured. Meanwhile the Sa'iqa units airdropped into Sinai the previous day began engaging Israeli reserves heading for the front. One unit captured the Ras Sidr Pass south of Port Tawfiq, along the Gulf of Suez. It held the pass for the remainder of the war, preventing Israeli reserves from reaching the front. In northern Sinai, a company established itself along the coastal road between Romani and Baluza. The following day, it ambushed an Israeli reserve armored brigade belonging to Adan's division, destroying around 18 tanks in addition to other vehicles. The advance of the brigade, commanded by Colonel Natke Nir, was halted for over five hours, and in the ensuing battle, another 12 tanks and 6 half-tracks were destroyed and 30 soldiers of the brigade were killed, while the Sa'iqa company lost 75 killed in action.[103] In addition to delaying Israeli reserves, commandos carried out sabotage missions. These operations inflicted significant losses to Israeli units and created confusion and anxiety in Southern Command, which was forced to allocate front-line units to protect installations and perform guard duties, while reserve units en route to the front adopted a cautious approach that delayed their arrival.[104]
At the northern end of the canal, troops from the 18th Division, under the command of Brigadier General Fuad 'Aziz Ghali, entered the town of Qantara and became engaged with Israeli units inside the town. Close quarter combat and even hand-to-hand fighting took place as Egyptian forces cleared the town building by building. Fighting was heavy, and by the end of October 7, most of the town and its outskirts was under Egyptian control.[105]
Israeli planning for a counterattack
David Elazar, encouraged by IAF reports of the destruction of Egyptian bridges, decided to visit Israeli Southern Command. He was accompanied by his aide, Colonel Avner Shalev and the former Israeli Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin. Elazar intended to meet with Israeli commanders and organize a plan for the following day. He arrived at Gonen's advance command post at Gebel Umm Hashiba at 18:45. He met with Gonen, Adan and Mandler. Sharon only arrived after the meeting had been concluded.[100]
Southern Command expected to have 640 tanks on Monday October 8, of which 530 tanks would be distributed among three divisions. Adan would command 200 tanks, Sharon would have 180 tanks, and Mandler would have 150 tanks (part of Mandler's losses would be replaced). Estimates put the number of Egyptian tanks on the east bank at 400, when in fact, there were 800 tanks across the canal by Sunday evening. In light of the apparent superiority, Gonen recommended a frontal attack at night, with Adan's 162nd Division attacking at Qantara and crossing to the west bank of the Suez, and Sharon's 143rd Division crossing into Suez City. Adan however, lacking infantry, urged a more cautious approach until more reserves reached the front.[100]
Elazar also preferred a cautious approach, and decided on a limited attack on the morning of October 8. Adan would attack southward against Second Army, remaining 3–5 kilometres (1.9–3.1 mi) away from the canal to avoid Egyptian anti-tank weaponry. Sharon would remain at Tasa to support Adan if needed. Should Adan succeed, Sharon would attack Third Army's bridgehead in a manner similar to Adan, and then cross to the west bank. Mandler would remain on the defensive, organizing his division which had been mauled by the fighting, and was down to a few dozen tanks. Elazar clearly emphasized that no canal crossing and no attempt to reach the strongpoints would occur without his approval. The meeting ended at 22:00.[106]
As Elazar prepared to leave, he met Sharon, who just arrived after missing the entire conference. Elazar exchanged a few words with him and told him to obtain his orders from Gonen. After being briefed, Sharon recommended a concentrated two division attack against one of the Egyptian bridgeheads. The suggestion appealed more to Gonen than Elazar's cautious approach, but he had his orders. The attack would proceed as planned.[107]
October 8
The five division-size bridgeheads consolidated themselves on Monday, October 8 into two army-size bridgeheads: the Second Army with its three divisions occupied Qantara in the north to Deversoir in the south, while the Third Army with two divisions occupied the southern end of the Bitter Lakes to a point southeast of Port Tawfiq (at the far end of the canal). On the east bank, these two bridgeheads incorporated a total of 90,000 men and 980 tanks, dug in and entrenched. Each division deployed, in accordance with Operation Badr, two infantry brigades in its forward echelon, and one mechanized infantry brigade in the second echelon. In reserve was one armored brigade, placed behind the three infantry brigades. The Egyptians had established anti-tank defences along their lines employing Sagger ATGMs, RPGs, B-10 and B-11 anti tank recoilless rifles.[108][109]
At dawn a friendly fire incident occurred as the 2nd and 16th Divisions in Second Army were closing the gap between their bridgeheads. A platoon from 2nd Division advanced south, while another platoon from 16th Division moved north. Cresting a ridge, both platoons confronted each other at 460 metres (1,510 ft). The tank crews on both sides were so agitated that all six tanks opened fire on each other. Each platoon lost two of its three tanks to direct hits within minutes, and several men were killed.[110]
Shazly visited the front in the early morning before the Israeli attack to form an assessment of the situation. He arrived at Second Army Headquarters, where he was briefed on the situation by the commanders, then went to 2nd Division's advanced headquarters, where he met with Brigadier General Hasan Abu Sa'ada and visited the frontline troops. Many of the soldiers had not slept for two nights, but the successful crossing was a moral booster, a tonic as he described it.
Shazly then went southward in his staff car along the bitter lakes. As the car moved through 7th Division's bridgehead in Third Army's sector, the traffic on the roads steadily increased until, several hundred meters from the division's main bridge, traffic was at a complete standstill. Shazly and his aide got out of the vehicle, walked to the bridge and met with the division commander, Brigadier General Badawy. The cause behind the heavy traffic was due to problems with laying bridges in 19th Division's sector further south. Since the bridges there had not been laid, supplies and reinforcements destined for that division had to go over 7th Division's already congested bridges, creating a solid traffic jam. Despite Sunday's lull, the situation had not yet improved. This only created further problems, as soldiers and tank crews lost contact with their units and consequently had no idea of the whereabouts of their units. Many infantrymen were low on supplies, and some even returned to the west bank of the canal to replenish their food and water supply.[111]
After conferring with the chief engineers of the Second and Third field armies, Shazly became aware that Israeli Air Force, in spite of its heavy losses, had destroyed so many bridge sections that the Egyptians had lost the equivalent of three heavy bridges, leaving four bridges in reserve along with the five already laid in the canal.[112] This gave rise to concerns about supply in the coming days and weeks. Shazly then discussed the possibility of constructing three bridges in the canal using earth and sand. This would make causeways impregnable against air strikes and artillery. The chief engineer of the Third Army, with whom he discussed the idea, was confidant that, given enough bulldozers, the causeways could be constructed in one week.[113]
Israeli counterattack
Shortly after midnight on October 8, Gonen changed plans for the attack. Adan would now attack in the direction of the strongpoints at Firdan and Ismailia. The new plan was not formulated on precise tactical intelligence, rather on the basis of optimistic field reports which expected an imminent Egyptian collapse. This change in plans caused some confusion among Israeli commanders for the rest of the day.[114]
Adan's division was deployed along the Baluza–Tasa road to the north. His division was composed of Colonel Natke Nir's armored brigade with 71 tanks, Gabi Amir's brigade with 50 M60 tanks, and Aryeh Keren's brigade with 62 tanks (still en route to the area) for a total of 183 tanks. In spite of Gonen's new order, Adan still planned to avoid Egyptian anti-tank weaponry. He planned to have Amir's brigade move southward between Lexicon and Artillery roads (the former road ran immediately alongside the canal, and the latter was 10–15 kilometres (6.2–9.3 mi) east of it), to reach a position that would link the brigade to the Hizayon strongpoint opposite Firdan and the Purkan strongpoint opposite Ismailia. Nir would also move in a similar manner to link up with Purkan. Keren would move east of Artillery Road and position his brigade opposite the Matzmed strongpoint at the northern end of the Bitter Lakes. A mechanized infantry brigade with 44 Super Shermans was expected to join in the attack by late morning. Little or no air support would come for the attack; the Israeli Air Force was concentrated on the Golan Heights.[115]
At 07:53, minutes before the Israeli attack was to commence, Israeli forces near Qantara became heavily engaged with a brigade that composed the right flank of the Egyptian 18th Division, as Egyptian troops sought to clear the town and its vicinity completely. Fuad, the division commander, supported the brigade in its mission with two companies of T-62 tanks. To prevent Israeli forces in the area from being outflanked, Gonen ordered Nir to remain near Qantara to help contain the Egyptian attack. This left Adan with only 50 tanks under Amir's command to carry out the attack between Lexicon and Artillery Roads.[116]
Amir began the drive south at 08:06, and was ordered to prepare to reach the strongpoints on Adan's signal. Keren was still en route to the area. Once his brigade arrived he would conduct an assault against 16th Division's bridgehead in the direction of Matzmed. However, Amir made an error in navigation, and instead of moving 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) from the canal, he moved along Artillery road, 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) away. Consequently, Amir would be forced to conduct a frontal assault in an east-west direction instead of the north-south flanking maneuver which Adan had planned.[117]
Amir's brigade began to reach the plain between Artillery Road and the Firdan bridge at 09:00. So far no Egyptian resistance of any significance had been encountered. The brigade had the objective of attacking 2nd Division's bridgehead. Abu Sa'ada, the division commander, had the 24th Armored Brigade as the divisional reserve, but he could only commit it in case of an Israeli penetration of the bridgehead. Gonen wanted Adan to reach the Hizayon strongpoint, and contacted Elazar in Tel Aviv at 09:55 to request a crossing of the canal. Gonen either downplayed or ignored negative reports and only told Elazar of positive developments on the battlefield. Elazar, who was at a meeting, communicated with Gonen through his assistant, and approved of a crossing of the canal and gave permission for Sharon's division to move south.[117]
At 10:40, Gonen ordered Adan to cross to the west bank and Sharon to move towards Suez City. Short of forces, Adan requested Gonen that Sharon send a battalion to protect his southern flank. Gonen consented, but Sharon would not comply, and consequently several critical positions would be lost to the Egyptians later on.[117]
Just before the assault commenced, one of Amir's battalions disengaged to resupply. The other battalion proceeded with the assault at 11:00. Some 25 tanks carried out an assault that was supposed to be performed by 121 tanks. The battalion broke through the first Egyptian troops and advanced to within 800 metres (2,600 ft) of the canal. At this point the Israelis came under heavy fire from Egyptian anti-tank weaponry, artillery and tanks. The battalion lost 18 tanks within minutes, and most of its commanders were either killed or wounded.[118]
By now Nir had disengaged at Qantara, leaving a battalion behind, and arrived opposite the Firdan bridge at 12:30 with two tank battalions. While Amir and Nir discussed plans for an attack, Keren arrived and Adan ordered him to support Nir and Amir by attacking towards Purkan. Meanwhile Sharon left Tasa and headed for Suez City, leaving behind a single reconnaissance company to hold vital ridges such as Hamadia and Kishuf, but the hills to the north, such as Hamutal 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) southeast of Purkan, were left unoccupied. This further endangered Adan's position.[119]
Amir's brigade was now down to one battalion. The battalion was to attack with Nir's brigade of 50 tanks. To Amir's surprise, a reserve armored battalion of 25 tanks commanded by Colonel Eliashiv Shemshi arrived in the area, en route to Keren's brigade. Short of forces, Amir, with Adan's approval, commandeered Shemshi's battalion, and ordered him to provide covering fire for Nir's assault on the Firdan bridge.[120]
At around 13:00, a reconnaissance group from 2nd Division discovered around 75 tanks concentrating north east of the bridgehead. Ten minutes later the Egyptians intercepted a radio signal in Hebrew. Nir was informing his command that he was ready to attack within twenty minutes. With little time left, Abu Sa'ada decided to take a risky move. Estimating, correctly, that the attack would come be directed between his two forward brigades, Abu Sa'ada planned to draw Israeli forces into his bridgehead to within three kilometers of the canal before engaging them from all sides. At 13:30, the attack was carried out by Amir and Nir's brigades. A lack of coordination and communication difficulties between both brigades hampered the attack. Nir's two battalions attacked at the same time in two echelons. The Egyptians allowed the Israelis to advance, then encircled them. As the attackers entered the pre-prepared killing zone, Egyptian armor of the 24th Brigade engaged the advancing tanks, their fire complemented by infantry anti-tank weapons on either flank of the Israeli forces, while tank hunting detachments attacked from the rear. Abu Sa'ada had committed all his anti-tank reserves. Within just 13 minutes, most of the Israeli force had been destroyed, and the Egyptians captured eight tanks intact. Among the captured were Lieutenant Colonel Asaf Yaguri, a battalion commander, whose unit lost 32 killed. By the end of the attack Nir had just four operational tanks remaining, including his own. Gabi Amir, attacking to Nir's right, was forced to halt his advance after encountering stiff resistance. Amir requested air support several times, but did not receive any.[108][121]
Egyptian advance
Operation Badr called for an enlargement of the bridgeheads on October 8. To accomplish this, each of the five infantry divisions had to reorganize its forces. The mechanized infantry brigade which formed the second echelon of a division's lines was to advance and push through the two forward infantry brigades. Thus the mechanized brigade would form the first line, the two infantry brigades would from the second line, and the reserve armored brigade would constitute a third echelon.[120]
During the afternoon of the 8th, Egyptian artillery barrages and air strikes took place along the entire front against opposing Israeli forces. The Israelis, who believed they were on the counter-offensive, were surprised at the sight of advancing Egyptian troops. Not all advancing Egyptian units managed to reach the 12 kilometres (7.5 mi) mark necessary to control Artillery Road, but each division held positions more than 9 kilometres (5.6 mi) deep.[109] In Second Army's sector, the 16th Infantry Division was the most successful by occupying the strategic positions of Mashchir, Televiza, Missouri and Hamutal; the latter was nearly 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) from the canal, and overlooked the juncture of Ismailia and Artillery Roads. Brigadier General 'Adil Yusri, commanding the attack on these positions, lost his leg while manning the forward command post. The deepest penetration was in Third Army's sector, where the bridgehead reached a depth of nearly 18 kilometres (11 mi).[2][108]
The Israelis now made an attempt to regain the lost ground. Keren organized his brigade for an assault on Hamutal Hill. While one battalion provided covering fire, two battalions under Lieutenant Colonels Dan Spair and Amir (not to be confused with the brigade commander Gabi Amir) attacked with 27 tanks. Nearly 1,000 metres (3,300 ft) from Egyptian positions, Dan Sapir was killed when his tank took a direct hit, disrupting his battalion's attack. Amir's battalion continued fighting until dusk after losing seven tanks.[108]
Gonen, starting to realise the gravity of Adan's position, ordered Sharon at 14:45 to pull back and return to his initial positions. Erez Armored Brigade arrived to offer assistance to Keren, but poor coordination between the commanders led to the failure of further attempts to capture Hamutal Hill.[108] By the end of the day Adan's division alone had lost around 100 tanks.[122]
Aftermath
Operation Badr was the opening battle of the Yom Kippur War in the Sinai, and the first major Arab victory against the Israelis in years.
By repelling a division-sized counterattack on October 8, and establishing bridgeheads on the east bank to a depth of around 15 kilometers, the Egyptians had accomplished the objectives of Operation Badr.[112][123] At the start of the war, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believed that the better-equipped Israelis would secure victory within a few days,[124] and thus tried to delay a ceasefire in the United Nations Security Council. The counterattack on October 8 however, came against American expectations. Kissinger was taken aback when told of the extent of Israel's losses on the morning of October 9 by Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, and asked "Explain to me, how could 400 tanks be lost to the Egyptians?" Meir had authorised the assembly of 13 atomic weapons the previous day, and nuclear-capable Jericho missiles and F-4s were readied for action. Dinitz may have threatened Kissinger with the use of nuclear weapons against Egypt and Syria in order to underline the urgency of Israel's situation and push the U.S. into initiating an airlift to replace Israel's losses. Later that day Kissinger relayed U.S. President Richard Nixon's decision to initiate Operation Nickel Grass – which aimed to replace all of Israel's material losses – to Dinitz.[125][126][127]
The prevailing view of Kissinger and many IDF officers on the Sinai Front was that the tide would quickly turn in their favor. The course of combat on October 8 thus came as a shock. At the end of the day Gonen, commented "It's not the Egyptian Army of 1967." In a press conference at night on October 8, not knowing that the counteroffensive had been defeated, Elazar claimed that the destruction of the Egyptian Army was underway, and that the IDF would soon "break their [the Arabs military personnel's] bones." He would later regret these statements.[122][128] Israeli commanders began to doubt Gonen's ability. In a meeting with Israeli commanders after midnight on October 9, Elazar decided to suspend offensive operations until the Syrians had been neutralized, especially since there were just 400 tanks left in the Sinai. Disregarding this new order, Sharon division mounted a major brigade-sized attack the following day. Despite initial successes, the Israelis had been repulsed by the end of the day with no gains, losing around 60 tanks in the process.[129] Gonen was furious at Sharon, not only because of his violation of the decision to remain on the defensive, but also because he had repeatedly disobeyed direct orders from Gonen on a number of occasions.[130] Elazar was equally livid, but rather than remove Sharon, an insubordinate but innovative commander with political connection to the opposition party, Elazar decided to replace Gonen, who had proven to be out of his depth, inept at being an operational commander. Former Chief of Staff Chaim Bar-Lev was brought out of retirement to replace Gonen. To avoid the appearance of firing him, Gonen was retained as deputy to Bar-Lev by Elazar. By October 10, the front settled into a stalemate.[131][132]
The success achieved by Operation Badr surprised Egyptian commanders, whose confidence soared. Sadat came under pressure to press the offensive towards the Sinai Passes, but remained unyielding, holding to the original goal of waging a limited war. Ahmed Ismail and Shazly were also on par with Sadat's opinion. However, appeals from the Syrians, whose situation was desperate by October 9, ultimately forced Sadat to change his mind for political reasons, against the protests of his commanders.[133] Consequently Egypt would lose the initiative to Israel when it launched its unsuccessful attack eastwards on October 14.
Political impact
Soon after the war, many Israelis demanded an impartial inquiry to investigate what became known as the machdal (the blunder), with a focus on the shortcomings of the government and the army, particularly their lack of preparedness for the attack and its ramifications. Golda Meir finally agreed to the formation of the Agranat Commission towards the end of November 1973. War veterans and members of the public attacked Meir and Moshe Dayan, while Israeli generals criticised one another's performance.[134]
While Meir and the Israeli Labor Party won the elections held in late-December, the release of the Agranat Commission's findings in April 1974 and its failure to accuse the nation's political leadership of any shortcomings – while recommending the dismissal of several senior officers – led to widespread public outrage. Meir resigned in response to public criticism, but Dayan remained steadfast. Eventually, the 1977 elections saw the end of Labor Party's unchallenged reign over Israeli politics with the election of Menachem Begin and the Likud Party.[134]
The 1973 war convinced the Israelis of the necessity of negotiations with the Arabs. This unprecedented willingness, coupled with Sadat's diplomatic initiatives and intercession by the United States to break barriers of mistrust between Egypt and Israel, made possible the long series of discussions between both nations. The negotiations ultimately resulted in the 1978 Camp David Agreements, and the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979. Thus, without resorting to another major war, Sadat had been able to regain the Sinai through diplomatic means.[135]
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- Hammad, Gamal (2002). Military Battles on the Egyptian Front (First ed.). Dār al-Shurūq. p. 903. ISBN 9770908665. Template:Ar icon
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Online Publication
- Gawrych, Dr. George W. (1996). The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. p. 97. In parts: