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Since nothing has arisen without depending on something, there is nothing that is not empty. (24.19) <ref>Bronkhorst (2009), p. 146.</ref></blockquote> |
Since nothing has arisen without depending on something, there is nothing that is not empty. (24.19) <ref>Bronkhorst (2009), p. 146.</ref></blockquote> |
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=== The two truths === |
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{{main|Two truths doctrine}}Beginning with [[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]], Mādhyamaka discerns [[Two truths doctrine|two levels of truth]], conventional truth (everyday [[Common sense|commonsense]] reality) and ultimate truth ([[Śūnyatā|emptiness]]).{{sfn|Cheng|1981}}<ref name=":5">Rje Tsong Khapa; Garfield, Jay; Geshe Ngawang Samten (translators), Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. xx.</ref> Ultimately, Mādhyamaka argues that all phenomena are empty of ''svabhava'' and only exist in dependence on other causes, conditions and concepts. Conventionally, Mādhyamaka holds that beings do perceive concrete objects which they are aware of empirically.{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=73}} In Madhyamaka this phenomenal world is the limited truth - <i>[[Samvriti|samvrti]] satya,</i> which literally means “to completely cover, conceal, or obscure” and arises due to [[Avidyā (Buddhism)|ignorance]].<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 80, 83.</ref> This seeming reality does not ''really'' exist as the highest truth realized by [[Prajñā (Buddhism)|wisdom]] which is <i>[[Paramārtha-satya|paramartha]] satya</i> (''parama'' is literally “supreme or ultimate,” and ''[[artha]]'' means “object, purpose, or actuality”)<i>,</i> and yet it has a kind of conventional reality which has its uses for reaching liberation.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 81.</ref> This limited truth includes everything, including the [[Gautama Buddha|Buddha]] himself, the teachings ([[Dharma]]), liberation and even Nāgārjuna's own arguments.<ref>Bronkhorst (2009), p. 149.</ref> This [[Two truths doctrine|two truth schema]] which did not deny the importance of convention allowed Nāgārjuna to defend himself against charges of [[nihilism]], understanding both correctly meant seeing the [[Middle Way|middle way]]:<blockquote>"Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught. Without understanding the ultimate, nirvana is not attained."<ref>Susan Kahn further explains: "The emptiness of emptiness refutes ultimate truth as yet another argument for essentialism under the guise of being beyond the conventional or as the foundation of it. To realize emptiness is not to find a transcendent place or truth to land in but to see the conventional as merely conventional. Here lies the key to liberation. For to see the deception is to be free of deception, like a magician who knows the magic trick. When one is no longer fooled by false appearances, phenomena are neither reified nor denied. They are understood interdependently, as ultimately empty and thus, as only conventionally real. This is the Middle Way."<ref group="web" name="Susan Kahn">[http://emptinessteachings.com/2014/09/11/the-two-truths-of-buddhism-and-the-emptiness-of-emptiness/ Susan Kahn, ''The Two Truths of Buddhism and The Emptiness of Emptiness.'']</ref></ref></blockquote>The limited, perceived reality is an experiential reality or a [[Nominalism|nominal]] reality which beings impute on the ultimate reality, it is not an ontological reality with substantial or independent existence.{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=73}}<ref name=":5" /> Hence, the two truths aren't two metaphysical realities, but according to Karl Brunnholzl, "the two realities refer to just what is experienced by two different types of beings with different types and scopes of perception."<ref name=":14">Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 74.</ref> As [[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]] says:<blockquote>It is through the perfect and the false seeing of all entities That the entities that are thus found bear two natures. The object of perfect seeing is true reality, And false seeing is seeming reality.</blockquote>This means that the distinction between the two truths is primarily [[Epistemology|epistemological]] and depending on the cognition of the observer, not [[Ontology|ontological]].<ref name=":14" /> As [[Shantideva]] says there are "two kinds of world", "the one of yogins and the one of common people."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 79.</ref> The seeming reality is the world of [[Saṃsāra|samsara]] because conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads to clinging and suffering. As [[Buddhapalita]] states: "unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them." <ref>Tsongkhapa, Garfield, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Volume 3), 2002, p. 210.</ref><p>According to Hayes, the two truths may also refer to two different goals in life: the highest goal of nirvana, and the lower goal of "commercial good". The highest goal is the liberation from attachment, both material ''and'' intellectual.{{sfn|Hayes|2003|p=8-9}}</p> |
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Madhyamaka discerns [[Two truths doctrine|two levels of truth]], conventional truth and ultimate truth,{{sfn|Cheng|1981}} to make clear that it does make sense to speak of existence. Ultimately, we realize that all phenomena are sunyata, empty of concrete existence. Conventionally, we ''do'' perceive concrete objects which we are aware of.{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=73}} Yet, this perceived reality is an experiential reality, not an ontological reality with substantial or independent existence.{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=73}} |
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=== The nature of ultimate reality === |
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The ultimate truth of ''sunyata'' does not refer to "nothingness" or "non-existence"; it refers to the absence of inherent existence.{{sfn|Chenh|1981}} |
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{{main|Śūnyatā}}According to Paul Williams, Nāgārjuna associates emptiness with the [[Two truths doctrine|ultimate truth]] but his conception of emptiness is not some kind of [[Absolute (philosophy)|Absolute]], but rather it is the very absence of true existence with regards to the conventional reality of things and events in the world.<ref>Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2002, p 147.</ref> Because the ultimate is itself empty, it is also explained as a "transcendence of deception" and hence is a kind of [[Apophatic theology|apophatic]] truth which experiences the lack of substance.<ref>Wynne, Alexander, Early Buddhist Teaching as Proto-sunyavada.</ref> |
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Because the nature of ultimate reality is said to be empty, even of "emptiness" itself, along with the very framework of the two truths are also conventional realities, and not part of the ultimate. This is often called "the emptiness of emptiness" and refers to the fact that even though Madhyamikas speak of emptiness as the ultimate unconditioned nature of things, this emptiness is itself empty of any real existence.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 111.</ref> |
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According to Hayes, the two truths may also refer to two different goals in life: the highest goal of nirvana, and the lower goal of "commercial good". The highest goal is the liberation from attachment, both material ''and'' intellectual.{{sfn|Hayes|2003|p=8-9}} |
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The two truths themselves are therefore just a practical tool used to teach others, but do not exist within the actual meditative equipoise that realizes the ultimate.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 75.</ref> As Candrakirti says: "the noble ones who have accomplished what is to be accomplished do not see anything that is delusive or not delusive."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 76.</ref> From within the experience of the enlightened ones there is only one reality which appears non-conceptually, as Nāgārjuna says in the Sixty stanzas on reasoning: "that nirvana is the sole reality, is what the Victors have declared."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 76-77.</ref> [[Bhāviveka|Bhāvaviveka's]] ''Madhyamakahrdayakārikā'' describes the ultimate truth through a negation of all four possibilities of the [[Catuṣkoṭi|''catuskoti'']]:<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 84.</ref><blockquote>Its character is neither existent, nor nonexistent, Nor both existent and nonexistent, nor neither. Centrists should know true reality That is free from these four possibilities.</blockquote>[[Atiśa|Atisha]] describes the ultimate as "here, there is no seeing and no seer, No beginning and no end, just peace...It is nonconceptual and nonreferential...it is inexpressible, unobservable, unchanging, and unconditioned."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 83-84.</ref> Because of the non-conceptual nature of the ultimate, according to Brunnholzl, the two truths are ultimately inexpressible as “one” or “different.”<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 89.</ref> |
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Insight into the emptiness of "things' is part of developing [[Wisdom in Buddhism|wisdom]], seeing things as they are. Conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads to clinging and suffering. [[Buddhapalita]] says: |
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{{quote|What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence. Unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them.|{{IAST|''Buddhapālita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti''}} P5242,73.5.6-74.1.2{{sfn|Tsong Khapa|2002}}}} |
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===The |
=== The middle way === |
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{{main|Middle Way}}As noted by Roger Jackson, non-Buddhist and Buddhist writers ancient and modern, have argued that the Mādhyamaka philosophy is [[Nihilism|nihilistic]] and this view has been challenged by others who argue that it is a [[Middle Way|middle way]] (''madhyamāpratipad'') between nihilism and eternalism.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oyJjCx_tEiMC&pg=PA4|title=The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy|author=Junjirō Takakusu|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|year=1998|isbn=978-81-208-1592-6|pages=4, 105–107}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i9gm9CzNd5EC|title=Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan|author=Hajime Nakamura|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|year=1991|isbn=978-81-208-0764-8|pages=590–591 footnote 20}}, Quote: "Already in India, 'sunyata' was liable to be misunderstood as nothingness or nihil'. (...) The [[Sarvastivada|Sarvastivadins]] of Hinayana Buddhism viewed the Madhyamika school as 'one that argues that everything is nothing. (...) It is only natural that most of the Western scholars call the ''prajnaparamita sutra'' or the doctrine of the Madhyamika school nihilism since criticisms were already expressed in India. Against such criticisms, however, Nagarjuna, founder of the Madhyamika school says, 'you are ignorant of the function of sunyata, the meaning of the sunyata and sunyata itself'."</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CjkRAQAAIAAJ|title=Mādhyamika Śūnyatā, a Reappraisal: A Reappraisal of Mādhyamika Philosophical Enterprise with Special Reference to Nāgārjuna and Chandrakīrti|author=G. C. Nayak|date=2001|publisher=Indian Council of Philosophical Research|isbn=978-81-85636-47-4|pages=9–12}}</ref> Mādhyamaka philosophers themselves explicitly rejected the nihilist interpretation, as Nāgārjuna writes: "through explaining true reality as it is, the seeming [<nowiki/>[[Samvriti|''samvrti'']]] does not become disrupted."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 212.</ref> [[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]] also responds to the charge of nihilism in his ''[[Prasannapada|Lucid Words]]'':<blockquote>Therefore, emptiness is taught in order to completely pacify all discursiveness without exception. So if the purpose of emptiness is the complete peace of all discursiveness and you just increase the web of discursiveness by thinking that the meaning of emptiness is nonexistence, you do not realize the purpose of emptiness [at all].<ref>Walser, Joseph, Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Culture, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 239.</ref></blockquote>Some scholars (Murti) interpret emptiness as described by Nāgārjuna as a Buddhist transcendental [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolute]], while other scholars such as [[David Kalupahana]] consider this a mistake since this would not make it a middle way.<ref name="ferrer1022">Jorge Noguera Ferrer, ''Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality.'' SUNY Press, 2002, page 102-103.</ref><ref>[[David J. Kalupahana]], ''Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way.'' SUNY Press, 1986, pages 48-50.</ref> |
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Ultimate truth also does not refer to "absolute truth," some absolute reality above or beyond the "relative reality."{{sfn|Cheng|1981}} On the contrary, emptiness itself is "empty" of inherent existence:{{sfn|Garfield|1994}} |
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{{quote|Ultimate truth does not point to a transcendent reality, but to the transcendence of deception. It is critical to emphasize that the ultimate truth of emptiness is a negational truth. In looking for inherently existent phenomena it is revealed that it cannot be found. This absence is not findable because it is not an entity, just as a room without an elephant in it does not contain an elephantless substance. Even conventionally, elephantlessness does not exist. Ultimate truth or emptiness does not point to an essence or nature, however subtle, that everything is made of.<ref group=web name="Susan Kahn" />{{refn|group=note|Susan Kahn further explains: "The emptiness of emptiness refutes ultimate truth as yet another argument for essentialism under the guise of being beyond the conventional or as the foundation of it. To realize emptiness is not to find a transcendent place or truth to land in but to see the conventional as merely conventional. Here lies the key to liberation. For to see the deception is to be free of deception, like a magician who knows the magic trick. When one is no longer fooled by false appearances, phenomena are neither reified nor denied. They are understood interdependently, as ultimately empty and thus, as only conventionally real. This is the Middle Way."<ref group=web name="Susan Kahn">[http://emptinessteachings.com/2014/09/11/the-two-truths-of-buddhism-and-the-emptiness-of-emptiness/ Susan Kahn, ''The Two Truths of Buddhism and The Emptiness of Emptiness.'']</ref>}}}} |
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===Essentialism and nihilism=== |
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What remains is the middle way between eternalism and annihilationism:{{sfn|Kalupahana|1994|p=165}} |
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{{quote|The object of the critique is to show that the eternalist view is untenable and further to show that the 'own-being' theory adopted by some Buddhists did not really differ, when its implications were strictly worked out, from the eternalist theory of [[Brahmanism]] (the theory of an [[Ātman (Hinduism)|eternal 'soul']] and other eternal 'substances').{{sfn|Warder|2000|p=361}}}} |
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These two views are considered to be the ''two extreme views'': |
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# ''Essentialism''{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}} or ''eternalism'' (sastavadava){{sfn|Warder|2000|p=361}} - a belief that things inherently exist and are therefore efficacious objects of [[tṛṣṇā|craving]] and [[Upādāna|clinging]];{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}} |
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# ''Nihilism''{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}} or ''annihilationism'' (ucchedavada){{sfn|Warder|2000|p=361}} - views that lead one to believe that there is no need to be responsible for one's actions. Nagarjuna argues that we naively and innately perceive things as substantial, and it is this predisposition which is the root delusion that lies at the basis of all suffering.{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}} |
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Madhyamaka represents the [[Middle way]] between them. |
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Mādhyamaka thinkers also argue that since things have the nature of lacking true existence or own being (''niḥsvabhāva''), all things are mere conceptual constructs (''prajñaptimatra'') because they are just impermanent collections of causes and conditions.<ref>Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2002, p 141.</ref> This also applies to the principle of causality itself, since ''everything'' is dependently originated.<ref>Williams, Paul. ''Buddhist Thought.'' Routledge 2000, page 142.</ref> Therefore in Mādhyamaka, phenomena appear to arise and cease, but in an ultimate sense they do not arise or remain as inherently existent phenomena.<ref name="Tsondru, Mabja 2011, pages 56-582">Tsondru, Mabja. ''Ornament of Reason.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 56-58, 405-417.</ref><ref>Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2002, p 151-152.</ref>{{refn|Chapter 21 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā goes into the reasoning behind this.<ref name="Tsondru, Mabja 2011, pages 56-58"/>|group=note}} This is believed by Madhyamaka philosophers to show that both views of [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolute]] or eternalist existence (such as the Hindu ideas of [[Brahman]] or ''sat-dravya'') and [[nihilism]] are untenable<ref>Tsondru, Mabja. ''Ornament of Reason.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 56-58, 405-417</ref><ref>unclear</ref>{{sfn|Warder|2000|p=361}} These two views are considered to be the ''two extremes'' that Madhyamaka steers clear from:<ol><li>''Essentialism''{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}} or <i>eternalism</i> (sastavadava){{sfn|Warder|2000|p=361}} - a belief that things inherently or substantially exist and are therefore efficacious objects of [[Tṛṣṇā|craving]] and [[Upādāna|clinging]];{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}} Nagarjuna argues that we naively and innately perceive things as substantial, and it is this predisposition which is the root delusion that lies at the basis of all suffering.{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}}</li><li>''Nihilism''{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}} or ''annihilationism'' (ucchedavada){{sfn|Warder|2000|p=361}} - views that lead one to believe that there is no need to be responsible for one's actions, such as the idea one is annihilated at death or that nothing has causal effects, but also the idea that absolutely nothing exists.</li></ol> |
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===The limits of language=== |
===The limits of language=== |
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Madhyamaka uses language to make clear the limits of our concepts. Ultimately, reality cannot be depicted by concepts.{{sfn|Cheng|1981}}{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=102}} This creates a tension, since it does have to use concepts to convey its teachings: |
Madhyamaka uses language to make clear the limits of our concepts. Ultimately, reality cannot be depicted by concepts.{{sfn|Cheng|1981}}{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=102}} This creates a tension, since it does have to use concepts to convey its teachings: |
Revision as of 22:44, 6 September 2018
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Mādhyamaka ("Middle position" or "Centrism"; Sanskrit: Mādhyamaka, Chinese: 中觀见; pinyin: Zhōngguān Jìan, Tibetan: dbu ma pa) also known as Śūnyavāda (the emptiness doctrine) and Niḥsvabhāvavāda (the no svabhāva doctrine) refers to a tradition of Buddhist philosophy founded by the Indian Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250 CE) and also to the inner meditative experience which this philosophy points to.[1][2][3] Mādhyamaka had a major influence on the subsequent development of the Mahayana Buddhist tradition. It is the dominant interpretation of Buddhist philosophy in Tibetan Buddhism and has also been influential in East Asian Buddhist thought.
According to the classical Mādhyamaka thinkers, all phenomena (dharmas) are empty (śūnya) of "nature,"[4] a "substance" or "essence" (svabhāva) which gives them "solid and independent existence,"[5] because they are dependently co-arisen. But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.[6][7][8]
Etymology
Madhya is a Sanskrit word meaning "middle". It is cognate with Latin med-iu-s and English mid. The -ma suffix is a superlative, giving madhyama the meaning of "mid-most" or "medium". The -ka suffix is used to form adjectives, thus madhyamaka means "middleling". The -ika suffix is used to form possessives, with a collective sense, thus mādhyamika mean "belonging to the mid-most" (the -ika suffix regularly causes a lengthening of the first vowel and elision of the final -a).
In a Buddhist context these terms refer to the "middle path" (madhyama pratipada) between the extremes of annihilationism (ucchedavāda) and eternalism (śassatavāda), for example:
ity etāv ubhāv antāv anupagamya madhyamayā pratipadā tathāgato dharmaṃ deśayati | - Kātyāyana Sūtra.
Thus, the Tathāgata teaches the Dharma by a middle path avoiding both these extremes.
- Madhyamaka refers to the school of thought associated with Nāgārjuna and his commentators.
- Mādhyamika refers to adherents of the Madhyamaka school.
Note that in both words the stress is on the first syllable.
Philosophical overview
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Svabhāva, what Mādhyamaka denies
Central to Mādhyamaka philosophy is śūnyatā, "emptiness", and this refers to the central idea that dharmas are empty of svabhāva.[9] This term has been translated variously as essence, intrinsic nature, inherent existence, own being and substance.[10][11][9] Furthermore, according to Richard P. Hayes, svabhava can be interpreted as either "identity" or as "causal independence".[12] Likewise, Westerhoff notes that svabhāva is a complex concept that has ontological and cognitive aspects. The ontological aspects include svabhāva as essence, as a property which makes an object what it is, as well as svabhāva as substance, meaning, as the Mādhyamaka thinker Candrakirti defines it, something that does "not depend on anything else".[9] It is substance-svabhāva, the objective and independent existence of any object or concept, which Mādhyamaka arguments mostly focus on refuting.[13] A common structure which Mādhyamaka uses to negate svabhāva is the catuṣkoṭi ("four corners" or tetralemma), which roughly consists of four alternatives: some proposition is true, it is false, it is both, or it is neither true or false. Some of the major topics discussed by classical Mādhyamaka include causality, change, and personal identity.[14]
Mādhyamaka's denial of svabhāva does not mean a nihilistic denial of all things, for in a conventional everyday sense, Mādhyamaka does accept that one can speak of "things", and yet ultimately these things are empty of inherent existence.[15] Furthermore, "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.[6][7][8]
Svabhāva's cognitive aspect is merely a superimposition (samāropa) that beings make when they perceive and conceive of things. In this sense then, emptiness does not exist as some kind of primordial reality, but it is simply a corrective to a mistaken conception of how things exist.[11] This idea of svabhāva that Mādhyamaka denies is then not just a conceptual philosophical theory, but it is a cognitive distortion that beings automatically impose on the world, such as when we regard the five aggregates as constituting a single self. Candrakirti compares it to someone who suffers from vitreous floaters that cause the illusion of hairs appearing in their visual field.[16] This cognitive dimension of svabhāva means that just understanding and assenting to Mādhyamaka reasoning is not enough to end the suffering caused by our reification of the world, just like understanding how an optical illusion works does not make it stop functioning. What is required is a kind of cognitive shift (termed realization) in the way the world appears and therefore some kind of practice to lead to this shift.[17] As Candrakirti says:
For one on the road of cyclic existence who pursues an inverted view due to ignorance, a mistaken object such as the superimposition (samāropa) on the aggregates appears as real, but it does not appear to one who is close to the view of the real nature of things.[18]
Much of Mādhyamaka philosophy centers on showing how various essentialist ideas have absurd conclusions through reductio ad absurdum arguments (known as prasanga in Sanskrit). Chapter 15 of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā centers on the words svabhava [note 1] parabhava[note 2] bhava [note 3] and abhava.[note 4] According to Peter Harvey:
Nagarjuna's critique of the notion of own-nature[note 5] (Mk. ch. 15) argues that anything which arises according to conditions, as all phenomena do, can have no inherent nature, for what is depends on what conditions it. Moreover, if there is nothing with own-nature, there can be nothing with 'other-nature' (para-bhava), i.e. something which is dependent for its existence and nature on something else which has own-nature. Furthermore, if there is neither own-nature nor other-nature, there cannot be anything with a true, substantial existent nature (bhava). If there is no true existent, then there can be no non-existent (abhava).[24]
An important element of Mādhyamaka refutation is that the classical Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising (the idea that every phenomena is dependent on other phenomena) cannot be reconciled with "a conception of self-nature or substance" and that therefore essence theories are contrary not only to the Buddhist scriptures but to the very ideas of causality and change.[25] Any enduring essential nature would prevent any causal interaction, or any kind of origination. For things would simply always have been, and will always continue to be, without any change.[26][note 6] As Nāgārjuna writes in the MMK:
We state that conditioned origination is emptiness. It is mere designation depending on something, and it is the middle path. (24.18) Since nothing has arisen without depending on something, there is nothing that is not empty. (24.19) [27]
The two truths
Beginning with Nāgārjuna, Mādhyamaka discerns two levels of truth, conventional truth (everyday commonsense reality) and ultimate truth (emptiness).[6][28] Ultimately, Mādhyamaka argues that all phenomena are empty of svabhava and only exist in dependence on other causes, conditions and concepts. Conventionally, Mādhyamaka holds that beings do perceive concrete objects which they are aware of empirically.[29] In Madhyamaka this phenomenal world is the limited truth - samvrti satya, which literally means “to completely cover, conceal, or obscure” and arises due to ignorance.[30] This seeming reality does not really exist as the highest truth realized by wisdom which is paramartha satya (parama is literally “supreme or ultimate,” and artha means “object, purpose, or actuality”), and yet it has a kind of conventional reality which has its uses for reaching liberation.[31] This limited truth includes everything, including the Buddha himself, the teachings (Dharma), liberation and even Nāgārjuna's own arguments.[32] This two truth schema which did not deny the importance of convention allowed Nāgārjuna to defend himself against charges of nihilism, understanding both correctly meant seeing the middle way:
"Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught. Without understanding the ultimate, nirvana is not attained."Cite error: A
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The limited, perceived reality is an experiential reality or a nominal reality which beings impute on the ultimate reality, it is not an ontological reality with substantial or independent existence.[29][28] Hence, the two truths aren't two metaphysical realities, but according to Karl Brunnholzl, "the two realities refer to just what is experienced by two different types of beings with different types and scopes of perception."[33] As Candrakirti says:
It is through the perfect and the false seeing of all entities That the entities that are thus found bear two natures. The object of perfect seeing is true reality, And false seeing is seeming reality.
This means that the distinction between the two truths is primarily epistemological and depending on the cognition of the observer, not ontological.[33] As Shantideva says there are "two kinds of world", "the one of yogins and the one of common people."[34] The seeming reality is the world of samsara because conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads to clinging and suffering. As Buddhapalita states: "unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them." [35]
According to Hayes, the two truths may also refer to two different goals in life: the highest goal of nirvana, and the lower goal of "commercial good". The highest goal is the liberation from attachment, both material and intellectual.[36]
The nature of ultimate reality
According to Paul Williams, Nāgārjuna associates emptiness with the ultimate truth but his conception of emptiness is not some kind of Absolute, but rather it is the very absence of true existence with regards to the conventional reality of things and events in the world.[37] Because the ultimate is itself empty, it is also explained as a "transcendence of deception" and hence is a kind of apophatic truth which experiences the lack of substance.[38]
Because the nature of ultimate reality is said to be empty, even of "emptiness" itself, along with the very framework of the two truths are also conventional realities, and not part of the ultimate. This is often called "the emptiness of emptiness" and refers to the fact that even though Madhyamikas speak of emptiness as the ultimate unconditioned nature of things, this emptiness is itself empty of any real existence.[39]
The two truths themselves are therefore just a practical tool used to teach others, but do not exist within the actual meditative equipoise that realizes the ultimate.[40] As Candrakirti says: "the noble ones who have accomplished what is to be accomplished do not see anything that is delusive or not delusive."[41] From within the experience of the enlightened ones there is only one reality which appears non-conceptually, as Nāgārjuna says in the Sixty stanzas on reasoning: "that nirvana is the sole reality, is what the Victors have declared."[42] Bhāvaviveka's Madhyamakahrdayakārikā describes the ultimate truth through a negation of all four possibilities of the catuskoti:[43]
Its character is neither existent, nor nonexistent, Nor both existent and nonexistent, nor neither. Centrists should know true reality That is free from these four possibilities.
Atisha describes the ultimate as "here, there is no seeing and no seer, No beginning and no end, just peace...It is nonconceptual and nonreferential...it is inexpressible, unobservable, unchanging, and unconditioned."[44] Because of the non-conceptual nature of the ultimate, according to Brunnholzl, the two truths are ultimately inexpressible as “one” or “different.”[45]
The middle way
As noted by Roger Jackson, non-Buddhist and Buddhist writers ancient and modern, have argued that the Mādhyamaka philosophy is nihilistic and this view has been challenged by others who argue that it is a middle way (madhyamāpratipad) between nihilism and eternalism.[46][47][48] Mādhyamaka philosophers themselves explicitly rejected the nihilist interpretation, as Nāgārjuna writes: "through explaining true reality as it is, the seeming [samvrti] does not become disrupted."[49] Candrakirti also responds to the charge of nihilism in his Lucid Words:
Therefore, emptiness is taught in order to completely pacify all discursiveness without exception. So if the purpose of emptiness is the complete peace of all discursiveness and you just increase the web of discursiveness by thinking that the meaning of emptiness is nonexistence, you do not realize the purpose of emptiness [at all].[50]
Some scholars (Murti) interpret emptiness as described by Nāgārjuna as a Buddhist transcendental absolute, while other scholars such as David Kalupahana consider this a mistake since this would not make it a middle way.[51][52] Mādhyamaka thinkers also argue that since things have the nature of lacking true existence or own being (niḥsvabhāva), all things are mere conceptual constructs (prajñaptimatra) because they are just impermanent collections of causes and conditions.[53] This also applies to the principle of causality itself, since everything is dependently originated.[54] Therefore in Mādhyamaka, phenomena appear to arise and cease, but in an ultimate sense they do not arise or remain as inherently existent phenomena.[55][56][note 7] This is believed by Madhyamaka philosophers to show that both views of absolute or eternalist existence (such as the Hindu ideas of Brahman or sat-dravya) and nihilism are untenable[58][59][15] These two views are considered to be the two extremes that Madhyamaka steers clear from:
- Essentialism[60] or eternalism (sastavadava)[15] - a belief that things inherently or substantially exist and are therefore efficacious objects of craving and clinging;[60] Nagarjuna argues that we naively and innately perceive things as substantial, and it is this predisposition which is the root delusion that lies at the basis of all suffering.[60]
- Nihilism[60] or annihilationism (ucchedavada)[15] - views that lead one to believe that there is no need to be responsible for one's actions, such as the idea one is annihilated at death or that nothing has causal effects, but also the idea that absolutely nothing exists.
The limits of language
Madhyamaka uses language to make clear the limits of our concepts. Ultimately, reality cannot be depicted by concepts.[6][61] This creates a tension, since it does have to use concepts to convey its teachings:
This dynamic philosophical tension—a tension between the Madhyamika accounts of the limits of what can be coherently said and its analytical ostension of what cannot be said without paradox but must be understood—must constantly be borne in mind in reading the text. It is not an incoherent mysticism, but it is a logical tightrope act at the very limits of language and metaphysics.[61]
Liberation
The ultimate aim of understanding emptiness is not philosophical insight as such, but to gain a liberated mind which does not dwell upon concepts. To realize this, meditation on emptiness may proceed in stages, starting with the emptiness of both self, objects and mental states,[62] culminating in a "natural state of nonreferential freedom."[63][note 8]
Origins and sources
The Mādhyamaka school is usually considered to have been founded by Nāgārjuna, though it may have existed earlier.[64] Various scholars have noted that some of themes in the work of Nāgārjuna can also be found in earlier Buddhist sources.
Early Buddhist Texts
It is well known that the only sutra that Nāgārjuna explicitly cites in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Chapter 15.7) is the "Advice to Kātyāyana", stating that "according to the Instructions to Katyayana, both existence and nonexistence are criticized by the Blessed One who opposed being and non-being."[65] This appears to have been a Sanskrit version of the Kaccānagotta Sutta (Saṃyutta Nikāya ii.16-17).[65] The Kaccānagotta Sutta itself says:
This world, Kaccana, for the most part depends on a duality–upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world.[65]
Joseph Walser also points out that verse six of chapter 15 contains an allusion to the “Mahahatthipadopama sutta”, another sutta of the Nidanavagga, the collection which also contains the Kaccānagotta, and which contains various suttas that focus on the avoidance of extreme views, which are all held to be associated with either the extreme of eternality (sasvata) or the extreme of disruption (uccheda).[65] Another allusion to an early buddhist text noted by Walser is in Nāgārjuna's Ratnavali chapter 1, where he makes reference to a statement in the Kevaddha sutta.[66]
The Aṭṭhakavagga (Pali, "Octet Chapter") and the Pārāyanavagga (Pali, "Way to the Far Shore Chapter") are two small collections of suttas within the Pāli Canon of Theravada Buddhism.[note 9] They are among the earliest existing Buddhist literature, and place considerable emphasis on the rejection of, or non-attachment to, all views. Gomez compared them to later Madhyamaka philosophy, which in its Prasaṅgika form especially makes a method of rejecting others' views rather than proposing its own.[67]
Tillman Vetter, although agreeing overall with Gomez's observations, suggests some refinements on historical and doctrinal grounds.[68] First, he notes that neither of these short collections of suttas are homogeneous and hence are not all amenable to Gomez' proposals. According to Vetter, those suttas which do lend support to Gomez probably originated with a heterodox ascetic group that pre-dated the Buddha, and were integrated into the Buddhist Sangha at an early date, bringing with them some suttas that were already in existence and also composing further suttas in which they tried to combine their own teachings with those of the Buddha.[68]
Paul Fuller has rejected the arguments of Gomez and Vetter.[69] He finds that
... the Nikayas and the Atthakavagga present the same cognitive attitude toward views, wrong or right.[70]
Alexander Wynne also rejects both of Vetter's claims that the Parayanavagga shows a chronological stratification, and a different attitude toward mindfulness and liberating insight than do other works.[71][note 10]
Abhidharma and early Buddhist schools
The Mādhyamaka school has been perhaps simplistically regarded as a reaction against the development of Buddhist Abhidharma, however according to Joseph Walser, this is problematic.[72] In Abhidharma, dharmas are characterized by defining traits (lakṣaṇa) or own-existence (svabhāva). The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya states for example: “dharma means ‘upholding,’ [namely], upholding intrinsic nature (svabhāva)”, while the Mahāvibhāṣā states “intrinsic nature is able to uphold its own identity and not lose it”.[73] However this does not mean that all Abhidharma systems hold that dharmas exist independently in an ontological sense, since all Buddhist schools hold that (most) dharmas are dependently originated, this doctrine being a central core Buddhist view, rather in Abhidharma, svabhāva is typically something which arises dependent on other conditions and qualities.[73] Svabhāva in the early Abhidharma systems then, is not a kind of ontological essentialism, but it is a way to categorize dharmas according to their distinctive characteristics. According to Noa Ronkin, the idea of svabhava evolved towards ontological dimension in the Sarvāstivādin Vaibhasika school's interpretation, which began to also use the term dravya which means "real existence".[73] This then, may have been the shift which Nagarjuna sought to attack when he targets certain Sarvastivada tenets.
However, the relationship between Madhyamaka and Abhidharma is complex, as Joseph Walser notes, "Nagarjuna’s position vis-à-vis abhidharma is neither a blanket denial nor a blanket acceptance. Nagarjuna’s arguments entertain certain abhidharmic standpoints while refuting others."[72] One example can be seen in Nagarjuna's Ratnavali which makes supports the study of a list of 57 moral faults which he takes from an Abhidharma text named the Ksudravastuka.[74] Abhidharmic analysis figures prominently in Madhyamaka treatises, and authoritative commentators like Candrakīrti emphasize that Abhidharmic categories function as a viable (and favored) system of conventional truths - they are more refined than ordinary categories, and they are not dependent on either the extreme of eternalism or on the extreme view of the discontinuity of karma, as the non-Buddhist categories of the time did.
Walser also notes that Nagarjuna's theories have much in common with the view of a sub-sect of the Mahasamgikas called the Prajñaptivadins, who held that suffering was prajñapti (designation by provisional naming) "based on conditioned entities that are themselves reciprocally designated" (anyonya prajñapti).[75] David Burton argues that for Nagarjuna, "dependently arisen entities have merely conceptually constructed existence (prajñaptisat)".[75] Commenting on this, Walser writes that "Nagarjuna is arguing for a thesis that the Prajñaptivádins already held, using a concept of prajñapti that they were already using."[76]
Prajñāpāramitā
Madhyamaka thought is also closely related to a number of Mahāyāna sources; traditionally, the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras are the literature most closely associated with Madhyamaka – understood, at least in part, as an exegetical complement to those Sūtras. Traditional accounts also depict Nāgārjuna as retrieving some of the larger Prajñāpāramitā sūtras from the world of the Nāgas (explaining in part the etymology of his name). Prajñā or ‘higher cognition’ is a recurrent term in Buddhist texts, explained as a synonym of Abhidharma, ‘insight’ (vipaśyanā) and ‘analysis of the dharmas’ (dharmapravicaya). Within a specifically Mahāyāna context, Prajñā figures as the most prominent in a list of Six Pāramitās (‘perfections’ or ‘perfect masteries’) that a Bodhisattva needs to cultivate in order to eventually achieve Buddhahood. Madhyamaka offers conceptual tools to analyze all possible elements of existence, allowing the practitioner to elicit through reasoning and contemplation the type of view that the Sūtras express more authoritatively (being considered word of the Buddha) but less explicitly (not offering corroborative arguments). The vast Prajñāpāramitā literature emphasizes the development of higher cognition in the context of the Bodhisattva path; thematically, its focus on the emptiness of all dharmas is closely related to the Madhyamaka approach. Allusions to the prajñaparamita sutras can be found in Nagarjuna's work. One example is in the opening stanza of the Root Verses on the Middle Way, which seem to allude to the following statement found in two prajñaparamita texts:
And how does he wisely know conditioned co-production? He wisely knows it as neither production, nor stopping, neither cut oª nor eternal, neither single nor manifold, neither coming nor going away, as the appeasement of all futile discoursings, and as bliss.[65]
The first stanza of Nagarjuna's root verses meanwhile, state:
I pay homage to the Fully Enlightened One whose true, venerable words teach dependent-origination to be the blissful pacification of all mental proliferation, neither production, nor stopping, neither cut off nor eternal, neither single nor manifold, neither coming, nor going away.[65]
Pyrrhonism
Because of the high degree of similarity between Madhyamaka and Pyrrhonism,[77] Thomas McEvilley[78] and Matthew Neale[79] suspect that Nāgārjuna was influenced by Greek Pyrrhonist texts imported into India. Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-c. 270 BCE), who is credited with founding this school of skeptical philosophy, was himself influenced by Buddhist philosophy during his stay in India with Alexander the Great's army.
Indian Mādhyamaka
Nāgārjuna
Kalupahana has argued that Nāgārjuna's intention was not to establish an ontology or epistemology, but to free the Buddhist soteriology from essentialist notions which obscured the Buddhist Middle Way:[80]
Āryadeva
Nāgārjuna's pupil Āryadeva (3rd century CE) emphasized the Bodhisattva-ideal. His works are regarded as a supplement to Nāgārjuna's,[81] on which he commented.[82] Āryadeva also refuted the theories of non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools.[82]
Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka
Buddhapālita (470–550) has been understood as the origin of the prāsaṅgika approach.[83] He was criticized by Bhāvaviveka (ca.500–ca.578), who argued for the use of syllogisms "to set one's own doctrinal stance".[84] Bhāvya/Bhāvaviveka was influenced by the Yogācāra school.
The opposing approaches of Buddhapālita and Bhāvya are explained by later Tibetan doxographers as the origin of a subdivision of Madhyamaka into two schools, the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika.
Candrakīrti
Candrakīrti (600–c. 650) wrote the Prasannapadā (Clear Words), a highly influential commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. This commentary is central in the understanding of Madhyamaka in Tibetan Buddhism.
Śāntideva
Śāntideva (end 7th century – first half 8th century) is well known for his Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life. He united "a deep religiousness and joy of exposure together with the unquestioned Madhyamaka orthodoxy".[85]
Shantarakshita
A Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka synthesis was posited by Shantarakshita in the 8th century[note 11] and may have been common at Nalanda University at that time. Like the Prāsaṅgika, this view approaches ultimate truth through the prasaṅga method, yet when speaking of conventional reality they may make autonomous statements like the earlier Svātantrika and Yogācāra approaches.
This was different from the earlier Svatantrika in that the conventional truth was described in terms of the theory of consciousness-only instead of the tenets of Svatantrika, though neither was used to analyze for ultimate truth.
For example, they may assert that all phenomena are nothing but the "play of mind" and hence empty of concrete existence—and that mind is in turn empty of defining characteristics. But in doing so, they're careful to point out that any such example would be an approximate ultimate and not the true ultimate. By making such autonomous statements, Yogācāra-Svatantrika-Madhyamaka is often mistaken as a Svātantrika or Yogācāra view, even though a Prāsaṅgika approach was used in analysis.[86] This view is thus a synthesis of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra.
Tibetan Buddhism
Madhyamaka philosophy obtained a central position in all the main Tibetan Buddhist schools, all whom consider themselves to be Madhyamikas. Madhyamaka thought has been categorized in various ways in India and Tibet.[note 12]
Early transmission
Influential early figures who are important in the transmission of Madhyamaka to Tibet include the Yogacara-Madhyamika Śāntarakṣita (725–788), and his students Haribhadra and Kamalashila (740-795) as well as the later figures of Atisha (982–1054) and his pupil Dromtön (1005–1064) who were mainly influenced by Candrakirti's Madhyamaka.[87]
The early transmission of Buddhism to Tibet saw these two main strands of philosophical views in debate with each other. The first was the camp which defended the Yogacara-Madhyamaka interpretation centered on the works of the scholars of the Sangphu monastery founded by Ngog Loden Sherab (1059-1109) and also includes Chapa Chokyi Senge (1109-1169).[88] The second camp was those who championed the work of Candrakirti over the Yogacara-Madhyamaka interpretation, and included Patsab Nyima Drag (b. 1055) and Jayananda (fl 12th century).[88] According to John Dunne, it was the Madhyamaka interpretation and the works of Candrakirti which became dominant over time in Tibet.[88]
Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika interpretations
In Tibetan Buddhist scholarship, a distinction began to be made between the Autonomist (Svātantrika, rang rgyud pa) and Consequentialist (Prāsaṅgika, Thal ’gyur pa) approaches to Madhyamaka reasoning. The distinction was one invented by Tibetans, and not one made by classical Indian Madhyamikas.[89] Tibetans mainly use the terms to refer to the logical procedures used by Bhavaviveka (who argued for the use of svatantra-anumana or autonomous syllogisms) and Buddhapalita (who held that one should only use prasanga, or reductio ad absurdum).[90] Tibetan Buddhism further divides svātantrika into into Sautrantika Svātantrika Madhyamaka (applied to Bhāviveka), and Yogācāra Svātantrika Madhyamaka (Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla).[91]
The svātantrika states that conventional phenomena are understood to have a conventional essential existence, but without an ultimately existing essence. In this way they believe they are able to make positive or "autonomous" assertions using syllogistic logic because they are able to share a subject that is established as appearing in common - the proponent and opponent use the same kind of valid cognition to establish it. The name comes from this quality of being able to use autonomous arguments in debate.[90] In contrast, the central technique avowed by the prasaṅgika is to show by prasaṅga (or reductio ad absurdum) that any positive assertion (such as "asti" or "nāsti", "it is", or "it is not") or view regarding phenomena must be regarded as merely conventional (saṃvṛti or lokavyavahāra). The prāsaṅgika holds that it is not necessary for the proponent and opponent to use the same kind of valid cognition (pramana) to establish a common subject; indeed it is possible to change the view of an opponent through a reductio argument.
Although presented as a divide in doctrine, the major difference between svātantrika and prasangika may be between two style of reasoning and arguing, while the division itself is exclusively Tibetan. Tibetan scholars were aware of alternative Madhyamaka sub-classifications, but later Tibetan doxography emphasizes the nomenclature of prāsaṅgika versus svātantrika. No conclusive evidence can show the existence of an Indian antecedent, and it is not certain to what degree individual writers in Indian and Tibetan discussion held each of these views and if they held a view generally or only in particular instances. Both Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas cited material in the āgamas in support of their arguments.[92]
The Tibetan Longchen Rabjam noted in the 14th century that Candrakirti favored the prasaṅga approach when specifically discussing the analysis for ultimacy, but otherwise he made positive assertions such as when describing the paths of Buddhist practice in his Madhyamakavatāra. Therefore even prāsaṅgikas make positive assertions when discussing conventional practice, they simply stick to using reductios specifically when analyzing for ultimate truth.[90]
Jonang and shentong
Further Tibetan philosophical developments began in response to the works of the scholar Dölpopa Shérap Gyeltsen (1292–1361) and led to two distinctly opposed Tibetan Madhyamaka views on the nature of ultimate reality.[93][94] Dolpopa, founder of the Jonang school, viewed the Buddha and Buddha Nature as not intrinsically empty, but as truly real, unconditioned, and replete with eternal, changeless virtues.[95] In the Jonang school, ultimate reality, i.e. Buddha Nature (tathagatagarbha) is only empty of what is impermanent and conditioned (conventional reality), not of its own self which is ultimate Buddhahood and the luminous nature of mind.[96] In Jonang, this ultimate reality is a "ground or substratum" which is "uncreated and indestructible, noncomposite and beyond the chain of dependent origination."[97] An important Tibetan treatise on Emptiness and the Buddha Nature is found in Dolpopa's voluminous study, Mountain Doctrine.[98] Basing himself on the Indian Tathāgatagarbha sūtras as his main sources, Dolpopa described the Buddha Nature as:
[N]on-material emptiness, emptiness that is far from an annihilatory emptiness, great emptiness that is the ultimate pristine wisdom of superiors ...Buddha earlier than all Buddhas, ... causeless original Buddha.[99]
This "great emptiness" i.e. the tathāgatagarbha is said to be filled with eternal powers and virtues:
[P]ermanent, stable, eternal, everlasting. Not compounded by causes and conditions, the matrix-of-one-gone-thus is intrinsically endowed with ultimate buddha qualities of body, speech, and mind such as the ten powers; it is not something that did not exist before and is newly produced; it is self-arisen.'[100]
The Jonang position came to be known as "emptiness of other" (gzhan stong, shentong), because it held that the ultimate truth was positive reality that was not empty of its own nature, only empty of what it was other than itself.[101] Dolpopa considered his view a form of Madhyamaka, and called his system "Great Madhyamaka".[102] Dolpopa opposed what he called rangtong (self-empty), the view that ultimate reality is that which is empty of self nature in a relative and absolute sense, that is to say that it is empty of everything, including itself. It is thus not a transcendental ground or metaphysical absolute which includes all the eternal Buddha qualities. This rangtong shentong distinction became a central issue of contention among Tibetan Buddhist philosophers.
Alternative interpretations of the shentong view is also taught outside of Jonang. Some Kagyu figures, like Jamgon Kongtrul (1813–1899) as well as the unorthodox Sakya philosopher Sakya Chokden (1428–1507), supported their own forms of shentong.
Tsongkhapa and Gelug
The Gelug school was founded by Je Tsongkhapa's reforms to Atisha's Kadam tradition in the 14th century.[note 13] Tsongkhapa emphasized compassion and insight into emptiness.
In his Ocean of Reasoning, Tsongkhapa comments on the Mulamadhyamakakarika.[103] According to Tsongkhapa, Nagarjuna uses the term svabhava to refer to sunyata as the nature of reality:[104]
Their nature of emptiness is their reality nature.[105]
This is in line with the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra:
Subhuti, since the five aggregates are without nature, they have a nature of emptiness.[105]
Although Tsongkhapa argued in favour of Yogacara views early in his career[106] his later understanding is derived from Candrakirti,[107] who states that conventionally there are entities with distinguishing characteristics, but ultimately those qualities are not independent essences. But since this emptiness is true for everything that exists, this emptiness may also be regarded as an essence, though not in the sense of an independent essence. Candrakirti formulates a final negation by stating that even the denial of svabhava implies ...
...that either oneself or one's audience is not entirely free from the belief in svabhava. Therefore, ultimate truth, truth as it is for those who are free from misknowledge, cannot be expressed by asserting either the existence or nonexistence of svahbava.[108]
Sakya
The Sakya school has generally held a classic prāsaṅgika position following Candrakirti closely, though with significant differences from the Gelug. Sakya scholars of Madhyamika, such as Rendawa Shyönnu Lodrö (1349–1412) and Rongtön Sheja Kunrig (1367–1450) were early critics of the "other empty" view.[109]
Gorampa Sonam Senge (1429-1489) was an important philosopher which defended the orthodox Sakya Madhyamika position, critiquing both Dolpopa and Tsongkhapa's interpretations. According to Cabezón, Gorampa called his version of Madhyamaka "the Middle Way qua freedom from extremes" (mtha’ bral dbu ma) or "Middle Way qua freedom from proliferations" (spros bral kyi dbu ma) and claimed that the ultimate truth was ineffable, beyond predication or concept.[110] Cabezón states that Gorampa's interpretation of Madhyamaka is "committed to a more literal reading of the Indian sources than either Dolpopa’s or Tsongkhapa’s, which is to say that it tends to take the Indian texts at face value."[111] For Gorampa, emptiness is not just the absence of inherent existence, but it is the absence of the four extremes in all phenomena i.e. existence, nonexistence, both and neither (see: catuskoti), without any further qualification.[112] Hence, in contrast to the view of Tsongkhapa for example, Gorampa's Madhyamaka negates existence itself, instead of (as in Tsongkhapa), merely negating "ultimate existence" or "inherent existence".[112] Gorampa also saw the ultimate truth of emptiness as being divided into two parts:[112]
- The emptiness that is reached by rational analysis (this is actually only an analogue, and not the real thing).
- The emptiness that yogis fathom by means of their own individual gnosis, the real ultimate truth, which is reached by negating the previous rational understanding of emptiness.
Unlike most orthodox Sakyas, the philosopher Sakya Chokden, a contemporary of Gorampa, also promoted a form of shentong as being complementary to rangtong. He saw shentong as useful for meditative practice, while rangtong as useful for cutting through views. [113]
Kagyu
In the Kagyu tradition, there is a broad field of opinion on the nature of emptiness, with some holding the other empty view while others holding different positions. One influential Kagyu thinker was Rangjung Dorje, 3rd Karmapa Lama. His view synthesized Madhyamaka and Yogacara perspectives. According to Brunnholzl, regarding his position in the rangtong shentong debate he "can be said to regard these two as not being mutually exclusive and to combine them in a creative synthesis."[114] However, Rangjung Dorje never uses these terms in any of his works and thus any claims to him being a promoter of shentong or otherwise is a later interpretation.[115]
Several Kagyu figures disagree with the view that shentong is a form of Madhyamaka. According to Brunnholzl, Mikyö Dorje, 8th Karmapa Lama (1507–1554) and Second Pawo Rinpoche Tsugla Trengwa see the term "Shentong Madhyamaka" as a misnomer, for them the Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu and the system of Nagarjuna are "two clearly distinguished systems". They also refute the idea that there is "a permanent, intrinsically existing Buddha nature".[116]
Mikyö Dorje also argues that the language of other emptiness does not appear in any of the sutras or the treatises of the Indian masters. He attacks the view of Dolpopa as being against the sutras of ultimate meaning which state that all phenomena are emptiness as well as being against the treatises of the Indian masters.[117] Mikyö Dorje rejects both perspectives of rangtong and shentong as true descriptions of ultimate reality, which he sees as being "the utter peace of all discursiveness regarding being empty and not being empty".[118]
One of the most influential Kagyu philosophers in recent times was Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Taye (1813–1899) who advocated a system of Shentong Madhyamaka and held that primordial wisdom was "never empty of its own nature and it is there all the time".[119][120]
The modern Kagyu teacher Khenpo Tsultrim (1934–), in his Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness, presents five stages of meditation, which he relates to five tenet systems.[121][122] He holds the "Shentong Madhyamaka" as the highest view, above prasangika. He sees this as a meditation on Paramarthasatya ("Absolute Reality"),[123][note 14] Buddhajnana,[note 15] which is beyond concepts, and described by terms as "truly existing."[125] This approach helps "to overcome certain residual subtle concepts,"[125] and "the habit – fosterd on the earlier stages of the path – of negating whatever experience arises in his/her mind."[126] It destroys false concepts, as does prasangika, but it also alerts the practitioner "to the presence of a dynamic, positive Reality that is to be experienced once the conceptual mind is defeated."[126]
Nyingma
In the Nyingma school, like in Kagyu, there is a variety of views. Some Nyingma thinkers promoted shentong, like Katok Tsewang Norbu, but the most influential Nyingma thinkers like Longchenpa and Ju Mipham held a more classical prāsaṅgika interpretation while at the same time seeking to harmonize it with the view of Dzogchen tantras which are traditionally seen as the pinnacle of the Nyingma view.
According to Sonam Thakchoe, the Ultimate truth in the Nyingma tradition, following Longchenpa, is mainly seen as being that "reality which transcends any mode of thinking and speech, one that unmistakenly appears to the nonerroneous cognitive processes of the exalted and awakened beings" and this is said to be "inexpressible beyond words and thoughts" as well as the reality that is the "transcendence of all elaborations.[127]
The most influential modern Nyingma scholar is Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso (1846–1912). He developed a unique theory of Madhyamaka, with two models of the two truths. While the adopts the traditional Madhyamaka model of two truths, in which the ultimate truth is emptiness, he also developed a second model, in which the ultimate truth is "Reality as it is" (de bzhin nyid) which is "established as ultimately real" (bden par grub pa).[127] This ultimate truth is associated with the Dzogchen concept of Rigpa. While it might seem that this system conflicts with the traditional Madhyamaka interpretation, for Mipham this is not so. For while the traditional model which sees emptiness and ultimate truth as a negation is referring to the analysis of experience, the second Dzogchen influenced model refers to the experience of unity in meditation.[128] Douglas Duckworth sees Mipham's work as an attempt to bring together the two main Mahayana philosophical systems of yogacara and madhyamaka, as well as shentong and rangtong into a coherent system in which both are seen as being of definitive meaning.[129]
Regarding the svatantrika prasangika debate, Ju Mipham explained that using positive assertions in logical debate may serve a useful purpose, either while debating with non-Buddhist schools or to move a student from a coarser to a more subtle view. Similarly, discussing an approximate ultimate helps students who have difficulty using only prasaṅga methods move closer to the understanding of the true ultimate. Ju Mipham felt that the ultimate non-enumerated truth of the Svatantrika was no different from the ultimate truth of the Prāsaṅgika. He felt the only difference between them was with respect to how they discussed conventional truth and their approach to presenting a path.[90]
East Asian Madhyamaka
Sānlùn school
Chinese Madhyamaka (known as Sānlùn, or the three treatise school) began with the work of Kumārajīva (344–413 CE) who translated the works of Nāgārjuna (including the MMK, also known in China as the Chung lun, “Madhyamakaśāstra”; Taishō 1564) to Chinese. Another influential text in Chinese Madhyamaka which was said to have been translated by Kumārajīva was the Ta-chih-tu lun, or *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa Śāstra (“Treatise which is a Teaching on the Great Perfection of Wisdom [Sūtra]”). According to Dan Arnold, this text is only extant in Kumārajīva's translation and has material that differs from the work of Nāgārjuna. In spite of this, the Ta-chih-tu lun became a central text for Chinese interpretations of Madhyamaka emptiness.[130] Sānlùn figures like Kumārajīva's pupil Sengzhao (384–414), and the later Jizang (549–623) were influential in restoring a more orthodox and non-essentialist interpretation of emptiness to Chinese Buddhism. Yin Shun (1906–2005) is one modern figure aligned with Sānlùn.
Sengzhao is often seen as the founder of Sānlùn. He was influenced not just by Indian Madhyamaka and Mahayana sutras like the Vimalakirti, but also by Taoist works and he widely quotes the Lao-tzu and the Chuang-tzu and uses terminology of the Neo-Daoist "Mystery Learning" (xuanxue 玄学) tradition while maintaining a uniquely Buddhist philosophical view.[131][132] In his essay "The Emptiness of the Non-Absolute" (buzhenkong, 不眞空), Sengzhao points out that the nature of phenomena cannot be taken as being either existent or inexistent:
Hence, there are indeed reasons why myriad dharmas are inexistent and cannot be taken as existent; there are reasons why [myriad dharmas] are not inexistent and cannot be taken as inexistent. Why? If we would say that they exist, their existent is not real; if we would say that they don’t exist, their phenomenal forms have taken shape. Having forms and shapes, they are not inexistent. Being not real, they are not truly existent. Hence the meaning of bu zhen kong [not really empty, 不眞空] is made manifest.[65]
Sengzhao saw the central problem in understanding emptiness as the discriminatory activity of prapañca. According to Sengzhao, delusion arises through a dependent relationship between phenomenal things, naming, thought and reification and correct understanding lies outside of words and concepts. Thus, while emptiness is the lack of intrinsic self in all things, this emptiness is not itself an absolute and cannot be grasped by the conceptual mind, it can be only be realized through non-conceptual wisdom (prajña).[133] Jizang (549–623) was another central figure in Chinese Madhyamaka who wrote numerous commentaries on Nagarjuna and Aryadeva and is considered to be the leading representative of the school.[134] Jizang called his method "deconstructing what is misleading and revealing what is corrective". He insisted that one must never settle on any particular viewpoint or perspective but constantly reexamine one's formulations to avoid reifications of thought and behavior.[134] In his commentary on the MMK, Jizang's method and understanding of emptiness can be seen:
The Abhidharma thinkers regard the four holy truths as true. The Satyasiddhi regards merely the truth of cessation of suffering, i.e., the principle of emptiness and equality, as true. The southern Mahāyāna tradition regards the principle that refutes truths as true, and the northern [Mahāyāna tradition] regards thatness [suchness] and prajñā as as true… Examining these all together, if there is a single [true] principle, it is an eternal view, which is false. If there is no principle at all, it is an evil view, which is also false. Being both existent and non-existent consists of the eternal and nihilistic views altogether. Being neither existent nor nonexistent is a foolish view. One replete with these four phrases has all [wrong] views. One without these four phrases has a severe nihilistic view. Now that [one] does not know how to name what a mind has nothing to rely upon and is free from conceptual construction, [he] foists “thatness” [suchness] upon it, one attains sainthood of the three vehicles… Being deluded in regard to thatness [suchness], one falls into the six realms of disturbed life and death.[65]
In one of his early treatises called "The Meaning of the two Truths" (Erdiyi), Jizang, expounds the steps to realize the nature of the ultimate truth of emptiness as follows:
In the first step, one recognises reality of the phenomena on the conventional level, but assumes their non-reality on the ultimate level. In the second step, one becomes aware of Being or Non-Being on the conventional level and negates both at the ultimate level. In the third step, one either asserts or negates Being and Non-Being on the conventional level, neither confi rming nor rejecting them on the ultimate level. Hence, there is ultimately no assertion or negation anymore; therefore, on the conventional level, one becomes free to accept or reject anything.
Chán
The Chán/Zen-tradition emulated Madhyamaka-thought via the San-lun Buddhists, influencing its supposedly "illogical" way of communicating "absolute truth."[6] The Madhyamika of Sengzhao for example, influenced the views of the Chan patriarch Shen Hui (670-762), a critical figure in the development of Chan, as can be seen by his "Illuminating the Essential Doctrine" (Hsie Tsung Chi). This text emphasizes that true emptiness or Suchness cannot be known through thought since it is free from thought (wu-nien): [135]
Thus we come to realize that both selves and things are, in their essence, empty, and existence and non-existence both disappear.
Mind is fundamentally non-action; the way is truly no-thought (wu-nien).
There is no thought, no reflection, no seeking, no attainment, no this, no that, no coming, no going.
Shen Hui also states that true emptiness is not nothing, but it is a "Subtle Existence" (miao-yu), which is just "Great Prajña." [135]
Western Buddhism
Thich Nhat Hanh
Thich Nhat Hanh explains the Madhyamaka concept of emptiness through the related concept of interdependence. In this analogy, there is no first or ultimate cause for anything that occurs. Instead, all things are dependent on innumerable causes and conditions that are themselves dependent on innumerable causes and conditions. The interdependence of all phenomena, including the self, is a helpful way to undermine mistaken views about inherence, or that one's self is inherently existent. It is also a helpful way to discuss Mahayana teachings on motivation, compassion, and ethics. The comparison to interdependence has produced recent discussion comparing Mahayana ethics to environmental ethics.[136]
Modern Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka forms an alternative to the Perennialist and essentialist (neo-)Advaita understanding of nondualism or modern spirituality.[web 1][web 2][web 3] The classical Madhyamaka-teachings are complemented with western (post-modern) philosophy,[web 4] critical sociology,[web 5] and social constructionism.[web 6] These approaches stress that there is no transcendental reality beyond this phenomenal world,[web 7] and in some cases even explicitly distinguish themselves from (neo-)Advaita approaches.[web 8]
Influence on Advaita Vedanta
Gaudapada, who was strongly influenced by Buddhism, borrowed the concept of "ajāta" from Nagajurna's Madhyamaka philosophy,[137][138] which uses the term "anutpāda":[139]
- "An" means "not", or "non"
- "Utpāda" means "genesis", "coming forth", "birth"[web 9]
Taken together "anutpāda" means "having no origin", "not coming into existence", "not taking effect", "non-production".[web 10]
The Buddhist tradition usually uses the term "anutpāda" for the absence of an origin[137][139] or sunyata.[140][note 16]
"Ajātivāda" is the fundamental philosophical doctrine of Gaudapada.[144] According to Gaudapada, the Absolute is not subject to birth, change and death. The Absolute is aja, the unborn eternal.[144] The empirical world of appearances is considered unreal, and not absolutely existent.[144]
Gaudapada's perspective is quite different from Nagarjuna.[145] Gaudapada's perspective is based on the Mandukya Upanishad.[145] In the Mandukya Karika, Gaudapada's commentary on the Mandukya Upanishad, Gaudapada sets forth his perspective. According to Gaudapada, Brahman cannot undergo alteration, so the phenomenal world cannot arise from Brahman. If the world cannot arise, yet is an empirical fact, then the world has to be an unreal[note 17] appearance of Brahman. And if the phenomenal world is an unreal appearance, then there is no real origination or destruction, only apparent origination or destruction. From the level of ultimate truth (paramārthatā) the phenomenal world is Maya.[145]
As stated in Gaudapada’s Karika Chapter II Verse 48:[web 11]
No jiva ever comes into existence. There exists no cause that can produce it. The supreme truth is that nothing ever is born.[web 12]
Understanding in modern scholarship
Western scholarship has given a broad variety of interpretations of Madhyamaka:
Over the past half-century the doctrine of the Madhyamaka school, and in particular that of Nāgārjuna has been variously described as nihilism, monism, irrationalism, misology, agnosticism, scepticism, criticism, dialectic, mysticism, acosmism, absolutism, relativism, nominalism, and linguistic analysis with therapeutic value.[146]
Jay L. Garfield likewise rephrases Ruegg:
"Modern interpreters differ among themselves about the correct way to read it as least as much as canonical interpreters. Nagarjuna has been read as an idealist (Murti 1960), a nihilist (Wood 1994), a skeptic (Garfield 1995), a pragmatist (Kalupahana 1986), and as a mystic (Streng 1967). He has been regarded as a critic of logic (Inada 1970), as a defender of classical logic (Hayes 1994), and as a pioneer of paraconsistent logic (Garfield and Priest 2003)".[147]
These interpretations "reflect almost as much about the viewpoints of the scholars involved as do they reflect the content of Nāgārjuna's concepts".[148]
Most recent western scholarship (Garfield,[149] Napper,[150] Hopkins,[151] Huntington, and others) have, after investigation, tended to adopt one or another of the Gelugpa collegiate interpretations of Madhyamaka.
Kalupahana
Kalupahana's interpretation sees Madhyamaka, along with Yogacara, as an antidote against essentialist biases in Mahayana Buddhist thought.[152][153]
Hayes
Richard P. Hayes is critical of the works of Nagarjuna:
Nagarjuna’s writings had relatively little effect on the course of subsequent Indian Buddhist philosophy. Despite his apparent attempts to discredit some of the most fundamental concepts of abhidharma, abhidharma continued to flourish for centuries, without any appreciable attempt on the part of abhidharmikas to defend their methods of analysis against Nagarjuna’s criticisms.[154]
According to Hayes, Nagarjuna makes use of two different possible meanings of the word svabhava, and uses those two meanings to make statements which are not logical.[155] In doing so, Hayes regards Nagarjuna...
[A] relatively primitive thinker whose mistakes in reasoning were eventually uncovered as the knowledge of logic in India became more sophisticated in subsequent centuries.[156]
Magee
William Magee strongly disagrees with Hayes. He points out the influence of Nagarjuna in Tibetan Buddhism, and refers to Tsonghkhapa's interpretation of Nagarjuna to argue that
Hayes is misidentifying Nagarjuna's intended meaning of svabhava. In contradistinction to Hayes' belief that Nagarjuna speaks equivocably of an identity nature and a causally independent, non-existent nature, Dzong-ka-ba feels that in chapter XV.1-2 Nagarjuna uses the term svabhava to refer to an existent emptiness nature.[157]
According to Magee, both Candrakirti and Dzong-ka-ba "see Nagarjuna as consistently referring to emptiness with the word svabhava".[158]
See also
Notes
- ^ 'Own-beings',[19] unique nature or substance,[20] an identifying characteristic; an identity; an essence,[21]
- ^ A differentiating characteristic,[21] the fact of being dependent,[21]
- ^ 'Being',[15] 'self-nature or substance'[22]
- ^ Not being present; absence:[23]
- ^ svabhava
- ^ Nāgārjuna equates svabhāva (essence) with bhāva (existence) in Chapter 15 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
- ^ Chapter 21 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā goes into the reasoning behind this.[57]
- ^ See also Atthakavagga and Parayanavagga, for early, Madhyamaka-like texts from the Buddhist canon on freedom from views.
- ^ In the Pali canon, these chapters are the fourth and fifth chapters of the Khuddaka Nikaya's Sutta Nipata, respectively.
- ^ Wynne devotes a chapter to the Parayanavagga.
- ^ Alex Trisoglio: "In the 8th century, Shantarakshita went to Tibet and founded the monastery at Samyé. He was not a direct disciple of Bhavaviveka, but the disciple of one of his disciples. He combined the Madhyamika-Svatantrika and Cittamatra schools, and created a new school of Madhyamika called Svatantrika-Yogachara-Madhyamika. His disciple Kamalashila, who wrote The Stages of Meditation upon Madhyamika (uma’i sgom rim), developed his ideas further, and together they were very influential in Tibet."Khyentse Rinpoche, Dzongsar Jamyang (2003). "Introduction". In Alex Trisoglio (ed.). Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara with Commentary (PDF) (1st ed.). Dordogne, France: Khyentse Foundation. p. 8. Retrieved 7 January 2013.
- ^ In his Tattvaratnāvalī, the Indian scholar Advayavajra classified Madhyamaka into "those who uphold non-duality from the simile of illusion" (māyopamādvayavādin) and "those who uphold non-placement into any dharma" (sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin); furthermore, in the Madhyamakaṣaṭka he envisaged a specifically Vajrayāna type of Madhyamaka.[citation needed]
- ^ Alexander Berzin: There was a very famous Nyingma lama at the time called Lhodrag Namka-gyeltsen, and this Nyingma lama had, continually, visions of Vajrapani. And he invited Tsongkhapa, and they became mutual teacher and disciple. It is from this Nyingma lama that Tsongkhapa got his main lam-rim transmissions from the Kadam tradition — two of the main Kadam lineages. There are three Kadampa lineages that had split. He got two of them from this Nyingma lama and one from a Kagyu lama. The Kadampa was divided into three: One was the lam-rim teachings, one was the textual teachings, and one was the oral guideline teachings. So he got the lam-rim and the oral guideline lineages from this Nyingma lama, and the textual tradition from a Kagyu lama. This I find very interesting. One always thinks that he got them from Kadampa lamas; he didn’t. And that Gelugpa was so separate from all these other traditions; it wasn’t. Look at this Kagyu lama, Lama Umapa, that Tsongkhapa studied Madhyamaka with; he had studied Madhyamaka with Sakya. The Sakyas were the main Madhyamaka people of those days.Berzin, Alexander (December 2003). "The Life of Tsongkhapa". Munich, Germany. Retrieved 20 June 2016.
- ^ According to Hookham, non-dual experience is Ultimate Reality.[124]
- ^ According to Hookham, "The Chinese Tathagarba schools describe Buddhajnana as the totality of all that is, which pervades every part of all that is in its totality."[124] According to Hookham, for Shentong Buddhajnana is "the non-dual nature of Mind completely unobscured and endowed with its countless Buddha Qualities (Buddhagunas).[124]
- ^ The term is also used in the Lankavatara Sutra.[141] According to D.T Suzuki, "anutpada" is not the opposite of "utpada", but transcends opposites. It is the seeing into the true nature of existence,[142] the seeing that "all objects are without self-substance".[143]
- ^ C.q. "transitory"
References
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- ^ Wynne, Alexander, Early Buddhist Teaching as Proto-sunyavada.
- ^ Williams 2000, p. 140.
- ^ Brunholzl 2004, p. 70.
- ^ Brunholzl 2004, p. 590.
- ^ a b c d e Cheng 1981.
- ^ a b Garfield 1994.
- ^ a b Garfield 2012.
- ^ a b c Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 12, 25.
- ^ Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, p. 180.
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- ^ Hayes 2003, p. 4.
- ^ Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 30.
- ^ Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 200.
- ^ a b c d e Warder 2000, p. 361.
- ^ Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 45.
- ^ Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 13.
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- ^ a b Walser, Joseph, Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Culture, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 234.
- ^ Walser, Joseph, Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Culture, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 239.
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- ^ Cuma Ozkan, A comparative analysis: Buddhist Madhyamaka and Daoist Chongxuan (twofold mystery) in the early Tang (618-720) University of Iowa, 2013.
- ^ Dippmann, Jeffrey, Sengzhao (Seng-Chao c. 378—413 C.E.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ a b Fox, Alan, Self-reflection in the Sanlun Tradition: Madhyamika as the "Deconstructive Conscience" of Buddhism, Journal of Chinese Philosophy V. 19 (1992) pp. 1-24.
- ^ a b Zeuschner, Robert B., The Hsie Tsung Chi (An Early Ch'an (Zen) Buddhist Text) Journal of Chinese Philosophy V. 3 (1976) pp. 253-268.
- ^ Thich Nhat Hanh 1988.
- ^ a b Renard 2010, p. 157.
- ^ Comans 2000, p. 35-36.
- ^ a b Bhattacharya 1943, p. 49.
- ^ Renard 2010, p. 160.
- ^ Suzuki 1999.
- ^ Suzuki 1999, p. 123-124.
- ^ Suzuki 1999, p. 168.
- ^ a b c Sarma 1996, p. 127.
- ^ a b c Comans 2000, p. 36.
- ^ Ruegg 1981, p. 2. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRuegg1981 (help)
- ^ Garfield and Samten 2006, p. xx.
- ^ Daye 1971, p. 77.
- ^ Garfield 1995.
- ^ Napper 1989.
- ^ Hopkins 1996.
- ^ Kalupahana 1992.
- ^ Kalupahana 1994.
- ^ Hayes 2003, p. 2.
- ^ Hayes 2003, p. 3-5.
- ^ Hayes 2003, p. 7.
- ^ Magee 1999, p. 126.
- ^ Magee 1999, p. 127.
Web references
- ^ Emptiness. Buddhist and Beyond
- ^ The Non-Buddhist
- ^ Emptiness teachings
- ^ Review of Richard Rorty's "Philosophy and Social Hope"
- ^ Patrick jennings (2014), Tsongkhapa: In Praise of Relativity; The Essence of Eloquence Archived 2015-05-18 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ emptiness.co, Review of Kenneth J. Gergen's "An Invitation to Social Construction"
- ^ Susan Kahn, The Two Truths of Buddhism and The Emptiness of Emptiness.
- ^ emptiness.co, Coming from the Advaitic/Awareness Teachings? Special Pointers
- ^ Sanskrit Dictionary for Spoken Sanskrit, Utpāda
- ^ Sanskrit Dictionary for Spoken Sanskrit, Anutpāda
- ^ Dr. Vemuri Ramesam, A Critique Of John Wheeler’s “You Were Never Born”
- ^ Mandukya Upanishad with Gaudapada's Karika
Sources
- Arena, Leonardo Vittorio (2012), Nonsense as the Meaning, ebook
- Arnold, Dan (2010). Nāgārjuna’s ‘Middle Way’: A Non-Eliminative Understanding of Selflessness. In:Revue Internationale de Philosophie vol. 64, no.253: 367-395
- Bhattacharya, Vidhushekhara (1943), Gauḍapādakārikā, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
- Brunnholzl, Karl (2004), Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition, Snow Lion Publications
- Cheng, Hsueh-Li (1981), "The Roots of Zen Buddhism", Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 8: 451–478, doi:10.1111/j.1540-6253.1981.tb00267.x
- Comans, Michael (2000), The Method of Early Advaita Vedānta: A Study of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and Padmapāda, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
- Cornu, Philippe (2001), "Nawoord", Schijn en werkelijkheid. De twee waarheden in de vier boeddhistische leerstelsels, KunchabPublicaties
- Daye, Douglas D. (1971), Major Schools of the Mahayana: Madhyamaka. In:Charles S. Prebisch, Buddhism, A Modern Perspective. Pages 76-96., ISBN 978-0-271-01195-0
- Fuller, Paul (2005), The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism: The Point of View (PDF), Routledge, archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-12-02
{{citation}}
: Unknown parameter|deadurl=
ignored (|url-status=
suggested) (help) - Garfield, Jay L. (1994), "Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness: Why did Nagarjuana start with causation?", Philosophy East & West, 44 (2)
- Garfield, Jay L. (1995), The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Garfield, Jay L. (2012), Madhyamaka is not emptiness (PDF), smith College, University of melbourne
- Gomez, Luis O. (1976), "Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli canon", Philosophy East and West, 26 (2): 137–165, doi:10.2307/1398186
- Harvey, Peter (1995), An introduction to Buddhism. Teachings, history and practices, Cambridge University Press
- Hayes, Richard P. (1994), Nagarjuna's appeal. In: Journal of Indian Philosophy 22: 299-378
- Hayes, Richard P. (2003), Nagarjuna: Master of Paradox,Mystic or Perpetrator of Fallacies? (PDF)
- Hookham, S.K. (1991), The Buddha within : Tathagatagarbha doctrine according to the Shentong interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791403587
- Hopkins, Jeffrey; Napper, Elizabeth (1996), Meditation on Emptiness
- Kalupahana, David J. (1992), The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, Delhi: ri Satguru Publications
- Kalupahana, David J. (1994), A History of Buddhist philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited
- Loy, David (2006), Second Buddha : Nagarjuna - Buddhism's Greatest Philosopher. In: Winter 2006 edition of Tricycle : The Buddhist Review
- Magee, William (1999), The Nature of Things. Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion
- Napper, Elizabeth (1989), Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, ISBN 0-86171-057-6
- Ng, Yu-kwan (1990), Chih-i and Madhyamika, Hamilton, Ontario: dissertation, McMaster University, p. 1, archived from the original on February 3, 2014
{{citation}}
: Unknown parameter|deadurl=
ignored (|url-status=
suggested) (help) - Renard, Philip (2010), Non-Dualisme. De directe bevrijdingsweg, Cothen: Uitgeverij Juwelenschip
- Rizzi, Cesare (1988), Candrakirti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited
- Ruegg, D. Seyfort (1981), The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India (A History of Indian literature), Harrassowitz, ISBN 978-3-447-02204-0
- Sarma, Chandradhar (1996), The Advaita Tradition in Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
- Shantarakshita; Ju Mipham (2005), The Adornment of the Middle Way, Padmakara Translation, ISBN 1-59030-241-9
- Suzuki, Daisetz Teitarō (1999), Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
- Thich Nhat Hanh (1988), The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the Prajnaparamita Heart Sutra
- Tsongkhapa, Lobsang Dragpa; Sparham, Gareth, trans.; in collaboration with Shotaro Iida (1993). Kapstein, Matthew (ed.). Ocean of Eloquence: Tsong kha pa's Commentary on the Yogacara Doctrine of Mind (in Tibetan and English) (1་ ed.). Albany, NY: State University of New York. ISBN 0791414795. Retrieved 18 December 2012.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - Tsong Khapa (2002), The great treatise on the stages of the path to enlightenment: Volume 3, Snow Lion Publications, ISBN 1-55939-166-9
- rJe Tsong Kha Pa; Garfield (tr.), Jay L.; Samten (tr.), Ngawang (2006), Ocean of Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-514733-9
- Vetter, Tilmann (1988), The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism (PDF), BRILL, ISBN 90-04-08959-4
- Warder, A. K. (2000), Indian Buddhism, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers
- Williams, Paul (2000), Buddhist Thought, Routledge
- Wynne, Alexander (2007), The Origin of Buddhist Meditation, Routledge
Further reading
- Brunnholzl, Karl (2004), Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition, Snow Lion Publications
- Della Santina, Peter (1986), Madhyamaka Schools in India, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
- Harris, Ian Charles (1991), The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara in Indian Mahayana Buddhism, New York: E. J.Brill
- His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama (Tenzin Gyatso) (2009), The Middle Way: Faith Grounded in Reason, Boston: Wisdom Publications
- Huntington, C. W., Jr. (1989). The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Madhyamika. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press
- Jones, Richard H. (2014), Nagarjuna: Buddhism's Most Important Philosopher, New York: Jackson Square Books
- Jones, Richard H. (2012), Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy After Nagarjuna, 2 vols., New York: Jackson Square Books
- Narain, Harsh. The Mādhyamika mind. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1997.
- Newland, Guy (2008), Introduction to Emptiness: As Taught in Tsong-kha-pa's Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path, Boston: Snow Lion
- Ruegg, David S. (1981), The Literature of the Madhyamaka School in India, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz
- Westeroff, Jan. (2009), Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka. A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press
External links
- The Mādhyamika or the Śūnyavāda school, Surendranath Dasgupta, 1940
- "Madhyamaka Buddhism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Nagarjuna". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Middle Way
- thezensite: articles on Nagarjuna
- Introduction to the Middle Way A contemporary commentary based on the teachings of Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Madhyamaka
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Nagarjuna