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|DecideDate=January 11 |
|DecideDate=January 11 |
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|DecideYear=2000 |
|DecideYear=2000 |
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|FullName= Kimel et al. v. Florida Board of Regents et al. |
|FullName=J. Daniel Kimel, Jr. et al. v. Florida Board of Regents et al. |
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|USVol=528 |
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|USPage=62 |
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|Citation=120 S.Ct. 631, 81 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 970, 187 A.L.R. Fed. 543, 76 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 46,190, 145 L.Ed.2d 522, 68 USLW 4016, 140 Ed. Law Rep. 825, 23 Employee Benefits Cas. 2945, 00 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 229, 2000 Daily Journal D.A.R. 293, 2000 CJ C.A.R. 190, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 25 |
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|Holding=The Court held that [[United States Congress|Congress's]] [[congressional power of enforcement|enforcement powers]] under the [[Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fourteenth Amendment]] to the [[United States Constitution|Constitution]] did not extend to the [[abrogation doctrine|abrogation]] of state [[sovereign immunity]] under the [[Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution|Eleventh Amendment]] where the discrimination complained of was based on age. Therefore the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act) does not apply to states. |
|Holding=The Court held that [[United States Congress|Congress's]] [[congressional power of enforcement|enforcement powers]] under the [[Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fourteenth Amendment]] to the [[United States Constitution|Constitution]] did not extend to the [[abrogation doctrine|abrogation]] of state [[sovereign immunity]] under the [[Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution|Eleventh Amendment]] where the discrimination complained of was based on age. Therefore the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act) does not apply to states. |
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|SCOTUS=1994-2005 |
|SCOTUS=1994-2005 |
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|LawsApplied=[[Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution|U.S. Const. amends. XI]], [[Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution|XIV]] |
|LawsApplied=[[Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution|U.S. Const. amends. XI]], [[Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution|XIV]] |
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⚫ | '''''Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents''''', [[court citation|528 U.S. 62 (2000)]] was a [[Supreme Court of the United States|United States Supreme Court]] case that determined that the [[United States Congress|Congress's]] [[congressional power of enforcement|enforcement powers]] under the [[Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fourteenth Amendment]] to the [[United States Constitution|Constitution]] did not extend to the [[abrogation doctrine|abrogation]] of state [[sovereign immunity]] under the [[Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution|Eleventh Amendment]] where the discrimination complained of was rationally based on age. |
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''For more information on decisions of the [[William Rehnquist]] Court that include the issues of [[States' Rights]] and [[Civil Rights]], see [[United States v. Morrison]] and [[Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett]] |
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⚫ | '''''Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents''''' was a [[Supreme Court of the United States|United States Supreme Court]] case that determined that the [[United States Congress|Congress's]] [[congressional power of enforcement|enforcement powers]] under the [[Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fourteenth Amendment]] to the [[United States Constitution|Constitution]] did not extend to the [[abrogation doctrine|abrogation]] of state [[sovereign immunity]] under the [[Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution|Eleventh Amendment]] where the discrimination complained of was rationally based on age. |
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⚫ | Employees of Florida State University and Florida International University, including J. Daniel Kimel, Jr., sued under the [[Age Discrimination in Employment Act]] of [[1967]] (the ADEA) because failure to adjust pay had a disparate impact on older employees. Wellington Dickson sued his employer, the Florida Department of Corrections, for not promoting him because of his age. Roderick MacPherson and Marvin Narz, who were associate professors at the University of Montevallo in Alabama, sued under the ADEA law alleging an evaluation system that discriminated against the elderly. The cases of Kimel, Dickson, MacPherson and Narz were consolidated on appeal to the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit|Eleventh Circuit]], and remained consolidated when the Supreme Court granted [[certiorari]]. |
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''Kimel'' invalidated the ADEA insofar as it allowed plaintiffs to sue states for [[money damages]].<ref>Although the ''Kimel'' decision bars state employees from suing states for [[money damages]] for age discrimination, it is still possible to sue under ''[[Ex parte Young]]'' ([[1908]]) for prospective injunctive relief. See ''State Police for Automatic Retirement Ass'n v. DiFava'', 317 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2003); see also ''[[Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett|Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett]]'', 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001). ''Ex parte Young'' allows state officials to be sued for injunctive relief when violating the federal Constitution.</ref> |
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⚫ | Employees of Florida State University and Florida International University, including J. Daniel Kimel, Jr., sued under the |
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==Legal background== |
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The Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents U. S. Supreme Court decision overturned the part of the ''[[Age Discrimination in Employment Act]]'' of 1967 that applied to states. The case was decided January 11, 2000. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Thomas, Scalia and Kennedy voted for the decision. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion for this case. |
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''Kimel'' concerned the ability of Congress to abrogate the states' "sovereign immunity" using its power under the Foureenth Amendment. The Supreme Court had previously held that the sovereign immunity of states – a principle ultimately derived from English commonly law, and used to refer to the immunity of the English monarch from suit – normally barred them from being sued by private citizens in federal court. Specifically, ''[[Hans v. Louisiana]]'' ([[1890]]) interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as implying the sovereign immunity of states from being sued, even though its terms provide only that citizens of one state cannot sue another state. The Rehnquist Court reaffirmed the sovereign immunity of states in ''[[Alden v. Maine]]'' and ''[[Seminole Tribe v. Florida]]''. These cases held that Congress could not use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The importance of ''Kimel'' was the strict limits it placed on the ability of Congress to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, which allows Congress to enforce the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Equal Protection Clause, by positive legislation. |
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The Court in ''Kimel'' based its decision in large part on ''[[City of Boerne v. Flores]]'', a case the Court had decided in [[1997]]. There, the Court limited congressional power to enforce the Foureenth Amendment, and for the first time required "congruence and proportionality" between the constitutional wrong and the congressionally enacted remedy to protect constitutional rights.<ref>521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).</ref> ''Boerne'' held that it was the Court, and only the Court, that could determine what constituted a constitutional wrong, and that Congress could not permissibly increase the level of constitutional protection beyond that which the Court had recognized.<ref>See 521 U.S. at 528-29.</ref> |
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==Rationale== |
==Rationale== |
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that Congress in enacting the ADEA had properly declared its intent to subject states to suits for money damages by private individuals. The majority held, however, that because the age-based classifications are subject only to [[rational basis review]] under the Equal Protection Clause, the ADEA, which prohibited all such classifications by states, proscribed much more conduct than the Fourteenth Amendment itself. Therefore, the Court said, the ADEA's private remedy failed to have the requisite "congruence and proportionality" required by ''City of Boerne v. Flores'' between the constitutional harm and the legislation passed to correct it. |
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O'Connor said that the Eleventh Amendment implies the [[sovereign immunity]] of states, but that Congress had properly declared its Fourteenth Amendment right to subject states to suits by individuals. However, due to a [[rational basis review]] test the equal protection clause applies to state governments only for irrational acts such as discrimination based on "race or gender", where a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" indicates irrational discrimination. She said that age discrimination serves a rational state interest, and that the rationality of age discrimination doesn't need to be applied "with razorlike precision"<ref>Finally, in Gregory, we upheld a provision of the Missouri Constitution that required judges to retire at age 70. Noting that the Missouri provision was based on a generalization about the effect of old age on the ability of individuals to serve as judges, we acknowledged that “[i]t is far from true that all judges suffer significant deterioration in performance at age 70,” “[i]t is probably not true that most do,” and “[i]t may not be true at all.” 501 U.S., at 473. Nevertheless, because Missouri’s age classification was subject only to rational basis review, we held that the State’s reliance on such imperfect generalizations was entirely proper under the Equal Protection Clause. Ibid. These decisions thus demonstrate that the constitutionality of state classifications on the basis of age cannot be determined on a person-by-person basis. Our Constitution permits States to draw lines on the basis of age when they have a rational basis for doing so at a class-based level, even if it “is probably not true” that those reasons are valid in the majority of cases." - O'Connor's opinion of the Court</ref> |
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on an individual basis, but can be applied to the elderly as a group. Therefore, ADEA failed to show the "congruence and proportionality" required by ''[[City of Boerne v. Flores]]'' between the harm Congress sought to correct and the legislation passed to correct it. |
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{{cquote|Age classifications, unlike governmental conduct based on race or gender, cannot be characterized as “so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.” ''[[City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.]]'' ... |
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⚫ | States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The rationality commanded by the |
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⚫ | Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the State’s legitimate interests. The Constitution does not preclude reliance on such generalizations. That age proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant. |
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⚫ | Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion said, "There is not a word in the text of the Constitution supporting the Court’s conclusion that the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity limits Congress’ power to authorize private parties, as well as federal agencies, to enforce federal law against the States." He referred to the "sovereign immunity" theory of ''Seminole Tribe v. Florida'' and ''Alden v. Maine'' as "[[judicial activism]]." |
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==Significance of ''Boerne'' to the ''Kimel'' decision== |
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''Kimel'' reaffirmed the Court's 1997 ''[[City of Boerne v. Flores]]'' precedent. With ''Boerne'', the Court sought to "limit congressional power" to enforce the Equal Protection Clause on the theory that Congress "has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." Because of the ''Boerne'' "congruence and proportionality" requirement, Congress could no longer exceed the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. This congruence requirement replaced the previous theory advanced in ''[[Katzenbach v. Morgan]]'' that the Equal Protection Clause is "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for and nature of legislation to secure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees." Before the 1997 ''Boerne'' decision, ''Katzenbach v. Morgan'' was widely interpreted as allowing Congress to go beyond, but not fall short of, the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. |
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The holding of ''Boerne'' said that only the Court could interprete the Constitution in order to maintain the "traditional separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary." Also, ''Boerne''<ref>Kennedy's opinion for the Court, City of Boerne v. Flores</ref> relied on states' rights arguments<ref>Democrats and conservative Republicans argued that the proposed Amendment would give Congress a power to intrude into traditional areas |
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of state responsibility, a power inconsistent with the federal design central to the Constitution. Typifying these views, Republican Representative Robert Hale of New York labeled the Amendment “an utter departure from every principle ever dreamed of by the men who framed our Constitution,” id., at 1063, and warned that under it “all State legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedures … may be overridden, may be repealed or abolished, and the law of Congress established instead.” Ibid. Senator William Stewart of Nevada likewise stated the Amendment would permit “Congress to legislate fully upon all subjects affecting life, liberty, and property,” such that “there would not be much left for the State Legislatures,” and would thereby “work an entire change in our form of government.” - City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court - These opinions were remarks by 19th century "Democrats and conservative Republicans" with reference to an early draft of the Fourteenth Amendment that were quoted by Kennedy</ref> based on "enumerated powers." The intent of ''Boerne'' was to prevent "a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority." |
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==Related issues== |
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⚫ | {{cquote|States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate interests they serve with razorlike precision. ... |
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According to the University of New Mexico's [http://lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr/volumes/35/vol3.php New Mexico Law Review], although the Kimel decision bars state employees from suing states for [[money damages]] for age discrimination, it might still be possible to sue under ''[[Ex parte Young]]'' for prospective, injunctive relief, rather than monetary damages. |
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⚫ | Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the State’s legitimate interests. The Constitution does not preclude reliance on such generalizations. That age proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant. [W]here rationality is the test, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)}} |
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The "sovereign immunity" of states from being sued is from English common law, and used to refer to the sovereignty of a King. The 1890 U. S. Supreme Court case ''[[Hans v. Louisiana]]'' interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as implying the sovereign immunity of states from being sued, even though it only says that citizens of one state can't sue another state. The ''[[Ex parte Young]]'' case of 1908 allows state representatives to be sued for injunctive relief when violating the Constitution. In 1974 Rehnquist interpreted this relief to be only prospective in ''[[Edelman v. Jordan]]'' in order to prevent states from having to pay monetary damages for past unconstitutional acts. The Rehnquist Court reaffirmed the sovereign immunity of states in ''[[Alden v. Maine]]'' and ''[[Seminole Tribe v. Florida]]'', which placed still more interpretive limits on Ex parte Young. |
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⚫ | Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion said, "There is not a word in the text of the Constitution supporting the Court’s conclusion that the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity limits Congress’ power to authorize private parties, as well as federal agencies, to enforce federal law against the States." He referred to the "sovereign immunity" theory of ''Seminole Tribe v. Florida'' and ''Alden v. Maine'' as "[[judicial activism]]." |
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[[Strict scrutiny]] is more strict than [[rational basis review]] in theory, and was successful 20% of the time by the early 2000s according to Adam Winkler of the UCLA School of Law.<ref>[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=897360 Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact,: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, Adam Winkler, University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law]</ref> |
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==Notes== |
==Notes== |
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==External links== |
==External links== |
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[http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=98-791 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents |
[http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=98-791 ''Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents''] |
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[[Category:United States Supreme Court cases]] |
[[Category:United States Supreme Court cases]] |
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[[Category:2000 in law]] |
[[Category:2000 in law]] |
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[[Category:Disability-related rulings]] |
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[[Category:United States Eleventh Amendment case law]] |
[[Category:United States Eleventh Amendment case law]] |
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[[Category:United States Fourteenth Amendment case law]] |
[[Category:United States Fourteenth Amendment case law]] |
Revision as of 19:11, 18 February 2007
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents | |
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Argued October 13, 1999 Decided January 11, 2000 | |
Full case name | J. Daniel Kimel, Jr. et al. v. Florida Board of Regents et al. |
Citations | 528 U.S. 62 (more) 120 S.Ct. 631, 81 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 970, 187 A.L.R. Fed. 543, 76 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 46,190, 145 L.Ed.2d 522, 68 USLW 4016, 140 Ed. Law Rep. 825, 23 Employee Benefits Cas. 2945, 00 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 229, 2000 Daily Journal D.A.R. 293, 2000 CJ C.A.R. 190, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 25 |
Holding | |
The Court held that Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution did not extend to the abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment where the discrimination complained of was based on age. Therefore the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act) does not apply to states. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | O'Connor |
Concurrence | , joined by O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I, II, and IV of which were joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., and Part III of which was joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ. Stevens, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Kennedy, J., joined. |
Dissent | Stevens |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amends. XI, XIV |
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) was a United States Supreme Court case that determined that the Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution did not extend to the abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment where the discrimination complained of was rationally based on age.
Facts and result
Employees of Florida State University and Florida International University, including J. Daniel Kimel, Jr., sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the ADEA) because failure to adjust pay had a disparate impact on older employees. Wellington Dickson sued his employer, the Florida Department of Corrections, for not promoting him because of his age. Roderick MacPherson and Marvin Narz, who were associate professors at the University of Montevallo in Alabama, sued under the ADEA law alleging an evaluation system that discriminated against the elderly. The cases of Kimel, Dickson, MacPherson and Narz were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, and remained consolidated when the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Kimel invalidated the ADEA insofar as it allowed plaintiffs to sue states for money damages.[1]
Legal background
Kimel concerned the ability of Congress to abrogate the states' "sovereign immunity" using its power under the Foureenth Amendment. The Supreme Court had previously held that the sovereign immunity of states – a principle ultimately derived from English commonly law, and used to refer to the immunity of the English monarch from suit – normally barred them from being sued by private citizens in federal court. Specifically, Hans v. Louisiana (1890) interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as implying the sovereign immunity of states from being sued, even though its terms provide only that citizens of one state cannot sue another state. The Rehnquist Court reaffirmed the sovereign immunity of states in Alden v. Maine and Seminole Tribe v. Florida. These cases held that Congress could not use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The importance of Kimel was the strict limits it placed on the ability of Congress to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, which allows Congress to enforce the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Equal Protection Clause, by positive legislation.
The Court in Kimel based its decision in large part on City of Boerne v. Flores, a case the Court had decided in 1997. There, the Court limited congressional power to enforce the Foureenth Amendment, and for the first time required "congruence and proportionality" between the constitutional wrong and the congressionally enacted remedy to protect constitutional rights.[2] Boerne held that it was the Court, and only the Court, that could determine what constituted a constitutional wrong, and that Congress could not permissibly increase the level of constitutional protection beyond that which the Court had recognized.[3]
Rationale
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that Congress in enacting the ADEA had properly declared its intent to subject states to suits for money damages by private individuals. The majority held, however, that because the age-based classifications are subject only to rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, the ADEA, which prohibited all such classifications by states, proscribed much more conduct than the Fourteenth Amendment itself. Therefore, the Court said, the ADEA's private remedy failed to have the requisite "congruence and proportionality" required by City of Boerne v. Flores between the constitutional harm and the legislation passed to correct it.
The majority explained its decision as follows:
States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate interests they serve with razorlike precision. ... Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the State’s legitimate interests. The Constitution does not preclude reliance on such generalizations. That age proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant. [W]here rationality is the test, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion said, "There is not a word in the text of the Constitution supporting the Court’s conclusion that the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity limits Congress’ power to authorize private parties, as well as federal agencies, to enforce federal law against the States." He referred to the "sovereign immunity" theory of Seminole Tribe v. Florida and Alden v. Maine as "judicial activism."
Notes
- ^ Although the Kimel decision bars state employees from suing states for money damages for age discrimination, it is still possible to sue under Ex parte Young (1908) for prospective injunctive relief. See State Police for Automatic Retirement Ass'n v. DiFava, 317 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001). Ex parte Young allows state officials to be sued for injunctive relief when violating the federal Constitution.
- ^ 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
- ^ See 521 U.S. at 528-29.