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| value3 = * [[February 2]], [[1999]] – [[April 12]], [[2002]]<br>* [[April 13]], [[2002]] – [[Present (time)|Present]] |
| value3 = * [[February 2]], [[1999]] – [[April 12]], [[2002]]<br>* [[April 13]], [[2002]] – [[Present (time)|Present]] |
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Hugo Chávez has been married twice. He first married [[Nancy Colmenares]], a woman from a poor family originating in Chávez's own hometown of Sabaneta. Chávez and Colmenares remained married for eighteen years, during which time they had three children: Rosa Virginia, María Gabriela, and Hugo Rafael. They separated soon after Chávez's 1992 coup attempt, but have remained good friends since then.<ref name="La Semana 2000">{{Harv|La Semana|2000}}.</ref> During his first marriage, Chávez also had an affair with young historian [[Herma Marksman]]; they had a relationship which lasted nine years.<ref name="Guillermoprieto_2005">{{Harv|Guillermoprieto|2005}}.</ref><ref name="Byrne_2005">{{Harv|Byrne|2005}}.</ref> At present, Chávez is separated from his second wife, journalist [[Marisabel Rodríguez de Chávez]]. Chávez had another daughter, Rosa Inés, through that marriage, in addition to a son-in-law, Raúl "Raúlito" Alfonzo. Chávez also has one granddaughter, Gabriela.<ref name="Palast_2005">{{Harv|Palast|2005}}.</ref> |
Hugo Chávez has been married twice. He first married [[Nancy Colmenares]], a woman from a poor family originating in Chávez's own hometown of Sabaneta. Chávez and Colmenares remained married for eighteen years, during which time they had three children: Rosa Virginia, María Gabriela, and Hugo Rafael. They separated soon after Chávez's 1992 coup attempt, but have remained good friends since then.<ref name="La Semana 2000">{{Harv|La Semana|2000}}.</ref> During his first marriage, Chávez also had an affair with young historian [[Herma Marksman]]; they had a relationship which lasted nine years.<ref name="Guillermoprieto_2005">{{Harv|Guillermoprieto|2005}}.</ref><ref name="Byrne_2005">{{Harv|Byrne|2005}}.</ref> At present, Chávez is separated from his second wife, journalist [[Marisabel Rodríguez de Chávez]]. Chávez had another daughter, Rosa Inés, through that marriage, in addition to a son-in-law, Raúl "Raúlito" Alfonzo. Chávez also has one granddaughter, Gabriela.<ref name="Palast_2005">{{Harv|Palast|2005}}.</ref> |
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Chávez is of [[Roman Catholic Church|Roman Catholic]] extraction, and is currently a practicing Christian. Nevertheless, he has had a series of bitter disputes with both the Venezuelan Catholic clergy and [[Protestantism|Protestant]] church hierarchies.<ref name="Kozloff_2005">{{Harv|Kozloff|2005}}.</ref><ref name="Morsbach_2006">{{Harv|Morsbach|2006}}.</ref> Although he has traditionally kept his own faith a private matter, Chávez has over the course of his presidency become increasingly open to discussing his religious views, stating that both his faith and his |
Chávez is of [[Roman Catholic Church|Roman Catholic]] extraction, and is currently a practicing Christian. Nevertheless, he has had a series of bitter disputes with both the Venezuelan Catholic clergy and [[Protestantism|Protestant]] church hierarchies.<ref name="Kozloff_2005">{{Harv|Kozloff|2005}}.</ref><ref name="Morsbach_2006">{{Harv|Morsbach|2006}}.</ref> Although he has traditionally kept his own faith a private matter, Chávez has over the course of his presidency become increasingly open to discussing his religious views, stating that both his faith and his interpretation of [[Jesus]]' personal life and ideology have had a profound impact on his leftist and progressivist views: |
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|"He [Jesus] accompanied me in difficult times, in crucial moments. So Jesus Christ is no doubt a historical figure—he was someone who rebelled, an anti-imperialist guy. He confronted the Roman Empire.... Because who might think that Jesus was a capitalist? No. Judas was the capitalist, for taking the coins! Christ was a revolutionary. He confronted the religious hierarchies. He confronted the economic power of the time. He preferred death in the defense of his [[humanism|humanistic]] ideals, who fostered change.... He is our Jesus Christ."<ref name="Chávez 2005b">{{Harv|Chávez|2005b}}.</ref> |
|"He [Jesus] accompanied me in difficult times, in crucial moments. So Jesus Christ is no doubt a historical figure—he was someone who rebelled, an anti-imperialist guy. He confronted the Roman Empire.... Because who might think that Jesus was a capitalist? No. Judas was the capitalist, for taking the coins! Christ was a revolutionary. He confronted the religious hierarchies. He confronted the economic power of the time. He preferred death in the defense of his [[humanism|humanistic]] ideals, who fostered change.... He is our Jesus Christ."<ref name="Chávez 2005b">{{Harv|Chávez|2005b}}.</ref> |
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== See also == |
== See also == |
Revision as of 05:59, 8 February 2006
Template:Venezuelan presidents infobox
Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (IPA: ['ugo(ʊ) ˌɹɑfe(ɪ)'ɛl 'tʃɑbɛz 'fɹiɪs]; born July 28, 1954) is the 53rd[1] and current President of Venezuela. As the leader of the "Bolivarian Revolution", Chávez is known for his democratic socialist governance, his promotion of Latin American integration, and his criticism—which he terms anti-imperialism — of neoliberal globalization and United States foreign policy.[2]
A career military officer, Chávez founded the leftist Fifth Republic Movement after a failed 1992 coup d'état. Chávez was elected President in 1998[3] on promises of aiding Venezuela's poor majority, and reelected in 2000.[4] Domestically, Chávez has launched massive Bolivarian Missions to combat disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, poverty, and other social ills. Abroad, Chávez has acted against the Washington Consensus by supporting alternative models of economic development, and has advocated cooperation among the world's poor nations, especially those in Latin America.
Chávez has been severely criticized, mostly by Venezuela's middle class and upper classes. He has been accused of electoral fraud, human rights violations, and political repression,[5][6][7] and has survived both a brief 2002 coup and a failed 2004 recall referendum.[8][9][10] Whether viewed as a socialist liberator or an authoritarian demagogue, Chávez remains one of the most complex, controversial, and high-profile figures in modern Latin American politics.
Early life (1954–1992)
Chávez was born the second son of poor schoolteachers Hugo de los Reyes Chávez and Elena Frías de Chávez in Sabaneta, Barinas. Of mixed Amerindian, African, and Spanish descent, Chávez and his five siblings were raised in a thatched palm leaf house. Later, Chávez and his older brother went to live with paternal grandmother Rosa Inés Chávez in Sabaneta proper. After elementary school, Chávez relocated to Barinas to attend the Daniel Florencio O'Leary School; he graduated with a science degree.[11]
At the age of seventeen, Chávez enrolled at the Venezuelan Academy of Military Sciences. After graduating in 1975 as a sub-lieutenant with master's degrees in military science and engineering, Chávez entered military service for several months. He was then allowed to pursue graduate studies in political science at Caracas' Simón Bolívar University, but left without a degree. Over the course of his college years, Chávez and fellow students developed a fervently left-nationalist doctrine that they termed "Bolivarianism", inspired by the Pan-Americanist philosophies of 19th-century Venezuelan revolutionary Simón Bolívar, the influence of Peruvian dictator Juan Velasco, and the teachings of various socialist and communist leaders. Chávez engaged in sporting events and cultural activities during these years as well. Notably, Chávez played both baseball and softball with the Criollitos de Venezuela, progressing with them to the Venezuelan National Baseball Championships in 1969. Chávez also authored numerous poems, stories and theatrical pieces.[11]
Upon completing his studies, Chávez initially entered active-duty military service as a member of a counter-insurgency battalion stationed in Barinas. Chávez's military career lasted 17 years, during which time he held a variety of post, command, and staff positions, eventually rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Chávez also held a series of teaching and staffing positions at the Military Academy of Venezuela, where he was first acknowledged by his peers for his fiery lecturing style and unusually radical critique of Venezuelan government and society.[12] At this time, Chávez established the Bolivarian Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 (MBR-200). Afterward, he rose to fill a number of sensitive high-level positions in Caracas and was decorated several times.[11]
Coup attempt of 1992
After an extended period of popular dissatisfaction and economic decline [13] under the neoliberal administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez, Chávez made extensive preparations for a military-civilian coup d'état [14] Initially planned for December, Chávez delayed the MBR-200 coup until the early twilight hours of February 4, 1992. On that date, five army units under Chávez's command barreled into urban Caracas with the mission of assaulting and overwhelming key military and communications installations throughout the city, including the Miraflores presidential palace, the defense ministry, La Carlota military airport, and the Historical Museum. Chávez's ultimate goal was to intercept and take custody of Pérez before he returned to Miraflores from an overseas trip.
Chávez held the loyalty of some 10% of Venezuela's military forces;[15] still, numerous betrayals, defections, errors, and other unforeseen circumstances soon left Chávez and a small group of other rebels completely cut off in the Historical Museum, without any means of conveying orders to their network of spies and collaborators spread throughout Venezuela.[16] Worse, Chávez's allies were unable to broadcast their prerecorded tapes on the national airwaves in which Chávez planned to issue a general call for a mass civilian uprising against Pérez. As the coup unfolded, Pérez eluded capture, and fourteen soldiers were killed, and 50 soldiers and some 80 civilians injured, in the ensuing violence.[17] Nevertheless, rebel forces in other parts of Venezuela made swift advances and were ultimately able to take control of such large cities as Valencia, Maracaibo, and Maracay with the help of spontaneous civilian aid. Chávez's forces, however, had failed to take Caracas.[18]
Chávez, alarmed, soon gave himself up to the government. He was then allowed to appear on national television to call for all remaining rebel detachments in Venezuela to cease hostilities. When he did so, Chávez famously quipped on national television that he had only failed "por ahora"—"for the moment".[19] Chávez was immediately catapulted into the national spotlight, with many poor Venezuelans seeing him as a figure who had stood up against government corruption and kleptocracy.[19][2] Afterwards, Chávez was sent to Yare prison; meanwhile, Pérez, the coup's intended target, was impeached a year later. While in prison, Chávez developed a carnosity of the eye, which spread to his iris. The clarity of his eyesight was slowly corrupted; despite treatments and operations, Chávez's eyesight was permanently weakened.[20]
Political rise (1992–1999)
After a two-year imprisonment, Chávez was pardoned by President Rafael Caldera in 1994. Upon his release, Chávez immediately reconstituted the MBR-200 as the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR—Movimiento Quinta República, with the V representing the Roman numeral five). Later, in 1998, Chávez began to campaign for the presidency. In working to gain the trust of voters, Chávez drafted an agenda that drew heavily on his philosophy of Bolivarianism. Chávez thus campaigned on an anti-corruption and anti-poverty platform, while pledging to dismantle puntofijismo, the traditional two-party patronage system.[14][21] Controversially, foreign banks — including Spain's Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) and Banco Santander, each the owner of one of Venezuela's largest banks—illicitly funneled millions of dollars into Chávez's campaign.[22][23]
Chávez utilized his charisma and flamboyant public speaking style—noted for its abundance of colloquialisms and ribald manner—on the campaign trail to win the trust and favor of a primarily poor and working class following. By May 1998, Chávez's support had risen to 30% in polls, and by August he was registering 39%. Chávez went on to win the Carter Center-endorsed 1998 presidential election on December 6, 1998 with 56.2% of the vote.[14][3]
Presidency (1999–present)
Chávez's first presidential inauguration in 1999 led to widespread transformation and turmoil. Venezuelan society under Chávez has seen sweeping and radical shifts in social policy, moving away from the government officially embracing a free market economy and neoliberal reform principles and towards quasi-socialist income redistribution and social welfare programs. Chávez has just as radically upended Venezuela's traditional foreign policy. Instead of continuing Venezuela's past support for U.S. and European strategic interests, Chávez has promoted alternative development and integration paradigms for the Global South.
Chávez's reforms have drawn both critical acclaim and bitter condemnation. He has alienated some upper and middle class Venezuelans, who have reported political repression and human rights violations under his rule. The controversy surrounding Chávez's policies spawned a transitory 2002 overthrow of Chávez, a 2004 recall attempt, and rumors and allegations regarding foreign conspiracies to overthrow Chávez via additional military coups, assassination attempts, and even military invasions. Nevertheless, Chávez remains a powerful figure in modern politics and a focal point for growing international resistance to the Washington Consensus and United States foreign policy.
1999: Economic crisis and new constitution
Chávez took the presidential oath of office on February 2, 1999 with a mandate to reverse Venezuela's economic decline and strengthen the role of the state in ensuring distributive social justice. Chávez's first few months in office were dedicated primarily to dismantling puntofijismo via new legislation and constitutional reform, while his secondary focus was on immediately allocating more government funds to new social programs.
However, as a recession triggered by historically low oil prices and soaring international interest rates rocked Venezuela, the shrunken federal treasury provided very little of the resources Chávez required for his promised massive anti-poverty measures. As a result, in April 1999 Chávez was forced to set his eyes upon the one Venezuelan institution that was costly for the government but did little for the systematic social development that Chávez desired: the military. Chávez ordered all branches of the military to devise programs to combat poverty and to further civic and social development in Venezuela's vast slum and rural areas. This civilian-military program was launched as Plan Bolivar 2000, and was heavily patterned after a similar program enacted by Cuban President Fidel Castro during the early 1990s, while the Cuban people were still suffering through the Special Period. Projects within Plan Bolivar 2000's scope included road building, housing construction, and mass vaccination. These programs were widely criticized by Chávez's opposition as corrupt and inefficient. Chávez defended them by stating that these programs were some of the only ways he had to effect his social agenda in the face of a state bureaucracy that he saw as stubbornly opposed to his reforms.[24]
Chávez sharply diverged from previous administrations' economic policies, terminating their practice of extensively privatizing Venezuela's state-owned holdings, such as the national social security system, holdings in the aluminum industry, and the oil sector.[25] However, Chávez faced a profound dilemma in that, while he wished to improve living standards through redistribution, increased regulation, and social spending, he did not wish to discourage foreign direct investment (FDI). In keeping with his predecessors, Chávez attempted to shore up FDI influxes to prevent an economic crisis of chronic capital flight and monetary inflation.
Chávez also worked to reduce Venezuelan oil extraction in the hopes of garnering elevated oil prices and, at least theoretically, elevated total oil revenues, thereby boosting Venezuela's severely deflated foreign exchange reserves. He extensively lobbied other OPEC countries to cut their production rates as well. As a result of these actions, Chávez became known as a "price hawk" in his dealings with the oil industry and OPEC. Chávez also attempted a comprehensive renegotiation of 60-year-old royalty payment agreements with oil giants Philips Petroleum and ExxonMobil.[26] These agreements had allowed the corporations to pay in taxes as little as 1% of the tens of billions of dollars in revenues they were earning from the Venezuelan oil they were extracting. Afterwards, a frustrated Chávez stated his intention to complete the nationalization of Venezuela's oil resources. Although unsuccessful in his attempts to renegotiate with the oil corporations, Chávez succeeded in improving both the fairness and efficiency of Venezuela's formerly lax tax collection and auditing system, especially for major corporations and landholders.
Nevertheless, by mid-1999, Chávez was thoroughly incensed by his administration's setbacks in enacting his much-promised anti-poverty initiatives. The National Assembly's opposition members were forestalling his allies' legislation. Chávez moved to bypass such opposition by approving the scheduling of two fresh national elections for July 1999—just months after Chávez's presidential election. The first was a nationwide referendum to determine whether a national constitutional assembly should be created. The assembly was tasked with framing a new Venezuelan constitution that hewed more closely to Chávez's own political ideology. A second election was held that elected delegates to this constitutional assembly. Chávez's widespread popularity allowed the constitutional referendum to pass with a 71.78% "yes" vote; in the second election, members of Chávez's MVR and select allied parties formed the Polo Patriotico ("Patriotic Pole"). Chávez's Polo Patriotico went on to win 95% (120 out of the total 131) of the seats in the voter-approved Venezuelan Constitutional Assembly.
However, in August 1999, the Constitutional Assembly established a special "judicial emergency committee" with the power to remove judges without consulting with other branches of government — over 190 judges were eventually suspended on charges of corruption. In the same month, the Constitutional Assembly declared a "legislative emergency", resulting in a seven-member committee that was tasked with conducting the legislative functions ordinarily carried out by the National Assembly. Legislative opposition to Chávez's policies was immediately disabled. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Assembly prohibited the National Assembly from holding meetings of any sort.[27]
The Constitutional Assembly itself drafted the new 1999 Venezuelan Constitution. With 350 articles, the document was, as drafted, one of the world's lengthiest constitutions. It first changed the country's official name from "Republic of Venezuela" to "Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela". It also increased the presidential term of office from five to six years, introduced a presidential two-term limit, and introduced provisions for national presidential recall referenda—that is, Venezuelan voters gained the right to remove the president from office before the expiration of his presidential term. Such referenda can only be activated by a petition to do so with the required number of signatures. The presidency was also dramatically strengthened, with the power to dissolve the National Assembly upon decree. The new constitution converted the formerly bicameral National Assembly into a unicameral legislature, and stripped it of many of its former powers. Provisions were also made for a new position, the Public Defender, an office with the authority to check the activities of the presidency, the National Assembly, and the constitution. Chávez characterized the Public Defender as the guardian of the "moral branch" of the new Venezuelan government, tasked with defending public and moral interests. Lastly, the Venezuelan judiciary was reformed. Judges, under the new constitution, were now to be installed after passing public examinations and were not, as in the old manner, to be appointed by the National Assembly.
This new constitution was presented to the national electorate in December 1999 and approved with a CNE-audited 71.78% "yes" vote. Over a span of a mere 60 days, the Constitutional Assembly thus framed a document that enshrined as constitutional law most of the structural changes Chávez desired. Chávez stated that such changes were necessary in order to successfully and comprehensively enact his planned social justice programs. He planned to enact sweeping changes in Venezuelan governmental and political structure, and, based on his 1998 campaign pledges, to dramatically open up Venezuelan political discourse to independent and third parties. In the process, Chávez sought to fatally paralyze his AD and COPEI opposition. All of Chávez's aims were, in one move, dramatically furthered.
2000–2001: Reelection and reform
Elections for the new unicameral National Assembly were held on July 30, 2000. During this same election, Chávez himself stood for reelection. Chávez's coalition garnered a commanding two-thirds majority of seats in the National Assembly while Chávez was reelected with 60% of the votes. The Carter Center monitored the 2000 presidential election; their report on that election stated that, due to lack of transparency, CNE partiality, and political pressure from the Chávez government that resulted in unconstitutionally early elections, it was unable to validate the official CNE results.[4]
Later, on December 3, 2000, local elections and a referendum were held. The referendum, backed by Chávez, proposed a law that would force Venezuela's labor unions to hold state-monitored elections. The referendum was widely condemned by international labor organizations—including the International Labour Organization — as undue government interference in internal union matters; these organizations threatened to apply sanctions on Venezuela.[28]
After the May and July 2000 elections, Chávez backed the passage of the "Enabling Act" by the National Assembly. This act allowed Chávez to rule by decree for one year. In November 2001, shortly before the Enabling Act was set to expire, Chávez enacted a set of 49 decrees. These included the Hydrocarbons Law and the Land Law, which are detailed below. Fedecámaras, a national business federation, opposed the new laws and called for a general business strike on December 10, 2001. The strike failed to significantly impact Chávez's policies, however.
By the end of the first three years of his presidency, Chávez's main policy concerns had successfully challenged the Venezuelan oligarchy's control over Venezuela's land, and introduced reforms aimed at improving the social welfare of the population by lowering infant mortality rates, introducing land reform, and implementing a cursory government-funded free healthcare system and education up to university level.[26] By December of 2001, Chávez's capital-control policies had reduced inflation from 40% to 12% while generating 4% economic growth. His administration also reported an increase in primary school enrollment by one million students.[26]
2002: Coup and strike/lockout
On April 9, 2002, CTV leader Carlos Ortega called for a two-day general strike. Approximately 500,000 people took to the streets on April 11, 2002 and marched towards the headquarters of Venezuela's state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), in defense of its recently-fired management. The organizers decided to redirect the march to Miraflores, the presidential palace, where a pro-Chávez demonstration was taking place. Chávez took over the Venezuelan airwaves several times in the early afternoon in what is termed a cadena, or a commandeering of the media airwaves to broadcast public announcements, asking protesters to return to their homes, playing lengthy pre-recorded discourses, and attempting to block coverage of the ensuing violence. Gunfire and violence erupted between two groups of demonstrators, Caracas's Metropolitan Police (under the control of the oppositionist mayor), and the Venezuelan national guard. When snipers began firing on the crowd, television channels owned by anti-Chavez leaders reported that the shots came from the areas where chavistas (supporters of Chávez) were concentrated; these statements are contested by, among others, the filmmakers who produced The Revolution Will Not Be Televised.
By the end of the outbreak of violence, more than 100 casualties and 17 deaths had been documented. Then, unexpectedly, Lucas Rincón Romero, commander-in-chief of the Venezuelan armed forces, announced in a broadcast to a stunned nationwide audience that Chávez had tendered his resignation from the presidency. While Chávez was brought to a military base and held there, rebel military leaders appointed the president of the Fedecámaras, Pedro Carmona, as Venezuela's interim president. Carmona's first decree reversed all of the major social and economic policies that comprised Chávez's "Bolivarian Revolution", including loosening Chávez's credit controls and ending his oil price quotas by raising production back to pre-Chávez levels. Carmona also dissolved both the National Assembly and the Venezuelan judiciary, while reverting the nation's name back to República de Venezuela.
Carmona's rapid reforms generated pro-Chávez uprisings all across Caracas. Responding to these disturbances, Venezuelan soldiers loyal to Chávez called for popular support for a counter-coup. In the wake of massive street protests[29] two days after the coup, these soldiers stormed and retook the presidential palace, freeing Chávez from captivity. The shortest-lived government in Venezuelan history was thus toppled, and Chávez resumed his presidency on the night of Saturday, April 13, 2002. Following this episode, Rincón was reappointed by Chávez as commander-in-chief, and later as Interior Minister in 2003.[30]
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4d/Hugo_Chavez_in_Brazil-1861.jpeg/225px-Hugo_Chavez_in_Brazil-1861.jpeg)
After being reinstated, Chávez ordered several investigations to be carried out, and their official results supported Chávez's assertions that the 2002 coup was sponsored by the United States.[31] On April 16, 2002, Chávez reported that a plane with U.S. registration numbers had visited and been berthed at Venezuela's Orchila Island airbase, where Chávez had been held captive. On May 14, 2002, Chávez alleged that he had definitive proof of U.S. military involvement in April's coup. He claimed that during the coup Venezuelan radar images had indicated the presence of U.S. military naval vessels and aircraft in Venezuelan waters and airspace. Chávez also repeatedly claimed during the coup's immediate aftermath that the U.S. was still seeking his overthrow. On October 6, 2002, for example, Chávez stated that he had foiled a new coup plot, and on October 20, 2002, Chávez stated that he had barely escaped an assassination attempt while returning from a trip to Europe.[26]
Chávez quickly took steps to prevent future coup attempts and stabilize the government. First, Chávez fired sixty generals and completely replaced the upper echelons of Venezuela's armed forces, substituting them with more complacent pro-Chávez personnel. Chávez also sought to deepen his emotional bond with rank and file soldiers who, like Chávez himself, came from neglected segments of Venezuelan society. He boosted support programs, employment, and benefits for veterans, while promulgating new civilian-military development initiatives.
However, only a few months would pass after the April 2002 coup before the Chávez presidency would enter another crisis. Chávez, outraged by the coup and seeking more funds for his social programs, moved in late 2002 to implement total control over the PDVSA and its revenues. As a result, for two months following December 2, 2002, Chávez faced a strike from resistant PDVSA workers that sought to force Chávez out of office by completely removing his access to the all-important government oil revenue. The strike, led by a coalition of labor unions, industrial magnates, and oil workers, sought to halt the activities of the PDVSA. As a result, Venezuela ceased exporting its former daily average of 2,800,000 barrels (450,000 m³) of oil and oil derivatives. Hydrocarbon shortages soon erupted throughout Venezuela, with long lines forming at petrol-filling stations. Gasoline imports were soon required. Chávez responded by firing PDVSA's anti-Chávez upper-echelon management and dismissing 18,000 skilled PDVSA employees. Chávez justified this by alleging their complicity in gross mismanagement and corruption in their handling of oil revenues, while opposition supporters of the fired workers stated that his actions were politically motivated. Later, allegations arose from anti-Chávez activists that Chávez had authorized the creation of blacklists to prevent the employment of strike participants. A disputed Venezuelan court ruling declared the dismissal of these workers illegal and ordered the immediate return of the entire group to their former posts. Nevertheless, Chávez and his allies have repeatedly stated that the ruling will not be enforced.
2003–2004
In 2003, Chávez created Mission Guaicaipuro (October 12, 2003), Mission Robinson (July 2003), Mission Sucre (late 2003), and Mission Ribas (November 2003). In July 2004, speaking to 50,000 formerly illiterate Mission Robinson beneficiaries, Chávez stated that "it was truly a world record: in a year, we have graduated 1,250,000 Venezuelans". Additionally, the inflation rate eased from 31% (2002) to 27% (2003).
In May 9, 2004, a group of 126 Colombians were captured during a raid of a farm near Caracas. Chávez soon accused them of being a foreign-funded paramilitary force who intended to violently overthrow Chávez.[1] These events merely served to further the extreme and violent polarization of Venezuelan society between pro- and anti-Chávez camps. Chávez's allegations of a putative 2004 coup attempt continue to stir controversy and doubts to this day. In October 2005, 27 of the accused Colombians were found guilty, while the rest were released and deported.[32]
In early and mid-2003, the Venezuelan opposition began the process of collecting the millions of signatures needed to activate the presidential recall provision provided for in the 1999 Constitution. In August 2003, around 3.2 million signatures were presented, but these were rejected by the pro-Chávez majority in the National Electoral Council on the grounds that many had been collected before the mid-point of Chávez's presidential term.[33] Reports then began to emerge among opposition and international news outlets that Chávez had begun to act punitively against those who had signed the petition, while pro-Chávez individuals stated that they had been coerced by employers into offering their signatures at their workplaces. In November 2003, the opposition collected an entirely new set of signatures, with 3.6 million names produced over a span of four days. Riots erupted nationwide as allegations of fraud were made by Chávez against the signature collectors.
Reports again emerged that Chávez and his allies were penalizing signers of the publicly posted petition. Charges were made of summary dismissals from government ministries, PDVSA, the state-owned water corporation, the Caracas Metro, and public hospitals controlled by Chávez's political allies. Finally, after opposition leaders submitted to the CNE a valid petition with 2,436,830 signatures that requested a presidential recall referendum, a recall referendum was announced on June 8, 2004 by the CNE. Chávez and his political allies responded to this by launching a massive grassroots effort to mobilize supporters and encourage rejection of the recall with a "no" vote. The recall vote itself was held on August 15, 2004. A record number of voters turned out to defeat the recall attempt with a 59.25% "no" vote.[34][8] A jubilant Chávez pledged to redouble his efforts against both poverty and imperialism, while promising to foster dialogue with his opponents. The election was overseen by the Carter Center and certified by them as fair and open.[35] However, the opposition called the results fraudulent, citing documents which indicated that the true results were the complete opposite of the reported ones.
2004–present: Focus on foreign relations
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/da/N%C3%A9stor_Kirchner_y_Hugo_Ch%C3%A1vez-Venezuela-Julio_2004.jpg/200px-N%C3%A9stor_Kirchner_y_Hugo_Ch%C3%A1vez-Venezuela-Julio_2004.jpg)
After his referendum victory, Chávez used Venezuela's increasing oil revunues — from rises in world oil prices — to focus on expanding social programs. Economic growth also picked up markedly, reaching double-digit growth in 2004 and a projected 8% growth rate for 2005. In late March 2005, the Chávez government criminalized broadcast libel and slander directed against public officials, including prison sentences of up to 40 months for serious cases. Yet, when asked if he would ever impose such penalties, Chávez stated that "I don't care if they [the private media] call me names.... As Don Quixote said, 'If the dogs are barking, it is because we are working.'"[36] Chávez also expanded social programs via new Missions: Mission Vuelta al Campo, phases II and III of Mission Barrio Adentro, and Mission Miranda.
Chávez's foreign policy included humanitarian aid, construction projects, and other agreements with Argentina's Nestor Kirchner, China's Hu Jintao, Cuba's Fidel Castro, and Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. On March 4, 2005, Chávez publicly declared that the U.S.-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was "dead". Chávez also stated his desire for the establishment of a Latin American analogue of NATO. At Chávez's direction, the military also began shifting armaments procurements to non-U.S. sources, including Brazil, China, Russia, and Spain. Meanwhile, Chávez ordered all active-duty U.S. soldiers to leave Venezuela. In 2005, he created the 1.5 million-strong Mission Miranda "military reserve" program.[2] In October 2005, Chávez banished the "New Tribes Mission" from the country, accusing it of "imperialist infiltration" and collaboration with the CIA.[3] Chávez's government also gave Amazonian indigenous peoples inalienable titles to 6,800 km² of lands and launched Mission Guaicaipuro.
At a graduation ceremony at Cuba's Latin American School of Medicine on August 20, 2005, Chávez announced the joint establishment of a tuition-free medical school, including 30,000 planned slots for poor students.[37] During his speech at the 2005 UN World Summit, Chávez again denounced neoliberalism and warned of hydrocarbon depletion.[38] At the November 7, 2005 Mar del Plata Fourth Summit of the Americas, Chávez hailed the stalling of the FTAA proposal and stated that "the taste of victory" was at hand regarding the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, started by Venezuela and Cuba on December 14, 2004.[4]
Impact of Presidency
Labor policy
Chávez has had a combative relationship with the nation's largest trade union confederation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), which is historically aligned with the Acción Democrática party. During the December 2000 local elections, Chávez placed a referendum measure on the ballot that would mandate state-monitored elections within unions. The measure, which was condemned by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) as undue interference in internal union matters, passed by a large margin on a very low electoral turnout. In the ensuing CTV elections, Carlos Ortega declared his victory and remained in office as CTV president, while Chavista (pro-Chávez) candidates declared fraud.
The Unión Nacional de los Trabajadores (UNT—"National Union of Workers"), a new pro-Chávez union federation, formed in response, and has been growing in membership; it seeks to ultimately supplant the CTV. Several Chavista unions have withdrawn from the CTV because of their strident anti-Chávez activism, and have instead affiliated with the UNT. In 2003, Chávez chose to send UNT, rather than CTV, representatives to an annual ILO meeting.
At the request of its workers, Chávez nationalized Venepal, a formerly closed paper and cardboard manufacturing firm, on January 19, 2005. Workers had occupied the factory floor and restarted production, but following a failed deal with management and amidst management threats to liquidate the firm's equipment, Chávez ordered the nationalization, extended a line of credit to the workers, and ordered that the Venezuelan educational missions purchase more paper products from the company.
Economic policy
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/21/Chavez_in_Arab_SouthAmerica_Summit.jpeg/200px-Chavez_in_Arab_SouthAmerica_Summit.jpeg)
Venezuela is a major producer of oil products, which remain the keystone of the Venezuelan economy. Chávez has gained a reputation as a price hawk in OPEC by pushing for stringent enforcement of production quotas and higher target oil prices. He has also attempted to broaden Venezuela's customer base, striking joint exploration deals with other developing countries, including Argentina, Brazil, China and India. Record oil prices have meant more funding for social programs, but have left the economy increasingly dependent on both the Chávez government and the oil sector; the private sector's role has correspondingly diminished. Despite the high government income, official unemployment figures have remained above 11%.[39]
Chávez has redirected the focus of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Venezuela's state-owned oil company, by bringing it more closely under the direction of the Energy Ministry. He has also attempted to repatriate more oil funds to Venezuela by raising royalty percentages on joint extraction contracts that are payable to Venezuela. Chávez has also explored the liquidation of some or all of the assets belonging to PDVSA's U.S.-based subsidiary, Citgo. The oil ministry has been successful in restructuring Citgo's profit structure,[40] resulting in large increases in dividends and income taxes from PDVSA. In 2005, Citgo announced the largest dividend payment to PDVSA in over a decade, $400 million. Yet despite massive efforts to increase production, daily oil production is still well short of the levels attained under the previous administration.
Template:Bolivarian Missions Infobox 1
Chávez's domestic policy is embodied by the Bolivarian Missions, a series of social justice programs that have radically altered the economic and cultural landscape of Venezuela. Although recent economic activity under Chávez has been robust under these programs,[41][42] per-capita GDP in 2004 has dropped around 1% from 1999 levels.[43][44] However, as of September 2005, there have also been significant drops since 1999 in unemployment[45] and in the government's definition of "poverty",[46] and there have been marked improvements in national health indicators between 1998 and 2005.[47][43]
Aims of the Bolivarian Missions have included the launching of massive government anti-poverty initiatives,[48][49] the construction of thousands of free medical clinics for the poor,[50] the institution of educational campaigns that have reportedly made more than one million adult Venezuelans literate,[51][52] and the enactment of food[53] and housing subsidies.[54] The Missions have overseen widespread state-supported experimentation in citizen- and worker-managed governance,[55][56] as well as the granting of thousands of free land titles to formerly landless poor and indigenous communities.[57] In contrast, several large landed estates and factories have been, or are in the process of being, expropriated.
Foreign policy
Chávez has refocused Venezuelan foreign policy on Latin American economic and social integration by enacting bilateral trade and reciprocal aid agreements, including his so-called "oil diplomacy".[58][59] Examples include PetroCaribe, Petrosur, and Telesur. Bilateral trade relationships with other Latin American countries have also played a major role in his policy, with Chávez increasing arms purchases from Brazil, forming oil-for-expertise trade arrangements with Cuba, funding an approximately $300 million ex gratia oil pipeline built to provide discounted natural gas to Colombia,[5] and creating unique barter arrangements that exchange Venezuelan petroleum for cash-strapped Argentina's meat and dairy products. Additionally, Chávez worked closely with other Latin American leaders following the 1997 Summit of the Americas in many areas—especially energy integration—and championed the OAS decision to adopt the Anti-Corruption Convention. Chávez also participates in the United Nations Friends groups for Haiti, and is pursuing efforts to join and engage the Mercosur trade bloc to expand the hemisphere's trade integration prospects. Abroad, Chávez denounces both "neocolonialism" and "neoliberalism", including U.S. foreign policy regarding Iraq, Haiti, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Chávez's friendship with Cuban President Fidel Castro has markedly compromised the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba.[60] Long-standing ties between the U.S. and Venezuelan militaries were also severed by Chávez. Chávez's has also lobbied OPEC producers to decrease production ceilings. Pursuing this goal, Chávez made a ten-day tour of OPEC countries; he thus became the first head of state to meet Saddam Hussein since the Gulf War.[61]
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6c/Kirchner_and_Chavez.jpg/200px-Kirchner_and_Chavez.jpg)
Chávez's foreign policy conduct and anti-Bush rhetoric has occasionally reached the level of personal attacks. In response to the ousting of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004, Chávez referred to U.S. President George W. Bush as a pendejo ("jerk"). In a later speech, he made personal remarks regarding Condoleezza Rice, referring to her as a "complete illiterate" with regards to comprehending Latin America.[6][7][7] Additionally, although Chávez typically enjoys fair to excellent relations with fellow Latin American leaders, there have been examples of heated disputes between them. On November 10, 2005, Chávez, stated regarding Mexican President Vicente Fox in a talk before supporters in Caracas that he was saddened that "the president of a people like the Mexicans lets himself become the puppy dog of the empire" for what he alleged was Fox's obsequience to U.S. trade interests in his promotion of the newly stalled FTAA. Additionally, on the November 13, 2005 episode of his weekly talk show, Aló, Presidente!, Chávez stated that the Mexican president was "bleeding from his wounds" and warned Fox to not "mess" with him, lest he "get stung". Fox, upon hearing of the remarks, expressed his outrage and threatened to recall the Mexican ambassador to Venezuela if the Venezuelan government did not promptly issue an apology. However, rather than apologizing, Chávez simply recalled Venezuela's own ambassador to Mexico City, Vladimir Villegas. The Mexican ambassador to Caracas was recalled the following day.[62] Although ties between the two countries have been strained, neither country will say that diplomatic ties have been indefinitely severed. Several groups in both Mexico and Venezuela are working to restore the diplomatic relationship between the two countries.
In two highly-publicized episodes, Chávez has attempted to score rhetorical points against the U.S. government with offers of petroleum-related aid. After Hurricane Katrina battered the United States’ gulf coast in late 2005, the Chávez administration was the first foreign government to offer aid to its "North American brothers". Chávez offered tons of food, water, and a million barrels of extra petroleum to the U.S. He has also proposed to sell, at a significant discount, as many as 66,000 barrels of heating fuel to poor communities that were hit by the hurricane, and offered mobile hospital units, medical specialists, and power generators. The Bush administration opted to refuse this aid.[8] Later, in November 2005, officials in Massachusetts signed an agreement with Venezuela to provide heating oil at a 40% discount to low income families through CITGO, a subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela.[63] Chávez has stated that such gestures comprise "a strong oil card to play on the geopolitical stage" and that "[i]t is a card that we are going to play with toughness against the toughest country in the world, the United States."[64]
Chávez and the media
Even before the April 2002 coup, many owners, managers, and commentators working for the five major private mainstream television networks and largest mainstream newspapers had stated their opposition to Chávez's policies. These media outlets have accused the Chávez administration of intimidating their journalists using specially-dispatched gangs. Chávez in turn alleges that the owners of these networks have primary allegiance not to Venezuela but to the United States, and that they seek the advancement of neoliberalism via corporate propaganda.
Throughout his presidency, Chávez has hosted the live talk show known as Aló, Presidente! ("Hello, President!").[65] The show broadcasts in varying formats on Venezolana de Televisión (VTV—Venezuelan State Television) each Sunday at 11:00 AM. The show, which lasts for hours, features Chávez addressing topics of the day, taking phone calls and live questions from both the studio and broadcast audience, and touring locations where government social welfare programs are active. Additionally, on July 25, 2005, Chávez inaugurated Telesur, a proposed pan-American homologue of Al-Jazeera that seeks to challenge the present domination of Latin American television news by United States-based CNN en Español and Univision. Chávez's media policies have contributed to elevated tensions between the United States and Venezuela.[66]
Bolivarianism and Chavismo
Chávez's version of Bolivarianism, although drawing heavily from Simón Bolívar's ideals, was also influenced by the writings of Marxist historian Federico Brito Figueroa. Chávez was also thoroughly steeped in the South American tradition of socialism and communism early in his life, such as that practiced by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and Salvador Allende. Other key influences on Chávez's political philosophy include Ezequiel Zamora and Simón Rodríguez. Although Chávez himself refers to his ideology as "Bolivarianismo" ("Bolivarianism"), Chávez's supporters and opponents in Venezuela refer to themselves as being either for or against "Chavismo", indicating a public perception that Chávez's political philosophy does not originate from Bolívar so much as from his own views. Thus, Chávez supporters refer to themselves not as "Bolivarians" or "Bolivarianists", but rather as "chavistas".
Later in his life, Chávez would acknowledge the role that democratic socialism (a form of socialism that emphasizes grassroots democratic participation) plays in Bolivarianism. For example, on January 30, 2005 at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, Chávez declared his support for democratic socialism as integral to Bolivarianism, proclaiming that humanity must embrace "a new type of socialism, a humanist one, which puts humans, and not machines or the state, ahead of everything."[9] He later reiterated this sentiment in a February 26 speech at the 4th Summit on Social Debt held in Caracas.
The central points of Chávez's Bolivarianism are:[21]
- Total Venezuelan sovereignty (anti-imperialism).
- Grassroots political participation via popular votes and referendums (participatory democracy).
- Comprehensive economic self-sufficiency (in food, consumer durables, et cetera).
- Instilling a national sentiment of patriotic service.
- Equitable distribution of Venezuela's vast oil revenues.
- Elimination of corruption.
- Elimination of puntofijismo by way of constitutional reforms.[67]
Because his Bolivarianism relies on popular support, Chávez has made provision for grassroots and participatory democracy via the so-called "Bolivarian Circles". In 2000, Chávez authorized then-Vice President Diosdado Cabello to financially support such circles. The circles themselves were decentralized and autonomous from any central government or hierarchical overseeing, and were organized on the neighborhood and block level. The circles were charged with such tasks as neighborhood beautification, grassroots organizing and activism, lending support to small businesses, and charity work.[68] The circles reached a peak membership of 2.2 million in July 2003 and were instrumental in, among other things, urging voter approval of the 1999 Constitution and foiling the 2002 coup attempt with mass grassroots mobilization for pro-Chávez demonstrations.[69] However, their significance to Venezuelan politics has trailed off significantly since 2003, as most circles have effectively disbanded. Pro-Chávez Bolivarian circles are not exclusive to Venezuela—similar circles of supporters remain widespread in, for example, Germany, Austria, the United States, and France (where circles exist in Vienna, Tübingen, Bielefeld, and Paris). Circles are also found in Australia, Canada, and several other nations.
Criticism
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7c/Anti-chavez_march.jpg/225px-Anti-chavez_march.jpg)
Chávez is a deeply disputed personality, both in Venezuela and abroad. His most steadfast domestic opponents state that Chávez is a dangerous militarist and authoritarian revolutionary who poses a fundamental threat to Venezuelan democracy. The opposition also reports that both poverty and unemployment figures under Chávez have not seen significant improvements and that official corruption under his government continues to be rampant,[70][71] and point to the 1% drop in Venezuela's per-capita GDP under Chávez. Opposition figures also cite the many public hospitals that lack even basic medicine and hygenic supplies, while others describe Chávez as a demagogue and his supporters as a personality cult, intended to help Chávez achieve power and adulation. For example, Chávez critics question the motives behind the Bolivarian Missions' regular cash and in-kind payments to the millions of poor Venezuelans enrolling in their social programs. They worry that receiving benefits from many Missions simultaneously will corrupt their work ethic and predispose them to support Chávez. However, the particular claims about the inefficacy of government programs that have eradicated poverty, illiteracy and ill health are also made specifically through media owned by the very upper class of Venezuela, and are strongly disputed by the lower classes who are the recipients of these government initiatives and constitute the bulk of the Chavista movement.
The opposition has also claimed that the Chávez government has engaged in extensive electoral fraud, especially during the 2000 and 2004 elections, and has reported that many anti-Chávez activists are detained as political prisoners.[10] More sympathetic criticisms arise from reports that Chávez is not fulfilling his major campaign pledges with respect to labor and land reform.[11][72][73] Many claim that the beaureaucratic setup Chavez inherited has strongly corrupted roots, and are subversive or inefficient elements in the programs for social change. Abroad, sources in the Western mainstream news media have reported that Chávez is a confrontational ideologue[74] who willingly harbors, funds, and trains terrorists in Venezuela and insurgents abroad.[75][76]
The human rights organizations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented numerous human rights violations under Chávez.[5][6] Scores of deaths and hundreds of injuries inflicted during both opposition and pro-Chávez demonstrations have resulted in little investigative action taken on the part of Chávez. These organizations have also made allegations of ill treatment of detainees, torture, and censorship by the police and military. However, there is also much repression of lower class Chavez supporters and even social workers, and the local police act on behalf of the local mayors, many of whom are wealthy anti-Chavistas, rather than the central government. The government is currently attempting to nationalize police to eliminate local corruption. Meanwhile, relatives of victims who were killed in the April 11, 2002 clashes have filed a case against Chávez and others at the International Criminal Court, stating that Chávez is legally complicit in crimes against humanity. A ruling has yet to be reached.[77]
Chávez has also made controversial statements. In January 2006, he stated that “[t]he world is for all of us, then, but it so happens that a minority, the descendants of the same ones that crucified Christ, the descendants of the same ones that kicked Bolívar out of here and also crucified him in their own way over there in Santa Marta, in Colombia. A minority has taken possession all of the wealth of the world...”[12] The Simon Wiesenthal Center omitted the reference to Bolívar without ellipsis, stated that Chávez was referring to Jews, and denounced the remarks as antisemitic by way of his allusions to wealth. Meanwhile, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Confederation of Jewish Associations of Venezuela all defended Chávez, stating that he was speaking not of Jews, but of South America's white oligarchy. Why Chávez would refer to this oligarchy as the killers of Christ is unclear, and is not addressed by any of these groups; but would seem to be a reference to the Roman government, whose soldiers were directly involved in the torture and execution of Christ, and from which most western European nations are descended. [78]
Personal life and religion
Hugo Chávez has been married twice. He first married Nancy Colmenares, a woman from a poor family originating in Chávez's own hometown of Sabaneta. Chávez and Colmenares remained married for eighteen years, during which time they had three children: Rosa Virginia, María Gabriela, and Hugo Rafael. They separated soon after Chávez's 1992 coup attempt, but have remained good friends since then.[79] During his first marriage, Chávez also had an affair with young historian Herma Marksman; they had a relationship which lasted nine years.[14][80] At present, Chávez is separated from his second wife, journalist Marisabel Rodríguez de Chávez. Chávez had another daughter, Rosa Inés, through that marriage, in addition to a son-in-law, Raúl "Raúlito" Alfonzo. Chávez also has one granddaughter, Gabriela.[81]
Chávez is of Roman Catholic extraction, and is currently a practicing Christian. Nevertheless, he has had a series of bitter disputes with both the Venezuelan Catholic clergy and Protestant church hierarchies.[82][83] Although he has traditionally kept his own faith a private matter, Chávez has over the course of his presidency become increasingly open to discussing his religious views, stating that both his faith and his interpretation of Jesus' personal life and ideology have had a profound impact on his leftist and progressivist views:
"He [Jesus] accompanied me in difficult times, in crucial moments. So Jesus Christ is no doubt a historical figure—he was someone who rebelled, an anti-imperialist guy. He confronted the Roman Empire.... Because who might think that Jesus was a capitalist? No. Judas was the capitalist, for taking the coins! Christ was a revolutionary. He confronted the religious hierarchies. He confronted the economic power of the time. He preferred death in the defense of his humanistic ideals, who fostered change.... He is our Jesus Christ."[20]
See also
Notes
- ^ (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello 1999) .
- ^ (O'Keefe 2005) .
- ^ a b (McCoy & Trinkunas 1999, p. 49) .
- ^ a b (McCoy & Neuman 2001, pp. 71–72) .
- ^ a b (AI 2005) .
- ^ a b (HRW 2005) .
- ^ a b (Diehl 2005) .
- ^ a b (Carter Center 2004, p. 7) .
- ^ (Carter Center 2005, pp. 133–134) .
- ^ (Ginden 2005) .
- ^ a b c (Government of Venezuela 2005) .
- ^ (Gott 2005b) .
- ^ (Schuyler 2001, p. 10) .
- ^ a b c d (Guillermoprieto 2005) . Cite error: The named reference "Guillermoprieto_2005" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ (Gott 2005, p. 64) .
- ^ (Gott 2005, p. 63) .
- ^ (Gott 2005, p. 69) .
- ^ (Gott 2005, pp. 66–67) .
- ^ a b (Gott 2005, p. 67) .
- ^ a b (Chávez 2005b) .
- ^ a b (Wilpert 2003) .
- ^ (Marcano 2005, p. 50) .
- ^ (Toro 2004) .
- ^ (Harnecker 2003) .
- ^ (Ellner 2005) .
- ^ a b c d (Center for Cooperative Research 2006) .
- ^ (Mcgirk 1999) .
- ^ (McCoy & Neuman 2001, p. 73) .
- ^ (Gott 2005, pp. 234–236) .
- ^ (CNN 2003) .
- ^ (Vulliamy 2002) .
- ^ (EP 2004) .
- ^ (BBC News 2003) .
- ^ (BBC News 2004) .
- ^ (Carter Center 2005, pp. 133–134) .
- ^ (BBC Talking Point 2005) .
- ^ (Reed 2005) .
- ^ (Campbell 2005) .
- ^ (Venezuela Analysis 2005a) .
- ^ (Ramirez 2005) .
- ^ (Latin Business Chronicle 2005) .
- ^ (Weisbrot 2005) .
- ^ a b (CIA 2005) .
- ^ (CIA 1999) .
- ^ (Venezuela Analysis 2005b) .
- ^ (Venezuela Analysis 2005) .
- ^ (CIA 1998) .
- ^ (Niemeyer 2004, p. 36) .
- ^ (UNICEF 2005) .
- ^ (Kuiper 2005) .
- ^ (Niemeyer 2004, p. 14) .
- ^ (Burbach 2005) .
- ^ (Niemeyer 2004, p. 15) .
- ^ (Venezuela Analysis 2005b) .
- ^ (Albert 2005) .
- ^ (Ellsworth 2005) .
- ^ (Wilpert 2005a) .
- ^ (Economist 2005) .
- ^ (Wagner 2005) .
- ^ (Macbeth 2005) .
- ^ (CNN 2000) .
- ^ (BBC News 2005c) .
- ^ (BBC News 2005d) .
- ^ (Blum 2005) .
- ^ (Lakshmanan 2005) .
- ^ (Wilpert 2005b) .
- ^ (Wilpert 2003a) .
- ^ (Sanchez 2003) .
- ^ (Burke 2003) .
- ^ (Jorquera 2005) .
- ^ (Parma 2005b) .
- ^ (Márquez 2005) .
- ^ (Parma 2005a) .
- ^ (Sanchez 2005) .
- ^ (Robinson 2003) .
- ^ (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting 2005) .
- ^ (Alvarez 2004) .
- ^ (Perelman 2006) .
- ^ (La Semana 2000) .
- ^ (Byrne 2005) .
- ^ (Palast 2005) .
- ^ (Kozloff 2005) .
- ^ (Morsbach 2006) .
- ^ Marshall, Robyn. (Green Left Weekly, 26 May 2004). "New Coup Plot Uncovered". Retrieved 01 Nov 2005.
- ^ Wagner, Sarah. (Venezuela Analysis, 25 Apr 2005). "U.S.-Venezuela Military Cooperation Indefinitely Suspended". Retrieved 20 Oct 2005.
- ^ Alford, Deann. (Christianity Today, 14 Oct 2005). "Venezuela to Expel New Tribes Mission". Retrieved 09 Nov 2005.
- ^ Parma, Alessandro. (Venezuela Analysis, 07 Nov 2005). "Chavez Claims Victory Over Bush in Argentina Summit". Retrieved 09 Nov 2005.
- ^ El Tiempo. (November 25, 2005). "Presidente de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, Ofreció Petróleo a Colombia, por Trueque".
- ^ Ministerio de Comunicación e Información. (23 Jan 2005)."Marcha Defensa de la Soberanía". Retrieved 10 Nov 2005.
- ^ People's Daily. (12 Jan 2004). "Chavez calls Condoleezza Rice an 'illiterate' following sharp criticism". Retrieved 10 Nov 2005.
- ^ Martin, Jorge. (In Defense of Marxism, 02 Sep 2005). "While Bush prevaricates, Venezuela offers help to US poor". Retrieved 05 Nov 2005.
- ^ Sojo, Cleto A. (Venezuela Analysis, 31 Jan 2005). "Venezuela’s Chávez Closes World Social Forum with Call to Transcend Capitalism". Retrieved 20 Oct 2005.
- ^ Boyd, Aleksander. (VCrisis: Venezuelan News and Analysis, 04 Jul 2005). "List of missing persons and political prisoners in Venezuela". Retrieved 17 Nov 2005.
- ^ Fuentes, Federico. (Venezuela Analysis, 26 Sep 2005). "Challenges for Venezuela's Workers’ Movement". Retrieved 05 Nov 2005.
- ^ Simon Wiesenthal Center. SWC Condemns antisemitic statements by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez - demands public apology
References
External links
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