HMAS Melbourne in 1981, with USS Midway in line astern
| |
History | |
---|---|
Australia (RAN) | |
Namesake | City of Melbourne |
Ordered | 1943 |
Builder | Vickers-Armstrongs |
Laid down | 15 April 1943 |
Launched | 28 February 1945 |
Christened | 28 October 1955 |
Commissioned | 28 October 1955 |
Decommissioned | 30 May 1982 |
Homeport | Sydney |
Motto | list error: <br /> list (help) Vires Acquirit Eundo Latin: "She Gathers Strength As She Goes" |
Nickname(s) | 'Little M' (as comparison with 'Big E' USS Enterprise) |
Fate | Sold to China for scrap in 1985. Studied as part of a top secret PLAN operation to develop a Chinese aircraft carrier. |
Badge | Ship's badge and motto |
General characteristics | |
Class and type | Modified Majestic class light aircraft carrier |
Displacement | list error: <br /> list (help) 15,740 tons standard 20,000 tons full load |
Length | list error: <br /> list (help) 213.97 metres (702 ft) overall Increased by 2.43 metres (8 ft) in 1969 |
Beam | 24.38 metres (80 ft) |
Draught | 7.62 metres (25 ft) |
Propulsion | Two Parsons single-reduction geared turbine sets; four Admiralty 3-drum type boilers; two screws; 40,000 shp |
Speed | 24 knots ([convert: unknown unit]) |
Range | list error: <br /> list (help) 12,000 nautical miles at 14 knots 6,200 nautical miles at 23 knots |
Complement | 1,350, including 350 Air Group personnel |
Sensors and processing systems | list error: <br /> list (help) Radar: 1955-1968: 3 x Type 277Q height-finding set 1 x Type 293Q surface search set 1 x Type 978 navigational set 1969-1982: 1 x Type 293Q surface search set 1 x Type 978 navigational set 1 x LW-02 air search set 1 x SPN-35 landing aid radar |
Armament | list error: <br /> list (help) 1955-1959: 25 x 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns (6 twin mountings, 13 single mountings) 1959-1968: 21 x 40 mm Bofors guns (6 twin, 9 single) 1969-1980: 12 x 40 mm Bofors guns (4 twin, 4 single) 1980-1982: 4 x 40 mm Bofors guns (4 single) |
Aircraft carried | Up to 27 aircraft and helicopters |
Notes | Characteristics sourced from[1][2][3] |
HMAS Melbourne (R21) was the lead ship of the Royal Navy's Majestic class light aircraft carriers. Launched in 1945 and operating until 1982, she was the third and final conventional aircraft carrier[I] to serve in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). Melbourne also served as the RAN flagship during her career.
Her keel was laid down in April 1943 and she was launched as light fleet carrier HMS Majestic (R77) in February 1945. At the end of World War II, work on the ship was suspended until she was purchased by the Royal Australian Navy in 1947. At the time of purchase, it was decided to incorporate new aircraft carrier technologies into the design, making Melbourne the third ship to be constructed with an angled flight deck. Delays in integrating the advances into the design meant that the carrier was not commissioned until 1955.
Melbourne never fired a shot in anger during her career, having only peripheral, non-combat roles in the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation and the Vietnam War. However, she was involved in two major collisions with allied vessels. On the evening of 10 February 1964, Melbourne collided with and sank HMAS Voyager when the Daring class destroyer altered course across her bow. Eighty-two of Voyager’s crew were killed, and two Royal Commissions were held to investigate the incident. The second collision occurred in the early morning of 3 June 1969, when Melbourne collided with and sank the Allen M. Sumner class destroyer USS Frank E. Evans in similar circumstances. Seventy-four United States Navy (USN) personnel were killed, and a joint USN-RAN Board of Inquiry was held. Melbourne was initially found to be partly at fault for both collisions, although later investigations found the destroyers solely to blame. These events, along with several minor collisions, shipboard accidents, and aircraft losses, led to the reputation that Melbourne was jinxed.[4]
Melbourne was paid off from RAN service in 1982. Following the failure of a proposal to convert her for use as a floating casino and an aborted sale in 1984, she was sold to China in 1985 to be broken up for scrap. The scrapping was delayed as Melbourne was studied by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as part of a top secret plan to develop a Chinese aircraft carrier and used to train PLAN aviators in carrier flight operations.[5]
Construction and acquisition
Melbourne was constructed by Vickers-Armstrongs at their Naval Construction Yard in Barrow-in-Furness, England.[6] The ship was laid down as HMS Majestic on 15 April 1943, and was launched on 28 February 1945 by Lady Anderson, the wife of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Anderson.[6] Following the end of World War II, the Admiralty ordered the suspension of many British shipbuilding projects, including the fitting out of Majestic and her five sister ships.[6] Construction resumed in 1946, and major modifications to the design were incorporated.[6]
A review by the Australian Government's Defence Committee held after World War II recommended that the post-war forces of the RAN be structured around a Task Force incorporating multiple aircraft carriers.[7] Initial plans were for three carriers, with two active and a third to be held in reserve.[8] The carriers would be rotated between active and reserve postings, to allow for maintenance and equal wear.[8] Cuts to the available funding resulted in the reduction to two carriers, and in June 1947, on the recommendation of the Admiralty, the Australian Government purchased Majestic and sister ship HMS Terrible together for the sum of AU£2.75 million.[6][9] An additional AU£450,000 was paid for each ship's initial load of stores, fuel, and ammunition.[6] As Terrible was the closer of the two ships to completion, construction was finished according to the original design, and she was commissioned into the RAN on December 16 1948 as HMAS Sydney.[6] Work progressed on Majestic at a slower rate, as she was to be upgraded with the latest technology and equipment.[10] The Colossus class carrier HMS Vengeance was loaned to the RAN from 13 November 1952 until 12 August 1955 to cover Majestic’s absence.[10]
Labour difficulties, late delivery of equipment, additional requirements for Australian operations, and the prioritisation of merchant shipping over naval construction delayed the completion of Majestic.[11][12] Incorporation of the new systems and advances increased the cost of the RAN carrier acquisition program to AU£8.3 million.[12] Construction and fitting out did not finish until October 1955.[13] As the carrier neared completion, a commissioning crew was formed in Australia and first used to return Vengeance to the United Kingdom, departing Sydney on 16 June 1955 and arriving at Devonport on 13 August.[14]
The completed carrier was commissioned into the RAN as HMAS Majestic on 26 October 1955.[15] Two days later, on 28 October, the ship was renamed Melbourne by Lady White, the wife of Sir Thomas White, the Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.[16] A separate ceremony held immediately after recommissioned Melbourne into the RAN.[17]
Design
As the lead ship of the Majestic class of light aircraft carriers, Melbourne was conceived as a modified version of the Colossus class carrier, incorporating improvements in flight deck design and habitability.[6] Majestic and Colossus carriers were almost identical in hull design and both were considered subclasses of the '1942 design' light aircraft carrier program.[18] These carriers were intended to be 'disposable warships': they were to be operated during World War II and scrapped at the end of hostilities or within three years of entering service.[19]
Modifications during construction
Following the recommencement of construction, a series of modifications to the ship were made, initially based on the operational experiences of Colossus class carriers, but later incorporating all of Britain's post-war carrier warfare technology and innovations.[20] Modifications and improvements included an angled flight deck, steam catapult, and landing signal lights, making Melbourne the third aircraft carrier (following HMS Ark Royal and USS Forrestal) to be constructed with these additions, instead of having them added after completion.[21]
The main modifications centred around the need to operate larger and heavier aircraft than the carrier had initially been designed for.[22] The flight deck was angled 5.5 degrees left of the carrier's centreline, to allow for the simultaneous launch and recovery of jet aircraft, and was increased to approximately one acre in area.[13] This deck was still significantly smaller than other carriers of the Cold War era; Trackers, with their 72 foot 7 inch (22.12 m) wingspan, had less than a metre's clearance between their right wingtip and the carrier's island superstructure when landing.[23] American pilots would often refuse to land on Melbourne, thinking Australian pilots were crazy for even considering it.[24] Water rationing was required in the early years of the carrier's operation, as the ship's fresh water supply was insufficient to freely provide for the steam catapult, the propulsion turbines, and the crew.[21] The flight deck, hangar deck, and aircraft lifts were strengthened, and reinforced arrestor cables were installed.[25] Flight direction radar was included, making Melbourne at the time of her commissioning the only military airfield in the Australasian region capable of operating aircraft at night and in poor weather.[16]
Refits
Early in her career, Melbourne underwent a series of small four-month refits on an almost annual basis, with most commencing in September and ending in January or February of the next year.[26] In later years, these refits would either extend in length or be displaced by large-scale refits, as the age of the carrier led to the increasing need and importance of maintenance.
Melbourne’s first major refit commenced in December 1967 and continued until February 1969, primarily to ensure she was capable of operating the new S-2 Tracker and A-4 Skyhawk aircraft.[3] The modifications cost AU$8.5 million, and included an overhaul of the hull and machinery, strengthening of the flight deck, improvements to the catapult and arrestor cables, modification of the aviation fuel systems and flight control arrangements, and upgrades of the navigational aids and radar.[27][28] Air conditioning systems and a liquid oxygen generation plant were also installed.[28] Melbourne re-entered service at the conclusion of the refits on 14 February, and performed sea trials in Jervis Bay from 17 February until 5 May.[29] At the time of the refit, it was the largest project to be undertaken by Garden Island Dockyard.[28]
The next major refit commenced in 1971.[30] The primarily reason for the refit was the scheduled rebuilding of the catapult, although this was only possible after spare parts were scrounged from HMCS Bonaventure and USS Coral Sea.[31] The flight deck was again reinforced and strengthened, and attempts were made to increase the effectiveness of the air conditioning system installed in 1969.[30] Melbourne had been designed to operate in North Atlantic and Arctic climates, and the original ventilation systems were inapprorpiate for Melbourne’s primary operating climate, the tropics.[23] The 1969 and 1971 refits did improve conditions, although there was little scope for upgrade, and the system was still inadequate.[23] Temperatures inside the ship continued to reach over 65 °C (149 °F), and on one occasion a hold reached 78 °C (172.4 °F).[23] The refit took seven months to complete, at a cost AU$2 million.[30]
More large-scale refits occurred throughout the rest of the 1970s. Melbourne was back in dock from November 1972 until August 1973, with further work done to her catapult.[32] The next major refit ran from 21 April 1975 to 21 June 1976, and was intended to increase the operational lifespan of the carrier to at least 1985.[33][34] The time spent in refit was dragged out by industrial action at the dockyard.[33] A third major refit began in late 1978 and proceeded until August 1979.[35]
Melbourne’s final refit was scheduled to begin in late 1981.[36] It was postponed in September until a decision was reached regarding the new carrier.[36] The refit was cancelled in January 1982, after the announcement that the RAN would be acquiring HMS Invincible.[37]
Armament
Melbourne carried a defensive armament of anti-aircraft guns and an air group comprising both attack and anti-submarine aircraft. As the ship was never directly involved in a conflict, her weapons and embarked aircraft did not fire a shot in anger.[4]
Weapons and systems
Melbourne’s initial armament included 25 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns: 6 twin mountings and 13 single mountings.[38] The radar suite consisted of three Type 277Q height-finding sets, a Type 293Q surface search set, and a Type 978 navigational set.[2] Between entering service and 1959, four of the single mount Bofors were removed.[38]
During the 1967-1969 refit, the number of Bofors was reduced to 12: 4 twin and 4 single.[2] The three 277Q radars were replaced with updated American and Dutch designs: a LW-02 air search set and a SPN-35 landing aid radar.[2] A TACAN aerial and electronic countermeasures were also installed during this refit.[3] The four Bofors twin mountings were removed in 1980.[38]
Aircraft
Melbourne carried three Fleet Air Arm squadrons.[39] Initially, she had up to 20 planes and 2 helicopters embarked at any time.[39] The number of aircraft gradually increased until 1972, when the air group peaked at 27 aircraft.[2] Approximately 350 of the personnel aboard the carrier belonged to the Fleet Air Arm.[39]
Initially, two types of fixed-wing aircraft were operated from Melbourne. de Havilland Sea Venom fighter-bombers were flown by 805 Squadron RAN and 808 Squadron RAN, while Fairey Gannet anti-submarine strike aircraft were operated by 816 Squadron RAN and 817 Squadron RAN.[21] At the time of their arrival, the Sea Vampires were the only radar equipped and all-weather combat aircraft in the Southern Hemisphere.[21] At Melbourne’s commissioning, the standard air group consisted of 8 Sea Venoms and two squadrons of 6 Gannets, with 2 Bristol Sycamore search-and-rescue helicopters added shortly after the carrier entered service.[2]
These aircraft were due to become obsolete in the late 1950s, and the RAN considered purchasing modern aircraft of French or Italian design, which were smaller than those being developed by the British, and therefore better suited for operation on a light carrier.[40] A second consideration was to replace Melbourne with a larger carrier. [40] Instead of pursuing these alternatives, the Australian government announced in 1959 that Melbourne would be reconfigured to operate as a helicopter carrier after her planned 1963 refit.[40] The fixed-wing aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm were to be decommissioned and replaced by 27 Westland Wessex anti-submarine helicopters.[41] A reduction of embarked numbers to 4 Sea Venoms and 6 Gannets, coupled with regular rotation and careful use of the aircraft extended their service life until the mid-1960s.[2][41] To maintain the size of the air group, up to ten Wessex helicopters would be embarked at any given time.[2] The decision to retire the fixed-wing component of the Fleet Air Arm was rescinded in 1963, and on 10 November 1964, a AU£212 million increase in defence spending included the purchase of new aircraft for Melbourne.[42][43]
The RAN planned to acquire 14 Grumman S-2E Tracker anti-submarine aircraft, and modernise Melbourne to operate the aircraft.[43] The acquisition of 18 Douglas A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers was also suggested, but these were dropped from the initial plan.[44] A separate proposal to order 10 A-4G Skyhawks in 1965 was approved.[44] Both aircraft entered RAN service in 1968, with the Trackers operated by 816 Squadron RAN and 851 Squadron RAN, and the Skyhawks by 805 Squadron RAN and 724 Squadron RAN.[45][46] The aircraft did not fly from Melbourne until the conclusion of her refit in 1969.[46] In 1969, the RAN purchased another 10 A-4G Skyhawks, instead of the proposed seventh and eighth Oberon class submarines, due to the importance of improving Melbourne’s strike force and increasing RAN offensive capabilities.[46] Melbourne operated a standard air group of 4 Skyhawks, 6 Trackers, and 10 Wessex helicopters until 1972, when the Wessexes were replaced with 10 Westland Sea King ASW helicopters and the number of Skyhawks doubled.[2] Wessex helicopters remained part of the air group as search-and-rescue craft, although the embarked number fluctuated between two and three.[2]
On 5 December 1976, a fire at the Naval Air Station HMAS Albatross destroyed or heavily damaged 12 of the 13 Grumman S-2E Trackers used by squadrons operating from Melbourne.[47] The carrier was sent to the United States in 1977 to transport back 16 S-2G Tracker aircraft as replacements.[48]
Over the course of her career, 30 aircraft were either lost or heavily damaged while operating from Melbourne.[49] The majority of the aircraft ditched or crashed over the side, but some losses were due to catapult or arrestor cable failures.[49] After Melbourne was decommissioned the Fleet Air Arm ceased operating all fixed-wing combat aircraft in 1984.[50] The final flight was performed on 1 June 1984 by a flight of Trackers, which saluted the decommissioned Melbourne.[50]
Role
Melbourne was the third and final conventional aircraft carrier to operate with the RAN. Following the first decommissioning of sister ship HMAS Sydney in 1958, Melbourne became the only aircraft carrier in Australian service.[51] Melbourne was unavailable to provide air cover for the RAN for up to 4 months in every year; this time was required for refits, refuelling, crew leave, and non-carrier duties, such as the transportation of troops or aircraft.[51][52] Although one of the largest ships to serve in the RAN, Melbourne was also one of the smallest carriers to operate in the post-World War II period.[30][53] A decision was made in 1959 to restrict Melbourne’s role to helicopter operations only, but was reversed shortly before its planned 1963 implementation.[40][42]
As well as an operational aircraft carrier, Melbourne was Flagship of the RAN. She received this role almost immediately following her 1956 arrival in Australia, and fulfilled it until she was decommissioned in 1982.[54] During her service, the carrier was deployed overseas on thirty-five occasions, and visited over twenty-two countries.[55] Melbourne was the physical and psychological centrepiece of the RAN fleet, and after her decommissioning and lack of replacement, the RAN fell from its position as the most powerful Navy in the Pacific area to sixth most powerful.[56][57]
As Melbourne was the only ship of her size (both physical and in crew complement) in the RAN, the carrier underwent a regular rotation of commanding officers in order to give them experience.[58] Commanding officers were changed on a regular basis—on average every fifteen months, with few remaining on board for over 2 years.[58] The majority of Melbourne’s commanders later reached flag rank.[58] The carrier was also called on to perform underway replenishments and command and control functions.[57]
Operational history
1955-1964
Following a working-up period in British waters, Melbourne departed Glasgow on 11 March 1956 on her maiden voyage to Australia via the Suez Canal.[15][17] Aboard were the 64 aircraft of RAN squadrons 808, 816 and 817, as well as the racing yacht Samuel Pepys (named after the English naval administrator), which was a gift to the RAN Sailing Association from the Royal Navy.[59][3] The ship visited Gibraltar, Naples, Malta, Port Said, Aden, and Colombo, before arriving in Fremantle on 24 April 1956.[17][60] Melbourne sailed east via the Great Australian Bight, meeting sister ship HMAS Sydney near Kangaroo Island a week later.[17] After visiting Melbourne and Jervis Bay, where the aircraft were offloaded and sent to Naval Air Station HMAS Albatross, the carrier concluded her maiden voyage in Sydney on 10 May.[3][61] The role of flagship was transferred from Sydney to Melbourne three days later.[61] The carrier immediately underwent a two and a half month refit, allowing for the inspection of machinery and repair of defects detected during the maiden voyage.[62] Melbourne spent from September to November in Southeast Asian waters, during which she participated in exercise Albatross and received an official visit by Philippines president Ramon Magsaysay.[63] On return to Australia in mid-November, the carrier visited Melbourne for the 1956 Olympics, where 200 of Melbourne’s crew were provided to work as signallers, event marshals, carpenters, and medical workers.[59]
In February 1957, Melbourne was sent to the Royal Hobart Regatta.[39] Following this, she travelled to New Zealand, where she participated in exercises with HMNZS Royalist and visited several New Zealand ports.[3] The first of several annual three-month deployments to Southeast Asia as part of the Far East Strategic Reserve began in April, with Melbourne returning to Darwin at the end of June.[64][65] The carrier spent the rest of the year visiting Australian ports for open inspections by the public.[66] During the visit to Port Adelaide, on 28 October 1957, Melbourne was slightly damaged when she was struck by MV Straat Lanka—the first of several minor collisions the carrier would experience throughout her career.[67] Operations for the year concluded with participation in Exercise Astrolabe off lord Howe Island, with ships from the RAN, Royal Navy, and Royal New Zealand Navy, before returning to Sydney on 13 December.[39][66]
From February until July 1958, Melbourne was deployed on a 25,000 nautical miles (46,000 km) flag-showing cruise.[39] During this cruise the carrier participated in four inter-fleet exercises and visited Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Japan, Pearl Harbor and Fiji.[39][68] On return to Sydney, Melbourne entered a short refit, which concluded on 13 October and was immiediately followed by a visit to Port Phillip, where the carrier was displayed to Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force officer cadets.[68] On 15 November, after returning to Sydney, the friends and family of Melbourne’s crew were invited aboard for a harbour cruise, before the carrier docked at Garden Island for a short refit over December and January.[69]
At the start of 1959, Melbourne spent four days in her namesake city, where she was used for the filming of On The Beach, based on Neville Shute's post-apocalyptic novel of the same name.[70][71] Several of the ship's crew appeared in the film as extras.[70] After filming concluded, the carrier participated in a demonstration exercise off the coast of Sydney before embarking on a Far East Strategic Reserve deployment from March until May.[71] The rest of the year was spent visiting Australian and New Zealand ports.[71]
The following year, 1960, was a bad year for the carrier's air group, with four Sea Venoms and two Gannets damaged in incidents aboard Melbourne over the course of the year.[72] All four Sea Venom incidents occurred in March, with three attributed to aircrew error and one to brake failure.[73] The year began with exercises en-route to Adelaide, followed by a visit to the Royal Hobart Regatta.[74] The Regatta was followed by the year's Strategic Reserve deployment from April to June, followed by manoeuvres along the east coast of Australia.[74] Melbourne arrived in Sydney in September.[74]
In the lead up to Melbourne’s 1961 deployment to the Strategic Reserve, the carrier visited Bombay, Karachi, and Trincomalee.[75][76] It was the first time a flagship of the RAN had entered Indian waters.[75] Melbourne returned to Australia in June, and on 15 June led several ships in a ceremonial entry to Sydney Harbour to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the RAN.[75] In August, Melbourne was called upon to lead Exercise Tuckerbox, in the Coral Sea.[75] Following the conclusion of Tuckerbox, the carrier visited several New Zealand ports before returning to Sydney for demonstration exercises and public relations activities.[76]
In 1962, Melbourne began the year's activities at the Royal Hobart Regatta, before sailing to her Strategic Reserve deployment, by way of Adelaide and Fremantle.[77] After Strategic Reserve duties were completed, the carrier visited Japan, Guam, and Manus Island before returning to Sydney in late July.[77] In September, Melbourne reprised her role as the leader of Exercise Tuckerbox II.[75] The 10,000th catapult launch from Melbourne was performed in late 1962.[75] The carrier's annual refit began in Sydney on 1 October.[77]
At the beginning of 1963, Melbourne again visited to the Royal Hobart Regatta, which was immediately followed by a deployment to the Strategic Reserve, including involvement in SEATO Exercise Sea Serpent.[78] The 20,000th landing on Melbourne was performed in April by a Gannet, and in September, Melbourne participated in Exercise Carbine near Hervey Bay, Queensland.[75][79]
Voyager collision
On 10 February 1964, Melbourne was performing trials in Jervis Bay under the command of Captain John Robertson, following the annual refit.[80] The Daring class destroyer HMAS Voyager was also present, undergoing her own trials following refit, under the command of Captain Duncan Stevens.[80] That evening, Melbourne was to perform night flying exercises, while Voyager acted as the carrier's plane guard escort.[80] This required Voyager to maintain a position 20° off Melbourne’s port quarter at a distance from the carrier of 1,500 to 2,000 yards.[81]
During the early part of the evening, Voyager had no difficulties maintaining her position during the manoeuvres both ships performed.[81] Following a series of turns intended to reverse the courses of both ships beginning at 8:40 pm, Voyager ended up to starboard of Melbourne.[81] At 8:52 pm, Voyager was ordered to resume the plane guard station.[82] The procedure to accomplish this required Voyager to turn away from Melbourne in a large circle, cross the carrier's stern, then take position off Melbourne’s port side.[82] Instead, Voyager first turned to starboard, away from Melbourne, then turned to port without warning.[82] It was initially assumed by Melbourne’s bridge crew that Voyager was conducting a series of tight turns in order to lose speed before swinging behind Melbourne, but Voyager did not alter course again.[83]
At 8:55 pm, with Voyager still turning to port, Melbourne’s navigator ordered the carrier's engines to half astern speed, with Robertson ordering an increase to full astern a few seconds later.[83] At the same time, Stevens, having just arrived on Voyager’s bridge, gave the order "Full ahead both engines. Hard-a starboard.", before instructing the destroyer's Quartermaster to announce that a collision was imminent.[83] Both ships' measures were too late to avoid a collision; Melbourne hit Voyager at 8:56 pm.[84]
Melbourne impacted just aft of Voyager’s bridge structure, rolling the destroyer to starboard before cutting her in half.[85] Voyager’s forward boiler exploded, briefly setting fire to the bow of the carrier before it was extinguished by seawater.[85] The destroyer's forward section sank quickly, due to the weight of the two 4.5 inch gun turrets.[86] The aft section did not begin sinking until half an hour after the collision, and did not completely submerge until just after midnight.[87] Messages were sent to the Fleet Headquarters in Sydney immediately after the collision, although staff in Sydney initially underestimated the extent of the damage to Voyager.[88] Melbourne launched her boats almost immediately after the collision to recover survivors, and the carrier's wardroom and C Hangar were prepared for casualties.[89] At 9:58 pm, Melbourne was informed that five Ton class minesweepers, search-and-rescue boats from HMAS Creswell, and helicopters from Naval Air Station Nowra, had been despatched to assist in the search.[90] All of the survivors were recovered within fifteen minutes of the collision, although the search continued until the next day.[91]
Of the 314 personnel aboard Voyager at the time of the collision, 14 officers, 67 sailors, and 1 civilian dockyard worker were killed, including Stevens and all but one of the bridge crew.[88] Melbourne arrived in Sydney with the survivors on 14 February, and after spending time alongside at Garden Island, was moved to Cockatoo Island Dockyard on 25 March, where a 40 ton prefabricated bow was fitted.[92]
First Royal Commission
A Royal Commission into the events of the collision, headed by Sir John Spicer, was announced by Prime Minister Robert Menzies on 13 February 1964.[93] This commission was directed to primarily investigate the causes of the collision and the circumstances leading to the collision, with secondary considerations to include the suitability of both ships for the exercise and the rescue and treatment of survivors.[93] These instructions were prepared without the consultation of the RAN.[93] The number of competing arguments caused the progress of the investigation to slow, and it was not until 25 June that the inquiry concluded.[94] The Spicer Report was released publicly on 26 August 1964.[95]
The report was considered to be of poor quality, with a disjointed narrative and failures to cite the relevant evidence.[96] In it, Spicer concluded that the collision was primarily the fault of Voyagers bridge crew, who neglected to maintain an effective lookout and awareness of the carrier's location, although individual members of the crew were not blamed.[97] When reporting on the contribution of Melbourne and her crew to the collision, Spicer specifically indicated failures of Robertson and two other bridge officers, primarily to alert Voyager to the danger she was in and to take measures to prevent Melbourne from colliding.[98] Following the report's release, it was announced that Robertson was to be posted to HMAS Watson, a training base in Sydney.[99] The decision was made by the RAN prior to the publication of Spicer's report; Robertson was to be punished, regardless of the outcome, by receiving a posting equivalent to a demotion.[100] Robertson submitted his resignation on 10 September 1964, two days after receiving official notice of his new posting.[101] The media considered Robertson to be a scapegoat for the incident.[102]
Second Royal Commission
Over the next few years there was increasing pressure from the public, the media, and politicians from both the Government and Opposition over the handling of the first Royal Commission, and claims were made by Lieutenant Commander Peter Cabban, the former executive officer of Voyager, that Captain Stevens frequently drank to excess and was unfit for command.[103] On 18 May 1967, Prime Minister Harold Holt announced a second Royal Commission into the Melbourne-Voyager collision, with Sir Stanley Burbury as presiding Commissioner, to investigate the claims made by Cabban.[104] It was the only time in Australian history that two Royal Commissions were held on the same incident, although it was emphasised during the second enquiry that its focus was Cabban's allegations, not the accident itself.[105] The commission opened on 13 June 1967, with hearings beginning on 18 July.[106]
During the Commission, it was argued that Stevens was unfit for command on the evening of the incident due to illness, drunkenness, or a combination of the two, and that the description of the collision in Spicer's report and the conclusions drawn from it were inconsistent with events.[107] The hearings lasted 85 days, and the Burbury Report was released publicly on 25 February 1968.[108] The report found that Stevens was medically unfit for command and that some of the findings of the first Royal Commission were therefore based on incorrect assumptions.[109] Robertson and the other officers of Melbourne were absolved of blame for the incident.[110]
1964-1969
Melbourne spent ten weeks at Cockatoo Island Dockyard, having her new bow fitted.[111] Following the repairs, Melbourne was involved in Strategic Reserve deployments and exercises in Southeast Asia from June until September 1964.[92] During this deployment, the carrier visited Subic Bay, where the RAN had the opportunity to perform flight deck trials with S-2 Tracker anti-submarine aircraft and A-4 Skyhawk attack fighters.[41] The success of the trials, coupled with the revelation that Melbourne was able to operate both aircraft with only minor modification to the carrier, led the Australian Government to approve the purchase of the aircraft.[41]
From March 1965 until mid-1967, Melbourne underwent a regular pattern of deployments to Southeast Asia, exercises, and flag-showing visits to nations in the Asia-Pacific region.[92] Several of the Southeast Asian deployments were related to the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation, and involved participation in show of force exercises off the coast of Malaysia.[112] Twice in 1965 and twice again in 1966, Melbourne escorted HMAS Sydney, which had been recommissioned as a fast troop transport, during parts of the latter's journey to and from Vietnam.[113] Despite the carrier being the centrepiece of several plans to involve Australian forces in the Vietnam War, these escort runs were the extent of Melbourne’s participation in the conflict.[114]
In September 1967, Melbourne travelled to the United States to collect new aircraft: 14 Trackers and 10 Skyhawks.[3] In order to operate the new aircraft, the carrier had to enter a major refit on her return to Sydney, which began in December 1967 and concluded on 14 February 1969.[3] Melbourne re-entered service at the conclusion of the refits, performed sea trials in Jervis Bay from 17 February until 5 May, then sailed for Subic Bay, Philippines, to participate in the SEATO Exercise Sea Spirit.[29][115]
Frank E. Evans collision
Melbourne’s commanding officer during the SEATO exercise was Captain John Phillip Stevenson.[115] Rear Admiral John Crabb, the Flag Officer Commanding Australian Fleet, was also embarked on the carrier.[115] During Sea Spirit, Melbourne was assigned five escorts: US Ships Everett F. Larson, Frank E. Evans, and James E. Kyes,[II] HMNZS Blackpool, and HMS Cleopatra.[115] Stevenson held a dinner for the five escort captains at the start of the exercise, during which he recounted the events of the Melbourne-Voyager collision, emphasised the need for caution when operating near the carrier, and provided written instructions on how to avoid such a situation developing again.[116][117] Additionally, during the lead-up to the exercise, Admiral Crabb had strongly warned that all repositioning manoeuvres performed by the escorts had to commence with a turn away from Melbourne.[115] Despite these warnings, a near-miss occurred in the early hours of 31 May when USS Larson turned towards the carrier after being ordered to the plane guard station.[118] Subsequent action narrowly prevented a collision.[118] The escorts were again warned about the dangers of operating near the carrier and informed of Stevenson's expectations, while the minimum distance between carrier and escorts was increased from 2,000 to 3,000 yards (1,800 to 2,700 metres).[118]
On the night of 2-3 June, Melbourne and her escorts were involved in anti-submarine training exercises.[117] In preparation for launching a Tracker, Stevenson ordered Evans to the plane guard station, reminded the destroyer of Melbourne’s course, and instructed the carrier's navigational lights to be brought to full brilliance.[115][119] Evans had performed the manoeuvre four times over the course of the night.[115] Evans was positioned on Melbourne’s port bow, but began the manoeuvre by turning starboard, towards the carrier.[115] A radio message was sent from Melbourne to Evans’ bridge and Combat Information Centre, warning the destroyer that she was on a collision course, which Evans acknowledged.[120][115] Seeing the destroyer take no action and on a course to place herself under Melbourne’s bow, Stevenson ordered the carrier hard to port, signalling the turn by both radio and siren blasts.[121][115] At approximately the same time, Evans turned hard to starboard to avoid the approaching carrier.[121] It is uncertain which ship began to manoeuvre first, but each ship's bridge crew claimed that they were informed of the other ship's turn after they commenced their own.[121] After having narrowly passed in front of Melbourne, the turns quickly placed Evans back in the carrier's path.[122] Melbourne hit Evans amidships at 3:15 am, cutting the destroyer in two.[122]
Seventy-four of the 273 crew from Evans were killed in the collision, with the majority of these believed to have been asleep or trapped inside the bow section, which sank within minutes.[122] Melbourne deployed her boats, liferafts, and lifebuoys, before carefully manoeuvring alongside the stern section of Evans, where both ships' crews used mooring lines to lash the ships together.[123] Other members of Melbourne’s crew dived into the water to rescue overboard survivors close to the carrier, while the carrier's boats and helicopters collected those farther out.[124] All of the survivors were located within 12 minutes of the collision and rescued before half an hour had passed, although the search continued for fifteen more hours.[125] After Evans’ stern was evacuated, it was cast off while the carrier moved away to avoid damage.[126] The stern failed to sink, and was recovered, stripped of parts, and later sunk for target practice.[122] Following the collision, Melbourne travelled to Singapore for temporary repairs to her bow, arriving on 6 June.[127] Melbourne departed Singapore on 27 June and arrived in Sydney on 9 July, where the carrier spent until November docked at Cockatoo Island Dockyard while she underwent repairs and installation of the new bow.[127]
Joint Board of Inquiry
A Joint RAN-USN Board of Inquiry was established to investigate the incident, following the passing of special regulations allowing the presence of Australian personnel at a United States inquiry.[122] The Board was in session for over 100 hours between 9 June and 14 July, and was made up of six officers: Rear Admiral Jerome King (the Board's president), Captain S.L. Rusk, and Captain C.B. Anderson of the USN, and Admiral David Stevenson (no relation to Melbourne’s Captain Stevenson), Captain Ken Shards, and Captain John Davidson of the RAN.[128][122] King's position was controversial, as he was the commanding officer of both the forces involved in the SEATO exercise and the fleet unit Evans normally belonged to, and was seen during the Inquiry to be biased against Captain Stevenson and other RAN personnel.[122][116][129] King's attitude, performance, and conflict of interest were criticised by both Australians present at the inquiry and the Press, and his handling of the inquiry was seen as detrimental to relations between the two countries.[130]
Despite admissions by members of the USN, given privately to personnel in other navies, that the incident was entirely the fault of Evans, significant attempts were made to reduce the US destroyer's culpability and place partial blame for the incident on Melbourne.[131] King's actions included banning the RAN legal advisor from attending, even as an observer, and intensely questioning RAN officers, while not doing the same for USN witnesses.[132][131] Mentions of the near miss with USS Larson were interrupted with the instruction that those details could be recounted at a later time, but the matter was never raised by the Board.[133] Many of the Australians present at the inquiry noted that none of the Australian members of the Board made any effort to protect the rights of the RAN personnel interviewed.[134]
The unanimous decision of the Board was that although Evans was partially at fault for the collision, Melbourne had contributed by not taking evasive action sooner; doing this would have been a direct contravention of international sea regulations, which stated that in the leadup to a collision, the larger ship was required to maintain course and speed.[135] It was learned during the inquiry that Evans’ commanding officer was asleep in his quarters at the time of the incident, and command of the vessel was held by Lieutenants Ronald Ramsey and James Hopson; the former had failed the qualification exam to stand watch, while the latter was at sea for the first time.[115][133] Stevenson was informed of the result of the Inquiry, although not of the Inquiry's findings regarding specific responsibility for the collision, and that a court-martial charging him for his role in the incident may be required.[136] Two charges of negligence—for failing to explicitly instruct Evans to change course to avoid collision and for failing to set the carrier's engines to full astern—were laid on 15 August, with the court martial held from 20 August to 25 August.[137][136] The charges were considered ridiculous, as performing the actions suggested by the two charges would have had no positive effect. There was not enough time or space to negate the carrier's momentum, and during the hearing the Judge Advocate asked on the matter of the second charge "What was [Stevenson] supposed to do - turn his guns on them?".[115][117]
The reasons for the court-martial given by historians vary. Some accounts state that it was to appease the USN, which had court-martialled three officers from Evans and had threatened to prevent US ships from operating as part of Australian-commanded forces if no action was taken against Stevenson.[136][138] The other view is that the court-martial was used in an attempt to clear Stevenson's name and to allow the RAN to distance itself from the findings of the Joint Board of Inquiry.[136] The defence submitted that there was 'no case to answer', resulting in the dropping of both charges and the verdict of 'Honourably Acquitted'.[136] Despite the findings, Stevenson's next posting was to be as chief of staff to a minor flag officer; seen by him as a demotion in all but name.[136] Following the events, publicly considered to be another scapegoating of a Melbourne commander, Stevenson requested retirement, as he no longer wished to serve under people he no longer respected.[139] This retirement was initially denied, but was later permitted.[139]
1970-1976
During the 1970s and early 1980s, replacing parts became an increasing problem.[140] Components were failing due to wear and age, but the companies responsible for manufacturing the parts had gone out of business during the previous twenty years, sometimes immediately after World War II ended.[140] The carrier's engineers often resorted to making replacements from scratch.[140]
In 1970, Melbourne participated in three major inter-navy exercises: Sea Rover with SEATO forces in the South China Sea, Bersatu Padu with British Commonwealth forces off Malaysia, and Swan Lake with the Royal Navy and Royal New Zealand Navy off Western Australia.[127][141] During this year, the carrier also visited Japan to participate in Expo '70, and was hit by Manly ferry South Steyne while alongside at Garden Island, causing minor damage to both vessels.[31][127] Melbourne was out of service for most of 1971 to undergo refits, which concluded in early August.[30] The year ended with Melbourne participating in the first RIMPAC exercise, RIMPAC 71.[30]
Operations in 1972 commenced with a three month deployment to Southeast Asia.[30] During this deployment, Melbourne led a fleet of 17 ships from the RAN, Royal Navy, Royal New Zealand Navy, US Navy, Philippine Navy, and Royal Thai Navy in Exercise Sea Hawk.[30] This was followed by goodwill visits to numerous Southeast Asian ports, including Hong Kong, Jakarta, Manila, Singapore, and Surabaya, before Melbourne returned to Sydney at the end of April.[3][30] The carrier spent May performing exercises off the New South Wales coast, during which she was called on to rescue three fisherman who had been stranded at sea for the previous two days.[30] In August, Melbourne sailed for Hawaii with HMA Ships Brisbane and Perth, to participate in RIMPAC 72.[30] At the conclusion of this exercise, Melbourne proceeded to Japan on a diplomatic visit, then sailed to the Philippines to exercise with SEATO ships.[3] During this deployment, a fire ignited inside the ship's main switchboard.[67] The carrier returned to Australia on 27 November after 101 days at sea, and underwent a seven month refit.[3] On 24 August 1973, the carrier returned to Hawaii with HMA Ships Brisbane and Stuart to participate in RIMPAC 73.[3] Melbourne returned to Australia on 12 October, but sailed out ten days later to participate in Exercise Leadline off Malaysia.[30] She returned to Sydney in December.[30]
Melbourne began 1974 by transporting 120 Australian soldiers to a temporary assignment with an American infantry battalion based in Hawaii.[33] She then sailed to San Francisco to collect 12 new Chinook and five UH-1 Iroquois helicopters for the RAAF, arriving in Australia with her cargo in April.[33] In June, the carrier took part in Exercise Kangaroo in the Coral Sea, before returning to Sydney in July.[33] On 11 July, the passenger liner SS Australis hit and damaged Melbourne in Sydney Harbour.[67] In November, the carrier took part in disaster relief exercises.[33] These were prophetic, as on the night of 24-25 December 1974, Cyclone Tracy destroyed the city of Darwin. Melbourne’s crew were recalled immediately from leave, the ship was loaded with supplies, and the carrier departed Sydney on 26 December in the company of HMAS Brisbane.[142] Melbourne, Brisbane, and eleven other ships were deployed as part of the largest peace-time rescue effort ever organised by the RAN: Operation Navy Help Darwin.[142] Melbourne remained off Darwin until 18 January 1975, acting as the operational headquarters and helicopter base.[31][142] During this operation, the seven Wessex helicopters embarked on Melbourne performed 2,493 flights, carrying 7,824 passengers and 107 tons of cargo.[33]
Following Navy Help Darwin, Melbourne participated in RIMPAC 75, accompanied by HMA Ships Parramatta and Hobart.[33] On 21 April, ten days after the carrier's return to Sydney, she underwent a refit, which was completed exactly fourteen months later on 21 August 1976, after delays caused by industrial action at the dockyard.[33] While moored in Sydney Harbour, on 24 July, Melbourne was struck by Japanese cargo ship Blue Andromeda in Sydney Harbour.[143] While working up following the refit, Melbourne and HMAS Torrens provided assistance to MV Miss Chief off the coast of Bundaberg, Queensland in 16 August 1976.[47] In October, Melbourne participated in Exercise Kangaroo II, before sailing to her namesake city for the carrier's 21st birthday celebrations, then returning to Sydney on 5 November.[33][144]
1976-1983
On 5 December 1976, a fire deliberately lit at HMAS Albatross by a member of the Fleet Air Arm damaged or destroyed all but one of Australia's S-2 Trackers.[145][47] Following participation in RIMPAC 77, Melbourne was sent to San Diego to collect replacement aircraft.[51][146] Arriving back in Sydney on 5 April, the carrier was sent on a five-month deployment to the United Kingdom on 28 April, accompanied by HMAS Brisbane and HMNZS Canterbury.[146][147] En route, Melbourne lost a Sea King in the Indian Ocean on 9 May, with the aircrew recovered by Brisbane.[148] A Tracker from Melbourne located the disabled Dutch vessel Impala Princess in the Gulf of Aden on 25 May and directed a French destroyer to assist.[45] Two Bofors naval guns were deposited by Melbourne at Souda Bay, Crete on 2 June, marking the first visit of an Australian warship to Crete since June 1941.[45] These weapons were donated to the Australian War Memorial at Stavromenos, in Crete's Rethymno Prefecture.[45] The highlight of the deployment saw the three ships represent Australia and New Zealand at the Silver Jubilee Naval Review on 28 June 1977.[147] Two days later, a Sea Harrier VTOL/STOVL aircraft performed multiple takeoffs and landings aboard Melbourne.[45] Following the Jubilee Review and participation in Exercise Highwood in July, Melbourne and her escorts returned to Australia, arriving in Fremantle on 19 September and Sydney on 4 October.[149] Melbourne was docked in Garden Island's drydock on arrival, where she remained until January 1978.[3]
External image | |
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HMAS Melbourne and USS Enterprise HMAS Melbourne passing USS Enterprise—respectively the smallest and largest aircraft carriers in operation at the time |
At the end of March 1978, Melbourne left Sydney for RIMPAC 78.[150] During this exercise, Melbourne acquired the nickname 'Little M' after working with 'Big E' USS Enterprise—the smallest and largest conventional aircraft carriers (respectively) in operation at the time.[150] On return in July, the carrier entered a major refit, which continued until 3 August 1979.[35] During this refit, on 3 March, a boiler explosion caused minor damage to the carrier.[143] The remainder of the year involved participation in three exercises, Tasmanex off Wellington, New Zealand, Sea Eagle I in the Tasman Sea, and Kangaroo III in the Coral Sea.[151] Heavy seas during Exercise Tasmanex were responsible for the loss of Melbourne’s LW-02 radar aerial and a Skyhawk; both falling off the carrier in separate incidents.[152]
During February and March 1980, Melbourne participated in RIMPAC 80, as the flagship of Battle Group Two.[33] This was immediately followed by a visit to the Solomon Islands in early April.[153] The carrier was in Sydney from mid-April until mid-August, during which the 25th anniversary of Melbourne’s service in the RAN was celebrated on 15 August with a cocktail party aboard the carrier, popularly referred to as 'The Night of the Admirals'.[33][153] On 18 August, Melbourne sailed for Fremantle to participate in Exercise Sandgroper 80.[153] On 8 September, HMA Ships Melbourne, Perth, Derwent, Stalwart, Supply, and Otama deployed to the Indian Ocean as the Australian Squadron for a flag-showing cruise.[154] During this cruise two Skyhawks were lost: on 2 October and 21 October.[154] On 24 October, a Tracker from Melbourne observed Soviet warships Storozhevoy and Ivan Rogov shadowing the Squadron.[154] The Squadron's return in November 1980 concluded the largest and longest RAN deployment since World War II.[3]
Following her return, the carrier spent six months in Australian waters, before a two-month deployment to Southeast Asia.[3] During this deployment, on 21 June 1981, Melbourne rescued 99 Vietnamese refugees from a disabled fishing vessel in the South China Sea.[155] The carrier's deployments for the second half of the year consisted of two exercises, Sea Hawk and Kangaroo 81.[3] A major refit scheduled to begin in late 1981 was cancelled pending the decision on a replacement carrier.[36] After docking at Garden Island in December, the carrier was accidentally flooded by an officer who was impatient to commence leave.[156] In his haste to shut down the carrier, he failed to deactivate the water pumps, and over 180 tons of fresh water were pumped in before a maintenance party discovered the flooding the next day.[156] Melbourne remained in dock at the start of 1982, and did not leave before the decision regarding her replacement was made.
Replacement
A replacement for Melbourne was under consideration as early as 1956, and the question was revisited on several occasions until the 1980s. In every situation, a new aircraft carrier was turned down due to the increases in manpower and operating costs required to operate the ship when compared to Melbourne.
Between 1956 and 1959, the RAN considered acquiring a larger carrier to replace Melbourne, as the Fleet Air Arm was becoming obsolete and the RAN did not believe the ship could be modified to operate newer, heavier aircraft.[40] Under consideration were British carrier HMS Albion and a ship of the United States' Essex class.[40] Both options were turned down, and it was instead proposed to operate Melbourne as a helicopter carrier.
In 1960, the United States Navy offered an Essex class carrier to the Australian government, in the interest of improving relations between the two nations and their navies.[157] The only cost to the RAN would have been the modifications required to make the carrier operationally compatible with the RAN's primarily British-designed fleet.[157] In the late 1960s, the British made a similar offer, following a 1966 review indicating that HMS Hermes was a superfluous naval unit.[158] In 1968, Hermes took part in a combined exercise with the RAN, during which the carrier was visited by RAN and Australian government officials, while RAN Skyhawks and Trackers practiced landings on the larger carrier.[158] Both offers were turned down due to operating and manpower costs.
The need to secure a replacement for Melbourne grew as the carrier's age caused the operating costs to increase to over AU$25 million per year.[159] In June 1977, the Defence Force Development Committee approved an investigation into acquiring at STOVL/helicopter carrier.[160] By August 1979, the decision was limited to three ships: a modified American Iwo Jima class amphibious assault ship, an Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi class carrier, and a Sea Control Ship design that later became the Spanish Navy's Principe de Asturias.[161] By February 1981, the Garibaldi class design had been eliminated, and the Iwo Jima class was considered to be the best option.[162]
HMS Invincible
Plans to replace Melbourne changed in July 1981, when the recently-commissioned HMS Invincible was announced as surplus to requirements and offered to the RAN for the 'bargain' price of GB£175 million (AU$285 million).[163] Although the Invincible class had been considered and discarded during the investigation, the decreased price and the fact the already-constructed carrier would be ready for RAN service in 1983 prompted the Australian government to announce its intention to purchase Invincible on 25 February 1982 and close the carrier acquisition program.[162] The government also announced that the ship would be re-named HMAS Australia and operated as a helicopter carrier, and that a decision on the purchase of Sea Harriers would be made after acquisition.[158] Melbourne entered reserve on 30 June, and the primary Skyhawk and Tracker squadrons were disbanded on 2 July.[162]
The deal was put on hold in April 1982, following the outbreak of the Falklands War.[158] The report which suggested reductions in the size of Britain's carrier fleet—with the flow-on effect of making Invincible available for sale—was shown to be flawed following the performance of Invincible and other Royal Navy aircraft carriers during the Falklands War, and both sides withdrew from the deal in July.[162] The RAN was again offered HMS Hermes, and again declined due to the carrier's age and manpower requirements.[164] The Australian government began to reconsider the previous contenders for replacement, as well as considering requesting the United Kingdom or United States to build a simple carrier capable of operating F/A-18 Hornet strike fighters, but the issue was suspended at the commencement of the 1983 Australian Federal Election.[165] On 14 March, following the election of Bob Hawke's Labor Government, that announcement was made that Melbourne would not be replaced.[165]
Decommissioning and fate
Following the decision on 25 February 1982 to replace Melbourne with HMS Invincible, the postponed refit was cancelled outright.[162] The Australian carrier was prepared for disposal, and was decommissioned and placed in reserve on 30 June 1982.[162] She was towed to the mooring dolphins near Bradley's Head, where she remained until 1985.[3] Melbourne was capable of being reactivated as a helicopter-equipped anti-submarine warfare carrier within 26 weeks; this was never required.[166] A Sydney-based group proposed in 1984 to purchase Melbourne and operate her as an offshore casino moored in international waters off Eden, New South Wales, but nothing came of this.[167] Melbourne’s air wing was disbanded at HMAS Albatross on 2 July 1982, with the transfer of 805 Squadron's Skyhawks to 724 Squadron and the absorption of 816 Squadron into 851 Squadron.[168] The Skyhawks remained in service as fleet support aircraft until 30 June 1984, while the Trackers were withdrawn from service on 31 August 1984 after being used as land-based maritime patrol aircraft.[168]
The carrier was initially sold for AU$1.7 million, although the sale fell through in June 1984.[3][II] She was sold again in February 1985 to the China United Shipbuilding Company for AU$1.4 million, with the intention that she be towed to China and broken up for scrap.[158] The carrier departed Sydney on 27 April 1985, heading for Guangzhou, China under the tow of tug De Ping. [169] The journey was delayed when the towing line began to part, requiring the carrier and tug to shelter in Moreton Bay, Queensland on 30 April.[169] The towing gear broke a day later, requiring a second tug to secure the carrier while repairs were made to De Ping.[170] Three days later, Melbourne ran aground while still in Moreton Bay.[171] Melbourne finally arrived in China on 13 June.[169] The Australian government received a telex on this day, reading:[III]
Please be advised that HMAS Melbourne arrived at Port Huangpu, intact and safely afloat, proud and majestic. She has been innocent, never once bowed to the natural or human force, in spite of the heavy storm and the talked about jinx
— Telex communication to the Australian Government, [169]
The ship was not scrapped immediately; instead she was studied by Chinese naval architects and engineers as part of the nation's top-secret carrier development program.[5] Melbourne’s flight deck was either removed from the carrier or duplicated, to be used at a land base for the equally secret training of People's Liberation Army Navy pilots in carrier flight operations.[5] The carrier was not dismantled for many years, with some rumours stating she was not completely broken up until 2002.[158]
Melbourne’s service is commemorated with a stained-glass window at the Garden Island Naval Chapel. One of the ship's anchors is incorporated into a memorial to naval aviation at Nowra, New South Wales.[172]
Footnotes
^[I] For the purpose of this article, a conventional aircraft carrier is defined as a ship designed primarily to launch and recover multiple fixed-wing aircraft from a flight deck, and operated as such. This definition does not include seaplane tender HMAS Albatross, or the Canberra class large amphibious ships.
^[II] Sources are inconsistent regarding who attempted to purchase Melbourne in the first sale. Lind states the sale was to South Korea,[50] Cassells claims it was to Taiwan, and that the sale fell through when they failed to commit to scrapping the carrier,[170] and the Sea Power Centre indicates an Australian company was the buyer.[3]
^[III] The text of the telex message has been altered for readability. The original message reads:
Pls b advised that HMAS Melbourne arrived at Port Huangpu, intact n safely afloat, proud n majestic. She has bn innocent, never once bowed to the natural or human force, in spite of the heavy storm n the talked abt jinx
Citations
- ^ Bastock, pp. 308-309.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Bishop & Chant, p. 62.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s HMAS Melbourne (II), Sea Power Centre.
- ^ a b Hall, p. 9.
- ^ a b c Storey & Ji, p. 79.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Hobbs, p. 5.
- ^ Donohue, p. 33.
- ^ a b Donohue, p. 38.
- ^ Donohue, pp. 45-47.
- ^ a b Donohue, p. 94.
- ^ Donohue, p. 149.
- ^ a b Stevens et al., p. 165.
- ^ a b Hall, p. 72.
- ^ HMAS (ex-HMS) Vengeance, Sea Power Centre.
- ^ a b Cassells, p. 84.
- ^ a b Hall, pp. 72-73.
- ^ a b c d Hall, p. 73.
- ^ Stevens & Reeve, p. 211.
- ^ Stevens & Reeve, p. 217.
- ^ Hobbs, pp. 5-6.
- ^ a b c d Hobbs, p. 6.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, pp. 13-15.
- ^ a b c d Hall, p. 16.
- ^ Hall, p. 83.
- ^ Donohue, p. 33.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, pp. 26, 28, 30, 33, 37, 39, 44, 48, 53, 84.
- ^ Hall, p. 174.
- ^ a b c Coulthard-Clark, p. 61.
- ^ a b Gillett, p 59.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Bastock, p. 313.
- ^ a b c Hall, p. 213.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 77.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Cassells, p. 86.
- ^ ANAM, p. 235.
- ^ a b Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, pp. 89, 91.
- ^ a b c ANAM, p. 251.
- ^ Wright, p. 168.
- ^ a b c Gillett, Australian and New Zealand Warships since 1946, p. 22.
- ^ a b c d e f g Bastock, p. 309.
- ^ a b c d e f Stevens et al., p. 187.
- ^ a b c d Stevens et al., p. 193.
- ^ a b Hobbs, p. 7.
- ^ a b Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 88.
- ^ a b Stevens et al., pp. 193-194.
- ^ a b c d e Lind, p. 293.
- ^ a b c Stevens et al., p. 194.
- ^ a b c Lind, p. 291.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 83.
- ^ a b Hall, pp. 218-219.
- ^ a b c Lind, p. 302.
- ^ a b c Lind, p. 247.
- ^ ANAM, p. 221.
- ^ Frame, No Pleasure Cruise, p 261.
- ^ Hall, pp. 74-75.
- ^ Hobbs, p. 8.
- ^ Lind, p. 274.
- ^ a b Stevens et al., p. 250.
- ^ a b c Hall, p. 20.
- ^ a b Lind, p. 234.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, pp. 21-22.
- ^ a b Hall, p. 74.
- ^ ANAM, p. 128.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 22.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 25.
- ^ Frame, No Pleasure Cruise, p. 215.
- ^ a b Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 26.
- ^ a b c Hall, p. 217.
- ^ a b Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 27.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 28.
- ^ a b Lind, p. 237.
- ^ a b c Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 29.
- ^ Lind, p. 239.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 35.
- ^ a b c Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 33.
- ^ a b c d e f g Bastock, p. 310.
- ^ a b Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 37.
- ^ a b c Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 39.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 43.
- ^ Hall, p. 76.
- ^ a b c Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 8.
- ^ a b c Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 11.
- ^ a b c Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 12.
- ^ a b c Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 13.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, pp. 14-15.
- ^ a b Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 1.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 2.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, pp. 3, 7.
- ^ a b Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 5.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 4.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, pp. 5-6.
- ^ Hall, p. 131.
- ^ a b c Bastock, p. 311.
- ^ a b c Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 27.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, pp. 53, 64.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 67.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 68.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 69.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, pp. 67-68.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 78.
- ^ Hall, p. 147.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 79.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 82.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 88; Stevens et al., p 202.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, pp. 114-115.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 117.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, pp. 117-118.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, pp. 144-145.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, pp. 149, 157.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, pp. 159-160.
- ^ Frame, The Cruel Legacy, p. 160.
- ^ Hall, p. 132.
- ^ Stevens et al., p. 198.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, pp. 47, 51.
- ^ Stevens et al., pp. 204, 208.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Frame, Pacific Partners, p 126.
- ^ a b Hall, p 175.
- ^ a b c Hills, In The Wake
- ^ a b c Hall, p 176.
- ^ Smith & Lancaster, p. 1.
- ^ Hall, p 178.
- ^ a b c Sherbo, Death of a Destroyer.
- ^ a b c d e f g Frame, Pacific Partners, p 127.
- ^ Hall, pp 178, 184.
- ^ Hall, pp 183-184.
- ^ Hall, p 182, 184.
- ^ Hall, p 185.
- ^ a b c d John Bastock (1975). Australia's Ships of War, pg 312
- ^ Stevenson, pp 56, 68, 167-168
- ^ David Stevens et al. (2001). The Royal Australian Navy, pg 203
- ^ Frame, Pacific Partners, pp 127-128.
- ^ a b Frame, Pacific Partners, p 128.
- ^ Hall, p 194.
- ^ a b Hall, p 200.
- ^ Hall, p 195.
- ^ Hall, p 204.
- ^ a b c d e f Frame, Pacific Partners, p 129.
- ^ Hall, p 205
- ^ Hall, p 206.
- ^ a b Frame, Pacific Partners, pp 130-131
- ^ a b c Hall, p. 12.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 61.
- ^ a b c Lind, p. 289; Hobbs, pp. 8-9.
- ^ a b Hall, p. 218.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 79.
- ^ Hall, p. 19.
- ^ a b Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 83.
- ^ a b Stevens et al., p. 231.
- ^ Lind, p. 292.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, pp. 83-84.
- ^ a b Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 89.
- ^ Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, pp. 91-92.
- ^ ANAM, p. 245.
- ^ a b c Gillett, HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years, p. 95.
- ^ a b c Lind, p. 297.
- ^ Lind, p. 299.
- ^ a b Hall, p. 15.
- ^ a b Frame, Pacific Partners, p 101.
- ^ a b c d e f Hobbs, p. 9.
- ^ Hall, p. 11.
- ^ Stevens et al., p. 225.
- ^ Stevens et al., p. 226.
- ^ a b c d e f Stevens et al., p. 227.
- ^ Wright, p. 167.
- ^ Stevens et al., p. 228.
- ^ a b Wright, p. 173.
- ^ ANAM, p. 253.
- ^ Lind, p. 301.
- ^ a b 851 Squadron, Sea Power Centre; Wilson, p. 171-172.
- ^ a b c d Lind, p. 304.
- ^ a b Cassells, p. 87.
- ^ Cassells, p. 88.
- ^ Cassells, p. 91.
Reference list
Books
- Australian Naval Aviation Museum (ANAM) (1998). Flying Stations: a story of Australian naval aviation. St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-86448-846-8. OCLC 39290180.
- Bastock, John (1975). Australia's Ships of War. Cremorne, NSW: Angus and Robertson. ISBN 0-207-12927-4. OCLC 2525523.
- Bishop, Chris (2004). Aircraft Carriers: the world's greatest naval vessels and their aircraft. London: MBI. ISBN 0-760-32005-5. OCLC 56646560.
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suggested) (help) - Cassells, Vic (1980). The Capital Ships: their battles and their badges. East Roseville, NSW: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7318-0941-6. OCLC 48761594.
- Coulthard-Clark, Chris (1999). Breaking free: transformation of Australia's defense industries. Melbourne, VIC: Australian Scholarly Publishing. ISBN 1-875606-68-8. OCLC 45754802.
- Donohue, Hector (1996). From Empire Defence to the Long Haul: post-war defence policy and its impact on naval force structure planning 1945-1955. Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs (No. 1). Canberra: Sea Power Centre. ISBN 0-642-25907-0. OCLC 36817771. ISSN 1327-5658.
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ignored (help) - Frame, Tom (1992). Pacific Partners: a history of Australian-American naval relations. Rydalmere, NSW: Hodder & Stoughton. ISBN 034056685X. OCLC 27433673.
- Frame, Tom (2004). No Pleasure Cruise: the story of the Royal Australian Navy. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-74114-233-4. OCLC 55980812.
- Frame, Tom (2005). The Cruel Legacy: the HMAS Voyager tragedy. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1741152542. OCLC 61213421.
- Gillett, Ross (1980). HMAS Melbourne - 25 Years. Sydney, NSW: Nautical Press. ISBN 0-949756-00-8. OCLC 24405967.
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(help) - Gillett, Ross (1988). Australian and New Zealand Warships since 1946. Brookvale, NSW: Child & Associates. ISBN 0-86777-219-0.
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(help) - Hall, Timothy (1982). HMAS Melbourne. North Sydney, NSW: George Allen & Unwin. ISBN 0-86861-284-7. OCLC 9753221.
- Lind, Lew (1986) [1982]. The Royal Australian Navy - Historic Naval Events Year by Year (2nd ed. ed.). Frenchs Forest, NSW: Reed Books. ISBN 0-7301-0071-5. OCLC 16922225.
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has extra text (help) - Stevens, David & Reeve, John, ed. (2005). The Navy and the Nation: the influence of the Navy on modern Australia. Corws Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-74114-200-8. OCLC 67872922.
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(help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link) - Stevens, David (2001). Stevens, David (ed.). The Royal Australian Navy. The Australian Centenary History of Defence (vol III). South Melbourne, VIC: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-195-54116-2. OCLC 50418095.
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suggested) (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) - Stevenson, Jo (1999). In The Wake: The true story of the Melbourne-Evans Collision, Conspiracy and Cover-up. Alexandria, NSW: Hale & Iremonger. ISBN 0-86806-681-8. OCLC 44928410.
- Wilson, Stewart (1993). Phantom, Hornet and Skyhawk in Australian Service. Canberra: Aerospace Publications. ISBN 187567103X. OCLC 31331178.
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(help) - Wright, Anthony (1998) [1978]. Australian Carrier Decisions: the acquisition of HMA Ships Albatross, Sydney and Melbourne. Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs (No. 4). Canberra: Sea Power Centre. ISBN 0-642-29503-4. OCLC 39641731. ISSN 1327-5658.
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Journal articles
- Hills, Ben (1999-06-01). "In The Wake". Sydney Morning Herald. (reproduced on author's website). p. 14. Retrieved 2008-02-01.
- Hobbs, Commander David (2007). "HMAS Melbourne (II) - 25 Years On". The Navy. 69 (4): 5–9. ISSN 1332-6231 Parameter error in {{issn}}: Invalid ISSN..
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ignored (help) - Sherbo, Paul (2003). "Death of a Destroyer". Naval History. 17 (6). Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute: pp 36-41. ISSN 1042-1920. OCLC 16311980.
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ignored (help) - Smith, Phil (2001). "USS Frank E. Evans: Disaster in the South China Sea". Vietnam Magazine: 3 pgs. Retrieved 2008-02-01.
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ignored (help) - Storey, Ian (2004). "China's aircraft carrier ambitions: seeking truth from rumours". Naval War College Review. 57 (1): 77–93. ISSN 0028-1484. Retrieved 2007-11-13.
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Websites
- "851 Squadron". Naval Aviation History. Sea Power Centre. Retrieved 2008-01-15.
- "HMAS Melbourne (II)". HMA Ship Histories. Sea Power Centre. Retrieved 2008-01-15.
- "HMAS (ex-HMS) Vengeance". HMA Ship Histories. Sea Power Centre. Retrieved 2008-01-15.