In the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, conatus (/koʊˈneɪtəs/; wikt:conatus; Latin for "effort; endeavor; impulse, inclination, tendency; undertaking; striving") is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself. This "thing" may be mind, matter, or a combination of both. and is often associated with God's will in a pantheist view of Nature. The history of the term conatus is that of a series of subtle tweaks in meaning and clarifications of scope. The conatus may refer to the instinctive "will to live" of living organisms or to various metaphysical theories of motion and inertia.[1][2] Today, conatus is rarely used in the technical sense, since classical mechanics uses concepts such as inertia and conservation of momentum that have superseded it. It has, however, been a notable influence on later thinkers such as Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche.
Definition and origin
The Latin cōnātus comes from the verb cōnor, which is usually translated into English as, "to endeavor"; used as an abstract noun, conatus is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself.[3] There is a traditional connection between conatus and motion itself. Many different definitions and treatments have been formulated by other Early Modern philosophers philosophers René Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, and Thomas Hobbes who each had made significant contributions and put their own personal twist on the concept, each developing the term differently.[4]
Thomas Aquinas and Abravanel (1265–1321) both related the concept directly to that which Augustine (354–430 CE) saw to be the "natural movements upward and downward or with their being balanced in an intermediate position" described in his The City of God, (c. 420 CE). They called this force that causes objects to rise or fall, "amor naturalis", or "natural love".[5] Jean Buridan (1300–1358) also rejected the notion that this motion-generating property, which he named impetus, dissipated spontaneously. Buridan's position was that a moving object would be arrested by the resistance of the air and the weight of the body which would oppose its impetus. He also maintained that impetus increased with speed; thus, his initial idea of impetus was similar in many ways to the modern concept of momentum. Despite the obvious similarities to more modern ideas of inertia, Buridan saw his theory as only a modification to Aristotle's basic philosophy, maintaining many other peripatetic views, including the belief that there was still a fundamental difference between an object in motion and an object at rest. Buridan also maintained that impetus could be not only linear, but also circular in nature, causing objects such as celestial bodies to move in a circle.[6]
Whereas the medieval Scholastic philosophers developed a notion of conatus as a mysterious intrinsic property of things, René Descartes (1596–1650) began to develop a more modern, mechanistic concept of the conatus.[7][8] For Descartes, in contrast to Buridan, motion and rest are properties of the interactions of matter according to eternally fixed mechanical laws, not dispositions and intentions, nor as inherent properties or "forces" of things, but rather as a unifying, external characteristic of the physical universe itself.[9] God may set this activity in motion, but thereafter no new motion or rest can be created or destroyed.[10] The conatus is just the tendency of bodies to move when they collide with each other.
Descartes specifies two varieties of the conatus: conatus a centro and conatus recedendi. Conatus a centro, or "tendency towards the center", is used by Descartes as a theory of gravity; conatus recendendi, or "tendency away from the center", represents the centrifugal forces.[1] Descartes, in developing his First Law of Nature, also invokes the idea of a conatus se movendi, or "conatus of self-preservation".[11] This law is a generalization of the principle of inertia, which was developed and experimentally demonstrated earlier by Galileo, which was formalized by Isaac Newton and made into the first of his three Laws of Motion fifty years after the death of Descartes."[12]
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) criticized previous definitions of conatus for failing to explain the origin of motion, defining conatus to be impetus, the infinitesimal unit at the beginning of motion: an inclination in a specified direction. [13][14] Resistance is caused by a contrary conatus; force is this motion plus "the magnitude of the body".[15] Hobbes also uses the word conatus to refer to the "restorative forces" which may cause springs to contract or expand and return to their previous state. Hobbes claims these forces are inherent in these objects, a precursor to modern material elasticity.[16] Furthermore, Hobbes uses conatus to describe cognition functions in the mind,[17] describing emotion as the beginning of motion and the will as the sum of all emotions, which forms the conatus of a body[7] and its physical manifestation is the perceived "will to survive".[4] Hobbes also equates this conatus with "imagination", and states that a change in the conatus, or will, is the result of "deliberation".[18]
In Spinoza's philosophy
Conatus is a central theme in the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677). According to Spinoza, "each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (Ethics, part 3, prop. 6). Spinoza presents a few reasons for believing this. First, particular things are, as he puts it, modes of God, which means that each one expresses the power of God in a particular way (Ethics, part 3, prop. 6, dem.). Moreover, it could never be part of the definition of God that his modes contradict one another (Ethics, part 3, prop. 5); each thing, therefore, "is opposed to everything which can take its existence away" (Ethics, part 3, prop. 6, dem.). This resistance to destruction is formulated by Spinoza in terms of a striving to continue to exist, and conatus is the word he most often uses to describe this force.[19]
Striving to persevere is not merely something that a thing does in addition to other activities it might happen to undertake. Rather, striving is "nothing but the actual essence of the thing" (Ethics, part 3, prop. 7). Spinoza also uses the term conatus to refer to rudimentary concepts of inertia, as Descartes had earlier.[4] Since a thing cannot be destroyed without the action of external forces, motion and rest, too, exist indefinitely until disturbed.[20]
Behavioral manifestation
The concept of the conatus, as used in Baruch Spinoza's psychology, is derived from sources both ancient and medieval. Spinoza reformulates principles that especially Hobbes and Descartes developed.[21] One significant change he makes to Hobbes' theory is his belief that the conatus ad motum, (conatus to motion), is not mental, but material.[22]
Spinoza, with his determinism, believes that man and nature must be unified under a consistent set of laws; God and nature are one, and there is no free will. Contrary to most philosophers of his time and in accordance with most of those of the present, Spinoza rejects the dualistic assumption that mind, intentionality, ethics, and freedom are to be treated as things separate from the natural world of physical objects and events.[23] His goal is to provide a unified explanation of all these things within a naturalistic framework, and his notion of conatus is central to this project. For example, an action is "free", for Spinoza, only if it arises from the essence and conatus of an entity. There can be no absolute, unconditioned freedom of the will, since all events in the natural world, including human actions and choices, are determined in accord with the natural laws of the universe, which are inescapable. However, an action can still be free in the sense that it is not constrained or otherwise subject to external forces.[24]
Human beings are thus an integral part of nature.[20] Spinoza explains seemingly irregular human behaviour as really "natural" and rational and motivated by this principle of the conatus.[25] In the process, he replaces the notion of free will with the conatus, a principle that can be applied to all of nature and not just man.[20]
Emotions and affects
Spinoza's view of the relationship between the conatus and the human affects is not clear. Some have argued that the human affects arise from the conatus and the perpetual drive toward perfection.[26] Indeed, Spinoza states in his Ethics that happiness, specifically, "consists in the human capacity to preserve itself". This "endeavor" is also characterized by Spinoza as the "foundation of virtue".[27] Conversely, a person is saddened by anything that opposes his conatus[28] Others have associated "desire", a primary affect, with the conatus principle of Spinoza. This view is backed by the Scholium of IIIP9 of the Ethics which states, "Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of the appetite. So desire can be defined as appetite together with consciousness of the appetite"[4] Desire is then controlled by the other affects, pleasure and pain, and thus the conatus strives towards that which causes joy and avoids that which produces pain.[29]
In his Exposition and Defence of the New System (1695), Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) uses the word conatus to describe a notion similar that of Hobbes, but he differentiates between the conatus of the body and soul, the first of which may only travel in a straight line by its own power, and the latter of which may "remember" more complicated motions.[31][30] Leibniz uses this concept of a conatus in developing the principles of integral calculus. In order for anything to begin moving at all, there must be some mind-like, voluntaristic property or force inherent in the basic constituents of the universe that propels them. This conatus is a sort of instantaneous or "virtual" motion that all things possess, even when they are static. Motion, meanwhile, is just the summation of all the conatuses that a thing has, along with the interactions of things. By summing an infinity of such conatuses (i.e., what is now called integration), Leibniz could measure the effect of a continuous force.[32] [32] [33] Based on the work of Kepler, Leibniz develops a model of planetary motion based on the conatus principle, the idea of aether and a fluid vortex. This theory is expounded in the work Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis (1689).[32] According to Leibniz, Kepler's analysis of elliptical orbits into a circular and a radial component can be explained by a "harmonic vortex" for the circular motion combined with a centrifugal force and gravity, both of which are examples of conatus, to account for the radial motion.[34] Leibniz later defines the term monadic conatus, as the "state of change" through which his monads perpetually advance.[35] [34] After the development of Classical mechanics, the concept of a conatus, in the sense used by philosophers other than Spinoza"[36], an an intrinsic property of all physical bodies, was largely superseded by the principle of inertia and conservation of momentum. Similarly, Conatus recendendi became centrifugal force, and conatus a centro became gravity.[1]
Nearly a century after the beginnings of modern science, Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), inspired by Neoplatonism, explicitly rejected the principle of inertia and the laws of motion of the new physics. For him, conatus was the essence of human society,[37] and also, in a more traditional, hylozoistic sense, as the generating power of movement which pervades all of nature[38], which was composed neither of atoms, as in the dominant view, nor of extension, as in Descartes, but of metaphysical points animated by a conatus principle provoked by God.[39]
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) developed a principle notably similar to that of Hobbes's conatus.[4][40] This principle, Wille zum Leben, or of a "Will to Live", described the specific phenomenon of an organism's self-preservation instinct.[41] Schopenhauer qualified this, however, by suggesting that the Will to Live is not limited in duration, but rather, "the will wills absolutely and for all time", across generations.[42] Rejecting the primacy of Schopenhauer's Will to Live, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) developed a separate principle the Will to Power, which comes out of a rejection of such notions of self-preservation.[43]
The cultural anthropologist Louis Dumont (1911–1988), described a cultural conatus built directly upon Spinoza's seminal definition in his Ethics. The principle behind this derivative concept states that any given culture, "tends to persevere in its being, whether by dominating other cultures or by struggling against their domination".[44]
In systems theory, the Spinozistic conception of a conatus has been related to modern theories of autopoiesis in biological systems.[45][46][47]. However, the scope of the idea is definitely narrower today, being explained in terms of chemistry and neurology where, before, it was a matter of metaphysics and theurgy.[48][49]
Notes
- ^ a b c Kollerstrom 1999, pp. 331–356
- ^ Wolfson 1934, p. 202
- ^ Traupman 1966, p. 52
- ^ a b c d e LeBuffe 2006
- ^ Wolfson 1934, pp. 197, 200
- ^ Grant 1964, pp. 265–292
- ^ a b Pietarinen 2000
- ^ Garber 1992, pp. 150, 154
- ^ Garber 1992, pp. 180, 184
- ^ Gueroult 1980, pp. 120–34
- ^ Wolfson 1934, p. 201
- ^ Blackwell 1966, p. 220
- ^ Hobbes 1998, III, xiv, 2
- ^ Jesseph 2006, p. 22
- ^ Jesseph 2006, p. 35
- ^ Osler 2001, pp. 157–61
- ^ Bidney 1962, p. 91
- ^ Schmitter 2006
- ^ Allison 1975, p. 124
- ^ a b c Allison 1975, p. 125
- ^ Morgan 2006, p. ix
- ^ Bidney 1962, p. 93
- ^ Jarrett 1991, pp. 470–475
- ^ Lachterman 1978
- ^ Dutton 2006, chp. 5
- ^ DeBrabander 2007, pp. 20–1
- ^ Damasio 2003, p. 170
- ^ Damasio 2003, pp. 138–9
- ^ Bidney 1962, p. 87
- ^ a b Arthur 1998
- ^ Leibniz 1988, p. 135
- ^ a b c Gillispie 1971, pp. 159–161
- ^ Duchesneau 1998, pp. 88–89
- ^ a b Carlin 2004, pp. 365–379
- ^ Arthur 1994, sec. 3
- ^ Bidney 1962, p. 88
- ^ Goulding 2005, p. 22040
- ^ Vico 1710, pp. 180–186
- ^ Landucci 2004, pp. 1174, 1175
- ^ Schopenhauer 1958, p. 357
- ^ Rabenort 1911, p. 16
- ^ Schopenhauer 1958, p. 568
- ^ Durant & Durant 1963, chp. IX
- ^ Polt 1996
- ^ Ziemke 2007, p. 6
- ^ Damasio 2003, p. 36
- ^ Sandywell 1996, pp. 144–5
- ^ Damasio 2003, p. 37
- ^ Mathews 1991, p. 110
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Further reading
- Ariew, Roger (2003), Historical dictionary of Descartes and Cartesian philosophy, Lanham, Md. ; Oxford: Scarecrow Press
- Bernstein, Howard R. (1980), "Conatus, Hobbes, and the Young Leibniz", Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 11 (1): 167–81, Bibcode:1980SHPSA..11...25B, doi:10.1016/0039-3681(80)90003-5
- Bove, Laurent (1992), L'affirmation absolue d'une existence : essai sur la stratégie du conatus Spinoziste, Université de Lille III: Lille, OCLC 57584015
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- Chamberland, Jacques (September 2000), Duchesneau, Francois (ed.), "Les conatus chez Thomas Hobbes", The Review of Metaphysics, 54 (1), Université de Montreal
- Deleuze, Gilles (1988), Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, City Lights Book
- Duff, Robert Alexander (1903), Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy, J. Maclehose and Sons, ISBN 9780678006153, retrieved 2007-03-19
- Garber, Daniel (1994), "Descartes and Spinoza on Persistence and Conatus", Studia Spinozana, 10, Walther & Walther
- Garret, D. (2002), Koistinen, Olli; Biro, John (eds.), "Spinoza's Conatus Argument", Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes, 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 127–152, doi:10.1093/019512815X.003.0008, ISBN 9780195128154
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm; Gerhardt, K.; Langley, Alfred Gideon (1896), Langley, Alfred Gideon (ed.), New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Macmillan & Co., ltd., ISBN 9780790578965, retrieved 2007-03-19
- Lin, Martin (2004), "Spinoza's Metaphysics of Desire: IIIP6D", Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 86 (1): 21–55, doi:10.1515/agph.2004.003
- Lyon, Georges (1893), La philosophie de Hobbes, F. Alean, retrieved 2007-03-19
- Montag, Warren (1999), Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and his Contemporaries, New York: Verso, ISBN 978-1-85984-701-5
- Rabouin, David (June–July 2000), "Entre Deleuze et Foucault : Le jeu du désir et du pouvoir", Critique: 637–638
- Schrijvers, M. (1999), Yovel, Yirmiyahu (ed.), "The Conatus and the Mutual Relationship Between Active and Passive Affects in Spinoza", Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist, New York: Little Room Press
- Schulz, O. (1995), "Schopenhauer's Ethik — die Konzequenz aus Spinoza's Metaphysik?", Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 76: 133–149, ISSN 0080-6935
- Spinoza, Baruch (2005), Curley, Edwin (ed.), Ethics, New York: Penguin Classics, pp. 144–146, ISBN 978-0-14-043571-9
- Steinberg, Diane (Spring 2005), "Belief, Affirmation, and the Doctrine of Conatus in Spinoza", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 43 (1): 147–158, doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2005.tb01948.x, ISSN 0038-4283
- Tuusvuori, Jarkko S. (March 2000), Nietzsche & Nihilism: Exploring a Revolutionary Conception of Philosophical Conceptuality, University of Helsinki, ISBN 978-951-45-9135-8
- Wendell, Rich (1997), Spinoza's Conatus doctrine: existence, being, and suicide, Waltham, Mass., OCLC 37542442
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