→Laters usages and related concepts: quoted passage is really quite marginal here |
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{{short description|Innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself}} |
{{short description|Innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself}} |
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{{About|a term in philosophy|the Zola Jesus album|Conatus (album)| |
{{About|a term in philosophy|the Zola Jesus album|Conatus (album)|Conatus - Journal of Philosophy|Conatus (journal)}} |
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[[Image:Spinoza.jpg|thumb|upright| Conatus is a central theme in the philosophy of [[Baruch Spinoza]] (1632–1677). According to Spinoza, "each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (''[[Ethics (Spinoza)|Ethics]]'', part 3, prop. 6).]] |
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In the philosophy of [[Baruch Spinoza]], '''conatus''' ({{IPAc-en|k|oʊ|ˈ|n|eɪ|t|ə|s}}; [[:wikt:conatus]]; [[Latin]] for "effort; endeavor; impulse, inclination, tendency; undertaking; striving") is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself. This "thing" may be [[mind]], [[matter]], or a combination of both. and is often associated with [[God]]'s will in a [[pantheist]] view of [[Nature]]. The history of the term ''conatus'' is that of a series of subtle tweaks in meaning and clarifications of scope. The ''conatus'' may refer to the instinctive "will to live" of living organisms or to various metaphysical theories of [[Motion (physics)|motion]] and [[inertia]].<ref name="Koll">{{Harvnb|Kollerstrom|1999|pp=331–356}}</ref><ref name="Wolf">{{Harvnb|Wolfson|1934|p=202}}</ref> Today, ''conatus'' is rarely used in the technical sense, since classical mechanics uses concepts such as [[inertia]] and [[conservation of momentum]] that have superseded it. It has, however, been a notable influence on later thinkers such as [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] and [[Friedrich Nietzsche]]. |
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[[File:Spinoza.jpg|thumb|200px|Conatus is, for [[Baruch Spinoza]], where "each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being."{{efn|''[[Ethics (Spinoza)|Ethics]]'', part 3, prop. 6}}]] |
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==Definition and origin== |
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In the philosophy of [[Baruch Spinoza]], '''conatus''' ({{IPAc-en|k|oʊ|ˈ|n|eɪ|t|ə|s}}; [[:wikt:conatus]]; [[Latin]] for "effort; endeavor; impulse, inclination, tendency; undertaking; striving") is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself. This ''thing'' may be mind, matter, or a combination of both, and is often associated with God's will in a [[pantheist]] view of nature. The ''conatus'' may refer to the instinctive ''will to live'' of living organisms or to various metaphysical theories of [[motion]] and [[inertia]]. Today, ''conatus'' is rarely used in the technical sense, since classical mechanics uses concepts such as [[inertia]] and [[conservation of momentum]] that have superseded it. It has, however, been a notable influence on later thinkers such as [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] and [[Friedrich Nietzsche]]. |
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[[Image:Frans Hals - Portret van René Descartes.jpg|thumb|upright|[[René Descartes]]]] |
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The Latin ''[[wikt:conatus|cōnātus]]'' comes from the verb ''[[wikt:conor|cōnor]]'', which is usually translated into English as, "to endeavor"; used as an abstract noun, ''conatus'' is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself.<ref name="Traup">{{Harvnb|Traupman|1966|p=52}}</ref> There is a traditional connection between ''conatus'' and motion itself. Many different definitions and treatments have been formulated by other [[Early modern philosophy|Early Modern philosophers]] philosophers [[René Descartes]], [[Gottfried Leibniz]], and [[Thomas Hobbes]] who each had made significant contributions and put their own personal twist on the concept, each developing the term differently.<ref Name="LeB">{{Harvnb|LeBuffe|2006}}</ref> |
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==Definition and origin== |
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[[Thomas Aquinas]] and [[Judah Leon Abravanel|Abravanel]] (1265–1321) both related the concept directly to that which [[Augustine of Hippo|Augustine]] (354–430 CE) saw to be the "natural movements upward and downward or with their being balanced in an intermediate position" described in his ''[[The City of God]]'', (c. 420 CE). They called this force that causes objects to rise or fall, "''amor naturalis''", or "natural love".<ref>{{Harvnb|Wolfson|1934|pp=197,200}}</ref> [[Jean Buridan]] (1300–1358) also rejected the notion that this motion-generating property, which he named ''impetus'', dissipated spontaneously. Buridan's position was that a moving object would be arrested by the resistance of the air and the weight of the body which would oppose its impetus. He also maintained that impetus increased with speed; thus, his initial idea of impetus was similar in many ways to the modern concept of [[momentum]]. Despite the obvious similarities to more modern ideas of inertia, Buridan saw his theory as only a modification to Aristotle's basic philosophy, maintaining many other [[Peripatetic school|peripatetic]] views, including the belief that there was still a fundamental difference between an object in motion and an object at rest. Buridan also maintained that impetus could be not only linear, but also circular in nature, causing objects such as celestial bodies to move in a circle.<ref>{{Harvnb|Grant|1964|pp=265–292}}</ref> |
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[[File:Frans Hals - Portret van René Descartes.jpg|thumb|right|200px|[[René Descartes]] used the term ''conatus'' in his mechanistic theory of motion.]] |
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[[Image:Thomas Hobbes (portrait).jpg|thumb||left|upright|[[Thomas Hobbes]]]] |
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The Latin ''[[wikt:conatus|cōnātus]]'' comes from the verb ''[[wikt:conor|cōnor]]'', which is usually translated into English as, ''to endeavor''; used as an abstract noun, ''conatus'' is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself. Although the term is most central to Spinoza's philosophy, many other [[Early modern philosophy|early modern philosophers]] including [[René Descartes]], [[Gottfried Leibniz]], and [[Thomas Hobbes]] made significant contributions, each developing the term differently.<ref Name="LeB">{{Harvnb|LeBuffe|2006}}</ref> |
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Whereas the medieval [[Scholasticism|Scholastic]] philosophers developed a notion of ''conatus'' as a mysterious intrinsic property of things, René Descartes (1596–1650) began to develop a more modern, [[mechanism (philosophy)|mechanistic]] concept of the ''conatus.''<ref name="Piet">{{Harvnb|Pietarinen|2000}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Garber|1992|pp=150,154}}</ref> For Descartes, in contrast to Buridan, motion and rest are properties of the interactions of matter according to eternally fixed mechanical laws, not dispositions and intentions, nor as inherent properties or "forces" of things, but rather as a unifying, external characteristic of the physical universe itself.<ref>{{Harvnb|Garber|1992|pp=180,184}}</ref> |
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God may set this activity in motion, but thereafter no ''new'' motion or rest can be created or destroyed.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gueroult|1980|pp=120–34}}</ref> The ''conatus'' is just the tendency of bodies to move when they collide with each other. |
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Descartes |
Whereas the medieval [[Scholasticism|Scholastic]] philosophers such as [[Jean Buridan]] developed a notion of ''impetus'' as a mysterious intrinsic property of things,<ref>{{Harvnb|Grant|1964|pp=265–292}}</ref> René Descartes (1596–1650) developed a more modern, [[mechanism (philosophy)|mechanistic]] concept of motion which he called the ''conatus.''<ref>{{Harvnb|Garber|1992|pp=150,154}}</ref> For Descartes, in contrast to Buridan, motion and rest are properties of the ''interactions'' of matter according to eternally fixed mechanical laws, not dispositions and intentions, nor as inherent properties or ''forces'' of things, but rather as a unifying, external characteristic of the physical universe itself.<ref>{{Harvnb|Garber|1992|pp=180,184}}</ref> Descartes specifies two varieties of the ''conatus'': ''conatus a centro,''{{efn|"tendency towards the center"}} or a theory of [[gravity]] and ''conatus recedendi{{efn|"tendency away from the center"}}'' which represents [[centrifugal force|centrifugal forces]].<ref name="Koll">{{Harvnb|Kollerstrom|1999|pp=331–356}}</ref> Descartes, in developing his First Law of Nature, also invokes the idea of a ''conatus se movendi'', or "''conatus'' of self-preservation", a generalization of the principle of [[inertia]], which was formalized by [[Isaac Newton]] and made into the first of his three [[Laws of Motion]] fifty years after the death of Descartes."{{sfn|Wolfson|1934|pp=197-202}} |
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Thomas Hobbes |
[[Thomas Hobbes]] criticized previous definitions of ''conatus'' for failing to explain the origin of motion, defining ''conatus'' to be the infinitesimal unit at the ''beginning'' of motion: an inclination in a specified direction.<ref>{{Harvnb|Hobbes|1998|loc=III, xiv, 2}}</ref> Furthermore, Hobbes uses conatus to describe cognition functions in the mind,{{sfn|Bidney|1962|p=87-93}} describing [[emotion]] as the beginning of motion and the [[Will (philosophy)|will]] as the sum of all emotions, which forms the ''conatus'' of a body and its physical manifestation is the perceived "will to survive".<ref name="LeB" /> In a notion similar that of Hobbes, [[Gottfried Leibniz]] differentiates between the ''conatus'' of the body and soul,{{sfn|Arthur|1998}} primarily focusing however on the concept of a ''conatus'' of body in developing the principles of [[integral calculus]] to explain [[Zeno's paradoxes]] of motion.<ref>{{Harvnb|Leibniz|1988|p=135}}</ref> Leibniz later defines the term ''monadic conatus'', as the ''state of change'' through which his [[Monad (philosophy)|monads]] perpetually advance.<ref>{{Harvnb|Arthur|1994|loc=sec. 3}}</ref> This ''conatus'' is a sort of instantaneous or ''virtual'' motion that all things possess, even when they are static. Motion, meanwhile, is just the summation of all the ''conatuses'' that a thing has, along with the interactions of things. By summing an infinity of such ''conatuses'' (i.e., what is now called [[integral|integration]]), Leibniz could measure the effect of a continuous force.<ref name="Gill">{{Harvnb|Gillispie|1971|pp=159–161}}</ref> |
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==In Spinoza's philosophy== |
==In Spinoza's philosophy== |
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{{main|Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza}} |
{{main|Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza}} |
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Conatus is a central theme in the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677), which is derived from principles that Hobbes and Descartes developed.<ref>{{Harvnb|Morgan|2006|p=ix}}</ref> Contrary to most philosophers of his time, Spinoza rejects the dualistic assumption that mind, [[intentionality]], ethics, and freedom are to be treated as things separate from the natural world of physical objects and events.<ref>{{Harvnb|Jarrett|1991|pp=470–475}}</ref> One significant change he makes to Hobbes' theory is his belief that the ''conatus ad motum'', (''conatus'' to motion), is ''not'' mental, but material.{{sfn|Bidney|1962|p=87-93}} Spinoza also uses ''conatus'' to refer to rudimentary concepts of [[inertia]], as Descartes had earlier.<ref name="LeB" /> According to Spinoza, "each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (''[[Ethics (Spinoza)|Ethics]]'', part 3, prop. 6). Since a thing cannot be destroyed without the action of external forces, motion and rest, too, exist indefinitely until disturbed.{{sfn|Allison|1975|p=124-125}} His goal is to provide a unified explanation of all these things within a [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalistic]] framework, man and nature must be unified under a consistent set of laws; [[God]] and [[nature]] are one, and there is no [[free will]]. For example, an action is ''free'', for Spinoza, only if it arises from the essence and ''conatus'' of an entity. However, an action can still be free in the sense that it is not constrained or otherwise subject to external forces.<ref>{{Harvnb|Lachterman|1978}}</ref> Human beings are thus an integral part of nature.{{sfn|Allison|1975|p=124-125}} Spinoza explains seemingly irregular human behaviour as really ''natural'' and rational and motivated by this principle of the ''conatus''.{{sfn|Allison|1975|p=124-125}} Some have argued that the ''conatus'' consists of happiness and the perpetual drive toward perfection.<ref>{{Harvnb|DeBrabander|2007|pp=20–1}}</ref> Conversely, a person is saddened by anything that opposes his ''conatus.'' Others have associated ''desire'', a primary affect, with the ''conatus'' principle of Spinoza. Desire is then controlled by the other affects, pleasure and pain, and thus the ''conatus'' strives towards that which causes joy and avoids that which produces pain.{{sfn|Bidney|1962|p=87-93}} |
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Conatus is a central theme in the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677). According to Spinoza, "each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (''[[Ethics (Spinoza)|Ethics]]'', part 3, prop. 6). Spinoza presents a few reasons for believing this. First, particular things are, as he puts it, modes of God, which means that each one expresses the power of God in a particular way (''Ethics'', part 3, prop. 6, dem.). Moreover, it could never be part of the definition of God that his modes contradict one another (''Ethics'', part 3, prop. 5); each thing, therefore, "is opposed to everything which can take its existence away" (''Ethics'', part 3, prop. 6, dem.). This resistance to destruction is formulated by Spinoza in terms of a striving to continue to exist, and ''conatus'' is the word he most often uses to describe this force.<ref>{{Harvnb|Allison|1975|p=124}}</ref> |
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==Later usages and related concepts== |
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After the development of [[classical mechanics]], the concept of a ''conatus,'' in the sense used by philosophers other than Spinoza,{{sfn|Bidney|1962|p=87-93}} an intrinsic property of all physical bodies, was largely superseded by the principles of [[inertia]] and [[conservation of momentum]]. Similarly, ''Conatus recendendi'' became [[centrifugal force]], and ''conatus a centro'' became [[gravity]].<ref name="Koll" /> However, [[Giambattista Vico]], inspired by [[Neoplatonism]], explicitly rejected the principle of inertia and the laws of motion of the new physics. For him, ''conatus'' was the essence of human [[society]],<ref>{{Harvnb|Goulding|2005|p=22040}}</ref> and also, in a more traditional, [[hylozoism|hylozoistic]] sense, as the generating power of movement which pervades all of nature,<ref>{{Harvnb|Vico|1710|pp=180–186}}</ref> which was composed neither of atoms, as in the dominant view, nor of extension, as in Descartes, but of ''metaphysical points'' animated by a ''conatus'' principle provoked by God.<ref>{{Harvnb|Landucci|2004|pp=1174,1175}}</ref> [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] (1788–1860) developed a principle notably similar to that of Spinoza's ''conatus''.<ref name="LeB" /><ref name="Shop">{{Harvnb|Schopenhauer|1958|p=357}}</ref> This principle, ''Wille zum Leben'', or of a "Will to Live", described the specific phenomenon of an organism's self-preservation instinct.<ref>{{Harvnb|Rabenort|1911|p=16}}</ref> Schopenhauer qualified this, however, by suggesting that the Will to Live is not limited in duration, but rather, "the will wills absolutely and for all time", across generations.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schopenhauer|1958|p=568}}</ref> Rejecting the primacy of Schopenhauer's Will to Live, [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] (1844–1900) developed a separate principle the [[The Will to Power (manuscript)|Will to Power]], which comes out of a rejection of such notions of self-preservation.<ref>{{Harvnb|Durant|Durant|1963|loc=chp. IX}}</ref> In [[systems theory]], the Spinozistic conception of a ''conatus'' has been related to modern theories of [[autopoiesis]] in biological systems.<ref name=sandy144145>{{Harvnb|Sandywell|1996|pp=144–5}}</ref> However, the scope of the idea is definitely narrower today, being explained in terms of chemistry and neurology where, before, it was a matter of metaphysics and [[theurgy]].<ref name=mathews110>{{Harvnb|Mathews|1991|p=110}}</ref> |
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==See also== |
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Striving to persevere is not merely something that a thing does in addition to other activities it might happen to undertake. Rather, striving is "nothing but the actual essence of the thing" (''Ethics'', part 3, prop. 7). Spinoza also uses the term ''conatus'' to refer to rudimentary concepts of [[inertia]], as Descartes had earlier.<ref name="LeB" /> Since a thing cannot be destroyed without the action of external forces, motion and rest, too, exist indefinitely until disturbed.<ref name="All">{{Harvnb|Allison|1975|p=125}}</ref> |
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*[[Conation]] |
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===Behavioral manifestation=== |
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The concept of the ''conatus'', as used in [[Baruch Spinoza]]'s [[psychology]], is derived from sources both ancient and medieval. Spinoza reformulates principles that especially Hobbes and Descartes developed.<ref>{{Harvnb|Morgan|2006|p=ix}}</ref> One significant change he makes to Hobbes' theory is his belief that the ''conatus ad motum'', (''conatus'' to motion), is ''not'' mental, but material.<ref>{{Harvnb|Bidney|1962|p=93}}</ref> |
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Spinoza, with his [[determinism]], believes that man and nature must be unified under a consistent set of laws; [[God]] and [[nature]] are one, and there is no [[free will]]. Contrary to most philosophers of his time and in accordance with most of those of the present, Spinoza rejects the dualistic assumption that mind, [[intentionality]], ethics, and freedom are to be treated as things separate from the natural world of physical objects and events.<ref>{{Harvnb|Jarrett|1991|pp=470–475}}</ref> His goal is to provide a unified explanation of all these things within a [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalistic]] framework, and his notion of ''conatus'' is central to this project. For example, an action is "free", for Spinoza, only if it arises from the essence and ''conatus'' of an entity. There can be no absolute, unconditioned freedom of the will, since all events in the natural world, including human actions and choices, are [[determinism|determined]] in accord with the natural laws of the universe, which are inescapable. However, an action can still be free in the sense that it is not constrained or otherwise subject to external forces.<ref>{{Harvnb|Lachterman|1978}}</ref> |
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Human beings are thus an integral part of nature.<ref name="All" /> Spinoza explains seemingly irregular human behaviour as really "natural" and rational and motivated by this principle of the ''conatus''.<ref>{{Harvnb|Dutton|2006|loc= chp. 5}}</ref> In the process, he replaces the notion of free will with the ''conatus'', a principle that can be applied to all of nature and not just man.<ref name="All" /> |
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====Emotions and affects==== |
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Spinoza's view of the relationship between the ''conatus'' and the human [[affect (psychology)|affects]] is not clear. Some have argued that the human affects arise from the ''conatus'' and the perpetual drive toward perfection.<ref>{{Harvnb|DeBrabander|2007|pp=20–1}}</ref> Indeed, Spinoza states in his ''Ethics'' that happiness, specifically, "consists in the human capacity to preserve itself". This "endeavor" is also characterized by Spinoza as the "foundation of [[virtue]]".<ref>{{Harvnb|Damasio|2003|p=170}}</ref> Conversely, a person is saddened by anything that opposes his ''conatus''<ref>{{Harvnb|Damasio|2003|pp=138–9}}</ref> Others have associated "desire", a primary affect, with the ''conatus'' principle of Spinoza. This view is backed by the Scholium of IIIP9 of the ''Ethics'' which states, "Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of the appetite. So desire can be defined as appetite together with consciousness of the appetite"<ref name="LeB" /> Desire is then controlled by the other affects, pleasure and pain, and thus the ''conatus'' strives towards that which causes joy and avoids that which produces pain.<ref>{{Harvnb|Bidney|1962|p=87}}</ref> |
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==Laters usages and related concepts== |
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[[File:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Bernhard Christoph Francke.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]]]] |
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In his ''Exposition and Defence of the New System'' (1695), [[Gottfried Leibniz]] (1646–1716) uses the word ''conatus'' to describe a notion similar that of Hobbes, but he differentiates between the ''conatus'' of the body and soul, the first of which may only travel in a straight line by its own power, and the latter of which may "remember" more complicated motions.<ref>{{Harvnb|Leibniz|1988|p=135}}</ref><ref name="Art98" /> Leibniz uses this concept of a ''conatus'' in developing the principles of [[integral calculus]]. In order for anything to begin moving at all, there must be some mind-like, [[Voluntarism (philosophy)|voluntaristic]] property or force inherent in the basic constituents of the universe that propels them. This ''conatus'' is a sort of instantaneous or "virtual" motion that all things possess, even when they are static. Motion, meanwhile, is just the summation of all the ''conatuses'' that a thing has, along with the interactions of things. By summing an infinity of such ''conatuses'' (i.e., what is now called [[integral|integration]]), Leibniz could measure the effect of a continuous force.<ref name="Gill" /> <ref name="Gill">{{Harvnb|Gillispie|1971|pp=159–161}}</ref> <ref name="Duch">{{Harvnb|Duchesneau|1998|pp=88–89}}</ref> Based on the work of Kepler, Leibniz develops a model of planetary motion based on the ''conatus'' principle, the idea of aether and a fluid [[vortex]]. This theory is expounded in the work ''Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis'' (1689).<ref name="Gill" /> According to Leibniz, Kepler's analysis of elliptical orbits into a circular and a radial component can be explained by a "harmonic vortex" for the circular motion combined with a centrifugal force and gravity, both of which are examples of ''conatus'', to account for the radial motion.<ref name="Carl" /> Leibniz later defines the term ''monadic conatus'', as the "state of change" through which his [[Monad (philosophy)|monads]] perpetually advance.<ref>{{Harvnb|Arthur|1994|loc=sec. 3}}</ref> <ref name="Carl">{{Harvnb|Carlin|2004|pp=365–379}}</ref> After the development of [[Classical mechanics]], the concept of a ''conatus,'' in the sense used by philosophers other than Spinoza"<ref>{{Harvnb|Bidney|1962|p=88}}</ref>, an an intrinsic property of all physical bodies, was largely superseded by the principle of [[inertia]] and [[conservation of momentum]]. Similarly, ''Conatus recendendi'' became [[centrifugal force]], and ''conatus a centro'' became [[gravity]].<ref name="Koll" /> |
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Nearly a century after the beginnings of modern science, [[Giambattista Vico]] (1668–1744), inspired by [[Neoplatonism]], explicitly rejected the principle of inertia and the laws of motion of the new physics. For him, ''conatus'' was the essence of human [[society]],<ref>{{Harvnb|Goulding|2005|p=22040}}</ref> and also, in a more traditional, [[hylozoism|hylozoistic]] sense, as the generating power of movement which pervades all of nature<ref>{{Harvnb|Vico|1710|pp=180–186}}</ref>, which was composed neither of atoms, as in the dominant view, nor of extension, as in Descartes, but of ''metaphysical points'' animated by a ''conatus'' principle provoked by God.<ref>{{Harvnb|Landucci|2004|pp=1174,1175}}</ref> |
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[[Arthur Schopenhauer]] (1788–1860) developed a principle notably similar to that of Hobbes's ''conatus''.<ref name="LeB" /><ref name="Shop">{{Harvnb|Schopenhauer|1958|p=357}}</ref> This principle, ''Wille zum Leben'', or of a "Will to Live", described the specific phenomenon of an organism's self-preservation instinct.<ref>{{Harvnb|Rabenort|1911|p=16}}</ref> Schopenhauer qualified this, however, by suggesting that the Will to Live is not limited in duration, but rather, "the will wills absolutely and for all time", across generations.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schopenhauer|1958|p=568}}</ref> Rejecting the primacy of Schopenhauer's Will to Live, [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] (1844–1900) developed a separate principle the [[The Will to Power (manuscript)|Will to Power]], which comes out of a rejection of such notions of self-preservation.<ref>{{Harvnb|Durant|Durant|1963|loc=chp. IX}}</ref> |
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The [[cultural anthropology|cultural anthropologist]] [[Louis Dumont (anthropologist)|Louis Dumont]] (1911–1988), described a ''cultural conatus'' built directly upon Spinoza's seminal definition in his ''Ethics''. The principle behind this derivative concept states that any given culture, "tends to persevere in its being, whether by dominating other cultures or by struggling against their domination".<ref>{{Harvnb|Polt|1996}}</ref> |
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In [[systems theory]], the Spinozistic conception of a ''conatus'' has been related to modern theories of [[autopoiesis]] in biological systems.<ref name=ziemke6>{{Harvnb|Ziemke|2007|p=6}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Damasio|2003|p=36}}</ref><ref name=sandy144145>{{Harvnb|Sandywell|1996|pp=144–5}}</ref>. However, the scope of the idea is definitely narrower today, being explained in terms of chemistry and neurology where, before, it was a matter of metaphysics and [[theurgy]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Damasio|2003|p=37}}</ref><ref name=mathews110>{{Harvnb|Mathews|1991|p=110}}</ref> |
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==Notes== |
==Notes== |
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{{notelist}} |
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==References== |
==References== |
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| id = Thomson Gale Document Number:A54601187 |
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| issue = 1 |
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| doi = 10.1162/posc_a_00546 |
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| s2cid = 141579187 |
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* {{Citation |
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| last = Bidney |
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| publisher = Russell & Russell |
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| title= Leibniz on Conatus, Causation, and Freedom |
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| journal = Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |
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| volume = 85 |
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| pages = 365–379 |
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| title = Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling |
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* {{Citation |
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| publisher = University of Chicago Press |
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| journal = The Southern Journal of Philosophy |
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| volume = 41 |
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| pages=477–490 |
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| issue = 3 |
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Latest revision as of 09:31, 28 November 2023
In the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, conatus (/koʊˈneɪtəs/; wikt:conatus; Latin for "effort; endeavor; impulse, inclination, tendency; undertaking; striving") is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself. This thing may be mind, matter, or a combination of both, and is often associated with God's will in a pantheist view of nature. The conatus may refer to the instinctive will to live of living organisms or to various metaphysical theories of motion and inertia. Today, conatus is rarely used in the technical sense, since classical mechanics uses concepts such as inertia and conservation of momentum that have superseded it. It has, however, been a notable influence on later thinkers such as Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche.
Definition and origin
The Latin cōnātus comes from the verb cōnor, which is usually translated into English as, to endeavor; used as an abstract noun, conatus is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself. Although the term is most central to Spinoza's philosophy, many other early modern philosophers including René Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, and Thomas Hobbes made significant contributions, each developing the term differently.[1]
Whereas the medieval Scholastic philosophers such as Jean Buridan developed a notion of impetus as a mysterious intrinsic property of things,[2] René Descartes (1596–1650) developed a more modern, mechanistic concept of motion which he called the conatus.[3] For Descartes, in contrast to Buridan, motion and rest are properties of the interactions of matter according to eternally fixed mechanical laws, not dispositions and intentions, nor as inherent properties or forces of things, but rather as a unifying, external characteristic of the physical universe itself.[4] Descartes specifies two varieties of the conatus: conatus a centro,[b] or a theory of gravity and conatus recedendi[c] which represents centrifugal forces.[5] Descartes, in developing his First Law of Nature, also invokes the idea of a conatus se movendi, or "conatus of self-preservation", a generalization of the principle of inertia, which was formalized by Isaac Newton and made into the first of his three Laws of Motion fifty years after the death of Descartes."[6]
Thomas Hobbes criticized previous definitions of conatus for failing to explain the origin of motion, defining conatus to be the infinitesimal unit at the beginning of motion: an inclination in a specified direction.[7] Furthermore, Hobbes uses conatus to describe cognition functions in the mind,[8] describing emotion as the beginning of motion and the will as the sum of all emotions, which forms the conatus of a body and its physical manifestation is the perceived "will to survive".[1] In a notion similar that of Hobbes, Gottfried Leibniz differentiates between the conatus of the body and soul,[9] primarily focusing however on the concept of a conatus of body in developing the principles of integral calculus to explain Zeno's paradoxes of motion.[10] Leibniz later defines the term monadic conatus, as the state of change through which his monads perpetually advance.[11] This conatus is a sort of instantaneous or virtual motion that all things possess, even when they are static. Motion, meanwhile, is just the summation of all the conatuses that a thing has, along with the interactions of things. By summing an infinity of such conatuses (i.e., what is now called integration), Leibniz could measure the effect of a continuous force.[12]
In Spinoza's philosophy
Conatus is a central theme in the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677), which is derived from principles that Hobbes and Descartes developed.[13] Contrary to most philosophers of his time, Spinoza rejects the dualistic assumption that mind, intentionality, ethics, and freedom are to be treated as things separate from the natural world of physical objects and events.[14] One significant change he makes to Hobbes' theory is his belief that the conatus ad motum, (conatus to motion), is not mental, but material.[8] Spinoza also uses conatus to refer to rudimentary concepts of inertia, as Descartes had earlier.[1] According to Spinoza, "each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (Ethics, part 3, prop. 6). Since a thing cannot be destroyed without the action of external forces, motion and rest, too, exist indefinitely until disturbed.[15] His goal is to provide a unified explanation of all these things within a naturalistic framework, man and nature must be unified under a consistent set of laws; God and nature are one, and there is no free will. For example, an action is free, for Spinoza, only if it arises from the essence and conatus of an entity. However, an action can still be free in the sense that it is not constrained or otherwise subject to external forces.[16] Human beings are thus an integral part of nature.[15] Spinoza explains seemingly irregular human behaviour as really natural and rational and motivated by this principle of the conatus.[15] Some have argued that the conatus consists of happiness and the perpetual drive toward perfection.[17] Conversely, a person is saddened by anything that opposes his conatus. Others have associated desire, a primary affect, with the conatus principle of Spinoza. Desire is then controlled by the other affects, pleasure and pain, and thus the conatus strives towards that which causes joy and avoids that which produces pain.[8]
After the development of classical mechanics, the concept of a conatus, in the sense used by philosophers other than Spinoza,[8] an intrinsic property of all physical bodies, was largely superseded by the principles of inertia and conservation of momentum. Similarly, Conatus recendendi became centrifugal force, and conatus a centro became gravity.[5] However, Giambattista Vico, inspired by Neoplatonism, explicitly rejected the principle of inertia and the laws of motion of the new physics. For him, conatus was the essence of human society,[18] and also, in a more traditional, hylozoistic sense, as the generating power of movement which pervades all of nature,[19] which was composed neither of atoms, as in the dominant view, nor of extension, as in Descartes, but of metaphysical points animated by a conatus principle provoked by God.[20] Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) developed a principle notably similar to that of Spinoza's conatus.[1][21] This principle, Wille zum Leben, or of a "Will to Live", described the specific phenomenon of an organism's self-preservation instinct.[22] Schopenhauer qualified this, however, by suggesting that the Will to Live is not limited in duration, but rather, "the will wills absolutely and for all time", across generations.[23] Rejecting the primacy of Schopenhauer's Will to Live, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) developed a separate principle the Will to Power, which comes out of a rejection of such notions of self-preservation.[24] In systems theory, the Spinozistic conception of a conatus has been related to modern theories of autopoiesis in biological systems.[25] However, the scope of the idea is definitely narrower today, being explained in terms of chemistry and neurology where, before, it was a matter of metaphysics and theurgy.[26]
See also
Notes
- ^ a b c d LeBuffe 2006
- ^ Grant 1964, pp. 265–292
- ^ Garber 1992, pp. 150, 154
- ^ Garber 1992, pp. 180, 184
- ^ a b Kollerstrom 1999, pp. 331–356
- ^ Wolfson 1934, pp. 197–202.
- ^ Hobbes 1998, III, xiv, 2
- ^ a b c d Bidney 1962, p. 87-93.
- ^ Arthur 1998.
- ^ Leibniz 1988, p. 135
- ^ Arthur 1994, sec. 3
- ^ Gillispie 1971, pp. 159–161
- ^ Morgan 2006, p. ix
- ^ Jarrett 1991, pp. 470–475
- ^ a b c Allison 1975, p. 124-125.
- ^ Lachterman 1978
- ^ DeBrabander 2007, pp. 20–1
- ^ Goulding 2005, p. 22040
- ^ Vico 1710, pp. 180–186
- ^ Landucci 2004, pp. 1174, 1175
- ^ Schopenhauer 1958, p. 357
- ^ Rabenort 1911, p. 16
- ^ Schopenhauer 1958, p. 568
- ^ Durant & Durant 1963, chp. IX
- ^ Sandywell 1996, pp. 144–5
- ^ Mathews 1991, p. 110
References
- Allison, Henry E. (1975), Benedict de Spinoza, San Diego: Twayne Publishers, ISBN 978-0-8057-2853-8
- Arthur, Richard (1994), "Space and relativity in Newton and Leibniz", The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45 (1): 219–240, doi:10.1093/bjps/45.1.219, Thomson Gale Document Number:A16109468
- Arthur, Richard (1998), "Cohesion, Division and Harmony: Physical Aspects of Leibniz's Continuum Problem (1671–1686)", Perspectives on Science, 6 (1): 110–135, doi:10.1162/posc_a_00546, S2CID 141579187, Thomson Gale Document Number:A54601187
- Bidney, David (1962), The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza: A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas, New York: Russell & Russell
- DeBrabander, Firmin (March 15, 2007), Spinoza and the Stoics: Power, Politics and the Passions, London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, ISBN 978-0-8264-9393-4
- Duchesneau, Francois (Spring–Summer 1998), "Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in the Phoranomus and Dynamica de Potentia", Perspectives on Science, 6 (2): 77–109, doi:10.1162/posc_a_00545, S2CID 141935224, Thomson Gale Document Number: A54601186
- Durant, Will; Durant, Ariel (1963), "XXII: Spinoza: 1632–77", The Story of Civilization, vol. 8, New York: Simon & Schuster, archived from the original on 2007-04-23, retrieved 2007-03-29
- Dutton, Blake D. (2006), "Benedict De Spinoza", The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved 2007-01-15
- Garber, Daniel (1992), Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ISBN 978-0-226-28217-6
- Gillispie, Charles Coulston, ed. (1971), "Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm", Dictionary of Scientific Biography, New York, retrieved 2007-03-27
- Goulding, Jay (2005), Horowitz, Maryanne (ed.), "Society", New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 5, Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, Thomson Gale Document Number:CX3424300736
- Grant, Edward (1964), "Motion in the Void and the Principle of Inertia in the Middle Ages", Isis, 55 (3): 265–292, doi:10.1086/349862, S2CID 120402625
- Hobbes, Thomas (1998), De Corpore, New York: Oxford Publishing Company, ISBN 978-0-19-283682-3
- Jarrett, Charles (1991), "Spinoza's Denial of Mind-Body Interaction and the Explanation of Human Action", The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29 (4): 465–486, doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00604.x
- Jesseph, Doug (2006), "Hobbesian Mechanics" (PDF), Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, 3: 119–152, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199203949.003.0005, ISBN 978-0-19-920394-9, archived from the original (PDF) on 2006-11-07, retrieved 2007-03-10
- Kollerstrom, Nicholas (1999), "The Path of Halley's Comet, and Newton's Late Apprehension of the Law of Gravity", Annals of Science, 59 (4): 331–356, doi:10.1080/000337999296328
- Lachterman, D. (1978), Robert Shahan; J.I. Biro. (eds.), The Physics of Spinoza's Ethics in Spinoza: New Perspectives, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press
- Landucci, Sergio (2004), "Vico, Giambattista", in Gianni Vattimo (ed.), Enciclopedia Garzantine della Filosofia, Milan: Garzanti Editore, ISBN 978-88-11-50515-0
- LeBuffe, Michael (2006-03-20), "Spinoza's Psychological Theory", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), retrieved 2007-01-15
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von (December 31, 1988) [1695], "Exposition and Defence of the New System", in Morris, Mary, M.A. (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, J.M. Dent & Sons, p. 136, ISBN 978-0-460-87045-0
{{citation}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - Mathews, Freya (1991), The Ecological Self, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-10797-6
- Morgan, Michael L. (2006), The Essential Spinoza, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., p. ix, ISBN 978-0-87220-803-2
- Osler, Margaret J. (2001), "Whose ends? Teleology in early modern natural philosophy", Osiris, 16 (1): 151–168, doi:10.1086/649343, S2CID 143776874, Thomson Gale Document Number:A80401149
- Polt, Richard (1996), "German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back", The Review of Metaphysics, 49 (3), Thomson Gale Document Number:A18262679
- Rabenort, William Louis (1911), Spinoza as Educator, New York City: Teachers College, Columbia University
- Sandywell, Barry (1996), Reflexivity and the Crisis of Western Reason, vol. 1: Logological Investigations, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 144–5, ISBN 978-0-415-08756-8
- Schmitter, Amy M. (2006), "Hobbes on the Emotions", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved 2006-03-04
- Schopenhauer, Arthur (1958), Payne, E.F.J. (ed.), The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, Clinton, Massachusetts: The Colonial Press Inc.
- Vico, Giambattista (1710), L.M. Palmer (ed.), De antiquissima Italiorum sapientia ex linguae originibus eruenda librir tres, Ithaca: Cornell University Press
- Wolfson, Harry Austryn (1934). The philosophy of Spinoza : unfolding the latent processes of his reasoning. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-66595-8.
- Ziemke, Tom (2007), "What's life got to do with it?", in Chella, A.; Manzotti, R. (eds.), Artificial Consciousness, Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, ISBN 9781845406783
Further reading
- Bove, Laurent (1992), L'affirmation absolue d'une existence : essai sur la stratégie du conatus Spinoziste, Université de Lille III: Lille, OCLC 57584015
- Duff, Robert Alexander (1903), Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy, J. Maclehose and Sons, ISBN 9780678006153, retrieved 2007-03-19
- Tuusvuori, Jarkko S. (March 2000), Nietzsche & Nihilism: Exploring a Revolutionary Conception of Philosophical Conceptuality, University of Helsinki, ISBN 978-951-45-9135-8
- Wendell, Rich (1997), Spinoza's Conatus doctrine: existence, being, and suicide, Waltham, Mass., OCLC 37542442
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