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::Just to illustrate the point. But seriously, per [[WP:WINARS]], talk page comments are not [[WP:RS]].[[User:Timothyjosephwood|Timothyjosephwood]] ([[User talk:Timothyjosephwood|talk]]) 18:59, 18 June 2015 (UTC) |
::Just to illustrate the point. But seriously, per [[WP:WINARS]], talk page comments are not [[WP:RS]].[[User:Timothyjosephwood|Timothyjosephwood]] ([[User talk:Timothyjosephwood|talk]]) 18:59, 18 June 2015 (UTC) |
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:::Even if it '''was''' Mr. Conway Lanz, beyond a doubt, we couldn't use it anyways, considering it's arguably [[WP:UGC]]. [[User:GeneralizationsAreBad|GeneralizationsAreBad]] ([[User talk:GeneralizationsAreBad|talk]]) 19:50, 18 June 2015 (UTC) |
:::Even if it '''was''' Mr. Conway Lanz, beyond a doubt, we couldn't use it anyways, considering it's arguably [[WP:UGC]]. [[User:GeneralizationsAreBad|GeneralizationsAreBad]] ([[User talk:GeneralizationsAreBad|talk]]) 19:50, 18 June 2015 (UTC) |
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There are no easy answers here. I prefer not to be so gauche as to [[WP:RSRUBRIC|link my own essay]], but this case touches on so many points I would essentially have to reproduce the whole essay here to address them all. |
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What I can say for certain is it should not be the intention or expectation of editors to prove that Bateman is right or wrong. It's my assessment (though still up for debate), that his book is not self-published, and there cannot be a blanket statement that his views are [[WP:FRINGE]]. Some of his ''specific'' views may be fringe. He represents a significant viewpoint, which there is a duty to cover under [[WP:NPOV]]. He is definitely biased. If a point can be made using better sources, that should be preferred. Contradictions between sources should be highlighted, rather than used to suppress a source. Don't explain a contradiction unless a source explains it. [[User:Rhoark|Rhoark]] ([[User talk:Rhoark|talk]]) 21:10, 18 June 2015 (UTC) |
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== Source Request == |
== Source Request == |
Revision as of 21:10, 18 June 2015
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Index 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 |
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Reposting conglomerate proposed edits to the bottom of the page
Reposting this as everything seems to be swallowed up, and it's to the point where I have to look at diffs to tell where the debate is.Timothyjosephwood (talk) 17:23, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
The No Gun Ri Massacre (Korean 노근리 양민 학살 사건) occurred on July 26–29, 1950, early in the Korean War, when an undetermined number of South Korean refugees were killed by the 2nd Battalion, 7th U.S. Cavalry Regiment, and a U.S. air attack, at a railroad bridge near the village of No Gun Ri, 100 miles (160 km) southeast of Seoul, South Korea. In 2005, a South Korean government inquest certified the names of 163 dead or missing and 55 wounded and added that many other victims' names were not reported. The government-funded No Gun Ri Peace Foundation estimated as of 2012 that 250-300 were killed, mostly women and children.
The massacre allegations were little-known outside Korea until publication of an Associated Press (AP) story in 1999 in which 7th Cavalry veterans corroborated Korean survivors' accounts. The AP also uncovered orders to fire on civilians approaching U.S. positions because of reports of enemy North Korean infiltration of refugee groups. Some details were disputed, but the massacre account was found to be essentially correct. The U.S Army conducted an investigation and in 2001, after previously rejecting survivors’ claims, and acknowledged the killings but described the three-day event as "an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing." The Army rejected survivors' demands for an apology and compensation.
South Korean investigators disagreed, saying they believed 7th Cavalry troops were ordered to fire on the refugees. The survivors' group called the U.S. report a "whitewash". Additional archival documents later emerged[clarification needed], showing U.S. commanders ordering troops to “shoot” and “fire on” civilians at the war front during this period; these declassified documents were found but not disclosed by the Pentagon investigators. Among them was a report by the U.S. ambassador in South Korea that the U.S. military had adopted a theater-wide policy of firing on approaching refugee groups. Despite demands, the U.S. investigation was not reopened.
Differences:
- Add Korean translation
- Remove "as of 2012" from first para 5th line. It's odd wording and makes it seem like there are ongoing casualties. Compare "As of 2012 1.7 million people in Idaho have died of butt cancer." Obviously you expect people to keep dying from it.
- Para 2 line 5. Replace "after years" with "after previously". (This is the one that's probably gonna come back and bite me.) While it technically may be true that the US denied these claims for multiple years, readers should reach this on their own. Per WP:EDITORIALIZING "Wikipedia should not take a view as to whether an event was fortunate or not." Saying "after years" is one big "Gasp! Can you believe these heartless bastards made those people wait for so long!?" Instead the reader should go "Wait...2001? Didn't this happen in the 50s? That sure is a long time," and they should get there own their own without editorialized hand-holding.
- Para 2 last sentence. Added "Army" instead of "it". "It" just sounds weird. At least the Army should be a "they" or "the Pentagon", if you don't want to treat it like a person linguistically.
- Add quotes to whitewash because...it's a quote.
- Other than these minor edits, I still think we need to add sourcing in, at least for the claims in the last paragraph, as those are the most inflammatory (per WP:RS and WP:LEAD). I have also tagged the paragraph for clarity. It should not be mysterious magical archival evidence. Archival evidence from what by whom? We should WP:ATTRIBUTE the archive. Timothyjosephwood (talk)
- I can clarify some, and will follow with a tweaked version.
- Clarifications:
- We can say the foundation gave its estimate "in 2011." That's when the park/museum opened. The sourcing will be to Korean news reports of, I believe, 2012. (I've seen the exhibits, informational material myself.)
- There was a stray "and" before "acknowledged" in graf 2.
- Re graf 2: I've added an element one now realizes really should have been there all along: President Clinton's statement of regret. Agree? I also streamlined to "approaching civilians," instead of "civilians approaching U.S. positions because of..."
- Still graf 2 and TJW's query: The body, of course, gives the sources for the "emerged orders." It cites the 2010 Critical Asian Studies article for the commanders' orders, but actually they were first reported in an AP story of 2007, a story that led with the Army admitting it had deliberately omitted the Muccio letter from its 2001 report. Then, the discovery of the Muccio letter is attributed in the body to Conway-Lanz (journal article and book). I will now place the attributions directly in the text; if footnotes are preferred, with no explicit text attribution, that will take me a bit to recall how to handle duping citations that already appear below. (My "mental health" sabbatical has made me rusty.) FYI on this point, in further reply to TJWood, the undisclosed "kill" orders were found by AP researcher Randy Herschaft after he learned that the 1999-2001 Army investigation's own files had been processed at the National Archives -- another brilliant bit of prodigious digging by a superb researcher. I now also see the "among them" in that passage technically equates the Muccio letter with the commander's orders. I'll do a slight tweak.
- Also, restoring the intro's fourth graf, as edited by Wikimedes.
Counter 2
- Here's the tweaked version, with the big change the addition of Clinton:
The No Gun Ri Massacre (Korean 노근리 양민 학살 사건) occurred on July 26-29, 1950, early in the Korean War, when an undetermined number of South Korean refugees were killed by the 2nd Battalion, 7th U.S. Cavalry, and a U.S. air attack, at a railroad bridge near the village of No Gun Ri, 100 miles (160km) southeast of Seoul, South Korea. In 2005, a South Korean government inquest certified the names of 163 dead or missing and 55 wounded and added that many other victims' names were not reported. The government-funded No Gun Ri Peace Foundation estimated in 2011 that 250-300 were killed, mostly women and children.
The massacre allegations were little-known outside Korea until publication of an Associated Press (AP) story in 1999 in which 7th Cavalry veterans corroborated Korean survivors' accounts. The AP also uncovered U.S. Army orders to fire on approaching civilians because of reports of enemy North Korean infiltration of refugee groups. Some details were disputed, but the massacre account was found to be essentially correct. The Army conducted an investigation and in 2001, after previously rejecting survivors' claims, acknowledged the killings. President Bill Clinton issued a statement of regret. But the Army described the three-day event as "an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing," and rejected survivors' demands for an apology and compensation.
South Korean investigators disagreed, saying they believed 7th Cavalry troops were ordered to fire on the refugees. The survivors' group called the U.S. report a "whitewash". The AP later discovered additional archival documents showing U.S. commanders ordering troops to "shoot" and "fire on" civilians at the war front during this period; these declassified documents had been found but not disclosed by the Pentagon investigators. American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz reported that among undisclosed documents was a letter from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea that the U.S. military had adopted a theater-wide policy of firing on approaching refugee groups. Despite demands, the U.S. investigation was not reopened.
Prompted by the exposure of No Gun Ri, survivors of similar alleged incidents in 1950–1951 filed reports with the Seoul government. In 2008, an investigative commission said it had registered more than 200 cases of alleged large-scale civilian killings by the U.S. military, most of them air attacks.
- The last paragraph is a WP:COATRACK and should be removed. All it says is "We have an article about a bad thing. Bad things are bad. So lets use this article to talk about other bad things that are not the bad thing the article is about." The article is about No Gun Ri. This would be appropriate for an article about civilian deaths generally during the war, but is not appropriate to this article, and certainly not the lead. I'll look more in depth, but that's my first thought. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 18:09, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
- I disagree:
- 1) The No Gun Ri revelations are universally credited in South Korea for having opened the floodgates; within three months, some 60 further cases of had been filed with the government (whereas none had been raised before, out of fear). In fact, it became clear that No Gun Ri's greatest historiographical importance was this shedding of light on a landscape of indiscriminate killing.
- 2) These were not "civilian deaths generally," but for the most part deliberate strafings of refugee columns, along with attacks on sedentary groups of refugees, and therefore could be traced to the documented "kill" orders. New Air Force documents turned up with broad instructions to attack "people in white," i.e., Korean civilians.
- 3) Not tying NGR to the broader "landscape" will leave the reader wondering, Gee, with all those orders flying around, why were only the NGR refugees killed? Survivors of other events said in some cases the death toll ranged up to 300. An AP reporter at the time counted 200 dead women, children and men along a road south of Seoul. (His story, with photo, was squelched somehow.) It became routine.
Charles J. Hanley 18:52, 1 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)
- Sorry to be so annoyingly ambivalent, but I don't know how I stand on the last paragraph. Both of you make good points. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 18:57, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
- I think an effort to expand coverage of other killings might work best as a stand-alone article. I'm willing to help out with that if need be. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:11, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
- There is an article, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Korea), that covers U.S. Korean War killings of SK civilians, within a larger context of SK killing of SK civilians in that war, plus human rights violations pre- and post-war. Also, I'm sure you're aware there's a final section of this NGR Massacre article headed "TRCK." I very strongly believe this context must be in the article, and I think it belongs, briefly, in the intro because even there the reader wonders, Well, were these the only refugees on the roads in South Korea at the time? Because, of course, it's made clear that these were blanket "kill" orders, not just specific to NGR. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 19:29, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
Counter 3
Ok, how about this:
The No Gun Ri Massacre (Korean 노근리 양민 학살 사건) occurred on July 26-29, 1950, early in the Korean War, when an undetermined number of South Korean refugees were killed by the 2nd Battalion, 7th U.S. Cavalry, and a U.S. air attack, at a railroad bridge near the village of No Gun Ri, 100 miles (160km) southeast of Seoul, South Korea. In 2005, a South Korean government inquest certified the names of 163 dead or missing and 55 wounded and added that many other victims' names were not reported. The government-funded No Gun Ri Peace Foundation estimated in 2011 that 250-300 were killed, mostly women and children.
The massacre allegations were little-known outside Korea until publication of an Associated Press (AP) story in 1999 in which 7th Cavalry veterans corroborated Korean survivors' accounts. The AP also uncovered U.S. Army orders to fire on approaching civilians because of reports of enemy North Korean infiltration of refugee groups. Some details were disputed, but the massacre account was found to be essentially correct. The Army conducted an investigation and in 2001, after previously rejecting survivors' claims, acknowledged the killings. President Bill Clinton issued a statement of regret. But the Army described the three-day event as "an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing," and rejected survivors' demands for an apology and compensation.
South Korean investigators disagreed, saying they believed 7th Cavalry troops were ordered to fire on the refugees. The survivors' group called the U.S. report a "whitewash". The AP later discovered additional archival documents showing U.S. commanders ordering troops to "shoot" and "fire on" civilians at the war front during this period; these declassified documents had been found but not disclosed by the Pentagon investigators. American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz reported that among undisclosed documents was a letter from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea that the U.S. military had adopted a theater-wide policy of firing on approaching refugee groups. Despite demands, the U.S. investigation was not reopened.
This is just about the last paragraph. I haven't gotten into anything else. It is succinct in that it keeps the focus on NGR. I don't think it's an unfair compromise to mention the fact and then put the details in the body. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:30, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
- I agree brief is (always) good. Understand, though, that the initial 60 cases, adding up to 200-plus, all involved U.S. killings of civilians, not simply "civilian deaths throughout the theater."
- So I would suggest:
The attention gained by No Gun Ri prompted numerous investigations into other alleged killings of South Korean civilians by the U.S. military in 1950-1951.
- Is there any way we could remove the "but" after "regret?" It makes it seem like Clinton had a different view than the Army. (Of course, if this is true, then keep it.) GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 22:38, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
- You're right, of course. Last-minute additions inevitably raise new problems. How about a "however" later in that sentence (and adding graf 4 back)...
Counter 4
The No Gun Ri Massacre (Korean 노근리 양민 학살 사건) occurred on July 26-29, 1950, early in the Korean War, when an undetermined number of South Korean refugees were killed by the 2nd Battalion, 7th U.S. Cavalry, and a U.S. air attack, at a railroad bridge near the village of No Gun Ri, 100 miles (160km) southeast of Seoul, South Korea. In 2005, a South Korean government inquest certified the names of 163 dead or missing and 55 wounded and added that many other victims' names were not reported. The government-funded No Gun Ri Peace Foundation estimated in 2011 that 250-300 were killed, mostly women and children.
The massacre allegations were little-known outside Korea until publication of an Associated Press (AP) story in 1999 in which 7th Cavalry veterans corroborated Korean survivors' accounts. The AP also uncovered U.S. Army orders to fire on approaching civilians because of reports of enemy North Korean infiltration of refugee groups. Some details were disputed, but the massacre account was found to be essentially correct. The Army conducted an investigation and in 2001, after previously rejecting survivors' claims, acknowledged the killings and President Bill Clinton issued a statement of regret. The Army described the three-day event as "an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing," however, and rejected survivors' demands for an apology and compensation.
South Korean investigators disagreed, saying they believed 7th Cavalry troops were ordered to fire on the refugees. The survivors' group called the U.S. report a "whitewash". The AP later discovered additional archival documents showing U.S. commanders ordering troops to "shoot" and "fire on" civilians at the war front during this period; these declassified documents had been found but not disclosed by the Pentagon investigators. American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz reported that among undisclosed documents was a letter from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea that the U.S. military had adopted a theater-wide policy of firing on approaching refugee groups. Despite demands, the U.S. investigation was not reopened.
The attention gained by No Gun Ri prompted numerous investigations into other alleged killings of South Korean civilians by the U.S. military in 1950-1951.
Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 22:56, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
- Was is really killings in 50-51? With the war "ending" in 53, it seems like 50-51 is oddly specific. Why would everyone suddenly stop caring about civilian deaths in 1952? In the same vein, did it only spark interest in killings of civilians by US armed forces? Most of the troops were non-American. It seems odd, at face value (not a subject matter expert), that the US would have this problem but the SK and British troops would not, especially coming out of WWII where the killing of as many civilians as possible was a strategic objective for both sides. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 23:24, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
- Easy fix. Just make it "during the Korean War." GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:27, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
- Right. "during the Korean War." Do it. The cases brought were 1950-51, for tactical reasons we needn't get into, but GAB's fix harms nothing. The Brits were g'damned heroes, stopping a lot of crap. Yes, the TRCK investigated ROK killings of their own civilians, but those were gigantic mass executions, not strafing from the air, since, of course, they had no air. I hope we can go with this. The real problems lie ahead. Charles J. Hanley 23:37, 1 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)
Counter 5
The No Gun Ri Massacre (Korean 노근리 양민 학살 사건) occurred on July 26-29, 1950, early in the Korean War, when an undetermined number of South Korean refugees were killed by the 2nd Battalion, 7th U.S. Cavalry, and a U.S. air attack, at a railroad bridge near the village of No Gun Ri, 100 miles (160km) southeast of Seoul. In 2005, a South Korean government inquest certified the names of 163 dead or missing and 55 wounded and added that many other victims' names were not reported. The government-funded No Gun Ri Peace Foundation estimated in 2011 that 250-300 were killed, mostly women and children.
The massacre allegations were little-known outside Korea until publication of an Associated Press (AP) story in 1999 in which 7th Cavalry veterans corroborated Korean survivors' accounts. The AP also uncovered U.S. Army orders to fire on approaching civilians because of reports of enemy North Korean infiltration of refugee groups. Some details were disputed, but the massacre account was found to be essentially correct.[1] The Army conducted an investigation and in 2001, after previously rejecting survivors' claims, acknowledged the killings and President Bill Clinton issued a statement of regret. The Army described the three-day event as "an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing," however, and rejected survivors' demands for an apology and compensation.
South Korean investigators disagreed, saying they believed 7th Cavalry troops were ordered to fire on the refugees. The survivors' group called the U.S. report a "whitewash". The AP later discovered additional archival documents showing U.S. commanders ordering troops to "shoot" and "fire on" civilians at the war front during this period; these declassified documents had been found but not disclosed by the Pentagon investigators. American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz reported that among undisclosed documents was a letter from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea that the U.S. military had adopted a theater-wide policy of firing on approaching refugee groups. Despite demands, the U.S. investigation was not reopened.
The attention gained by No Gun Ri prompted numerous investigations into other alleged killings of civilians during the Korean War.
References
- ^ Sinn, Donghee (October 1972), "Building a collective memory of No Gun Ri: Creating Archives as memory.", World Library and Information Congress: 75TH IFLA General Conference and Assembly: 9
- Removed "South Korea" from mention of Seoul. I think it's pretty obvious we're talking about Korea. Plus it's kindof like saying New York City, United States.
- Added wikilinks for a lot of stuff. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 23:52, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
- The "essentially correct" can be sourced to Donghee Sinn, since that phrase was challenged previously. ("The central element of the AP story - that American troops fired on refugees - was confirmed by other researchers including the U.S. government's investigation team." -- in "Building Collective Memory," page 9, available on my page) GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 00:16, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- Added. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 00:55, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- Let me belatedly note, for the record, since I'm reviewing material and remembering things, the New York Times on May 13, 2000, when it first reported the reckless 7th Cav'er attack on AP, reported that the Pentagon had "confirmed" the core AP report AND that "hundreds" had been killed. Eight months later, the Pentagon spinners obviously insisted the cax toll should be "unknown." The Times paragraph: "Despite the new questions, senior Defense Department officials said yesterday that an Army investigation has confirmed the central element of the report, that American troops fired on refugees, resulting in what the Pentagon calls the 'tragic death of hundreds of civilians.'" Charles J. Hanley 19:14, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- It's late here and I'll sign off, but all looks fine. Charles J. Hanley 01:00, 2 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)
- I'm not sure who removed the bolding on the title in the first line, but please leave per WP:BOLDTITLE.
- I would like to continue thoroughly sourcing the lead. Compare the lead in Armenian Genocide, which contains 14 sources and even provides a source simply to justify the title of the article. Even two or three sources for a single statement is not overkill. For sure, direct quotes should always be accompanied by sources and there are four or five quote in the current proposal, none of which are sourced. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 02:46, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- Agreed, I will offer up sources for whatever I can, in a bit. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 16:37, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- Paragraph 2, last sentence: needs a citation. Paragraph 3, sentences 2 and 3: need citations for quotes. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:00, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- Agreed, I will offer up sources for whatever I can, in a bit. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 16:37, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- It's late here and I'll sign off, but all looks fine. Charles J. Hanley 01:00, 2 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)
- Two points:
- On sourcing the lead: Mostly all I know re WP comes from Wikipedia: The Missing Manual, which says citations in the lead "aren't generally appropriate," the reader knowing he'll see the cites in the body. But if there's a groundswell of support, I'm not objecting. I have them all, of course, so I'll just need to hear what's needed.
- I think Clinton, the presidential action, truly belongs in the lead. But it has complicated things a bit, and might still be better written, particularly since I'm now reminded that the next day he added, "Things happened which were wrong." What do you think? Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 14:17, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- Here rewriting to include Clinton quote, requiring some rejuggling; also to re-insert "U.S." before "killings" in final graf, since the 200-plus claims prompted by NGR all related to alleged U.S. killings. (I must say, however, that mentioning the so-called dispute, followed by "essentially correct," puts the cart -- the confirmation -- before the horse -- the investigation that confirmed -- for the reader. I really feel it need just say what the AP reported, then what the two official investigations said. The reader can see the essential confirmation):
Counter 6
The No Gun Ri Massacre (Korean 노근리 양민 학살 사건) occurred on July 26-29, 1950, early in the Korean War, when an undetermined number of South Korean refugees were killed by the 2nd Battalion, 7th U.S. Cavalry, and a U.S. air attack, at a railroad bridge near the village of No Gun Ri, 100 miles (160km) southeast of Seoul. In 2005, a South Korean government inquest certified the names of 163 dead or missing and 55 wounded and added that many other victims' names were not reported. The government-funded No Gun Ri Peace Foundation estimated in 2011 that 250-300 were killed, mostly women and children.
The massacre allegations were little-known outside Korea until publication of an Associated Press (AP) story in 1999 in which 7th Cavalry veterans corroborated Korean survivors' accounts. The AP also uncovered U.S. Army orders to fire on approaching civilians because of reports of enemy North Korean infiltration of refugee groups. Some details were disputed, but the massacre account was found to be essentially correct.[1] The Army conducted an investigation and in 2001, after previously rejecting survivors' claims, acknowledged the killings but described the three-day event as "an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing." The Army rejected survivors' demands for an apology and compensation. Instead, President Bill Clinton issued a statement of regret, adding the next day that "things happened which were wrong".
South Korean investigators disagreed with the U.S. report, saying they believed 7th Cavalry troops were ordered to fire on the refugees. The survivors' group called the U.S. report a "whitewash". The AP later discovered additional archival documents showing U.S. commanders ordering troops to "shoot" and "fire on" civilians at the war front during this period; these declassified documents had been found but not disclosed by the Pentagon investigators. American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz reported that among undisclosed documents was a letter from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea that the U.S. military had adopted a theater-wide policy of firing on approaching refugee groups. Despite demands, the U.S. investigation was not reopened.
The attention gained by No Gun Ri prompted numerous investigations into other alleged U.S. killings of civilians during the Korean War.
References
- ^ Sinn, Donghee (October 1972), "Building a collective memory of No Gun Ri: Creating Archives as memory.", World Library and Information Congress: 75TH IFLA General Conference and Assembly: 9
Counter 7
The No Gun Ri Massacre (Korean 노근리 양민 학살 사건) occurred on July 26-29, 1950, early in the Korean War, when an undetermined number of South Korean refugees were killed by the 2nd Battalion, 7th U.S. Cavalry, and a U.S. air attack, at a railroad bridge near the village of No Gun Ri, 100 miles (160km) southeast of Seoul. In 2005, a South Korean government inquest certified the names of 163 dead or missing and 55 wounded and added that many other victims' names were not reported.[1]: 247–249, 328, 278 The government-funded No Gun Ri Peace Foundation estimated in 2011 that 250-300 were killed, mostly women and children [2].
The massacre allegations were little-known outside Korea until publication of an Associated Press (AP) story in 1999 in which 7th Cavalry veterans corroborated Korean survivors' accounts.[3] The AP also uncovered U.S. Army orders to fire on approaching civilians because of reports of North Korean infiltration of refugee groups. Some details were disputed, but the massacre account was found to be essentially correct.[4] In 2001, the Army conducted an investigation and, after previously rejecting survivors' claims, acknowledged the killings but described the three-day event as "an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing." The Army rejected survivors' demands for an apology and compensation.[5] President Bill Clinton issued a statement of regret, adding the next day that "things happened which were wrong".[6]
South Korean investigators disagreed with the U.S. report, saying they believed 7th Cavalry troops were ordered to fire on the refugees. The survivors' group called the U.S. report a "whitewash". [7] The AP later discovered additional archival documents showing U.S. commanders ordering troops to "shoot" and "fire on" civilians at the war front during this period; these declassified documents had been found but not disclosed by the Pentagon investigators.[8] American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz reported that among undisclosed documents was a letter from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea stating that the U.S. military had adopted a theater-wide policy of firing on approaching refugee groups.[9] Despite demands, the U.S. investigation was not reopened.
The attention gained by No Gun Ri prompted numerous investigations into other alleged U.S. killings of civilians during the Korean War.[10][11]
References
- ^ Committee for the Review and Restoration of Honor for the No Gun Ri Victims (2009). No Gun Ri Incident Victim Review Report. Seoul: Government of the Republic of Korea. ISBN 978-89-957925-1-3.
- ^ Lee, B-C (2012-10-15). "노근리재단, 과거사 특별법 제정 세미나 개최". Newsis (online news agency) (in Korean). Seoul. Retrieved 2015-06-02.
{{cite news}}
: Unknown parameter|trans_title=
ignored (|trans-title=
suggested) (help)- ^ "War's hidden chapter: Ex-GIs tell of killing Korean refugees". Associated Press. September 29, 1999.
- ^ Sinn, Donghee (October 1972), "Building a collective memory of No Gun Ri: Creating Archives as memory.", World Library and Information Congress: 75TH IFLA General Conference and Assembly: 9
- ^ Dong-Choon, Kim (2012). "KOREA'S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION: AN OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT". Buffalo Human Rights Law Review. 19: 119–120. Retrieved 2 June 2015.
- ^ CBSNews.com staff (January 11, 2001). "No Gun Ri Survivors Denounce Report". CBS News. Retrieved 2 June 2015.
- ^ Choi, Suhi (Fall 2008). "Silencing Survivors' Narratives: Why Are We Again Forgetting the No Gun Ri Story?". Rhetoric & Public Affairs. 11: 369–370. doi:10.1353/rap.0.0043. Retrieved 2 June 2015.
- ^ Dong-Choon, Kim (December 2004). "Forgotten war, forgotten massacres--the Korean War (1950-1953) as licensed mass killings". Journal of Genocide Research. 6 (4): 530. doi:10.1080/1462352042000320592. Retrieved 2 June 2015.
- ^ Hanley, Charles (15 November 2010). "NO GUN RI: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Critical Asian Studies. 42 (4): 8–9. doi:10.1080/14672715.2010.515389. Retrieved 2 June 2015.
- ^ "Truth Commission: South Korea 2005". United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved 2 June 2015.
- ^ "Truth and Reconciliation: Activities of the Past Three Years" (PDF). Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea. Retrieved 2 June 2015.
I threw some refs in, all of which are available on my page. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:53, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- Clinton still needs sourcing. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:23, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- Done. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 20:45, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- I would like "numerous" citations for the claim of "numerous investigations" in the last sentence. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 21:01, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- Done. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 20:45, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- There's already a ref for the 200-plus cases in the final section of the article. I believe I have another standing by (and, of course, the AP reported it in 2008, making it at least three). In fact, and naturally, there are already refs in the body for everything in the lead section. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 21:22, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- Sourced investigations quote from USIP: "The Commission received 11,174 cases based on petitions from individuals. The body confirmed 8,468 cases (76%), rejected 1,729, and sent another 957 cases to other instances or closed them because of insufficient information." Also sourced from preliminary report, available here: http://www.japanfocus.org/data/TRC2009Report.pdf -- "215 cases of killings committed by U.S. soldiers" (page 43). GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 21:39, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- Fantastic. Give me sources for the last two sentences in the first paragraph and the first sentence in the second and I'm good to go. I realize I'm being lazy by not just doing this myself, but I'm trying my best to argue against everyone, which is hard to do if you're not standoffish. So I guess thanks for playing the part of the person I'm arguing against. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 22:04, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- The body cites two sources for the "inquest" casualty findings, in the "Casualties" section, 2nd graf.
- I'll have to work up a cite for the 250-300 dead estimate.
- You feel a cite is needed for saying the story was little known outside Korea before 1999? That's sort of like proving a negative, i.e., show me that it was known. Such was probably stated somewhere, but in my opinion finding it would be energy wasted on something unnecessary. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 22:28, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- No. I meant the source for the original AP story. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 22:52, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- I've inserted the cite for the original AP story in graf 2. Charles J. Hanley 23:16, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
- I've inserted the cite for the 250-300 estimate of dead. It's a Korean online news article reporting on a seminar at the NGR Peace Park that in the process uses the foundation's estimate of dead. Cjhanley (talk)
- I've inserted the cite for the "inquest" casualty estimate. Cjhanley (talk)
- By the way, I see GAB has posted and cited here Kim Dong-choon's 2004 article from the Journal of Genocide Research. Kim later became the Truth and Reconciliation Commission member who led its investigation of the U.S. killings of civilians. Looking back, I see again that this piece is very comprehensive and unflinching. Recommended reading. Charles J. Hanley 23:24, 2 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)
I'm satisfied. Support the edit. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 00:08, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- I concur. Support, and I'm keeping my fingers crossed for consensus. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 00:13, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- I've asked Irondome to take a look since he's another not-canvassed editor from MILHIST. If s/he approves I think s/he should be the person to make the edit since both the other third party editors here have been heavily involved in actually producing this final draft. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 00:42, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- Great. I'll check in tomorrow. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 00:49, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- I've asked Irondome to take a look since he's another not-canvassed editor from MILHIST. If s/he approves I think s/he should be the person to make the edit since both the other third party editors here have been heavily involved in actually producing this final draft. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 00:42, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- Comment, given the number of 7th Cav vets who stated the AP misquoted them and the three critical sources who confirmed orders were and were later shown to not have been present, I can object to the wording stating 7th cavalry vets corroborated the AP's account with at least some recognition of the issues surrounding that. I also cannot support the statement that the AP's account was confirmed. It wasnt. WeldNeck (talk) 20:02, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- We have a secondary source for that statement (Donghee Sinn), and I'll gladly provide more citations if that helps. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 21:29, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- Here's the full quote from Sinn:
- "The central element of the AP story - that American troops fired on refugees - was confirmed by other researchers including the U.S. government's investigation team."
- Also, Sinn does mention criticism of some of the challenged witnesses (Daily, Flint, Hesselman). To quote Sinn once more:
- "The controversy is that three veterans among those who were interviewed by the AP might not have participated in or witnessed the incident in question."
- She goes on to say:
- "Even though there was controversy over the interviewees’ reliability, the consensus of researchers seems to be that the veracity of the report concerning the No Gun Ri killings stands."
- All of this is sourced from "Building Collective Memory," page 9.
- GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 22:02, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- I think it's fairly clear that what we have are dozens and dozens of sources about the incident, and a handful of alternative sources casting doubt on particular details. These particular details do not, in any way, seem to be crucial for the essential truth of the AP story. Further, even if they completely undermined the AP story, the AP story does not itself appear to be crucial for the essential truth of the event as there were numerous other investigations including official inquiries by both governments.
- The wording is not problematic. The proposed edit does not say "every single 7th Cal soldier told exactly the same story word-for-word and no one ever changed a single word of that story ever." Some of the details are disputed, as is stated. If the reader wants to know what details are disputed they should go to the body of the article and see. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 23:29, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- Completely concur with the above. In addition I would urge both parties to consider the new section created below, and begin to interact, show us the things you do agree on. I still believe we can move forward. Is an optimist merely an ill-informed pessimist? Cheers all. Simon. Irondome (talk) 23:35, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- The wording is not problematic. The proposed edit does not say "every single 7th Cal soldier told exactly the same story word-for-word and no one ever changed a single word of that story ever." Some of the details are disputed, as is stated. If the reader wants to know what details are disputed they should go to the body of the article and see. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 23:29, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- By the way, it must be said, since I cannot allow repetitiveness to begin to take on the sound of truthfulness: All the contentions above about "misquotation" and "vets who weren't there" are simply bogus -- with one exception, and that's Daily, the unofficial regimental historian and ex-president of the vets' association, who had long known the details of NGR and who for his own reasons said (and very possibly still feels) he was there, when documents eventually dug up indicate otherwise. NOBODY was misquoted by AP way back when, and Flint and Hesselman WERE at NGR. Besides, a lot of water flowed under the bridge after that, and the journalists and Pentagon added some 20 more ex-GI witnesses to the ranks. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley 19:14, 4 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)
- The way I see it, the burden is not to establish that these dissenting reports are WP:TRUTH. The burden is to establish (1) even if they were true do they fundamentally undermine the story, and (2) even if they were true are they WP:MAINSTREAM or are they WP:FRINGE to the point that including them would produce WP:UNDUE weight to the argument. I do not feel that this standard has been met. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:38, 4 June 2015 (UTC)
- Precisely. I don't want to rehash this particular tedious dispute, but I do think it needs to be dealt with eventually, somehow. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 21:23, 4 June 2015 (UTC)
- I guess having said that, and in the interest of fairness, I'm still not convinced that a WP:CRIT section isn't appropriate, so long as it is concise and doesn't violate WP:INDISCRIMINATE. But the argument still needs to be made that such a section would not be WP:UNDUE. That is, evidence needs to be presented that these criticisms have numerous and prominent adherents, and not one or two things written by one or two people that have largely attracted little attention. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 22:24, 4 June 2015 (UTC)
- Precisely. I don't want to rehash this particular tedious dispute, but I do think it needs to be dealt with eventually, somehow. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 21:23, 4 June 2015 (UTC)
- The way I see it, the burden is not to establish that these dissenting reports are WP:TRUTH. The burden is to establish (1) even if they were true do they fundamentally undermine the story, and (2) even if they were true are they WP:MAINSTREAM or are they WP:FRINGE to the point that including them would produce WP:UNDUE weight to the argument. I do not feel that this standard has been met. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:38, 4 June 2015 (UTC)
- GAB is correct, it will have to be dealt with eventually, but not for a bit. And at that time I think things will be quite clear. Meantime, I have worked up an edit proposal for the Background section, but still must get a couple of kinks out of citation mechanics, and add explainer notes. To be done early Fri morn EDT. Charles J. Hanley 23:39, 4 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)
- I'm considering making a proposal myself on the peace park, or maybe the legal precedent. Obviously, if we don't need this, I can table it and help out with other proposals. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 00:19, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- On the peace park, I have considerable information, having spent three days at a conference there last fall. The separate Nogeun-ri article, about the village, will eventually need updating with park info, I believe. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 14:50, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- It is good to see renewed momentum here. I think a criticisms section would be advantageous providing it is richly sourced. I would like to see WeldNeck's input also on this point. Simon Irondome (talk) 00:56, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- Question is, criticisms of what? The AP story? The overall massacre allegations? I absolutely agree that meticulous and comprehensive sourcing is necessary, especially when the criticism would likely differ so sharply from the rest of the article. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 13:39, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- I dunno. Don't really care. I'm not proposing the section. I'm just saying I'm willing to listen to someone who does. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 15:15, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- Question is, criticisms of what? The AP story? The overall massacre allegations? I absolutely agree that meticulous and comprehensive sourcing is necessary, especially when the criticism would likely differ so sharply from the rest of the article. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 13:39, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- It is good to see renewed momentum here. I think a criticisms section would be advantageous providing it is richly sourced. I would like to see WeldNeck's input also on this point. Simon Irondome (talk) 00:56, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- FYI, I would suggest, before getting into the meat of this article, i.e., the massacre itself, that one might benefit from scanning the very brief written excerpts from two excellent TV documentaries, at User:Cjhanley/German ARD-TV No Gun Ri excerpts and User:Cjhanley/BBC No Gun Ri excerpts. The ARD text may be a tad ragged, but enlightening. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley 16:16, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- Just a reminder. You cannot post copyrighted material, even on your own userspace per WP:COPYVIO. This is basically because Wikipedia can get sued for violating intellectual property laws because they control the servers and beeping lights that let you do it. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 17:42, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- That's not copyrighted, just notes taken while viewing in one case, and excerpts from an unpublished script in another. Since most of you haven't enabled "email this user" at your user page, I'm at a loss as to how otherwise to get solid background material to you. Charles J. Hanley 19:33, 5 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)
Role call
It seems that debate in this section has reached a point where it is fundamentally not about the proposal. So lets be done with it.
Support as nominator.
Support fully. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 22:15, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
Support Counter 7. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 21:57, 7 June 2015 (UTC)
Nutshell list for moving forward
Timothyjosephwood, GeneralizationsAreBad, Wikimedes, Irondome, please see User:Cjhanley/No Gun Ri Massacre: The Problems, a very brief, section-by-section look at the article's general, broad problems, drawn from 17 years' experience in dealing with No Gun Ri. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley 18:44, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- Hey, what a surprise .. everything not sourced to the AP is "problematic". WeldNeck (talk) 19:56, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- Unproductive sarcasm duly noted. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 23:07, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
- Once again, Timothyjosephwood asked for specific edit proposals, rather than a general statement of problems with the article. If you could offer up suggestions, we can repeat the constructive, productive approach found above. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 21:37, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
GAB, that's precisely what my nutshell list was intended to be. For example, regarding the next section to be dealt with, the overdone Background section, I suggest 1) the sometimes questionable examples of "infiltration" be pared to one, or two if well-sourced, and 2) a quick line be added mentioning the "fire" orders that grew from these fears. My list is meant as reference for those not intimately familiar with the article, and as a heads-up about the extent of the work that lies ahead. By the way, as we move along, I have considerable new material and better or fresher alternate sources that have accumulated since taking my long sanity sabbatical. Also, Timothyjosephwood, is the intent to insert newly edited sections in the article as editors move along, or to rebuild an entire article first in Talk? If the first, I take it the revised intro awaits an OK from Irondome or Wikimedes? Shall we go ahead and work on the Background section? Thanks. Charles J. Hanley 12:01, 4 June 2015 (UTC)
- Forgive me. We can get to the edits now, if you are interested in doing so. I have also accumulated a large amount of information on the Korean war in general, which may or may not be helpful. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:21, 4 June 2015 (UTC)
- More words!?! Behind me stand 14-15 shelf feet of Korean War books (I'm working on a KWar book); in front of me, 24 gigabytes of computerized Korean War files, half directly NGR-related. We won't be wanting for reference material. I hope we're not wanting for fortitude. I would like to propose an edit for the "Background" section, but I must do some work first, to track back on sources. Charles J. Hanley 19:39, 4 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)
- As I am not a professional writer or researcher, I'm afraid I don't have access to the same volume of information that you do. I just meant to say that I am happy to work through some more proposals. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:54, 4 June 2015 (UTC)
- Sorry. Misunderstood. Thought you were implying you thought the article needed more material about the broader war, and I've long felt cutting is what's needed. Charles J. Hanley 22:26, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- More words!?! Behind me stand 14-15 shelf feet of Korean War books (I'm working on a KWar book); in front of me, 24 gigabytes of computerized Korean War files, half directly NGR-related. We won't be wanting for reference material. I hope we're not wanting for fortitude. I would like to propose an edit for the "Background" section, but I must do some work first, to track back on sources. Charles J. Hanley 19:39, 4 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)
- Cjhanley, this is not an edit proposal and is not useful. Please see Law of holes and consider not digging.
- There is a reason I posted WP policies on your talk, and it was not to persuade you to go to ANI and post a pages long tirade that is actively persuading editors that you need banned.
- You are making me look bad personally because I have argued very publicly that both of you can be roped in and converted into something other than rambling ideologues, something resembling a productive member of the community.
- You are not special. This is a big place. There are editors here who are Nobel laureates. There are lots of editors here who are subject matter experts. We value their knowledge and input, but we still require them to play by the rules. And we still ban then when they don't. I am replaceable. You are replaceable. Get over it.
- Do your self a favor, stop talking about WeldNeck. Don't type his name, at all, ever. Die an old man having never typed his name beyond today. Next time you start to type it, stop and have a moment of self-reflection and think "That's something a complete idiot would do, and seeing how I'm not a complete idiot, I'm going to not do that." You are not convincing anyone that WeldNeck is a big fat meanie who needs a spanking. You are convincing everyone that you are self-entitled, self-absorbed and care a great deal more about being right than you do about doing anything productive. Stop it.
- There is nothing wrong with being wrong. There is something wrong with being corrected and refusing to conform to community standards. You have been corrected. The policies are on your talk page. I encourage you to read them. (If you wish, you may now report me for violating WP:CIVIL. I'm not sure how else to get this message through.)Timothyjosephwood (talk) 23:07, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
Proposed edit 6
I propose that we change this:
Background
The division of Japan's former Korean colony into two zones at the end of World War II led to years of border skirmishing between U.S.-allied South Korea and Soviet-allied North Korea. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the south to try to reunify the peninsula, touching off a war that would draw in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries and end in a stalemate and armistice three years later.
The immediate U.S. response was to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division, which had been part of the occupation forces from Japan to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians.[1]: iv–v In the two weeks after the Americans first arrived on July 5, 1950, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces reeled in retreat.[2]: 251
With large gaps in their front lines and refugees fleeing the onrush of the North Korean advance, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns, a continuing concern throughout the war's first year.[1]: v
A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division war diary described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[3]: 101
During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon. The battle resulted in the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[4] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [5] with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.[6] On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.[2]: 199
Adding to this confusing situation, a July 23, 1950, Eighth United States Army intelligence report stated almost all refugees were searched over one 24-hour period on the main road and none was found carrying arms or uniforms.[7] But three days later, Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, 1st Cavalry Division commander, told rear-echelon reporters he suspected most of the refugee movement towards the U.S. defensive positions were North Korean infiltrators.[8] It was on that day, July 26, that one of Gay's front-line units, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment,[nb 2] dug in near the village of No Gun Ri, was faced with an approaching throng of hundreds of refugees, mostly from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.
References
- ^ a b c d Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
- ^ a b Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
- ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
- ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
- ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
- ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
- ^ Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950. Interrogation report. "North Korean methods of operation". Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. p. 74. ISBN 978-0-415-62241-7.
{{cite book}}
: Unknown parameter|editors=
ignored (|editor=
suggested) (help)- ^ The Associated Press, American and British Task Force Supports Yank Retreat July 26, 1950.
And instead use this:
Background
The division of Japan's former Korean colony into two zones at the end of World War II led to years of border skirmishing between U.S.-allied South Korea and Soviet-allied North Korea. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the south to try to reunify the peninsula, touching off a war that would draw in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries and end in a stalemate and armistice three years later.
The immediate U.S. response was to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division, and later the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, all part of the occupation forces in Japan, to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians.[1]: iv–v In the two weeks after the Americans first arrived on July 5, 1950, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces reeled in retreat.[2]: 251
With sometimes miles-wide gaps in their front lines and refugees fleeing the onrush of the North Korean advance, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns.[1]: v
A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division “war diary” described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[3]: 101
Around this time, 8th Cavalry troops reportedly were attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of the central South Korean town of Yongdong, 100 miles (160 km) south of Seoul.[4]The official Army history says a seemingly pregnant woman refugee was searched by 8th Cavalry Regiment troops and her "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes said to have been used to report American positions to enemy forces.[2]: 199
At the same time, an intelligence report by the overall Korea command, the U.S. Eighth Army, stated almost all refugees were searched over one 24-hour period on the main road and none was found carrying arms or uniforms.[5] “Such incidents were less numerous than the gossipmongers believed,” Korean War historian Allan R. Millett would later conclude.[6]
But Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, leading the 1st Cavalry Division in his first combat command, told rear-echelon reporters he suspected most refugees streaming down the roads were North Korean infiltrators.[7] Later archival research found orders went out from unit commands during this period to shoot approaching refugees.[8] Wrote a veteran American correspondent at the war front, “It is not a good time to be a Korean, for Yankees are shooting them all.”[9]. On the day Gay spoke with reporters, July 26, 1950, one of his front-line units, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment,[nb 4] dug in near the village of No Gun Ri, east of Yongdong, was faced with an approaching throng of hundreds of refugees, mostly from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.
References
- ^ a b c Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
- ^ a b Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
- ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
- ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (1950-07-27). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1,3 (This report is not corroborated in the official Army history).
- ^ Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950. Interrogation report. "North Korean methods of operation". Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. p. 74. ISBN 978-0-415-62241-7.
{{cite book}}
: Unknown parameter|editors=
ignored (|editor=
suggested) (help)- ^ Millett, Allan R. (2010). The War for Korea, 1950-51. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. p. 161. ISBN 9780700617098.
- ^ The Associated Press, American and British Task Force Supports Yank Retreat July 26, 1950.
- ^ "War's hidden chapter: Ex-GIs tell of killing Korean refugees". The Associated Press. 1999-09-29.
- ^ Keyes Beech, Newark, N.J., Star-Ledger, July 23, 1950, cited in Andersen, Robin (2006). A Century of Media, a Century of War. New York: Peter Lang. p. 38. ISBN 0820478946.
This edit restores some balance to this section and adds, in few words, some telling info. The rumors and fears of infiltration far outweighed the reality of the threat. The huge threat was from uniformed NK troops “infiltrating” through the gaps. (The official Army history uses that word to mean just that.)
Specifically:
- Graf 2: Adding the two other divisions early to Korea, both figuring later in the article.
- Graf 3: Noting the gaps in U.S. lines were sometimes miles wide. (Two 1st Cav battalions at Yongdong were seven miles apart.)
- Graf 5: Footnote notes this supposed incident from a news report is not mentioned in the official Army history.
- Graf 6: Millett, a leading KWar historian, puts things in perspective.
- Last graf: The fact that this was Gay’s first combat command is important, I feel. (He was a staff officer in WWII ETO. In fact, the same could be said of every officer from Gay on down to battalion level at NGR, and of most of the company commanders.)
- Last graf: Although the article’s lead discusses “kill” orders, it seemed to me this section should mention them. Otherwise, the reader goes on to read about the NGR killings in detail and has to wait until later sections to be reminded of the orders.
- Last graf: Keyes Beech’s quote is not essential; in fact, I’m ambivalent about it. I don’t have the article, but it’s cited in several books. (He actually was Chicago Daily News, syndicated in the Star-Ledger.) The reader may wonder, well, well, tell us more, Mr. Beech.
I appreciate your enthusiasm, and it may just be pedantry on my part, but you're going to have to break things up a bit. This is just speaking from experience: if we try to do this five paragraphs at a time, someone is going to take issue with points 3, 7, and 42 and the debate is going to quickly spiral into unproductivity. It's best if we take each edit one at a time in their own sections so that debate on one single point can remain in one single section.
It's not going to hurt anything if we get to proposed edit 407, and there's no rush to get everything done at once because there is no WP:DEADLINE. It also reduces the chance that an edit that actually doesn't have consensus slips through because people here simply missed it on account of trying to take in 14 edits at a time.
I realize you're taking my lead (not to mix words) on the proposed conglomerate lead section. But that was only after each individual edit was considered and discussed in vacuo. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 15:59, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- I hear what you're saying. But, on the other hand, the problem with taking it a graf at a time is that something may be done to graf 1 that hinges on something being done in graf 7. Editors will argue over 1 without seeing the full picture, including 7. In this case, there's currently overkill on supposed "infiltration" events, including a couple that are weakly sourced, so the edits reduce five such elements to three, while adding the very apropos quote from KWar historian Millett that these rumors were overblown. I believe editors need to see the full picture, and not start off by, for example, arguing over one weakly sourced element. The full picture shows nothing's lost by dropping it, and some balance is gained, along with considerable time.Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 16:43, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- That's not a problem because we can settle the first edit and when we get to the second edit we can say "Look back on edit 81 where we settled this issue. This is a purely pro forma proposal to extend the consensus to this other edit." Remember, this isn't just about addressing issues, this is also about establishing a record that issues were addressed, consensus was reached, and anyone who wants to change anything has to overcome this broad consensus, which isn't easy to do. Compare the literally hundreds of deletions of "but primarily affects women" at Sexism. Anyone who wants to change that and make it stick has to overcome about three pages of sources and consensus, which isn't easy to do. Trust me, I think the wording is itself sexist, and I've tried, as you can see on the talk page.
- At the heart of it, when someone changes something ten years from now, they're not going to change five paragraphs at a time. They're going to change one eensy weensy point. So we need a record that we reached consensus on that eensy weensy point and that's that. This is how you establish longevity on an encyclopedia that anyone can edit. It's all about WP:CONSENSUS. This is a diplomatic negotiation. It isn't a situation where your editor can mark up your draft with a red pen and tell you to fix it. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 16:59, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- Then again, one could post an entire chunk -- "big picture" -- and then discuss and approve one graf at a time. At least one sees how graf 1 hangs with 7. Let me start today with Proposed edit 6A.
Proposed edit 6A
I propose that we change this:
Background
The division of Japan's former Korean colony into two zones at the end of World War II led to years of border skirmishing between U.S.-allied South Korea and Soviet-allied North Korea. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the south to try to reunify the peninsula, touching off a war that would draw in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries and end in a stalemate and armistice three years later.
The immediate U.S. response was to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division, which had been part of the occupation forces from Japan to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians.[1]: iv–v In the two weeks after the Americans first arrived on July 5, 1950, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces reeled in retreat.[2]: 251
References
- ^ a b Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
- ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
And instead use this:
Background
The division of Japan's former Korean colony into two zones at the end of World War II led to years of border skirmishing between U.S.-allied South Korea and Soviet-allied North Korea. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the south to try to reunify the peninsula, touching off a war that would draw in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries and end in a stalemate and armistice three years later.
The immediate U.S. response was to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division, and later the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, all part of the occupation forces in Japan, to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians.[2]: iv–v In the two weeks after the Americans first arrived on July 5, 1950, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces retreated.[3]: 251
References
- ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
- ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
- ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
- This inserts the other early divisions, which otherwise are suddenly mentioned in the article without introduction.
- Removes "reeled in" retreat.
- On the photo caption: redundant info re infiltration removed, total number of refugees added, photo credited.
Charles J. Hanley 18:13, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
The inclusion of the role of North Korean infiltrators at the battle of Taejon was cited specifically in the Muccio letter when drafting the refugee policy. Hanley has always been eager to minimize reports of infiltration, even going so far to say "There was no “documented infiltration” among the refugees to be found in the records of front-line units in the time leading up to No Gun Ri". This as we know from the sources above is flat our wrong and more reflects Hanley's POV rather than what reliable secondary sources have stated. WeldNeck (talk) 18:44, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- Again, you do not need to establish that this is WP:TRUTH. You need to establish that it is WP:MAINSTREAM and not WP:FRINGE. You need to do this using secondary or tertiary sources. This is at least the third time I have said this. Also, you need to argue the sources, not what the other side thinks. I have said this more than I care to count. No one cares what either of you thinks. We care what sources you have. What part of that do you not understand? Timothyjosephwood (talk) 21:37, 7 June 2015 (UTC)
- Further re the caption: I believe someone up above (Irondome?) suggested that linking the refugees in the picture to infiltrators is wrong. Perhaps it should just stand as a photo of 1950 refugees, and let the article text deal with the infiltration issue. Charles J. Hanley 18:59, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- This is fairly minor and uncontroversial. I agree that we should just keep the photo caption simple, we'll discuss the infiltration in the text. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:00, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- Done. Cjhanley (talk)
- Great. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 22:51, 6 June 2015 (UTC)
- Done. Cjhanley (talk)
- This is fairly minor and uncontroversial. I agree that we should just keep the photo caption simple, we'll discuss the infiltration in the text. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:00, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
- If there's no dispute, shall we take a roll call on this edit? GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:17, 6 June 2015 (UTC)
- I've been out of town with very little sleep. I will look at this. Just not right now. I apologize. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:44, 7 June 2015 (UTC)
- It's totally fine, I think we're all a bit sleep-deprived here. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:47, 7 June 2015 (UTC)
- I've been out of town with very little sleep. I will look at this. Just not right now. I apologize. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:44, 7 June 2015 (UTC)
I don't have any issue with including the units. Not a big deal either way with me. As far as the captions go, I think both are less than ideal. I would prefer to simply state what's in the image, rather than using the image as a platform for talking about something else (see WP:COATRACK). I would prefer something like "South Korean refugees fleeing the village of Ching Chong in 1951 after the area was occupied by British troops." Now, all of that is completely made up and whether we actually have these details is anybody's guess. The current suggestions talks about refugees in general and not this picture in particular. In all fairness, we may or may not have bombed certain parts of the peninsula into the stone age. How do we know they're not running from us?
Also, as a general rule of thumb, if you are going to quote a statistic then you need a source. How do we know it was 100s of thousands of refugees and not millions? Timothyjosephwood (talk) 22:32, 9 June 2015 (UTC)
- Here's a source dealing with the refugees: [1]. The scale was huge, regardless of exact numbers. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:42, 9 June 2015 (UTC)
- Again, I agree with you that the captions should be short, descriptive and to the point. Let's not repeat the drama each time we have to caption an image. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:44, 9 June 2015 (UTC)
- Part of this is to illustrate a point about WP guidelines, guidelines that will hopefully become automatic and not have to be discussed again. This is a particularly good illustration. The article Hanley cites actually says 1.8 million refugees in the South and 1 million in the North. This is why we provide citations for statistics. So why not go with something like "the Korean war resulted in an estimated 2.8 million refugees". It provides a larger context for the 380,000 in the text and adds information to the article instead of vaguely rehashing what has already been said. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 00:35, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- I would also like to find a replacement for "reeled" in the last line per WP:EDITORIALIZING. This is an opinion, that their retreat was "reeling". Instead the sentence should include a bare statement of fact like (just making this up), "as UN forces retreated 100 miles over the course of 10 days." This actually adds information for the reader, rather than using colorful language to cover the fact that no actual information is being conveyed. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 01:52, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- That was actually on my mind for a while. Yes, I think it should be changed to "retreated" or "fell back." GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 11:57, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- I would also like to find a replacement for "reeled" in the last line per WP:EDITORIALIZING. This is an opinion, that their retreat was "reeling". Instead the sentence should include a bare statement of fact like (just making this up), "as UN forces retreated 100 miles over the course of 10 days." This actually adds information for the reader, rather than using colorful language to cover the fact that no actual information is being conveyed. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 01:52, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
Timothyjosephwood, GeneralizationsAreBad, Irondome, Wikimedes: There’s some heavy lifting ahead, and I hope this Background section, which should be noncontroversial, can be dealt with expeditiously. As I’ve said, I suspect you’ll see soon enough that trying to deal with the problems graf by graf will prove untenable. Let me explain in the context of this section.
Originally this section revived and dealt with the subject of infiltration (already established in the Lead as the rationale for shooting civilians) with this:
With large gaps in their front lines and refugees fleeing ahead of the North Korean advance, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns, a continuing concern throughout the war's first year.
But then all of this was added:
An official 25th ID war diary describes the refugee predicament they were faced with in the early days of the war: No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers transporting ammunition and heavy weapons in farm wagons and carrying military equipment in packs on their backs. They were observed many times changing from uniforms to civilian clothing and back into uniform. There were so many refugees that it was impossible to screen and search them all.
During the Battle of Taejon later in mid July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon resulting in the capture of General William Dean the conflict's highest ranking prisoner of war.
On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.
… with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.
Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong.
These infiltrators also established a roadblock behind the 8th Cavarly’s position, cutting them off from the rest of the American forces, wounding the Battalion’s commanding officer, and attacking rear echelon field artillery units supporting the rescue effort of the trapped 8th Cav soldiers. During the Battle of Chochiwon in early July, 1950, North Korean infiltration teams provided accurate and detailed information on the location and strength of the 21st Infantry's 3rd battalion providing the KPA with the intelligence needed to perform a coordinated assault, quickly routing the 3-21 from its positions.
Much of the overkill above is weakly sourced. And the final two “incidents,” the “roadblock” and Chochiwon in the final graf, are plainly false. The infiltrators were uniformed NK soldiers. The U.S. Army used the term “infiltration” for any enemy penetration behind U.S. lines. The episodes were clearly shown to be false in Talk, by quoting from the cited source, and still there was a flat refusal (Welcome to No Gun Ri Massacre) to remove the bogus incidents. They were later removed by other hands.
Bottom line: The Proposed Edit 6 above, seven grafs, represents a compromise. It even includes one reported episode that’s not supported in the official history.
This is an article about the massacre, not about verified and unverified infiltration reports (or General Dean, or minefields).
I hope we can discuss the section as a whole, deal with it expeditiously, and move on to more challenging sections. Thanks. Cjhanley (talk)
- Weakly sourced = not sourced to the AP. Nothing about the battle of Chochiwon is in the article (re you rfering to another article on Wikipedia perhaps?).
- You've made this point before about how the "official history" does not mention the KPA disguising its forces as civilians to infiltrate them past the US lines calling it a "particular falsehood" of mine. According to Roy Appleman who wrote what you refer to as the official history of the Korean War
The large numbers of Korean refugees crowding the Yongdong area undoubtedly helped the enemy infiltrate the 1st Cavalry Division positions. On 24 July, for example, a man dressed in white carrying a heavy pack, and accompanied by a woman appearing to be pregnant, came under suspicion. The couple was searched and the woman's assumed pregnancy proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes. She used this radio for reporting American positions. Eighth Army tried to control the refugee movement through the Korean police, permitting it only during daylight hours and along predetermined routes. - pg 199
- Many secondary sources, Bateman among them, have described the North Korean's use of these tactics as a contributing factor to what happened. WeldNeck (talk) 14:19, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- I believe that a mention of fears of infiltration -- if not infiltration itself -- is fine as long as it doesn't become undue. If we can source it well, I think it could reasonably be included. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 16:23, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
How about we actually discuss the edit that started this section and not revert back to a previous discussion. We are not proposing whole sections; we are proposing edits. We are not having a broad ideological discussion. Chanley, I appreciate that you hope this section is non-controversial. I appreciate your hope that this can be done expeditiously. Your hope fails you. The entire article is controversial. That's why we're doing this. I'm closing the above discussion up until the point that is was about specific edits and not broad sweeping changes. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 16:40, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- I removed the archive tag above. Such tags are appropriate for halting discussions not aimed at improving the article - but not for halting discussion of improvements you don't like. Rhoark (talk) 17:02, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- I archived the discussion because it is the same type of general debate of "let's delete five paragraphs because I need to WP:RIGHTGREATWRONGS" that has plunged this article into two years of unproductive argument. We have successfully updated the lead and we have done it by discussing specific edits, not wholesale sweeping changes. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 17:19, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- I am simply trying to frame, for all, the problems afflicting the article, as we enter each section. There can't possibly be anything wrong with discussing the article's problems. That's what editors do. And, believe me, this will be no tweaking exercise. The problem with this section is undue weight given to the infiltration matter, with often weak or misused sources. One must look at the section overall to see that, no? If we then insist on going graf by graf, fine, let's give it a try.
- Now, is there any need for further discussion of the Proposed Edit6A? Shall we move ahead? Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 17:59, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- I archived the discussion because it is the same type of general debate of "let's delete five paragraphs because I need to WP:RIGHTGREATWRONGS" that has plunged this article into two years of unproductive argument. We have successfully updated the lead and we have done it by discussing specific edits, not wholesale sweeping changes. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 17:19, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- The question at hand in the hatted portion did not seem to be any sweeping change, but a foundational question about what reliable sources say about North Korean forces concealing themselves among civilians. If they were doing this, or U.S. forces believed they were doing this, it's part of historical/encyclopedic interest in the etiology of the massacre. Part of the resistance on this point is, I think, borne from a fear that it could provide an exculpatory angle on the actions of U.S. forces, but verifiability is the only concern to which editors should give consideration. Rhoark (talk) 18:35, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- Verifiability, plus Undue Weight, Coatracking and probably a half-dozen other considerations that WP editors more practiced than I could cite. The editor who dumped all of that material into the article -- false, true and in between -- boasted that he would insert every infiltration report he could find into the article. The bad-faith intent was obvious. As noted, it even included two fabricated "incidents." The original was sufficient, simply noting there were such reports and this aroused fear among the troops. But I now propose going beyond that, retaining a couple of the more detailed elements, deleting a couple of questionable ones, and moving on. Speaking of which, again, is there agreement on Proposed Edit6A? Thanks. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 19:26, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- If we change "reeled in retreat" to "retreated," "fell back," or something similar, then I'm fine with 6A. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:35, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- Also, it would be good to put a footnote on the image caption. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:36, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- Sorry, that's a Defense Department photo (the refugees). Do you want to footnote that, or simply add a credit in parens? Also, re total number of refugees, I suggest Conway-Lanz's book as the definitive source; he cites the UN Command counting 5 million South and North Korean refugees as of spring 1951. I'll insert that, with footnote, in the caption. Charles J. Hanley 20:24, 10 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talk • contribs)
- Sorry for being unclear; I meant a footnote for the caption, "Hundreds of thousands of South Koreans..." GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 20:33, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- I just revised Proposed edit 6A to specify the numbers of refugees, and to credit the photo. Charles J. Hanley 20:36, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
- Great. In case we need even more citations/information, I suggest Tae-Ung Baik's "A War Crime against an Ally's Civilians," pages 461-463: [2] GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 20:44, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
Reposting 6A at bottom of discussion for clarity's sake
I apologize for my absence. I have quite a lot of life happening at the moment. I will try to keep up. Remember, WP:TIND. Also, encouragingly, I think we may have reached the point where Chanley is starting to spout off WP:SOMETHING like a true babbling editor. Just a little farther and you'll successfully ruin your writing career. Shoot for the moon; if you miss you'll probably go floating irretrievably into interstellar space.
I removed the "huge" sentence from the caption. Same editorializing issue as before. If a sentence doesn't actually convey factual information it should be removed. Surely you've all heard the "think like a Martian scientist" thought experiment. Think about WP:EDITORIALIZING as "think like an idiot robot". This guy is reducing prose down to 1s and 0s and he disregarding anything that sounds nice but doesn't actually increase his understanding of the world.
Background
The division of Japan's former Korean colony into two zones at the end of World War II led to years of border skirmishing between U.S.-allied South Korea and Soviet-allied North Korea. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the south to try to reunify the peninsula, touching off a war that would draw in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries and end in a stalemate and armistice three years later.
The immediate U.S. response was to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division, and later the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, all part of the occupation forces in Japan, to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians.[2]: iv–v In the two weeks after the Americans first arrived on July 5, 1950, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces retreated.[3]: 251
References
- ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
- ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
- ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
Proposed edit 6B
I propose changing this…
With large gaps in their front lines and refugees fleeing the onrush of the North Korean advance, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns, a continuing concern throughout the war's first year.[1]: v
A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division war diary described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[2]: 101
- ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
- ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
And instead using this…
With sometimes miles-wide gaps in their front lines and refugees fleeing the North Korean advance, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns.[1]: v [2]: 197
A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division “war diary” described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[3]: 101
- ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
- ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
- ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
- In first graf, this notes the gaps between U.S. units were sometimes miles wide (at least five miles at Yongdong). Also tightens that first graf, trimming to essentials.
- I think it's a minor tweak; I don't object. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:50, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
Proposed edit 6C
I propose that we change this:
A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division war diary described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[1]: 101
During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon. The battle resulted in the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[2] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [3] with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.[4] On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.[5]: 199
References
- ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
- ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
- ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
- ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
Appleman
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
And instead use this:
A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division “war diary” described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[1]: 101
The official Army history says that around this time a seemingly pregnant woman refugee was searched by 8th Cavalry Regiment troops and her "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes said to have been used to report American positions to enemy forces.[2]: 199
References
- ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
- ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
- This point re infiltration was originally made via a fat sentence saying American forces were sometimes attacked from behind, reports spread of infiltrators among refugees, and U.S. troops grew to fear refugees. That sentence supplemented a similar statement in the Lead section. Those were sufficient. But then an unnecessary overload of purported examples was piled on. Two “examples” even proved to be false, others weakly sourced. It’s a case of Undue Weight (plus the bloat of extraneous items, such as Gen. Dean and minefields, which have nothing to do with NGR), remedied here with a compromise that nonetheless retains two of the unnecessary “example” elements. Cjhanley (talk)
Proposed edit 6D
From this:
A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division war diary described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[1]: 101
During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon and the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[2] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [3] with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.[4] On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.[5]: 199
References
- ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
- ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
- ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
- ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
Appleman
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
To this:
A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division war diary described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[1]: 101
During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon and the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[2] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [3] with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.[4] In addition to harassment from disguised North Korean forces, the allies also had to contend with South Korean communist guerrillas[5]: 721–724 >. On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.[5]: 199
References
- ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
- ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
- ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
- ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
- ^ a b Cite error: The named reference
Appleman
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
I think this mentions infiltration by KPA forces as well as South Korean Communists using guerrilla tactics to strike behind allied lines. WeldNeck (talk) 20:30, 17 June 2015 (UTC)
- Please, your "Proposed Edit 6D" is simply a revert to the overloaded, "Undue Weight" passage that we're to discuss reducing to something reasonable and well-sourced. If you want to defend what now exists, including the overkill and the weak sources, let's hear it. But don't confuse things. For example, why do we need a bloated half-dozen elements/"examples", half of them weakly sourced, when a simple statement will do saying there were attacks from the rear, reports of infiltration, and fear among the U.S. troops? Why isn't that sufficient? Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 21:00, 17 June 2015 (UTC)
- Is the part about South Korean Communists also attributed to the footnote that follows? If not, then I would recommend sourcing it. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 21:30, 17 June 2015 (UTC)
This is getting difficult to follow when I'm not able to be on here for hours a day.
I'm going to say I think I disagree with both the suggestions. As a general rule, if you are going to list things, you need to be sourcing that list in a list of things. For example, if I wanted to make a section called "famous flanking maneuvers" in an article on mechanized warfare, it's not enough that I have lots of books on my shelves that deal with mechanized flanking. What I need is one single book called "the most flipping famous flanking maneuvers in mechanized warfare history".
Further, when I make that section I need to say "Victor Freckle in his book, The Most Flipping Famous Flanking Maneuvers in Mechanized Warfare History, listed the following examples as the most prominent: 1. That time Hannibal used jeeps and light tanks to encircle the Romans, 2. That time Patton decided enough shit hadn't been blown up that day..."
What I can't do is say "dude, I know a lot about mechanized flanking, and I have way too many books on it. I should take this stuff I know and compile it together in a WP section because I'm an expert." That is literally the definition of WP:SYNTH.
Further, per WP:UNDUE, the article isn't about asymmetrical warfare during the Korean war. The correct course of action here is to actually make an article on that topic and link to it from this one. That way if the reader wants to know more, they have the opportunity. At the same time the reader isn't saying "I thought I was reading an article on a bunch of civilians being killed. How come I'm reading so much generic stuff on the Korean War? Where's the part where lots of people stop being alive?" Timothyjosephwood (talk) 18:38, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
- The asymmetrical aspect of this war is cited by historians like BAteman and the US Army as significant contributing factors and its only three sentences.The entire reason there is a background section is to provide some detail as to the environment these events took place in so as to not have it come from a vacuum. WeldNeck (talk) 19:20, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
- There is no vacuum. There is the Korean War. That's why it's linked to in the first sentence.
- Come to think of it, why do we even have a background section? Is there really anything in there that can't be otherwise covered by Korean war? Half of it is a primer on the war; the other half is a primer on war. On the one hand, why do I need to know who the first unit deployed was? If I wanted to know that wouldn't I just look at the main article on the war? Oh look, Ctrl-F, they have eight paragraphs on the initial US response. On the other hand, of course there were combatants posing as civilians. This is modern warfare. Name a post WWII conflict that didn't have combatants posing as civilians. There are only two types of war left: types that destroy all life on earth, and asymmetrical warfare.
- Just trying to find a radical solution, but couldn't we just delete the whole damn thing and be done with it? Timothyjosephwood (talk) 19:31, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
- It seems to me that the better option is to make an entry on Asymmetric warfare about Korea, link to Korean war, and link to the section on Asymmetric warfare. It provides the information, but it avoids spending the first half dozen paragraphs of the article talking about stuff the article isn't about. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 19:38, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
- By my reading of WP:ORNOT, creating a list of things is not original research. It does not automatically imply the list is complete or formed of the most important instances of items that belong in the list. If those claims are made explicitly, it would of course need sourcing. To my knowledge there is not a policy that would support an absolute prescription on whether to provide examples of infiltration or only say that there were examples (assuming either statement is well-sourced.) Rhoark (talk) 20:46, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
Updating links
In order to 1) save some time later, and 2) provide possible new resources for all, I would like to update the "External Links" section by deleting/replacing dead links and inserting newfound ones. The dead ones are: the very first, the survivors committees's "No Gun Ri Incident" (to be replaced by the Peace Park link); one AP interactive; and a PBS special report from 2000. I have about a half-dozen new links to add. (I might later also add a book or two to "Further Reading.") Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 22:36, 6 June 2015 (UTC)
- Links would be wonderful, as well as further reading. On a totally unrelated note, I am still hunting for Suhi Choi's piece, "Communicating trauma." I will share what I have as well. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 22:53, 6 June 2015 (UTC)
- Choi's 'Communicating' piece is now at User:Cjhanley/Choi's 'Communicating Trauma'. I suggest downloading such into your PC -- and Conway-Lanz's, too -- so that I can delete them relatively quickly. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 19:42, 8 June 2015 (UTC)
- Done. Thanks very much. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:48, 8 June 2015 (UTC)
- The issue of getting adequate sources to all is a real challenge. I'm still looking... GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 22:46, 8 June 2015 (UTC)
- Done. Thanks very much. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:48, 8 June 2015 (UTC)
- Choi's 'Communicating' piece is now at User:Cjhanley/Choi's 'Communicating Trauma'. I suggest downloading such into your PC -- and Conway-Lanz's, too -- so that I can delete them relatively quickly. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 19:42, 8 June 2015 (UTC)
- I have updated the "External Links" section of the article, to delete/sub for dead links, and add a few. A cautionary note: Many of these commentaries etc. are outdated in important ways, having been written before the 2006-2007 revelations of the Muccio letter and its suppression, before or without knowledge of the SK government inquest of 2005, before the deep analysis that produced the 2010 Critical Asian Studies article, and before the consolidation of information at the NGR Peace Park. Some were even written without knowledge of the AP's detailed refutation of the Bateman/Galloway fictions of 2000. Possibly most important: an updated link to the NGR database at SUNY-Albany,which, however, is obviously a work in slow progress, hardly comprehensive. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 20:21, 8 June 2015 (UTC)
Counter 7
To all: please vote on Counter 7 above, if you have not already done so. I'd like to get that vote wrapped up so we can move on. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:27, 6 June 2015 (UTC)
- Yes. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 14:15, 15 June 2015 (UTC)
Proposed edit 8
Hi,
Sorry to have been out for a while. I propose changing this:
An explanation for the strafing of refugees was never confirmed by investigators. While several of the U.S. veterans stated that airstrikes were occurring in the valley out of their line of sight and many Korean refugees recalled an attack from the air that day, no flight logs or action summaries from any air assets operating in or around the No Gun Ri area reported an attack of this type in this area.[1]: 181 With aircraft flying too fast to positively identify a target and with a shortage of TACP’s, friendly fire was always a concern; earlier on the 26th, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry’s regimental command post was attacked by a F-80[1]: 97 [2]: 244 and the strafing of the refugees was dangerously close to U.S. forces.[2]: 126
To this:
An explanation for the strafing of refugees was never confirmed by investigators. While several of the U.S. veterans stated that airstrikes were occurring in the valley out of their line of sight and many Korean refugees recalled an attack from the air that day, no flight logs or action summaries from any air assets operating in or around the No Gun Ri area reported an attack of this type in this area.[1]: 181 With aircraft flying too fast to positively identify a target and with a shortage of TACP’s, friendly fire was always a concern; earlier on the 26th, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry’s regimental command post was attacked by a F-80[1]: 97 [2]: 244 and the strafing of the refugees was dangerously close to U.S. forces.[2]: 126 5th Air Force mission reports note that on July 26 and 27, "there were strafings very close to No Gun Ri - including an unidentified target - and the result was good.'" [3]
References
- ^ a b Cite error: The named reference
DAIG
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).- ^ a b Cite error: The named reference
BATEMAN
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).- ^ Sinn, Donghee (2009), "Building a collective memory of No Gun Ri: Creating Archives as memory.", World Library and Information Congress: 75TH IFLA General Conference and Assembly: 12
This adds a significant fact to the paragraph. If it might seem too much like WP:OR to the unwary reader, then we can put something in such as, "Donghee Sinn, citing 5th Air Force mission reports, notes that..." GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 16:05, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
- Also, sorry for not putting in the other Bateman/DAIG references. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 16:06, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
- Probably should add the wording about attributing the fact to Sinn. It's a direct quote, and it is quoting something quoting something. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 18:48, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
- OK. Here's a new version:
An explanation for the strafing of refugees was never confirmed by investigators. While several of the U.S. veterans stated that airstrikes were occurring in the valley out of their line of sight and many Korean refugees recalled an attack from the air that day, no flight logs or action summaries from any air assets operating in or around the No Gun Ri area reported an attack of this type in this area.[1]: 181 With aircraft flying too fast to positively identify a target and with a shortage of TACP’s, friendly fire was always a concern; earlier on the 26th, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry’s regimental command post was attacked by a F-80[1]: 97 [2]: 244 and the strafing of the refugees was dangerously close to U.S. forces.[2]: 126 Donghee Sinn, citing 5th Air Force mission reports, notes that on July 26 and 27, "there were strafings very close to No Gun Ri - including an unidentified target - and the result was good.'" [3]
References
- ^ a b Cite error: The named reference
DAIG
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).- ^ a b Cite error: The named reference
BATEMAN
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).- ^ Sinn, Donghee (2009), "Building a collective memory of No Gun Ri: Creating Archives as memory.", World Library and Information Congress: 75TH IFLA General Conference and Assembly: 12
WP:CN on the first sentence or is it supported by the second sentence citation? Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:18, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
- Good point. I'm not sure, myself. To quote from page 181,
"The number of Korean witness statements describing the strafing and the photograph interpretation by NIMA does not permit the U.S. Review Team to exclude the possibility that U.S. or allied aircraft might have hit civilian refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during an air strike/ strafing on July 26, 1950... The U.S. Review Team concluded that strafing may have occurred near No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950 and could have injured or killed Korean civilians but that any such air strikes were not deliberate attacks on Korean civilians... It was not a pre-planned strike on civilian refugees."
GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 20:34, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
Unreliable and beyond
"When a witness is found false in one material part of his testimony, he may be distrusted in all others." That's a well-known California jury instruction.
Before we go much further, I think it's essential for us to come to an understanding as to why two potential sources must be distrusted in all things.
The USNGRR
A simple reading of even this article, as it is, shows how deceitful the U.S. No Gun Ri Review was, the result of the alleged perpetrator investigating itself. Among items covered up or misrepresented in that 2001 U.S. Army report, some noted in the current article, some not: the Muccio letter on the shoot-refugees policy; the Rogers memo on the strafe-refugees policy; the USS Valley Forge report on the practice of strafing groups of eight or more; the 1st Cav Division orders declaring refugees "fair game" and similar; the 25th Inf Div orders to shoot civilians; the U.S. Air Force reports on missions that strafed refugees and that attacked in the No Gun Ri vicinity; and others. The USNGRR team lied to the South Koreans about the existence of those mission reports. The USNGRR covered up the absence of the crucial 7th Cav log of July 1950. The USNGRR suppressed the testimony of 7th Cavalry veterans who spoke of the practice of indiscriminate killing of civilians ("Word I heard was 'Kill everybody from 6 to 60,'" and similar from others).
The simple fact is that when the USNGRR is cited on anything, it almost invariably can be and will have to be countered with verifiable contrary facts, and the wordage will balloon and balloon until we have an article on the USNGRR and not on No Gun Ri.
The USNGRR must be cited on essentials, such as its declaring that the killings were "not deliberate" and that no orders to shoot were issued, but even there the article must cite the disappearance of the 7th Cav log that would have held the orders.
A prime example of this problem is the "TACP" business atop the "Events of 25-29 July" section, a highly inconsequential and landmine-loaded subject. It's a total waste of 150 good words that, if left in, must balloon to 300 to counter the USNGRR's untruths. But it should not be left in; it's pointless, unless the point is to blow smoke and confuse readers.
- The USNGRR has extensive interviews of the individuals involved. It cant be excluded because a certain someone doesnt like it. The TCAP 'business' is very relevant for a number of reasons.
- 1. It shows the refugees impression of events may not mirror reality with any degree of certainty.
- 2. It shows the lackadaisical fact checking done by the AP when they republished this allegation when a simple check of would have showed the AP the battalion lacked a TACP/ALO.
- WeldNeck (talk) 20:49, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
- This whole business is absolutely inconsequential. There was a strafing, all hands agree. Whether it was called in by Army communications up the chain, by ground air controllers (who were, indeed, in the area), by the airborne Army spotter who was known to have been overhead, by Air Force controllers known to be overhead, or it was a spontaneous strike by jets following policy -- is inconsequential. What is consequential is that the USAF had a policy of strafing approaching refugees. If anything belongs atop the "Events" section, that does. All of this blowing of smoke, in the "Events" section, and here in Talk, does nothing to improve the article. Let's get back to the Background section. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 21:29, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
BATEMAN
Bateman is the "beyond unreliable" here, an unbelievable combination of ineptitude, wackiness and deceitfulness. On multiple levels he is beyond unreliable on the subject of No Gun Ri:
LEVEL 1: He is a 7th Cavalry Regiment Association activist who vowed in an email to a newspaper to "expose" those who brought disrepute upon his regiment. The only publisher he could find -- or was directed to -- was one with a long Pentagon affiliation. His editor was a U.S. Army colonel. This COI is way more than enough, clearly, to dismiss him as a "reliable source." The article has sufficient Army POV from the self-investigating USNGRR.
LEVEL 2: Academics and others knowledgeable about NGR dismiss Bateman's book as junk "history," beginning with the fact that he didn't even go to Korea to interview surviving victims and understand the setting, and moving on to his many other affronts to serious research and analysis. See one astute scholar's assessment at Talk:No Gun Ri Massacre/Archive 5#The Other POV, the posting beginning, "Speaking as a PHD candidate..." He refers to Bateman's "either remarkably careless scholarship or deliberate distortion." See also moderator John Callaway's castigating of Bateman's terrible book on U.S. national TV, at 45 minutes, here. If needed, if Level 1 doesn't make clear his unreliability, I will post at my user page the AP team's lengthy demolition of Bateman's book, page by page.
LEVEL 3: If a flagrant conflict of interest (Level 1) and an obvious lack of seriousness and competence (Level 2) somehow don't disqualify Bateman from any consideration (and why not?), one then need only look at the jaw-dropping examples of what he has written: hijacking and sticking in a footnote an otherwise hidden document he claims shows "two guerrillas" were at NGR, his major "finding," when the document has nothing at all to do with NGR (see Talk:No Gun Ri Massacre/Archive 3#Bateman's 'technique' and see for yourself); as for wackiness, how about his going on for paragraphs, incredibly, (his page 216) insisting the original AP journalists claimed "24 generals" were present at NGR and were interviewed.
Perhaps most astounding among more than 100 astounding inanities in his book is his swinging back and forth (I kid you not) between declaring that NGR didn't happen, and then declaring it did and he alone knows "the truth" of how many were killed and how.
Here's Bateman on his page 126: "If they took place as described at all. ... the killings occurred in dozens and possibly hundreds of the small misfortunes that make war so horrible."
Then on his pages 198-199, he lays out "the truth, supported by historical evidence," that is, his scenario of mortar and small arms fire at NGR, and between a dozen to "slightly more" than two dozen refugees killed.
In between, on his page 151, he again denies NGR's confirmed reality, saying of a 19th-century massacre, "in the case of Wounded Knee, at least the event itself had occurred."
Elsewhere in his chaotic book, he cites ridiculously precise but ever-changing casualty tolls, from 8 to 70.
The fact that Bateman is cited more in the current mess of an article than are the people who actually did prodigious, honest research on No Gun Ri is a deeply sad commentary on Wikipedia and its failure to rein in POV pushers. The incoherent Bateman doesn't belong in the article, period. And the USNGRR necessarily does, but used prudently. Thanks. Cjhanley (talk)
- Here's my two cents:
- I agree that it is ideal to corroborate any material with additional sources. That's what footnotes are for: substantiating any material likely to be challenged. On this contentious subject, practically any fact whatsoever might be conceivably be challenged.
- I have repeatedly sought outside opinion on the use of Bateman, with mixed results. Ironically, my attempt to clarify on the use of Bateman as a source was pretty much what set this off again. My advice for this case is as above.
- There has been criticism of the US report on No Gun Ri. That's an incontrovertible fact. The headlines didn't read, "Korean Survivors Applaud Army Review." Criticism of the report is a legitimate POV which deserves inclusion. We should try to verify statements presented by NGRR using 3rd party references, and it's certainly appropriate to include "point-counterpoint" in the "criticism" section. I agree that undue weight to any one subject is ill-advised, but I think the air strikes (which killed an estimated 100 people) are significant enough to be covered in some depth. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 20:29, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
- Yes yes ... we get it. Bateman did such a fine job of damaging the AP's credibility over this issue that his use as a source is strictly verboten. Back to reality though ... Bateman's book was well received by the community of historians. WeldNeck (talk) 20:52, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
- My point on the strafing is more that the "Events" section should simply tell what happened, and the discussion of why there was a strafing be left until later sections, particularly "Investigations," rather than confuse the reader with "TACPs" and "mission reports" and then only with the counter-factual USNGRR elements on those points. Why interrupt the flow of action with a sudden discussion of such things, which only have to be taken up later? In addition, the "no TACPs" and "no mission reports" items are presented as fact in the current article, merely footnoted, when they're actually, demonstrably false claims by the USNGRR. They should be explicitly attributed to the USNGRR, and then knocked down by the objective, published research. Then we end up with many words interrupting the action, but little added to our knowledge of NGR.
- As for Bateman, "outside opinion" isn't going to be any more familiar with his book than you are. That's why I've marshaled countless examples of "show and tell" to make clear to any honest, intelligent editor that the guy's beyond the pale. And that's why that Ph.D. candidate bothered to demolish Bateman in his very cogent posting on Talk a while back, and why Sahr Conway-Lanz (see Talk Archive 5) said, "I have serious reservations about Bateman’s book as a source on No Gun Ri, especially because the book claims to be a comprehensive account of No Gun Ri but does not use Korean sources." I don't see why any more information than what has been laid out on Talk is needed to know to avoid Bateman while editing this article. Charles J. Hanley 21:11, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
- If there was a TACP/ALO available to the 2/7 or if the soldiers who ordered the refugees into the tunnels could communicate with the USAF, surely you have a reliable secondary source confirming this? As for Conway-Lanz's opinion's, these too can be sourced to a reliable secondary source? Because if this material can be disqualified because an anonymous commenter on a talk page said so, whats that say about the volumes of criticism written about the AP's work? WeldNeck (talk) 21:25, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
- I fully agree. Let's source it to his article, not his talk page comments. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 22:07, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
- Conway-Lanz, a highly regarded historian/archivist (his original journal article won the annual Bernath award from the Society of Diplomatic Historians), wasn't going to waste his time writing for publication to debunk a crank like Bateman.
- Most serious academics, as you must know, are disdainful of Wikipedia. But Conway-Lanz cared enough about protecting the truths of NGR that he came to this Talk page to warn editors and readers against the 7th Cav crusader. And I don't know what WN is talking about, as usual: Conway-Lanz was not "anonymous" (as WN is) but announced himself on Talk. As for this tiresome nonsense about TACPs: Let it go, man. We'll deal with it later, when, yes, we can show via secondary sources, backed up by documents, how trivial (and untrue) this stuff is. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 14:58, 17 June 2015 (UTC)
- I am the ghost of Albert Einstein. Photons are discriminatory. They encourage anorexia by reinforcing an unrealistic standard of masslessness. Trillions of so called "overweight" protons and neutrons are silently suffering.
- Just to illustrate the point. But seriously, per WP:WINARS, talk page comments are not WP:RS.Timothyjosephwood (talk) 18:59, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
- Even if it was Mr. Conway Lanz, beyond a doubt, we couldn't use it anyways, considering it's arguably WP:UGC. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:50, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
There are no easy answers here. I prefer not to be so gauche as to link my own essay, but this case touches on so many points I would essentially have to reproduce the whole essay here to address them all. What I can say for certain is it should not be the intention or expectation of editors to prove that Bateman is right or wrong. It's my assessment (though still up for debate), that his book is not self-published, and there cannot be a blanket statement that his views are WP:FRINGE. Some of his specific views may be fringe. He represents a significant viewpoint, which there is a duty to cover under WP:NPOV. He is definitely biased. If a point can be made using better sources, that should be preferred. Contradictions between sources should be highlighted, rather than used to suppress a source. Don't explain a contradiction unless a source explains it. Rhoark (talk) 21:10, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
Source Request
Does anyone have access to the following: Massacre at No Gun Ri?: American Military Policy Toward Civilian Refugees during the Korean War AUTHOR(S)Weinberg, Carl R. PUB. DATEOctober 2008 SOURCEOAH Magazine of History;Oct2008, Vol. 22 Issue 4, p58 Thanks WeldNeck (talk) 20:43, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
As a matter of fact, I do. I will try to find a way to make it available. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 21:13, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
- It's posted here: User:GeneralizationsAreBad/Weinberg. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 22:10, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
- Just a heads-up: as I don't want to fall afoul of copyright rules on Wikipedia, I'm going to leave the material up for a few more days and then delete it, just to be safe. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 17:29, 17 June 2015 (UTC)
PSA on naming conventions
Hi to all,
Just a reminder that we should follow WP:NCKOREAN when using Korean names.
GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 00:46, 17 June 2015 (UTC)
Cite error: There are <ref group=nb>
tags on this page, but the references will not show without a {{reflist|group=nb}}
template (see the help page).