most of this has nothing to do with Palestinian nationalism at all |
JonathanGo (talk | contribs) Undid revision 425206018 by Nableezy (talk) the edit is very accuarate and relevant information |
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In his 1997 book, ''Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness,'' historian [[Rashid Khalidi]] notes that the archaeological strata that denote the history of [[Palestine]] — encompassing the [[Biblical]], Roman, [[Byzantine]], [[Umayyad]], [[Fatimid]], [[Crusade]]r, [[Ayyubid]], Mamluk and [[Ottoman empire|Ottoman]] periods — form part of the identity of the modern-day Palestinian people, as they have come to understand it over the last century,<ref name=Khalidip18>Khalidi, 1997, p. 18.</ref> but derides the efforts of some Palestinian nationalists to attempt to "anachronistically" read back into history a nationalist consciousness that is in fact "relatively modern".<ref name=Khalidip18>Khalidi, 1997, p. 149.</ref> Khalidi stresses that Palestinian identity has never been an exclusive one, with "Arabism, religion, and local loyalties" playing an important role.<ref name=Khalidip19>Khalidi, 1997, p. 19–21.</ref> |
In his 1997 book, ''Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness,'' historian [[Rashid Khalidi]] notes that the archaeological strata that denote the history of [[Palestine]] — encompassing the [[Biblical]], Roman, [[Byzantine]], [[Umayyad]], [[Fatimid]], [[Crusade]]r, [[Ayyubid]], Mamluk and [[Ottoman empire|Ottoman]] periods — form part of the identity of the modern-day Palestinian people, as they have come to understand it over the last century,<ref name=Khalidip18>Khalidi, 1997, p. 18.</ref> but derides the efforts of some Palestinian nationalists to attempt to "anachronistically" read back into history a nationalist consciousness that is in fact "relatively modern".<ref name=Khalidip18>Khalidi, 1997, p. 149.</ref> Khalidi stresses that Palestinian identity has never been an exclusive one, with "Arabism, religion, and local loyalties" playing an important role.<ref name=Khalidip19>Khalidi, 1997, p. 19–21.</ref> |
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=== Claims Against the Existence of a Distinct Palestinian People === |
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===A mid nineteenth century origin=== |
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[[Baruch Kimmerling]] and Joel S. Migdal consider the [[Palestinian Arab revolt 1834|1834 revolt of the Arabs in Palestine]] as constituting the first formative event of the Palestinian people, <ref name=Kimmerling6>Kimmerling, Baruch and Migdal, Joel S, (2003) The Palestinian People: A History, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, ISBN 0674011317 p. 6-11</ref> whereas [[Benny Morris]] argues that the Arabs in Palestine remained part of a larger Pan-Islamist or [[Pan-Arab]] national movement.<ref>[[Benny Morris]], ''Righteous Victims'', pp.40-42 in the French edition.</ref> |
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[[Bernard Lewis]] argues it was not as a Palestinian nation that the Palestinian Arabs of the Ottoman empire objected to Zionists, since the very concept of such a nation was unknown to the Arabs of the area at the time and did not come into being until very much later. Even the concept of Arab nationalism in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, "had not reached significant proportions before the outbreak of World War I."<ref name=Lewis>{{cite book|title=''Semites and Anti-Semites, An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice''|author=Bernard Lewis| publisher=W.W. Norton and Company |year=1999|pages=169|isbn=0-393-31839-7}}</ref> |
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Haj Amin Al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem and the most prominent Palestinian leader at that time, arrived in [[Rome]] on October 11, 1941, and immediately contacted [[Servizio Informazioni Militari|Italian Military Intelligence]] (''[[Servizio Informazioni Militari]]'', or [[Servizio Informazioni Militari|SIM]]). He claimed to be head of a secret [[Arab nationalism|Arab nationalist]] organization with offices in all Arab countries. On condition that the [[Axis powers]] "recognize in principle the unity, independence, and sovereignty, of an Arab state, including Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan", he offered support in the war against Britain and stated his willingness to discuss the issues of "the Holy Places, Lebanon, the [[Suez Canal]], and [[Aqaba]]". The Italian foreign ministry approved al-Husayni's proposal, recommending to give him a grant of one million [[Italian lire|lire]], and referred him to [[Benito Mussolini]], who met al-Husayni on October 27. According to al-Husayni's account, the meeting went amicably with the Italian leader expressing his hostility to the Jews and Zionism.<ref>Lewis (1999), pp. 150-151</ref> |
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(for more details - see below) |
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In an interview with the [[Netherlands|Dutch]] newspaper "[[Trouw]]" (March 31, 1977), PLO executive committee member [[Zahir Muhsein]] said: |
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"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism. |
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"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, [[Beer-Sheva]] and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."<ref>http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=28222</ref> |
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===A mid nineteenth century origin=== |
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Rashid argues that the modern national identity of Palestinians has its roots in [[nationalism|nationalist]] discourses that emerged among the peoples of the [[Ottoman empire]] in the late 19th century, and which sharpened following the demarcation of modern nation-state boundaries in the [[Middle East]] after [[World War I]].<ref name=Khalidip19/> Khalidi also states that although the challenge posed by [[Zionism]] played a role in shaping this identity, that "it is a serious mistake to suggest that Palestinian identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism."<ref name=Khalidip19/> |
Rashid argues that the modern national identity of Palestinians has its roots in [[nationalism|nationalist]] discourses that emerged among the peoples of the [[Ottoman empire]] in the late 19th century, and which sharpened following the demarcation of modern nation-state boundaries in the [[Middle East]] after [[World War I]].<ref name=Khalidip19/> Khalidi also states that although the challenge posed by [[Zionism]] played a role in shaping this identity, that "it is a serious mistake to suggest that Palestinian identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism."<ref name=Khalidip19/> |
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<blockquote>''"The fact that Palestinian nationalism developed later than Zionism and indeed in response to it does not in any way diminish the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism or make it less valid than Zionism. All nationalisms arise in opposition to some "other." Why else would there be the need to specify who you are? And all nationalisms are defined by what they oppose."''<ref name = "Gelvin 92" /></blockquote> |
<blockquote>''"The fact that Palestinian nationalism developed later than Zionism and indeed in response to it does not in any way diminish the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism or make it less valid than Zionism. All nationalisms arise in opposition to some "other." Why else would there be the need to specify who you are? And all nationalisms are defined by what they oppose."''<ref name = "Gelvin 92" /></blockquote> |
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[[Baruch Kimmerling]] and Migdal, Joel S (a controversial Israeli sociologists) consider the [[Palestinian Arab revolt 1834|1834 revolt of the Arabs in Palestine]] as constituting the first formative event of the Palestinian people, <ref name=Kimmerling6>Kimmerling, Baruch and Migdal, Joel S, (2003) The Palestinian People: A History, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, ISBN 0674011317 p. 6-11</ref> whereas [[Benny Morris]] argues that the Arabs in Palestine remained part of a larger Pan-Islamist or [[Pan-Arab]] national movement.<ref>[[Benny Morris]], ''Righteous Victims'', pp.40-42 in the French edition.</ref> |
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[[Bernard Lewis]] argues it was not as a Palestinian nation that the Palestinian Arabs of the Ottoman empire objected to Zionists, since the very concept of such a nation was unknown to the Arabs of the area at the time and did not come into being until very much later. Even the concept of Arab nationalism in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, "had not reached significant proportions before the outbreak of World War I."<ref name=Lewis>{{cite book|title=''Semites and Anti-Semites, An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice''|author=Bernard Lewis| publisher=W.W. Norton and Company |year=1999|pages=169|isbn=0-393-31839-7}}</ref> |
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===A late nineteenth century origin=== |
===A late nineteenth century origin=== |
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*Morris, Benny, (second edition 2004 third printing 2006) The Birth Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-00967-7 p 23 The divide between the Husseinis and the Opposition had relatively clear geographical as well as familial-clan demarcations, both reflecting and intensifying the regionalism that had characterised Palestinian society and politics for centuries, Husseini strength lay in Jerusalem and its surrounding villages, rural Samaria and Gaza; the Opposition was strong in [[Hebron]], the [[Galilee]], [[Tiberias]] and [[Beisan]], [[Nablus]], [[Jenin]] and [[Haifa]].</ref> |
*Morris, Benny, (second edition 2004 third printing 2006) The Birth Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-00967-7 p 23 The divide between the Husseinis and the Opposition had relatively clear geographical as well as familial-clan demarcations, both reflecting and intensifying the regionalism that had characterised Palestinian society and politics for centuries, Husseini strength lay in Jerusalem and its surrounding villages, rural Samaria and Gaza; the Opposition was strong in [[Hebron]], the [[Galilee]], [[Tiberias]] and [[Beisan]], [[Nablus]], [[Jenin]] and [[Haifa]].</ref> |
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==Palestinian leadership Ties with Nazi Germany and the Axis Powers during World War II== |
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===Post creation of Israel period=== |
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===Pre-war=== |
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In 1933, within weeks of Hitler's rise to power in [[Germany]], the German Consul-General in [[Palestine]], the pro-nazi Heinrich Wolff,<ref>Wolff's wife was Jewish, and he was forced to resign in 1936. Hans Döhle replaced him. See Leni Yahil, ''The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932-1945,'' Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990 p. 676 n. 53</ref> sent a telegram to Berlin reporting the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem , Mohammad Amin al-Husayni's belief that Palestinian Muslims were enthusiastic about the new regime and looked forward to the spread of Fascism throughout the region. Wolff met al-Husayni and many Palestinian sheiks again, a month later, at [[Nabi Musa]]. They expressed their approval of the anti-Jewish boycott in Germany and asked Wolff not to send any Jews to Palestine.<ref>Nicosia (2000) pp. 85-86</ref> Wolff subsequently wrote in his annual report for that year that the Arabs' political naivety led them to fail to recognize the link between German Jewish policy and their problems in Palestine, and that their enthusiasm for Nazi Germany was devoid of any real understanding of the phenomenon.<ref>Nicosia, 2000 pp. 86-87</ref> The various proposals by Palestinian notables were rejected consistently over the years out of concern to avoid disrupting Anglo-German relations, in line with Germany's policy of not imperiling their economic and cultural interests in the region by a change in their policy of neutrality, and respect for English interests. Hitler's ''Englandpolitik'' essentially precluded significant assistance to Arab leaders.<ref>Francis R. Nicosia, ''Zionism and Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008 p. 196</ref> Italy also made the nature of its assistance to the Palestinians contingent on the outcome of its own negotiations with England, and cut off aid when it appeared that the English were ready to admit the failure of their pro-Zionist policy in Palestine.<ref>Renzo de Felice, ibid. pp. 211-212</ref> |
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Though Italy did offer substantial aid, some German assistance also trickled through. After asking the new German Consul-General, Hans Döhle on 21 July 1937 for support, the [[Abwehr]] briefly made an exception to its policy and gave some limited aid. But this was aimed to exert pressure on England over [[Czechoslovakia]]. Promised arms shipments never eventuated<ref>Nicosia. ''The Third Reich and the Palestine Question'' pp. 105, 185ff.</ref> |
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===In the Middle East=== |
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{{see also|1941 Iraqi coup d'état|Anglo-Iraqi War|Anglo-Soviet invasion of Persia}} |
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In 1937, wanted by the British, al-Husayni fled Palestine and took refuge successively in [[Lebanon]] and later [[Iraq]].<ref name="Churchill p. 224" >Churchill, p. 224</ref> With the outbreak of the [[Second World War]] in September 1939 the Iraqi Government broke off diplomatic relations with [[Nazi Germany]].<ref name="Playfair177">Playfair (1956), p. 177</ref> In March 1940, the an anti-British nationalist [[Rashid Ali]] replaced [[Nuri as-Said]]. Ali made covert contacts with German representatives in the [[Middle East]], though he was not yet an openly pro-Axis supporter. By summer of 1940 the Italian Legation in Baghdad became the chief centre for Axis propaganda and for fomenting anti-British feeling. In this they too were aided by Mohammad Amin al-Husayni. |
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On August 26, 1940, al-Husseini had sent his secretary Kemal Hadad to Berlin. Hadad acted as a liaison between the Axis powers and four pro-Nazi staff officers known as " the Golden Square" (Salah al-din al Sabag, Fahmi Said, Mahmud Salman and Kemal Shabib).<ref>Hirszowicz, op. cit. p. 82 - 83.</ref> Kemal Hadad made another trip in December 1940 because "funds were running low."<ref>Hirszowicz, op. cit. p. 108-109.</ref> On February 1941, Hadad again traveled to Berlin with a letter requesting military aid. |
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In January 1941, a political crisis within Iraq loomed towards the threat of civil war. [[Rashid Ali]] resigned as Prime Minister,<ref name="Playfair178" >Playfair (1956), p. 178</ref> and was replaced by [[Taha al-Hashimi]].<ref name="Playfair178" /> On 1 April 1941, pro-[[Nazi Germany|German]] [[Rashid Ali]] and his "[[Golden Square (Iraq)|Golden Square]]" supporters staged a [[1941 Iraqi coup d'état|coup d'état]]. The Mufti [[Amin al-Husayni]] was one of the orchestrators of [[Rashid Ali al-Gaylani]]'s coup d'état, with Nazi support and financing.<ref name="patterson">{{cite book |title=A Genealogy of Evil: Anti-Semitism from Nazism to Islamic Jihad |
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|last=Patterson |
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|first=David |
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|year=2010 |
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|page=114 |
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|publisher=Cambridge University Press |
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|isbn=9780521132619 |
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|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=lMLmK-fmf8kC&pg=PA114}}</ref> Amin al-Husayni was actively participating in [[Rashid Ali]]'s government, and motivated its [[Anglo-Iraqi War|military effort against the British]]. From his base in Iraq, al-Husayni issued a [[fatwa]] for a holy war against Britain in May and provided extensive aid for [[Antisemitism|Antisemitic propaganda]]. |
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By May 28, British forces were camped just outside Baghdad and there was no reinforcement of Germans or Italians for [[Golden Square (Iraq)|Rashid's regime]]. Less than days later, the [[Rashid Ali]] government collapsed, and its members were sentenced for death penalty. Unlike other generals, [[Rashid Ali]] and some of his associates succeeded to flee to [[Kingdom of Egypt|Egypt]], whereas al-Husayni escaped to pro-German [[Kingdom of Iran|Persia]], where he was granted [[right of asylum|legation asylum]] first by the [[Empire of Japan]] and then by [[Kingdom of Italy (1861-1946)|Fascist Italy]]. Meanwhile, just before the arrival of British troops, [[Al-Muthanna Club#Yunis al-Sabawi|Yunis al-Sabawi]] (another Iraqi pro-Nazi leader) appointed himself governor of central southern Iraq. He ordered Jews to remain in their homes on Saturday, May 31, and on June 1 and 2 (during the Jewish Shavuoth holiday), apparently intending a [[pogrom]]. Despite the British attempt to calm down the situation by deportation of [[Al-Muthanna Club#Yunis al-Sabawi|Yunis al-Sabawi]], the [[Farhud]] pogrom erupted on June 1, initiated by [[Futuwa|al-Futuwa]] youth organization and Rashid Ali's soldiers, returning from defeat by the British Army. Official Iraqi reports recorded 187 Jews killed, though higher numbers of 200 casualties were claimed with more than 2,000 injured.<ref>[http://www.aish.com/jewishissues/middleeast/The_Middle_Easts_Forgotten_Refugees.asp The Middle East's Forgotten Refugees] by Semha Alwaya</ref> |
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On October 8, after the occupation of Persia by the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] and after the new Persian government of [[Shah]] [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]] severed diplomatic relations with the [[Axis powers]], al-Husayni fled to [[German-occupied Europe]]<ref name=lew150>Lewis (1999), p. 150</ref> through [[Turkey]] and [[Albania under Italy|Albania]].{{Citation needed|date=May 2010}} Specifically, he fled to Fascist Italy with the Italian diplomats who provided him with an Italian service passport. To avoid recognition, al-Husayni changed his appearance by shaving his beard and dying his hair.<ref name=lew150/> Throughout the remainder of [[World War II]], al-Husayni repeatedly made requests in [[Berlin]] for the German government "to bomb Tel Aviv."<ref>Lewis (1995), 351.</ref> |
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===In Nazi-occupied Europe=== |
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Al-Husayni arrived in [[Rome]] on October 11, 1941, and immediately contacted [[Servizio Informazioni Militari|Italian Military Intelligence]] (''[[Servizio Informazioni Militari]]'', or [[Servizio Informazioni Militari|SIM]]). The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem claimed to be head of a secret [[Arab nationalism|Arab nationalist]] organization with offices in all Arab countries. On condition that the [[Axis powers]] "recognize in principle the unity, independence, and sovereignty, of an Arab state, including Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan", he offered support in the war against Britain and stated his willingness to discuss the issues of "the Holy Places, Lebanon, the [[Suez Canal]], and [[Aqaba]]". The Italian foreign ministry approved al-Husayni's proposal, recommending to give him a grant of one million [[Italian lire|lire]], and referred him to [[Benito Mussolini]], who met al-Husayni on October 27. According to al-Husayni's account, the meeting went amicably with the Italian leader expressing his hostility to the Jews and Zionism.<ref>Lewis (1999), pp. 150-151</ref> |
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Back in the summer of 1940 and again in February 1941, al-Hussayni submitted to the German government<ref>Black, Edwin. [http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/01/08/INGODGH99Q1.DTL&type=printable "Denial of Holocaust nothing new in Iran."] ''[[SFGate]]''. 8 January 2006. 27 May 2008.</ref> a draft declaration of German-Arab cooperation, containing a clause:<blockquote>Germany and Italy recognize the right of the Arab countries to solve the question of the Jewish elements, which exist in Palestine and in the other Arab countries, as required by the national and ethnic (''völkisch'') interests of the Arabs, and as the Jewish question was solved in Germany and Italy.<ref name='declaration'>Lewis (1984), p. 190.</ref></blockquote> |
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Now, encouraged by his meeting with the Italian leader, al-Husayni prepared a draft declaration, affirming the Axis support for the Arabs on November 3. In three days, the declaration, slightly amended by the Italian foreign ministry, received the formal approval of Mussolini and was forwarded to the German embassy in Rome. On November 6, al-Husayni arrived in [[Berlin]], where he discussed the text of his declaration with [[Ernst von Weizsäcker]] and other German officials. In the final draft, which differed only marginally from al-Husayni's original proposal, the Axis powers declared their readiness to approve the elimination (''Beseitigung'') of the Jewish National Home in Palestine.<ref>Lewis (1999), pp. 151-152</ref> |
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[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1987-004-09A, Amin al Husseini und Adolf Hitler.jpg|250px|right|thumb|Mohammad Amin al-Husayni meeting with Adolf Hitler (December 1941).]] |
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On November 20, al-Husayni met the German Foreign Minister [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]]<ref>Segev (2001), p. 463</ref> and was officially received by Adolf Hitler on November 28.<ref name="Lewis152">Lewis (1999), p. 152</ref> He asked Hitler for a public declaration that "recognized and sympathized with the Arab struggles for independence and liberation, and that would support the elimination of a national Jewish homeland".<ref name="declaration">Lewis (1984), p. 190.</ref> Hitler refused to make such a public announcement, saying that it would strengthen the [[Gaullists]] against the [[Vichy France]],<ref name="Lewis152"/> but asked al-Husayni to 'to lock ...deep in his heart' the following points, which Browning summarizes as follows, that <blockquote>‘Germany has resolved, step by step, to ask one European nation after the other to solve its Jewish problem, and at the proper time, direct a similar appeal to non-European nations as well'. When Germany had defeated Russia and broken through the Caucasus into the Middle East, it would have no further imperial goals of its own and would support Arab liberation... But Hitler did have one goal. "Germany’s objective would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of British power". (''Das deutsche Ziel würde dann lediglich die Vernichtung des im arabischen Raum unter der Protektion der britischen Macht lebenden Judentums sein''). In short, Jews were not simply to be driven out of the German sphere but would be hunted down and destroyed even beyond it.’<ref>Christopher Browning, with Jürgen Matthäus, ''The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942''. University of Nebraska Press, 2004 p. 406, drawing on David Yisraeli, ''The Palestine Problem in German Politics'', 1889-1945 p. 310.</ref></blockquote> |
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A separate record of the meeting was made by [[Fritz Grobba]], who until recently had been the German ambassor to Iraq. His version of the crucial words reads "when the hour of Arab liberation comes, Germany has no interest there other than the destruction of the power protecting the Jews".<ref>"''denn die Stunde der Befreieung der Araber habe dann geschlagen, Deutschland habe dort keine anderen Interessen als die Vernichtung der das Judentum protegierenden Macht.''". Yisraeli, David ''The Palestine Problem in German Politics, 1889-1945'' p. 310</ref> Al-Husayni's own account of this point, as recorded in his diary, is very similar to Grobba's.<ref>"Germany has no ambitions in this area but cares only to annihilate the power which produces the Jews." Joseph Schechtman, The Mufti and the Führer (Thomas Yoseloff, 1965). pp. 307-308</ref> Al-Husayni's own diary, seized after the war,<ref>'It is clear that the Jews have accomplished nothing in Palestine and their claims are lies. Everything that has been achieved in Palestine is due to the Arabs and not the Jews. I (Hitler) have decided to find a solution to the Jewish problem, approaching it step by step without holding back. In this regard, I am about to make a just and indispensable appeal, firstly to all the European countries and, later, to countries outside of Europe'. Henry Laurens, ''La Question de Palestine'', vol. 2 ibid. pp. 664-665 n. 47, citing the source from the archives of the [[Simon Wiesenthal Center]]</ref> recalls the encounter in slightly different terms.<!--this needs rewording--> |
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When al-Husayni arrived together with [[Rashid Ali]] in Berlin from Rome in May 1942, a spokesperson for the German governmental administration proclaimed that the Axis activity with "carriers of national politics in the Arab world" instead of slowing down had made further progress.{{Citation needed|date=May 2010}} |
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In an interview with the German newspaper ''National-Zeitung'' in June 1942, the Mufti al-Husayni (as the highest Muslim religious leader) declared that the "entire Arab world" now wished an Axis victory in the war, as he said they had common enemies in the Jews, Englishmen and [[bolshevik]]s.{{Citation needed|date=May 2010}} |
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In December 1942, al-Husayni further held a speech at the celebration of the opening of an "Islamic Central Institute" in [[Berlin]], of which he served as honorary chair. In the speech, he harshly criticised what he thought of as aggressors against Muslims, which included Jews, the United Kingdom, USA and the Soviet Union.<ref>{{citenews|url=http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5696|work=[[Hoover Institution]]|title=The Mufti and the Holocaust|first=John|last=Rosenthal}}</ref> |
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=== The Holocaust === |
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On November 2, 1943, Himmler sent a telegram to the Mufti: ''To the Grand Mufti: The National Socialist movement of Greater Germany has, since its inception, inscribed upon its flag the fight against the world Jewry. It has therefore followed with particular sympathy the struggle of freedom-loving Arabs, especially in Palestine, against Jewish interlopers. In the recognition of this enemy and of the common struggle against it lies the firm foundation of the natural alliance that exists between the National Socialist Greater Germany and the freedom-loving Muslims of the whole world. In this spirit I am sending you on the anniversary of the infamous Balfour declaration my hearty greetings and wishes for the successful pursuit of your struggle until the final victory.'' ''Reichsfuehrer S.S. Heinrich Himmler'' |
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Al-Husayni was in Berlin during the war, and denied knowing of the Holocaust. One of [[Adolf Eichmann]]'s deputies, [[Dieter Wisliceny]], stated after the war that al-Husayni had actively encouraged the extermination of European Jews, and that he had had an elaborate meeting with Eichmann at his office, during which Eichmann gave him an intensive look at the current state of the “[[Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe]]” by the [[Third Reich]]. |
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Husayni intervened on May 13, 1943, with the German Foreign Office to block possible transfers of Jews from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, after reports reached him that 4000 Jewish children accompanied by 500 adults had managed to reach Palestine. He asked that the Foreign Minister "to do his utmost" to block all such proposals and this request was complied with.<ref>[[Raul Hilberg]], ''The Destruction of the European Jews,'' (1961) New Viewpoints, New York 1973 p. 504</ref> A year later, on the 25 July 1944, he wrote to the Hungarian foreign minister to register his objection to the release of certificates for 900 Jewish children and 100 adults for transfer from Hungary, fearing they might end up in Palestine. He suggested that if such transfers of population were deemed necessary, then:- |
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<blockquote>"it would be indispensable and infinitely preferable to send them to other countries where they would find themselves under active control, as for example Poland, thus avoiding danger and preventing damage."<ref>Joseph Schechtman, ''The Mufti and the Führer'', ibid. pp. 154-155</ref></blockquote> |
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Among the acts of [[sabotage]] al-Husayni attempted to implement, [[Michael Bar Zohar]] reports a [[chemical warfare]] assault on the second largest and predominantly Jewish city in Palestine, [[Tel Aviv]]. According to him, five [[Parachuting|parachutists]] were sent with a [[toxin]] to dump into the water system. The police caught the infiltrators in a cave near [[Jericho]], and according to Jericho district police commander [[Fayiz Bey Idrissi]], "The laboratory report stated that each container held enough poison to kill 25,000 people, and there were at least ten containers.".<ref>http://www.wymaninstitute.org/articles/2003-03-chemical.php</ref> Medoff concludes, |
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<blockquote> |
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Under Husayni's direction, teams of Arab saboteurs were parachuted into Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine, where they attacked Allied facilities such as telephone lines, pipelines, bridges and railways. One such sabotage team was armed with a substantial quantity of poison that they were supposed to dump into the Tel Aviv water system. (In a separate but related |
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matter, the Mufti repeatedly urged the Germans to bomb Tel Aviv and Jerusalem "in order to injure Palestinian Jewry and for propaganda purposes in the Arab world," as his Nazi interlocutors put it. The proposals were rejected as militarily unfeasible.<ref>Medoff, Rafael (1996). The Mufti's Nazi Years Re-examined. ''The Journal of Israeli History'', vol. 17. No. 3, citing Michael Bar-Zohar and Eitan Haber, ''The Quest for the Red Prince'', New York, 1988, pp. 45-66. A British intelligence report on the interrogation of two captured members of one of the Mufti's sabotage teams is reprinted in ''The Arab War Effort: A Documented Account'', New York, 1947, pp. 43-46. Internal German correspondence on this subject [the proposed bombing of Palestine], in German and in English translation, is appended to The Nation Associates, ''The Record of Collaboration of King Farouk of Egypt with the Nazis and Their Ally The Mufti'': Memorandum Submitted to the United Nations, June 1948, New York, 1948.</ref> |
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</blockquote> |
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He is also said to have requested that Jerusalem be bombed by the German air force, a request, according to [[Walter Laqueur]], puts doubts on his religiosity, since, in [[Walter Laqueur]]'s words, "It is unlikely that a truly pious Muslim would have acted this way."<ref>[http://blog.oup.com/2006/10/the_origins_of_2/ Walter Laqueur The Origins of Fascism: Islamic Fascism, Islamophobia, Antisemitism 2006]</ref> |
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[[Wolfgang G. Schwanitz]] notes that in his memoirs Husayni recalled that [[Heinrich Himmler]], in the summer of 1943, while confiding some German war secrets, inveighed against Jewish "war guilt", and, speaking of Germany’s persecution of the Jews said that "up to now we have exterminated (in Arabic, ''abadna'') around three million of them". In his memoirs, Husayni wrote he was astonished to hear this. Schwanitz doubts the sincerity of his surprise since, he argues, Husayni had publicly declared that Muslims should follow the example Germans set for a "definitive solution to the Jewish problem".<ref>[http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2082 Wolfgang G. Schwanitz 'Amin al-Husaini and the Holocaust. What Did the Grand Mufti Know?' May 8, 2008], citing Abd al-Karim al-Umar (ed.), ''Memoirs of the Grand Mufti'', Damascus in 1999, p. 126</ref> |
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In September 1943, intense negotiations to rescue 500 Jewish children from the town of Arbe in Croatia collapsed due to the objection of al-Husayni who blocked the children's departure to Turkey because they would end up in Palestine.<ref>Daniel Carpi, [http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%204803.pdf ''The Rescue of Jews in the Italian Zone of Occupied Croatia''], Shoah Resource Center, page 39</ref> |
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Recent Nazi documents uncovered in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Military Archive Service in Freiburg [http://www.judeoscope.ca/breve.php3?id_breve=1226] by two researchers, Klaus Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers indicated that in the event of the British being defeated in Egypt by [[Generalfeldmarschall]] [[Erwin Rommel|Erwin Rommel's]] [[Afrika Korps]] the Nazis had planned to deploy a special unit called [[Einsatzkommando]] Ägypten to exterminate Palestinian Jews and that they wanted Arab support to prevent the emergence of a Jewish state. In their book the researchers concluded that, "the most important collaborator with the Nazis and an absolute Arab anti-Semite was Haj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem."<ref>[http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp?subchannel_id=26&story_id=29259&name=Nazis+planned+Holocaust+in+Palestine%3A+historians Nazis planned Holocaust in Palestine: historians - Expatica<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref> |
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===Propaganda and recruitment === |
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[[File:13divss.gif|left|thumb|Insignia of the 13th Handschar Division]] |
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[[Image:Bundesarchiv Bild 147-0483, Berlin, Besuch Amin el Husseini.jpg|right|thumb|19 December 1942 Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni talking with Moslem Waffen SS from Azerbaijan.]] |
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[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1980-036-05, Amin al Husseini bei bosnischen SS-Freiwilligen.jpg|thumb|right|November 1943 al-Husayni greeting Bosnian SS volunteers.]] |
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Throughout World War II, al-Husayni worked for the [[Axis powers|Axis Powers]] as a broadcaster in propaganda targeting Arab public opinion. The Muslim Mufti was paid “an absolute fortune” of 50,000 marks a month (when a German field marshal was making 25,000 marks a year). He recruited Muslim volunteers for the German armed forces operating in the [[Balkans]]. Beginning in 1941, al-Husayni visited Bosnia, and convinced Muslim leaders that a Muslim S.S. division would be in the interest of Islam. In spite of these and other propaganda efforts, "only half of the expected 20,000 to 25,000 Muslims volunteered."<ref>The Black Book of Bosnia by Nader Mousavizadeh, (Editor), Basic Books, New York, 1996, p. 23</ref> Al-Husayni was involved in the organization and recruitment of [[Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnian]] [[Muslims]] into several divisions of the Waffen SS and other units. The largest was the [[13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Croatian)|13th "Handschar" division]] of 21,065 men, which conducted operations against Communist [[Partisans (Yugoslavia)|partisans]] in the Balkans from February 1944,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10007255 |title=Hall Amin Al-Husayni: The Mufti of Jerusalem |accessdate=2007-10-19 |last= |first= |coauthors= |date=June 25, 2007 |work= |publisher=[[Holocaust Encyclopedia]]}}</ref> committing numerous atrocities against their traditional ethnic rivals the local Christian Serbs.<ref name="medoffJIH">Medoff, Rafael (1996). The Mufti's Nazi Years Re-examined. ''The Journal of Israeli History'', vol. 17. No. 3.</ref> |
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In 1942, al-Husayni helped organize Arab students and North African emigres in Germany into the "Arabisches Freiheitkorps," an Arab Legion in the German Army that hunted down Allied parachutists in the Balkans and fought on the Russian front.<ref name="medoffJIH"/> |
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On March 1, 1944, while speaking on Radio Berlin, al-Husayni said: 'Arabs, rise as one man and fight for your sacred rights. Kill the Jews wherever you find them. This pleases God, history, and religion. This saves your honor. God is with you.'<ref>Stillman (2000), p. 143</ref> |
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=== popularity among the Palestinian Arabs === |
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<blockquote>"Haj Amin's popularity among the Palestinian Arabs and within the Arab states actually increased more than ever during his period with the Nazis. When he returned to the Middle East from Europe, Arab leaders hurried to greet him, and the masses welcomed him enthusiastically. It was only after the defeat of 1948 that the need arose for someone to blame. To a certain extent, Haj Amin was chosen as the scapegoat."<ref>Z. Elpeleg, ''The Grand Mufti'', p. 106.</ref></blockquote> |
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Al-Husayni was elected to the presidency of the National Palestinian Council in 1948 even though he was a wanted war criminal at the time. Indeed, Professor [[Edward Said]] corroborates al-Husayni's popularity by stating: <blockquote>This committee [the Arab Higher Committee], chaired by Palestine’s national leader, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, represented the Palestinian Arab national consensus, had the backing of the Palestinian political parties that functioned in Palestine, and was recognized in some form by Arab governments as the voice of the Palestinian people.<ref>Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, eds. ''Blaming the Victims ''(London, Verso 201)</ref> </blockquote> |
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==Post creation of Israel period== |
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With the establishment of the [[State of Israel]] in 1948, The common experience of the [[Palestinian refugee]]s and the loss of the homeland in the [[Nakba]] was mirrored in a fading of Palestinian identity.<ref>Rashid Khalidi (1998) Palestinian identity: the construction of modern national consciousness Columbia University Press, ISBN 0231105150 p 178</ref> The institutions of a Palestinian nationality emerged slowly in the [[Palestinian refugees|Palestinian refugee]] diaspora. In 1950 [[Yasser Arafat]] founded ''Ittihad Talabat Filastin''.<ref>Rashid Khalidi (1998) Palestinian identity: the construction of modern national consciousness Columbia University Press, ISBN 0231105150 p 180</ref> |
With the establishment of the [[State of Israel]] in 1948, The common experience of the [[Palestinian refugee]]s and the loss of the homeland in the [[Nakba]] was mirrored in a fading of Palestinian identity.<ref>Rashid Khalidi (1998) Palestinian identity: the construction of modern national consciousness Columbia University Press, ISBN 0231105150 p 178</ref> The institutions of a Palestinian nationality emerged slowly in the [[Palestinian refugees|Palestinian refugee]] diaspora. In 1950 [[Yasser Arafat]] founded ''Ittihad Talabat Filastin''.<ref>Rashid Khalidi (1998) Palestinian identity: the construction of modern national consciousness Columbia University Press, ISBN 0231105150 p 180</ref> |
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By early [[Islam]]ic thinkers, nationalism had been viewed as an ungodly ideology, substituting "the [[nation]]" for [[God]] as an object of worship and reverence. The struggle for Palestine was viewed exclusively through a religious prism, as a struggle to retrieve [[Muslim]] land and the holy places of [[Jerusalem]]. However, later developments, not least as a result of Muslim sympathy with the Palestinian struggle, led to many Islamic movements accepting nationalism as a legitimate ideology. In the case of [[Hamas]] - the Palestinian offshoot of the [[Muslim Brotherhood]] - Palestinian nationalism has almost completely fused with the ideologically pan-Islamic sentiments originally held by the [[Islamism|Islamists]]. |
By early [[Islam]]ic thinkers, nationalism had been viewed as an ungodly ideology, substituting "the [[nation]]" for [[God]] as an object of worship and reverence. The struggle for Palestine was viewed exclusively through a religious prism, as a struggle to retrieve [[Muslim]] land and the holy places of [[Jerusalem]]. However, later developments, not least as a result of Muslim sympathy with the Palestinian struggle, led to many Islamic movements accepting nationalism as a legitimate ideology. In the case of [[Hamas]] - the Palestinian offshoot of the [[Muslim Brotherhood]] - Palestinian nationalism has almost completely fused with the ideologically pan-Islamic sentiments originally held by the [[Islamism|Islamists]]. |
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=== Claims Against the Existence of a Distinct Palestinian People === |
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In an interview with the [[Netherlands|Dutch]] newspaper "[[Trouw]]" (March 31, 1977), PLO executive committee member [[Zahir Muhsein]] said: |
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"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism. |
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"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, [[Beer-Sheva]] and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."<ref>http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=28222</ref> |
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== See also == |
== See also == |
Revision as of 21:11, 21 April 2011
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Palestinian nationalism is the national movement of the Palestinian people. It is one of many national movements that arose in the mid nineteenth to early twentieth century and that claims the right of sovereignty and self-determination on the land that they regard as their historic national home. Every national identity has a gestational period. Common with all nationalist movements Palestinian nationalism was in response to what was a perceived threat to the cultural make up of the country.[1] The question of when Palestinian national identity arose is a matter of dispute.
Origins
Primordialism
Some Palestinian nationalists, likewise with many nationalists movements believe that, “The nation was always there, indeed it is part of the natural order, even when it was submerged in the hearts of its members.” [2] Thus the web site of Al-Quds University informs us that although “Palestine was conquered in times past by ancient Egyptians, Hittites, Philistines, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Romans, Muslim Arabs, Mamlukes, Ottomans, the British, the Zionists…the population remained constant-and is now still Palestinian.”[3]
In his 1997 book, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, historian Rashid Khalidi notes that the archaeological strata that denote the history of Palestine — encompassing the Biblical, Roman, Byzantine, Umayyad, Fatimid, Crusader, Ayyubid, Mamluk and Ottoman periods — form part of the identity of the modern-day Palestinian people, as they have come to understand it over the last century,[4] but derides the efforts of some Palestinian nationalists to attempt to "anachronistically" read back into history a nationalist consciousness that is in fact "relatively modern".[4] Khalidi stresses that Palestinian identity has never been an exclusive one, with "Arabism, religion, and local loyalties" playing an important role.[5]
Claims Against the Existence of a Distinct Palestinian People
Bernard Lewis argues it was not as a Palestinian nation that the Palestinian Arabs of the Ottoman empire objected to Zionists, since the very concept of such a nation was unknown to the Arabs of the area at the time and did not come into being until very much later. Even the concept of Arab nationalism in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, "had not reached significant proportions before the outbreak of World War I."[6]
Haj Amin Al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem and the most prominent Palestinian leader at that time, arrived in Rome on October 11, 1941, and immediately contacted Italian Military Intelligence (Servizio Informazioni Militari, or SIM). He claimed to be head of a secret Arab nationalist organization with offices in all Arab countries. On condition that the Axis powers "recognize in principle the unity, independence, and sovereignty, of an Arab state, including Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan", he offered support in the war against Britain and stated his willingness to discuss the issues of "the Holy Places, Lebanon, the Suez Canal, and Aqaba". The Italian foreign ministry approved al-Husayni's proposal, recommending to give him a grant of one million lire, and referred him to Benito Mussolini, who met al-Husayni on October 27. According to al-Husayni's account, the meeting went amicably with the Italian leader expressing his hostility to the Jews and Zionism.[7]
(for more details - see below)
In an interview with the Dutch newspaper "Trouw" (March 31, 1977), PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein said:
"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.
"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."[8]
A mid nineteenth century origin
Rashid argues that the modern national identity of Palestinians has its roots in nationalist discourses that emerged among the peoples of the Ottoman empire in the late 19th century, and which sharpened following the demarcation of modern nation-state boundaries in the Middle East after World War I.[5] Khalidi also states that although the challenge posed by Zionism played a role in shaping this identity, that "it is a serious mistake to suggest that Palestinian identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism."[5]
Historian James L. Gelvin argues that Palestinian nationalism was a direct reaction to Zionism. In his book The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War he states that "Palestinian nationalism emerged during the interwar period in response to Zionist immigration and settlement."[9] Gelvin argues that this fact does not make the Palestinian identity any less legitimate:
"The fact that Palestinian nationalism developed later than Zionism and indeed in response to it does not in any way diminish the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism or make it less valid than Zionism. All nationalisms arise in opposition to some "other." Why else would there be the need to specify who you are? And all nationalisms are defined by what they oppose."[9]
Baruch Kimmerling and Migdal, Joel S (a controversial Israeli sociologists) consider the 1834 revolt of the Arabs in Palestine as constituting the first formative event of the Palestinian people, [10] whereas Benny Morris argues that the Arabs in Palestine remained part of a larger Pan-Islamist or Pan-Arab national movement.[11]
A late nineteenth century origin
Rashid argues that a Palestinian national consciousness probably had it origins in the late 19th century but had coalesced more fully near the beginning of the twentieth century.[12] Rashid describes the Arab population of British Mandatory Palestine as having "overlapping identities," with some or many expressing loyalties to villages, regions, a projected nation of Palestine, an alternative of inclusion in a Greater Syria, an Arab national project, as well as to Islam.[13] Although his book was the first to demonstrate substantive Palestinian nationalism in the early Mandatory period, Rashid writes that," Local patriotism could not yet be described as nation-state nationalism."[14]
Daniel Pipes asserts that “No "Palestinian Arab people" existed at the start of 1920 but by December it took shape in a form recognizably similar to today's.” Pipes argues that with the carving of the British Mandate of Palestine out of Greater Syria the Arabs of the new Mandate were forced to make the best they could of their situation, and therefore began to define themselves as Palestinian.[15]
Early history
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by an increasing sense of Arab identity in the Empire's Arab provinces, most notably Syria, considered to include both Northern Palestine and Lebanon. This development is often seen as connected to the wider reformist trend known as al-Nahda ("awakening", sometimes called "the Arab renaissance"), which in the late 19th century brought about a redefinition of Arab cultural and political identities with the unifying feature of Arabic.[16]
Under the Ottomans, Palestine's Arab population mostly saw themselves as Ottoman subjects. In the 1830s however, Palestine was occupied by the Egyptian vassal of the Ottomans, Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha. The Palestinian Arab revolt was precipitated by popular resistance against heavy demands for conscripts, as peasants were well aware that conscription was little more than a death sentence. Starting in May 1834 the rebels took many cities, among them Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus. In response, Ibrahim Pasha sent in an army, finally defeating the last rebels on 4 August in Hebron.[10]
While Arab nationalism, at least in an early form, and Syrian nationalism were the dominant tendencies along with continuing loyalty to the Ottoman state, Palestinian politics was marked by a reaction to foreign predominance and the growth of foreign immigration particularly Zionist.[17]
The Egyptian occupation of Palestine in the 1830s resulted in the destruction of Acre and thus, the political importance of Nablus increased. The Ottomans wrested back control of Palestine from the Egyptians in 1840-41. As a result, the Abd al-Hadi clan, who originated in Arrabah in the Sahl Arraba region in northern Samaria, rose to prominence. Loyal allies of Jezzar Pasha and the Tuqans, they gained the governorship of Jabal Nablus and other sanjaqs.[18]
In 1887 the mutassariflik of Jerusalem was constituted as part of an Ottoman government policy dividing the vilayet of Greater Syria into smaller administrative units. The administration of the mutassariflik took on a distinctly local appearance.[19]
Khalidi believes that “Although the Zionist challenge definitely helped to shape the specific form Palestinian national identification took, it is a serious mistake to suggest that Palestinian identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism”.[20]
Michelle Compos records that "Later, after the founding of Tel Aviv in 1909, conflicts over land grew in the direction of explicit national rivalry."[21] Zionist ambitions were increasingly identified as a threat by Palestinian leaders, while cases of purchase of lands by Zionist settlers and the subsequent eviction of Palestinian peasants aggravated the issue. This anti-Zionist trend became linked to anti-British resistance, to form a nationalist movement quite particular and separate from the pan-Arab trend that was gaining strength in the Arab world, and would later be headed by Nasser, Ben Bella and other anticolonial leaders.
The programmes of four Palestinian nationalist societies jamyyat al-Ikha’ wal-‘Afaf (Brotherhood and Purity), al-jam’iyya al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya, Shirkat al-Iqtissad alFalastini al-Arabi and Shirkat al-Tijara al-Wataniyya al-Iqtisadiyya were reported in the newspaper Falastin in June 1914 by letter from R. Abu al-Sal’ud. The four societies has similarities in function and ideals; the promotion of patriotism, educational aspirations and support for national industries.[22]
Nationalist movements
Notables
Palestinian Arab A’ayan ("Notables") were a group of urban elites at the apex of the Palestinian socio-economic pyramid where the combination of economic and political power dominated Palestinian Arab politics throughout the British mandate period. The dominance of the A’ayan had been encouraged and utilised during the Ottoman period and later, by the British during the Mandate period, to act as intermediaries between the authority and the people to administer the local affairs of Palestine.
The al-Husayni family were a major force in rebelling against Muhammad Ali who governed Egypt and Palestine in defiance of the Ottoman Empire. This solidified a cooperative relationship with the returning Ottoman authority. The family took part in fighting the Qaisi family in an alliance with a rural lord of the Jerusalem area Mustafa Abu Ghosh, who clashed with the tribe frequently. The feuds gradually occurred in the city between the clan and the Khalidis that led the Qaisis, however these conflicts dealt with city positions and not Qaisi-Yamani rivalry.[23] The Husaynis later led resistance and propaganda movements against the Young Turks who controlled the Ottoman Empire and more so against the British Mandate government and early Zionist immigration.[23] Jamal al-Husayni was the founder and chairman of the Palestine Arab Party (PAP) in 1935. Emil Ghoury was elected as General Secretary, a post he held until the end of the British Mandate in 1948. In 1948, after Jordan had occupied Jerusalem, King Abdullah of Jordan removed Hajj Amīn al-Husayni from the post of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and banned him from entering Jerusalem.
The Nashashibi family had particularly strong influence in Palestine during the British Mandate Period from 1920 until 1948.[24] Throughout this period, they competed with the Husaynis, for dominance of the Palestinian Arab political scene.[25] As with other A’ayan their lack of identification with the Palestinian Arab population allowed them to rise as leaders but not as representatives of the Palestinian Arab community.[26] The Nashashibi family was led by Raghib Nashashibi, who was appointed as Mayor of Jerusalem in 1920.[27] Raghib was an influential political figure throughout the British Mandate period, and helped form the National Defence Party in 1934.[28] He also served as a minister in the Jordanian government, governor of the West Bank, member of the Jordanian Senate, and the first military governor in Palestine.
The Touqan family, originally from northern Syria, was led by Hajj Salih Pasha Tuqan in the early eighteenth century and were the competitors of the Nimr family in the Jabal Nablus (the sub-district of Nablus and Jenin). Members of the Tuqan family held the post of mutasallim (sub-district governor) longer than did any other family in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.The rivalry between the Tuqans and Nimr family continued until the 1820s.[29]
Awni Abd al-Hadi of the ‘Abd al Hadi family. The Abd al-Hadis were a leading landowning family in the Palestinian districts of Afula, Baysan, Jenin, and Nablus. Awni established the Hizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party) as a branch of the pan-Arab party. Rushdi Abd al-Hadi joined the British administrative service in 1921. Amin Abd al-Hadi joined the SMC in 1929, and Tahsin Abd al-Hadi was mayor of Jenin. Some family members secretly sold their shares of Zirʿin village to the Jewish National Fund in July 1930 despite nationalist opposition to such land sales. Tarab ‘Abd al Hadi feminist and activist was the wife of Awni ‘Abd al Hadi, Abd al-Hadi Palace built by Mahmud ‘Abd al Hadi in Nablus stands testament to the power and prestige of the family.
Other A’ayan were the Khalidi family, al-Dajjani family, and the al-Shanti family. The views of the A’ayan and their allies largely shaped the divergent political stances of Palestinian Arabs at the time.
British Mandate period
In 1918, as the Palestinian Arab National Movement gained strength in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Acre and Nablus, Aref al-Aref joined Hajj Amīn, his brother Fakhri Al Husseini, Ishaaq Darweesh, Ibrahim Daeweesh, Jamal al-Husayni, Kamel Al Budeiri, and Sheikh Hassan Abu Al-So’oud in establishing the Arab Club.
The Faisal-Weizmann Agreement led the Palestinian Arab population to reject the Syrian-Arab-Nationalist movement led by Faisal (in which many previously placed their hopes) and instead to agitate for Palestine to become a separate state, with an Arab majority. To further that objective, they demanded an elected assembly.[30] In 1919, in response to Palestinian Arab fears of the inclusion of the Balfour declaration to process the secret society al-Kaff al-Sawada’ (the Black-hand, its name soon changed to al-Fida’iyya, The Self-Sacrificers) was founded, it later played an important role in clandestine anti-British and anti-Zionist activities. The society was run by the al-Dajjani and al-Shanti families, with Ibrahim Hammani in charge of training and ‘Isa al-Sifri developed a secret code for correspondence. The society was initially based in Jaffa but moved its headquarters to Nablus, the Jerusalem branch was run by Mahmud Aziz al-Khalidi.[31]
After the April riots an event took place that turned the traditional rivalry between the Husayni and Nashashibi clans into a serious rift,[32] with long-term consequences for al-Husayni and Palestinian nationalism. According to Sir Louis Bols, great pressure was brought to bear on the military administration from Zionist leaders and officials such as David Yellin, to have the Mayor of Jerusalem, Mousa Kazzim al-Husayni, dismissed, given his presence in the Nabi Musa riots of the previous March. Colonel Storrs, the Military Governor of Jerusalem, removed him without further inquiry, replacing him with Raghib. This, according to the Palin report, 'had a profound effect on his co-religionists, definitely confirming the conviction they had already formed from other evidence that the Civil Administration was the mere puppet of the Zionist Organization.'[33]
The High Commissioner of Palestine, Herbert Samuel, as a counterbalance the Nashashibis gaining the position of Mayor of Jerusalem, pardoned Hajj Amīn and Aref al-Aref and established a Supreme Muslim Sharia Council (SMC) on 20 December, 1921.[34][35] The SMC was to have authority over all the Muslim Waqfs (religious endowments) and Sharia (religious law) Courts in Palestine. The members of the Council were to be elected by an electoral college and appointed Hajj Amīn as president of the Council with the powers of employment over all Muslim officials throughout Palestine.[36] The Anglo American committee termed it a powerful political machine.[37] The Hajj Amin rarely delegated authority, consequently most of the council's executive work was carried out by Hajj Amīn.[37] Nepotism and favoritism played a central part to Hajj Amīn's tenure as president of the SMC, Amīn al-Tamīmī was appointed as acting president when the Hajj Amīn was abroad, The secretaries appointed were ‘Abdallah Shafĩq and Muhammad al’Afĩfĩ and from 1928-1930 the secretary was Hajj Amīn's cousin Jamāl al-Husaynī, Sa’d al Dīn al-Khaţīb and later another of the Hajj Amīn's relatives ‘Alī al-Husaynī and ‘Ajaj Nuwayhid, a Druze was an adviser.[37]
It was during the British mandate period that politicisation of the Wailing Wall occurred.[38] The disturbances of at the Wailing wall in 1928 were repeated in 1929, however the violence in the riots that followed, that left 116 Palestinian Arabs, 133 Jews dead and 339 wounded, were surprising in their intensity and was the first instance that indigenous Sephardi and Mizrahi had been killed.[39]
Izz ad-Din al-Qassam established the Black hand gang in 1935. Izz ad-Din died in a shoot out against the British forces.[40][41] He has been popularised in Palestinian nationalist folklore for his fight against Zionism.[42]
The Nashashibis broke with the Arab High Committee and Hajj Amīn shorty after the contents of the Palestine Royal Commission report were released announcing a Partition plan.[43]
The Great revolt 1936-1939 was an uprising by Palestinian Arabs in the British Mandate of Palestine in protest against mass Jewish Immigration. Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni member of the Palestine Arab Party he served as its Secretary-General and became editor-in-chief of the party's paper Al-Liwa’[44] and other newspapers, including Al-Jami’a Al-Islamiyya.[45] In 1938, Abd al-Qadir was exiled and in 1939 fled to Iraq where he took part in the Rashid Ali al-Gaylani coup.
al-Hawari who had started his career as a devoted follower of Hajj Amin, broke with the influential Husayni family in the early 1940s.[46] The British had estimated the al-Najjada para military scout movement, led by Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari, strength as 8,000 prior to 1947.[47] The revolt of 1936-39 led to an imbalance of power between the Jewish community and the Palestinian Arab community, as the latter had been substantially disarmed.[43]
al-Qadir moved to Egypt in 1946, but secretly returned to Palestine to lead the Army of the Holy War (AHW) in January 1948, and was killed during hand-to-hand fighting against Haganah; where AHW captured Qastal Hill on the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road, on 8 April 1948.[48] al-Qadir's death was a factor in the loss of morale among his forces, Ghuri, who had no experience of military command was appointed as commander of the AHW. Fawzi al-Qawuqji, at the head of the Arab Liberation Army remained as the only prominent military commander.[49]
The split in the ranks of the Arab High Committee (this was nothing more than a group of "traditional Notables") between rejectionists and pro Partitionists led to Hajj Amin taking control of the AHC and with the support of the Arab League, rejected the plan, however many Palestinians, principally Nashashibi clan and the Arab Palestinian Communist Party, accepted the plan.[50]
Palestinian leadership Ties with Nazi Germany and the Axis Powers during World War II
Pre-war
In 1933, within weeks of Hitler's rise to power in Germany, the German Consul-General in Palestine, the pro-nazi Heinrich Wolff,[51] sent a telegram to Berlin reporting the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem , Mohammad Amin al-Husayni's belief that Palestinian Muslims were enthusiastic about the new regime and looked forward to the spread of Fascism throughout the region. Wolff met al-Husayni and many Palestinian sheiks again, a month later, at Nabi Musa. They expressed their approval of the anti-Jewish boycott in Germany and asked Wolff not to send any Jews to Palestine.[52] Wolff subsequently wrote in his annual report for that year that the Arabs' political naivety led them to fail to recognize the link between German Jewish policy and their problems in Palestine, and that their enthusiasm for Nazi Germany was devoid of any real understanding of the phenomenon.[53] The various proposals by Palestinian notables were rejected consistently over the years out of concern to avoid disrupting Anglo-German relations, in line with Germany's policy of not imperiling their economic and cultural interests in the region by a change in their policy of neutrality, and respect for English interests. Hitler's Englandpolitik essentially precluded significant assistance to Arab leaders.[54] Italy also made the nature of its assistance to the Palestinians contingent on the outcome of its own negotiations with England, and cut off aid when it appeared that the English were ready to admit the failure of their pro-Zionist policy in Palestine.[55]
Though Italy did offer substantial aid, some German assistance also trickled through. After asking the new German Consul-General, Hans Döhle on 21 July 1937 for support, the Abwehr briefly made an exception to its policy and gave some limited aid. But this was aimed to exert pressure on England over Czechoslovakia. Promised arms shipments never eventuated[56]
In the Middle East
In 1937, wanted by the British, al-Husayni fled Palestine and took refuge successively in Lebanon and later Iraq.[57] With the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 the Iraqi Government broke off diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany.[58] In March 1940, the an anti-British nationalist Rashid Ali replaced Nuri as-Said. Ali made covert contacts with German representatives in the Middle East, though he was not yet an openly pro-Axis supporter. By summer of 1940 the Italian Legation in Baghdad became the chief centre for Axis propaganda and for fomenting anti-British feeling. In this they too were aided by Mohammad Amin al-Husayni.
On August 26, 1940, al-Husseini had sent his secretary Kemal Hadad to Berlin. Hadad acted as a liaison between the Axis powers and four pro-Nazi staff officers known as " the Golden Square" (Salah al-din al Sabag, Fahmi Said, Mahmud Salman and Kemal Shabib).[59] Kemal Hadad made another trip in December 1940 because "funds were running low."[60] On February 1941, Hadad again traveled to Berlin with a letter requesting military aid.
In January 1941, a political crisis within Iraq loomed towards the threat of civil war. Rashid Ali resigned as Prime Minister,[61] and was replaced by Taha al-Hashimi.[61] On 1 April 1941, pro-German Rashid Ali and his "Golden Square" supporters staged a coup d'état. The Mufti Amin al-Husayni was one of the orchestrators of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani's coup d'état, with Nazi support and financing.[62] Amin al-Husayni was actively participating in Rashid Ali's government, and motivated its military effort against the British. From his base in Iraq, al-Husayni issued a fatwa for a holy war against Britain in May and provided extensive aid for Antisemitic propaganda.
By May 28, British forces were camped just outside Baghdad and there was no reinforcement of Germans or Italians for Rashid's regime. Less than days later, the Rashid Ali government collapsed, and its members were sentenced for death penalty. Unlike other generals, Rashid Ali and some of his associates succeeded to flee to Egypt, whereas al-Husayni escaped to pro-German Persia, where he was granted legation asylum first by the Empire of Japan and then by Fascist Italy. Meanwhile, just before the arrival of British troops, Yunis al-Sabawi (another Iraqi pro-Nazi leader) appointed himself governor of central southern Iraq. He ordered Jews to remain in their homes on Saturday, May 31, and on June 1 and 2 (during the Jewish Shavuoth holiday), apparently intending a pogrom. Despite the British attempt to calm down the situation by deportation of Yunis al-Sabawi, the Farhud pogrom erupted on June 1, initiated by al-Futuwa youth organization and Rashid Ali's soldiers, returning from defeat by the British Army. Official Iraqi reports recorded 187 Jews killed, though higher numbers of 200 casualties were claimed with more than 2,000 injured.[63]
On October 8, after the occupation of Persia by the Allies and after the new Persian government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi severed diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, al-Husayni fled to German-occupied Europe[64] through Turkey and Albania.[citation needed] Specifically, he fled to Fascist Italy with the Italian diplomats who provided him with an Italian service passport. To avoid recognition, al-Husayni changed his appearance by shaving his beard and dying his hair.[64] Throughout the remainder of World War II, al-Husayni repeatedly made requests in Berlin for the German government "to bomb Tel Aviv."[65]
In Nazi-occupied Europe
Al-Husayni arrived in Rome on October 11, 1941, and immediately contacted Italian Military Intelligence (Servizio Informazioni Militari, or SIM). The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem claimed to be head of a secret Arab nationalist organization with offices in all Arab countries. On condition that the Axis powers "recognize in principle the unity, independence, and sovereignty, of an Arab state, including Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan", he offered support in the war against Britain and stated his willingness to discuss the issues of "the Holy Places, Lebanon, the Suez Canal, and Aqaba". The Italian foreign ministry approved al-Husayni's proposal, recommending to give him a grant of one million lire, and referred him to Benito Mussolini, who met al-Husayni on October 27. According to al-Husayni's account, the meeting went amicably with the Italian leader expressing his hostility to the Jews and Zionism.[66]
Back in the summer of 1940 and again in February 1941, al-Hussayni submitted to the German government[67] a draft declaration of German-Arab cooperation, containing a clause:
Germany and Italy recognize the right of the Arab countries to solve the question of the Jewish elements, which exist in Palestine and in the other Arab countries, as required by the national and ethnic (völkisch) interests of the Arabs, and as the Jewish question was solved in Germany and Italy.[68]
Now, encouraged by his meeting with the Italian leader, al-Husayni prepared a draft declaration, affirming the Axis support for the Arabs on November 3. In three days, the declaration, slightly amended by the Italian foreign ministry, received the formal approval of Mussolini and was forwarded to the German embassy in Rome. On November 6, al-Husayni arrived in Berlin, where he discussed the text of his declaration with Ernst von Weizsäcker and other German officials. In the final draft, which differed only marginally from al-Husayni's original proposal, the Axis powers declared their readiness to approve the elimination (Beseitigung) of the Jewish National Home in Palestine.[69]
On November 20, al-Husayni met the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop[70] and was officially received by Adolf Hitler on November 28.[71] He asked Hitler for a public declaration that "recognized and sympathized with the Arab struggles for independence and liberation, and that would support the elimination of a national Jewish homeland".[68] Hitler refused to make such a public announcement, saying that it would strengthen the Gaullists against the Vichy France,[71] but asked al-Husayni to 'to lock ...deep in his heart' the following points, which Browning summarizes as follows, that
‘Germany has resolved, step by step, to ask one European nation after the other to solve its Jewish problem, and at the proper time, direct a similar appeal to non-European nations as well'. When Germany had defeated Russia and broken through the Caucasus into the Middle East, it would have no further imperial goals of its own and would support Arab liberation... But Hitler did have one goal. "Germany’s objective would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of British power". (Das deutsche Ziel würde dann lediglich die Vernichtung des im arabischen Raum unter der Protektion der britischen Macht lebenden Judentums sein). In short, Jews were not simply to be driven out of the German sphere but would be hunted down and destroyed even beyond it.’[72]
A separate record of the meeting was made by Fritz Grobba, who until recently had been the German ambassor to Iraq. His version of the crucial words reads "when the hour of Arab liberation comes, Germany has no interest there other than the destruction of the power protecting the Jews".[73] Al-Husayni's own account of this point, as recorded in his diary, is very similar to Grobba's.[74] Al-Husayni's own diary, seized after the war,[75] recalls the encounter in slightly different terms.
When al-Husayni arrived together with Rashid Ali in Berlin from Rome in May 1942, a spokesperson for the German governmental administration proclaimed that the Axis activity with "carriers of national politics in the Arab world" instead of slowing down had made further progress.[citation needed]
In an interview with the German newspaper National-Zeitung in June 1942, the Mufti al-Husayni (as the highest Muslim religious leader) declared that the "entire Arab world" now wished an Axis victory in the war, as he said they had common enemies in the Jews, Englishmen and bolsheviks.[citation needed]
In December 1942, al-Husayni further held a speech at the celebration of the opening of an "Islamic Central Institute" in Berlin, of which he served as honorary chair. In the speech, he harshly criticised what he thought of as aggressors against Muslims, which included Jews, the United Kingdom, USA and the Soviet Union.[76]
The Holocaust
On November 2, 1943, Himmler sent a telegram to the Mufti: To the Grand Mufti: The National Socialist movement of Greater Germany has, since its inception, inscribed upon its flag the fight against the world Jewry. It has therefore followed with particular sympathy the struggle of freedom-loving Arabs, especially in Palestine, against Jewish interlopers. In the recognition of this enemy and of the common struggle against it lies the firm foundation of the natural alliance that exists between the National Socialist Greater Germany and the freedom-loving Muslims of the whole world. In this spirit I am sending you on the anniversary of the infamous Balfour declaration my hearty greetings and wishes for the successful pursuit of your struggle until the final victory. Reichsfuehrer S.S. Heinrich Himmler
Al-Husayni was in Berlin during the war, and denied knowing of the Holocaust. One of Adolf Eichmann's deputies, Dieter Wisliceny, stated after the war that al-Husayni had actively encouraged the extermination of European Jews, and that he had had an elaborate meeting with Eichmann at his office, during which Eichmann gave him an intensive look at the current state of the “Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe” by the Third Reich.
Husayni intervened on May 13, 1943, with the German Foreign Office to block possible transfers of Jews from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, after reports reached him that 4000 Jewish children accompanied by 500 adults had managed to reach Palestine. He asked that the Foreign Minister "to do his utmost" to block all such proposals and this request was complied with.[77] A year later, on the 25 July 1944, he wrote to the Hungarian foreign minister to register his objection to the release of certificates for 900 Jewish children and 100 adults for transfer from Hungary, fearing they might end up in Palestine. He suggested that if such transfers of population were deemed necessary, then:-
"it would be indispensable and infinitely preferable to send them to other countries where they would find themselves under active control, as for example Poland, thus avoiding danger and preventing damage."[78]
Among the acts of sabotage al-Husayni attempted to implement, Michael Bar Zohar reports a chemical warfare assault on the second largest and predominantly Jewish city in Palestine, Tel Aviv. According to him, five parachutists were sent with a toxin to dump into the water system. The police caught the infiltrators in a cave near Jericho, and according to Jericho district police commander Fayiz Bey Idrissi, "The laboratory report stated that each container held enough poison to kill 25,000 people, and there were at least ten containers.".[79] Medoff concludes,
Under Husayni's direction, teams of Arab saboteurs were parachuted into Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine, where they attacked Allied facilities such as telephone lines, pipelines, bridges and railways. One such sabotage team was armed with a substantial quantity of poison that they were supposed to dump into the Tel Aviv water system. (In a separate but related matter, the Mufti repeatedly urged the Germans to bomb Tel Aviv and Jerusalem "in order to injure Palestinian Jewry and for propaganda purposes in the Arab world," as his Nazi interlocutors put it. The proposals were rejected as militarily unfeasible.[80]
He is also said to have requested that Jerusalem be bombed by the German air force, a request, according to Walter Laqueur, puts doubts on his religiosity, since, in Walter Laqueur's words, "It is unlikely that a truly pious Muslim would have acted this way."[81]
Wolfgang G. Schwanitz notes that in his memoirs Husayni recalled that Heinrich Himmler, in the summer of 1943, while confiding some German war secrets, inveighed against Jewish "war guilt", and, speaking of Germany’s persecution of the Jews said that "up to now we have exterminated (in Arabic, abadna) around three million of them". In his memoirs, Husayni wrote he was astonished to hear this. Schwanitz doubts the sincerity of his surprise since, he argues, Husayni had publicly declared that Muslims should follow the example Germans set for a "definitive solution to the Jewish problem".[82]
In September 1943, intense negotiations to rescue 500 Jewish children from the town of Arbe in Croatia collapsed due to the objection of al-Husayni who blocked the children's departure to Turkey because they would end up in Palestine.[83]
Recent Nazi documents uncovered in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Military Archive Service in Freiburg [3] by two researchers, Klaus Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers indicated that in the event of the British being defeated in Egypt by Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps the Nazis had planned to deploy a special unit called Einsatzkommando Ägypten to exterminate Palestinian Jews and that they wanted Arab support to prevent the emergence of a Jewish state. In their book the researchers concluded that, "the most important collaborator with the Nazis and an absolute Arab anti-Semite was Haj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem."[84]
Propaganda and recruitment
Throughout World War II, al-Husayni worked for the Axis Powers as a broadcaster in propaganda targeting Arab public opinion. The Muslim Mufti was paid “an absolute fortune” of 50,000 marks a month (when a German field marshal was making 25,000 marks a year). He recruited Muslim volunteers for the German armed forces operating in the Balkans. Beginning in 1941, al-Husayni visited Bosnia, and convinced Muslim leaders that a Muslim S.S. division would be in the interest of Islam. In spite of these and other propaganda efforts, "only half of the expected 20,000 to 25,000 Muslims volunteered."[85] Al-Husayni was involved in the organization and recruitment of Bosnian Muslims into several divisions of the Waffen SS and other units. The largest was the 13th "Handschar" division of 21,065 men, which conducted operations against Communist partisans in the Balkans from February 1944,[86] committing numerous atrocities against their traditional ethnic rivals the local Christian Serbs.[87]
In 1942, al-Husayni helped organize Arab students and North African emigres in Germany into the "Arabisches Freiheitkorps," an Arab Legion in the German Army that hunted down Allied parachutists in the Balkans and fought on the Russian front.[87]
On March 1, 1944, while speaking on Radio Berlin, al-Husayni said: 'Arabs, rise as one man and fight for your sacred rights. Kill the Jews wherever you find them. This pleases God, history, and religion. This saves your honor. God is with you.'[88]
popularity among the Palestinian Arabs
"Haj Amin's popularity among the Palestinian Arabs and within the Arab states actually increased more than ever during his period with the Nazis. When he returned to the Middle East from Europe, Arab leaders hurried to greet him, and the masses welcomed him enthusiastically. It was only after the defeat of 1948 that the need arose for someone to blame. To a certain extent, Haj Amin was chosen as the scapegoat."[89]
Al-Husayni was elected to the presidency of the National Palestinian Council in 1948 even though he was a wanted war criminal at the time. Indeed, Professor Edward Said corroborates al-Husayni's popularity by stating:
This committee [the Arab Higher Committee], chaired by Palestine’s national leader, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, represented the Palestinian Arab national consensus, had the backing of the Palestinian political parties that functioned in Palestine, and was recognized in some form by Arab governments as the voice of the Palestinian people.[90]
Post creation of Israel period
With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, The common experience of the Palestinian refugees and the loss of the homeland in the Nakba was mirrored in a fading of Palestinian identity.[91] The institutions of a Palestinian nationality emerged slowly in the Palestinian refugee diaspora. In 1950 Yasser Arafat founded Ittihad Talabat Filastin.[92]
After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, most of the Husseini clan relocated to Jordan and the Gulf States. Many family heads that remained in the Old City and the northern neighborhoods of East Jerusalem fled due to hostilities with the Jordanian government—which controlled that part of the city; King Abdullah's assassin was a member of an underground Palestinian organization led by Daoud al-Husayni.[93]
The Fatah movement, which espoused a Palestinian nationalist ideology in which Palestinians would be liberated by the actions of Palestinian Arabs, was founded in 1954 by members of the Palestinian diaspora — principally professionals working in the Gulf States who had been refugees in Gaza and had gone on to study in Cairo or Beirut. The founders included Yasser Arafat who was head of the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) (1952–56) in Cairo University, Salah Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir, Khaled Yashruti was head of the GUPS in Beirut (1958–62).[94]
The Palestine Liberation Organisation was founded by a meeting of 422 Palestinian national figures in Jerusalem in May 1964 following an earlier decision of the Arab League, its goal was the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle.[95] The original PLO Charter (issued on 28 May 1964[96]) stated that "Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British mandate is an integral regional unit" and sought to "prohibit... the existence and activity" of Zionism.[97] The charter also called for a right of return and self-determination for Palestinians.
Defeat suffered by the Arab states in the June 1967 Six-day War, brought the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip under Israeli military control.
Yasser Arafat, claimed the Battle of Karameh as a victory (in Arabic, "karameh" means "dignity") and quickly became a Palestinian national hero; portrayed as one who dared to confront Israel. Masses of young Arabs joined the ranks of his group Fatah. Under pressure, Ahmad Shukeiri resigned from the PLO leadership and in July 1969, Fatah joined and soon controlled the PLO. The fierce Palestinian guerrilla fighting and the Jordanian Artillery bombardment forced the IDF withdrawal and gave the Palestinian Arabs an important morale boost as Israel was calling their army the indomitable army and this was its first defeat at the hands of Arabs after the two wins in 1948 and 1967.After the battle, Fatah began to engage in communal projects to achieve popular affiliation.[98] After the Battle of Karameh there was a subsequent increase in the PLO's strength.[99][100]
In 1974 the PLO called for an independent state in the territory of Mandate Palestine.[101] The group used guerilla tactics to attack Israel from their bases in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as from within the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[102] In 1988, the PLO officially endorsed a two-state solution, with Israel and Palestine living side by side contingent on specific terms such as making East Jerusalem capital of the Palestinian state and giving Palestinians the right of return to land occupied by Palestinians prior to the 1948 and 1967 wars with Israel.[103]
The First Intifada (1987-93) would prove another watershed in Palestinian nationalism, as it brought the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza to the forefront of the struggle. The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) (al-Qiyada al Muwhhada) mobilised grassroots support for the uprising. In 1987 The Intifada caught the (PLO) by surprise, the leadership abroad could only indirectly influence the events. ,[104] A new local leadership emerged; the UNLU comprising many leading Palestinian factions. The disturbances initially spontaneous soon came under local leadership from groups and organizations loyal to the PLO that operated within the Occupied Territories; Fatah, the Popular Front, the Democratic Front and the Palestine Communist Party.[105] The UNLU was the focus of the social cohesion that sustained the persistent disturbances.[106] After King Hussein of Jordan proclaimed the administrative and legal separation of the West Bank from Jordan in 1988,[107] the UNLU organised to fill the political vacuum.[108] During the intifada Hamas replaced the monopoly of the PLO as sole representave of the Palestinian people.[109] Some Israelis had become tired of the constant violence of the First Intifada, and many were willing to take risks for peace.[110] Some wanted to realize the economic benefits in the new global economy. The Gulf War (1990-1991) did much to persuade Israelis that the defensive value of territory had been overstated, and that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait psychologically reduced their sense of security.[111]
A renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian quest for peace began at the end of the Cold War as the United States took the lead in international affairs. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western observers were optimistic, as Francis Fukuyama wrote in an article, titled "The End of History". The hope was that the end of the Cold War heralded the beginning of a new international order. President George H. W. Bush, in a speech on 11 September 1990, spoke of a "rare opportunity" to move toward a "New world order" in which "the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony," adding that "today the new world is struggling to be born".[112]
The demands of these populations were somewhat differing from those of the Palestinian diaspora, which had constituted the main base of the PLO until then, in that they were primarily interested in independence, rather than refugee return. The resulting 1993 Oslo Agreement cemented the belief in a two-state solution in the mainstream Palestinian movement, as opposed to the PLO's original goal, a one-state solution which entailed the destruction of Israel and its replacement with a secular, democratic Palestinian state. The idea had first been seriously discussed in the 1970s, and gradually become the unofficial negotiating stance of the PLO leadership under Arafat, but it had still remained a taboo subject for most, until Arafat officially recognized Israel in 1988, under strong pressure from the USA. However, the belief in the ultimate necessity of Israel's destruction and/or its Zionist foundation (i.e. its existence as specifically Jewish state) is still advocated by many, such as the religiously motivated Hamas movement, although no longer by the PLO leadership.
In 1993, with the transfer of increased control of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem from Israel to the Palestinians, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat appointed Sulaiman Ja'abari as Grand Mufti. When he died in 1994, Arafat appointed Ekrima Sa'id Sabri. Sabri was removed in 2006 by Palestinian National Authority president Mahmoud Abbas, who was concerned that Sabri was involved too heavily in political matters. Abbas appointed Muhammad Ahmad Hussein, who was perceived as a political moderate.
Competing national, political and religious loyalties
Pan-Arabism
However, many groups within the PLO held more of a pan-Arab view than Fatah, and Fatah itself has never clearly renounced Arab nationalism in favour of a strictly Palestinian nationalist ideology. Still, the PLO has with few exceptions remained fully committed to the cause of Palestine, with even its most fervently pan-Arabist members justifying this by claiming that the Palestinian struggle must be the spearhead of a wider, pan-Arab movement. This was true, for example, in the case of the Marxist PFLP, which not only viewed the "Palestinian revolution" as the first step to Arab unity, but also as inseparable from a global anti-Imperialist struggle.
Pan-Islamism
In a later repetition of these developments, the pan-Islamic sentiments embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and other religious movements, would similarly provoke conflict with Palestinian nationalism. About 90% of Palestinians are Sunni Muslims, and while never absent from the rhetoric and thinking of the secularist PLO factions, Islamic political doctrines, or Islamism, never fully entered the Palestinian movement until the 1980s.
By early Islamic thinkers, nationalism had been viewed as an ungodly ideology, substituting "the nation" for God as an object of worship and reverence. The struggle for Palestine was viewed exclusively through a religious prism, as a struggle to retrieve Muslim land and the holy places of Jerusalem. However, later developments, not least as a result of Muslim sympathy with the Palestinian struggle, led to many Islamic movements accepting nationalism as a legitimate ideology. In the case of Hamas - the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood - Palestinian nationalism has almost completely fused with the ideologically pan-Islamic sentiments originally held by the Islamists.
See also
- Views of Palestinian statehood
- Arab revolt
- Arab nationalism
- Pan-Arabism
- History of Palestine
- Grand Mufti of Jerusalem
- Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni
- Musa al-Husayni
- Palestine Liberation Organization
- Khalil al-Sakakini
- Yousef al-Khalidi
Footnotes
- ^ Dave Winter (1999) Israel handbook: with the Palestinian Authority areas Footprint Travel Guides, ISBN 1900949482 p 773
- ^ Smith, Anthony D. "Gastronomy or geology? The role of nationalism in the reconstruction of nations." Nations and Nationalism 1, no. 1 (1994): 3-23. p. 18
- ^ Jerusalem, the Old City: An Introduction, Al-Quds University homepage [1] accessed on Mar 17, 2009
- ^ a b Khalidi, 1997, p. 18. Cite error: The named reference "Khalidip18" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ a b c Khalidi, 1997, p. 19–21.
- ^ Bernard Lewis (1999). Semites and Anti-Semites, An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice. W.W. Norton and Company. p. 169. ISBN 0-393-31839-7.
- ^ Lewis (1999), pp. 150-151
- ^ http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=28222
- ^ a b Gelvin, 2005, p. 92-93.
- ^ a b Kimmerling, Baruch and Migdal, Joel S, (2003) The Palestinian People: A History, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, ISBN 0674011317 p. 6-11
- ^ Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, pp.40-42 in the French edition.
- ^ Jacob Lassner (2000) The Middle East remembered: forged identities, competing narratives, contested spaces University of Michigan Press, ISBN 0472110837 p 102
- ^ Provence, Michael (2005) The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism, University of Texas Press, ISBN 0292706804 p. 158
- ^ Rashid Khalidi (1997) Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, Columbia University Press, ISBN 0231105150 p. 32
- ^ The Year the Arabs Discovered Palestine, by Daniel Pipes, Jerusalem Post September 13, 2000 [2]
- ^ Gudrun Krämer and Graham Harman (2008) A history of Palestine: from the Ottoman conquest to the founding of the state of Israel Princeton University Press, ISBN 0691118973 p 123
- ^ Foreign predominance and the rise of Palestinian nationalism
- Gelvin, James L. "The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One ..." Google Book Search. 5 February 2009.
- Palestine: a study of Jewish, Arab, and British policies By Esco Foundation for Palestine, inc
- ^ Doumani, 1995, Chapter: Egyptian rule, 1831-1840.
- ^ Jacob Lassner, Selwyn Ilan Troen (2007) Jews and Muslims in the Arab world: haunted by pasts real and imagined Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0742558428 P 70
- ^ Rashid Khalidi (1997) Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, Columbia University Press, ISBN 0231105150 p 20
- ^ Sandra Marlene Sufian and Mark LeVine (2007) Reapproaching borders: new perspectives on the study of Israel-Palestine Rowman & Littlefield,-Remembering Jewish-Arab Contact and Conflict by Michelle Compos ISBN 074254639X p 48
- ^ Kayyālī, ʻAbd al-Wahhāb (1978) Palestine: a modern history Routledge, ISBN 0856646350 p 33
- ^ a b The Rise and Fall of the Husainis Pappe, Ilan. Institute of Jerusalem Studies
- ^ Jerusalemites Families of Jerusalem and Palestine
- ^ Don Peretz (1994) The Middle East today Greenwood Publishing Group, ISBN 0275945766 p 290
- ^ Ilan Pappé (2004) A history of modern Palestine: one land, two peoples Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521556325 p 103
- ^ Meron Benvenisti (1998) City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem University of California Press, ISBN 0520207688 p 119
- ^ Issa Khalaf, Issa (1991) Politics in Palestine: Arab factionalism and social disintegration, 1939-1948, State University of New York Press, ISBN 079140708X p 79
- ^ Rediscovering Palestine
- ^ Porath, chapter 2
- ^ Eliezer Tauber, The Formation of Modern Iraq and Syria, Routledge, London 1994 pp.105-109
- ^ Eliezer Tauber, The Formation of Modern Iraq and Syria, Routledge, London 1994 p.102
- ^ Palin Report, pp. 29-33. Cited Huneidi p.37.
- ^ Cleveland, William L.(2000) A history of the modern Middle East Westview Press, ISBN 0813334896 243
- ^ Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1993) Political Assassinations by Jews: A Rhetorical Device for Justice SUNY Press, ISBN 0791411656 p 222
- ^ UN Doc
- ^ a b c Kupferschmidt, Uri M. (1987) The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam Under the British Mandate for Palestine ISBN 9004079297 pp 66-67
- ^ Jerusalemite Institute of Jerusalem Studies: Heritage, Nationalism and the Shifting Symbolism of the Wailing Wall by Simone Ricca
- ^ 1929 Palestine riots
- Sandra Marlene Sufian and Mark LeVine (2007) -Remembering Jewish-Arab Contact and Conflict by Michelle Compos p 54
- San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 9, 2005, "A Time of Change; Israelis, Palestinians and the Disengagement"
- NA 59/8/353/84/867n, 404 Wailing Wall/279 and 280, Archdale Diary and Palestinian Police records.
- ^ Fereydoun Hoveyda, National Committee on American Foreign Policy (2002) The broken crescent: the "threat" of militant Islamic fundamentalism Greenwood Publishing Group, ISBN 0275979024 p 11
- ^ Sylvain Cypel (2006) p 340
- ^ Abdallah Frangi (1983) p 87
- ^ a b Ted Swedenburg. (1988)
- ^ Levenberg, 1993, p. 6.
- ^ Kabahā, Muṣṭafá (2007) The Palestinian Press as Shaper of Public Opinion 1929-39: Writing Up a Storm Vallentine Mitchell, ISBN 0853036721 p 71
- ^ Benny Morris (2008) 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press ISBN 9780300126969 pp. 88-89.
- ^ Khalaf, 1991, p 143.
- ^ al-Qadir dies at Qastal
- Morris, (2003), pp. 234-235.
- New York Times, 'Arabs Win Kastel But Chief is Slain; Kader el-Husseini, a Cousin of Mufti, Falls as His Men Recapture Key Village' by Dana Adams Schmidt, 9 April 1948.
- Benveniśtî, (2002), p.111.
- ^ Gelber, Yoav (2001) pp 89-90
- ^
Morris, Benny. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge, 2004), p. 588. qtd. by Susser.
- Quigley, John. "Israel and the Palestinians: An Exchange." The New York Review of Books. 7 March 1991. 17 March 2009.
- Haaretz The real Nakba By Shlomo Avineri 09 May 2008
- Shlaim, Avi (reprint 2004) The Politics of Partition; King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine 1921-1951 Oxford University Press ISBN 0-19-829459-x p 104
- Morris, Benny, (second edition 2004 third printing 2006) The Birth Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-00967-7 p 23 The divide between the Husseinis and the Opposition had relatively clear geographical as well as familial-clan demarcations, both reflecting and intensifying the regionalism that had characterised Palestinian society and politics for centuries, Husseini strength lay in Jerusalem and its surrounding villages, rural Samaria and Gaza; the Opposition was strong in Hebron, the Galilee, Tiberias and Beisan, Nablus, Jenin and Haifa.
- ^ Wolff's wife was Jewish, and he was forced to resign in 1936. Hans Döhle replaced him. See Leni Yahil, The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932-1945, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990 p. 676 n. 53
- ^ Nicosia (2000) pp. 85-86
- ^ Nicosia, 2000 pp. 86-87
- ^ Francis R. Nicosia, Zionism and Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008 p. 196
- ^ Renzo de Felice, ibid. pp. 211-212
- ^ Nicosia. The Third Reich and the Palestine Question pp. 105, 185ff.
- ^ Churchill, p. 224
- ^ Playfair (1956), p. 177
- ^ Hirszowicz, op. cit. p. 82 - 83.
- ^ Hirszowicz, op. cit. p. 108-109.
- ^ a b Playfair (1956), p. 178
- ^ Patterson, David (2010). A Genealogy of Evil: Anti-Semitism from Nazism to Islamic Jihad. Cambridge University Press. p. 114. ISBN 9780521132619.
- ^ The Middle East's Forgotten Refugees by Semha Alwaya
- ^ a b Lewis (1999), p. 150
- ^ Lewis (1995), 351.
- ^ Lewis (1999), pp. 150-151
- ^ Black, Edwin. "Denial of Holocaust nothing new in Iran." SFGate. 8 January 2006. 27 May 2008.
- ^ a b Lewis (1984), p. 190.
- ^ Lewis (1999), pp. 151-152
- ^ Segev (2001), p. 463
- ^ a b Lewis (1999), p. 152
- ^ Christopher Browning, with Jürgen Matthäus, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942. University of Nebraska Press, 2004 p. 406, drawing on David Yisraeli, The Palestine Problem in German Politics, 1889-1945 p. 310.
- ^ "denn die Stunde der Befreieung der Araber habe dann geschlagen, Deutschland habe dort keine anderen Interessen als die Vernichtung der das Judentum protegierenden Macht.". Yisraeli, David The Palestine Problem in German Politics, 1889-1945 p. 310
- ^ "Germany has no ambitions in this area but cares only to annihilate the power which produces the Jews." Joseph Schechtman, The Mufti and the Führer (Thomas Yoseloff, 1965). pp. 307-308
- ^ 'It is clear that the Jews have accomplished nothing in Palestine and their claims are lies. Everything that has been achieved in Palestine is due to the Arabs and not the Jews. I (Hitler) have decided to find a solution to the Jewish problem, approaching it step by step without holding back. In this regard, I am about to make a just and indispensable appeal, firstly to all the European countries and, later, to countries outside of Europe'. Henry Laurens, La Question de Palestine, vol. 2 ibid. pp. 664-665 n. 47, citing the source from the archives of the Simon Wiesenthal Center
- ^ Rosenthal, John. "The Mufti and the Holocaust". Hoover Institution.
- ^ Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, (1961) New Viewpoints, New York 1973 p. 504
- ^ Joseph Schechtman, The Mufti and the Führer, ibid. pp. 154-155
- ^ http://www.wymaninstitute.org/articles/2003-03-chemical.php
- ^ Medoff, Rafael (1996). The Mufti's Nazi Years Re-examined. The Journal of Israeli History, vol. 17. No. 3, citing Michael Bar-Zohar and Eitan Haber, The Quest for the Red Prince, New York, 1988, pp. 45-66. A British intelligence report on the interrogation of two captured members of one of the Mufti's sabotage teams is reprinted in The Arab War Effort: A Documented Account, New York, 1947, pp. 43-46. Internal German correspondence on this subject [the proposed bombing of Palestine], in German and in English translation, is appended to The Nation Associates, The Record of Collaboration of King Farouk of Egypt with the Nazis and Their Ally The Mufti: Memorandum Submitted to the United Nations, June 1948, New York, 1948.
- ^ Walter Laqueur The Origins of Fascism: Islamic Fascism, Islamophobia, Antisemitism 2006
- ^ Wolfgang G. Schwanitz 'Amin al-Husaini and the Holocaust. What Did the Grand Mufti Know?' May 8, 2008, citing Abd al-Karim al-Umar (ed.), Memoirs of the Grand Mufti, Damascus in 1999, p. 126
- ^ Daniel Carpi, The Rescue of Jews in the Italian Zone of Occupied Croatia, Shoah Resource Center, page 39
- ^ Nazis planned Holocaust in Palestine: historians - Expatica
- ^ The Black Book of Bosnia by Nader Mousavizadeh, (Editor), Basic Books, New York, 1996, p. 23
- ^ "Hall Amin Al-Husayni: The Mufti of Jerusalem". Holocaust Encyclopedia. June 25, 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-19.
{{cite web}}
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(help) - ^ a b Medoff, Rafael (1996). The Mufti's Nazi Years Re-examined. The Journal of Israeli History, vol. 17. No. 3.
- ^ Stillman (2000), p. 143
- ^ Z. Elpeleg, The Grand Mufti, p. 106.
- ^ Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, eds. Blaming the Victims (London, Verso 201)
- ^ Rashid Khalidi (1998) Palestinian identity: the construction of modern national consciousness Columbia University Press, ISBN 0231105150 p 178
- ^ Rashid Khalidi (1998) Palestinian identity: the construction of modern national consciousness Columbia University Press, ISBN 0231105150 p 180
- ^ Arab Hebronites who came to Jerusalem after 1948 dominate Jerusalem Arab society today Danny Rubenstein, Ha'aretz; 6 June 2001
- ^ Said K. AbusrishAburish, Said K. (1998) Arafat, From Defender to Dictator. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, pp.41–90. ISBN 1-58234-049-8.
- ^ Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Palestinian National Covenant
- ^ Helena Cobban,The Palestinian Liberation Organisation(Cambridge University Press, 1984) p.30
- ^ Articles 2 and 23 of the Palestinian National Covenant
- ^ Kurz (2006), p. 55
- ^ "1968: Karameh and the Palestinian revolt". Telegraph. 2002-05-16. Retrieved 2008-09-03.
- ^ Pollack (2002), p. 335
- ^ The PNC Program of 1974, June 8, 1974. On the site of MidEastWeb for Coexistence R.A. - Middle East Resources. Page includes commentary. Retrieved 5 December 2006.
- ^ Arab-Israeli Conflict, Encarta
- ^ William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, Westview Press (2004). ISBN 0813340489.
- ^ Yasser Arafat obituary, socialistworld.net (Committee for a Worker’s International).
- ^ Zachary Lockman, Joel Beinin (1989) Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation South End Press, ISBN 0896083632 p 39
- ^ Joel Beinin, Joe Stork, Middle East Report (1997) Political Islam: essays from Middle East Report I.B.Tauris, ISBN 1860640982 p 194
- ^ King Hussein, Address to the Nation, Amman, Jordan, July 31, 1988. The Royal Hashemit Court's tribute to King Hussein
- ^ Suha Sabbagh (1998) Palestinian women of Gaza and the West Bank Indiana University Press, ISBN 0253333776 p 48
- ^ Mishal, Shaul and Sela, Avraham (2000) The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence, and coexistence, Columbia University Press, ISBN 0231116756 p 1
- ^ The Israel-Palestine Conflict, James L. Gelvin
- ^ the gulf conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and war in the new world order, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh
- ^ President Bush's speech to Congress al-bab.com
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